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2ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes America's strategic policy for the 
Indian Ocean area from 1970 to 1980 and assesses the efficacy 
of its contribution to the US security objectives there of 
upholding friendly, primarily Persian Gulf states' security 
and stability, maintaining access to oil, ensuring the safety 
of shipping and limiting Soviet influence. Minor
intermittent naval display succeeded in balancing the Soviet 
naval presence, the main purpose of American policy until 
1979, because that presence was too small to exercise 
significant influence. The littoral states, however, were 
ambivalent: they wanted the US to balance the USSR but feared 
a potential super-power naval arms race. Naval display failed 
as part of America's indirect threat in 1973-74 to retaliate 
against friendly Gulf Arab states if they continued the oil 
embargo caused by the October 1973 Middle East war.
America modified its strategic policy when Gulf security 
became more precarious after the Iranian revolution in early
1979. It intensified its naval display and began to 
approximate a land force presence in South-West Asia in order 
to show greater concern for its interests, to reassure friends 
about its reliability as a security actor and to enhance the 
political and military balance against the Soviets. The US 
emphasized more direct and active deterrence against a 
potential Soviet or Iraqi attack and preparation for 
intervention, if necessary, within a friendly Gulf state in 
order to protect access to oil.
America's modified policy gave some reassurance to 
friendly Gulf states that shipping would be safe, that, 
available in the background and if requested in a crisis, its 
armed forces would help them to cope with likely external 
threats and that the US was more determined to counter the 
USSR. But America was also perceived to be a political and 
potential interventionist danger to friendly countries and to
be of uncertain reliability in the event of "worst case” 
Soviet or Iraqi aggression because its immediately available 
combat capability was weak. The US armed forces were 
unnecessary and virtually inappropriate for helping friendly 
regimes to maintain domestic stability or for preserving 
access to oil. America's strategic policy was of little 
relevance for limiting the USSR's improvement of its political 
and strategic position in South-West Asia in the late 1970s, 
and more direct and active US deterrence reinforced marginally 
at most the Soviet intention not to attack into the Persian 
Gulf.
Black i A Vladivostok
U S S R
•  Ankara V  _
TURKEY ^
r - 7^ \
d T  U . SYRIA J  IRAQ )
 ^ ^Baghdad • L
Beijing •
KOREA
JAPAN
---
"I
•* K a b u l*  f  Islam abad /
/A F G H A N IS T A N  /  's  ^
•Tehran
C H I N AM editerranean Sea
S u e r C anal ' S R A E L / ? - ^  
t ^ ^  . KUW AIT ;
IRAN
Cairo West L V  /  V '
. JORDANCairo BHUTAN
Strait o t H orm uz  * 7  . p j N ew DelhiEGYPT M a n a m a V j ^ X / y
BAHREIN~Jf. ^ A
Riyadh- I f e s d h a u ,  —
SAUDI ARABIA '  '  - f  J  * » \ * ,u8cal 
/ < ) Seeb
Qena ■
B A N G LA D E S H -V  Dhaka y  t  •  si rRas Banas
i  BURM A N  j T  Hanoi
Masirahl. (Oman) 
Thamarit 
Salalah
\  YEMEN Bengal ^ .* (  y  ^
Andaman Is. ;  V-f"L  t-------
A RABIAN SEASOUTH
YEMENKhartoum •
B a b-a l-M an da b
Guam Ob'S l/d /lSUDAN PH ILIPPINES
Socotra ( S. Y e m e n ) Subic Bay ^
KAMPUCHEA j f )
Aden
DJIBOUTI
Addis ’ • ^ B e r b e r s
•A b a b a  V
V V  ETHIO PIA
 ^ \
\ ; ...... (
( In d ia ) n
C o io m b o ^ ^
Nicobar Is. 1.
India
SRI LANKA
MALDIVES .. Kuala Lumpur S ' f '
V M A L A Y S I A / - ^  j  
Singapore w - ■
M alacca Strait
I  KENYA  
■ _  t Nairobi I
A . “  - V  ■
tri
Mogadishu
$>0
Diakarta INDO NESIA
SEYCHELLES  
Mahe
Mombasa
TANZANIA
^  Diego Garcia ( UK ) 
I N D I A N  O C E A N
Das es Salaam
Sunda Strait
1 *)Oc£=> c ~ = a  '• 5 0 ^
f ^  _ ( X
Lom bok Strait0 Com oros Is
Cocos Is. ( A ustra lia )
Darwin
•  Antananarivo
0  M AURITIUS  
^  REUNION
. /  \
|. r -  Pretoria 
. )  • •  / * , /M a p u to
North West Cape
♦  Naval Support Facilities 
O Naval Base 
Access Facilities 
A Communication Facilities
MADAGASCAR A U S T R A L I A
SO UTH AFRICA
r 
^ .
UAE - United Arab Emirates 
0  m ile s  1 0 0 0
Cockburn Sound
Canberra •
k m  1 0 0 0
5TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT p. 2
MAP p. 4
INTRODUCTION p. 6
CHAPTER ONE: RUDIMENTS OF POLICY p. 17
CHAPTER TWO: CREATION OF POLICY, 1970 p. 70
CHAPTER THREE: MINOR ADJUSTMENT OF POLICY, p. 118
1973-74
CHAPTER FOUR: ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH p. 181
THE SOVIET UNION, 1977-78
CHAPTER FIVE: MAJOR MODIFICATION OF POLICY, p. 228
1979
CHAPTER SIX: ELABORATION OF POLICY, 1980 p. 319
CHAPTER SEVEN: RESPONSES TO POLICY p. 402
CHAPTER EIGHT: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS p. 435
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 443
INTERVIEWEES p. 468
6INTRODUCTION
The United States' strategic policy for the Indian Ocean 
area from 1970 to 1980 consisted of mainly naval display and, 
from 1979, more direct and active deterrence and (preparedness 
for) intervention. That policy was intended to contribute to 
the achievement of America's security objectives principally 
in the Persian Gulf region: to promote the security and
stability of friendly states, to assure continuous access to 
oil, to provide for the safety of shipping and to limit Soviet 
influence.
Those objectives were pursued in the initial context of 
Britain's virtual military withdrawal from the Indian Ocean 
area in 1971, the establishment of a small, slowly growing 
Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean from 1968 and the 
restraint imposed by the Nixon Doctrine on US security policy 
for the Persian Gulf, which policy looked to primarily 
Imperial Iran to maintain regional military security. The 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area originated by the 
US government in 1970 comprised occasional minor deployments 
by 7th Fleet detachments, retaining the small Middle East 
Force of three ships and constructing a communications station 
at Diego Garcia. US naval forces in a passive, defensive, 
essentially political role would, it was assumed, be adequate 
to show America's interest in the area, balance the Soviet 
naval presence, which was too small to pose a military threat 
or to exert important influence, and thereby reassure littoral 
states. America's interest in naval arms control negotiations 
with the USSR was not reciprocated in practice.
The United States made a minor adjustment to its 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area in late 1973 and 
1974, responding to the oil embargo (October 1973-March 1974) 
caused by the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 and to the 
Soviets' perceived greater willingness shown during that war 
to use their armed forces abroad. It began regular naval
7deployments to the Arabian Sea and it proposed to expand Diego 
Garcia into a logistic support facility. From late 1973 into 
1975 America made veiled threats of retaliation against 
"friendly" Gulf Arab states should the oil embargo continue 
indefinitely and, later, of intervention if a new embargo were 
imposed.
By 1977 political conditions in the Persian Gulf and 
Indian Ocean area, relations between the US and the USSR and 
the level and activity of their naval presences were stable 
enough for the super-powers to enter into negotiations for 
naval arms control. But in early 1978 the Americans postponed 
those talks indefinitely, not because of the serious 
bargaining difficulties rooted in the asymmetry between each 
side's force posture and operational practices but because of 
the USSR's intervention in the Ethiopian-Somali war and the 
doubling of its naval presence.
In 1979-1980 the United States made a major modification 
in its strategic policy: it undertook more direct and active 
deterrence against the Soviet Union, suggesting that it might 
anticipate a Soviet attack into the Gulf region with pre­
emptive movement by the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) created 
in 1980, spread a conflict with the USSR to other regions or 
resort to tactical nuclear weapons, in view of its weak 
conventional capability. Deterrence applied also to Iraq, 
against whom the US was prepared to intervene, if necessary 
and requested, in support of a friendly Gulf Arab state under 
attack. Intervention in the event of unrest within a friendly 
Gulf state in order to "save" a regime or to "protect" access 
to oil became a legitimate policy option. Display was 
important for balancing politically as well as deterring the 
Soviet armed forces and for reassuring littoral states about 
the reliability of America's contribution to their security. 
The US enlarged its naval presence to two continuously 
deployed aircraft carrier task groups and augmented that 
display with visits and exercises in South-West Asia by land-
8based forces from America. It began to expand anew Diego 
Garcia and gained access to military facilities in Oman, 
Somalia, Kenya and, informally, Egypt in order that it could 
support better its naval forces and the RDF in crises. These 
changes in policy were caused by the Iranian revolution in 
January 1979, which increased tension, uncertainty and 
instability in the Gulf, and were accelerated by the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan from December 1979. That 
intervention intensified America's sense of the potential 
Soviet military threat to its Persian Gulf interests. 
Concerned that the USSR might use its regional military 
superiority to influence the Gulf states and potentially to 
seize Iranian territory and oilfields, thereby exerting 
immense economic leverage on the West and shifting the global 
balance of power decisively in its favour, President Carter 
declared in January 1980 that
[a]n attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the 
vital interests of the United States of America, and such 
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force.1
Implicit in America's devising and later modifying its 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area was the assumption 
that the display, threat or use of the armed forces was 
necessary and useful for helping to achieve its regional 
security objectives. But that policy did not seem to be very 
necessary in "normal” conditions (1970-78) for contributing to 
security and stability in the Persian Gulf, maintaining access 
to oil, protecting shipping or countering the moderate Soviet 
naval presence. Also the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean states 
opposed a potential dangerous super-power naval arms race. 
The relative unimportance of naval display, the primary US 
strategic role for much of the 1970s, was suggested by US
1 United States, Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, 
U.S. Interests In. And Policies Toward. The Persian Gulf.
1980. Hearings Before The Subcommittee On Europe And The 
Middle East. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, p. 469.
Administrations' interest in 1970-71 and 1977-78 in 
negotiating an arms control agreement with the USSR. In more 
unsettled and crisis conditions (1979-1980) intervention by 
American armed forces was judged to be inappropriate for 
"protecting" a regime or access to oil endangered by severe 
domestic unrest, and the presence of US land-based forces on 
friendly states' territory might worsen more than contribute 
to their regional, and internal, security. US strategic 
policy had not prevented the Soviet "encirclement" of the 
Arabian peninsula in the late 1970s and America's credible 
deterrence of a major Soviet or Iraqi attack was in doubt 
because the US did not possess the ready conventional 
capability to defeat it.
This thesis attempts to analyze America's strategic 
policy for the Indian Ocean area from 1970, when it was 
created, to 1980, when a much modified policy gained general 
definition. It seeks to explain what that policy was and why 
it was needed and to evaluate its usefulness. The thesis 
outlines the United States' interests, the threats to them, 
the setting in which they were perceived and America's 
objectives and commitments as set forth by its security policy 
for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area which guided strategic 
policy and itself changed in 1979-1980. It examines in detail 
US strategic policy, its origin and evolution; its modes - 
display, deterrence and intervention - and the assumptions 
justifying them; its elements - naval deployments, bases and 
facilities, the Rapid Deployment Force, logistic forces, arms 
control and the role of friends and allies; American strategic 
policy's difficulties and weaknesses and its effect upon the 
main littoral states of the Indian Ocean area and the Soviet 
Union. The central proposition of this thesis is that 
America's strategic policy contributed efficaciously to 
achieving its security objectives for the Indian Ocean area.
This thesis investigates a super-power's policy for 
essentially the political use of the armed forces in a distant
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area and assesses the utility of that policy. It considers 
the role of the armed forces in peacetime and crisis without 
necessary recourse to physical violence and evaluates their 
efficacy as a means to influence other states and benefit the 
deploying power's regional security policy.
Chapter One provides an analytical survey of the 
historical setting, from 1945 to 1970, of the United States' 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area and it explains the 
part of display, deterrence and potentially intervention in 
America's pursuit of its security objectives. Chapter Two 
discusses the creation in 1970 of that policy, the influences 
upon it and the response to it by littoral states and the 
USSR. Chapter Three explores the minor modification of policy 
in 1973-74 and America's indirect threats to use force against 
Gulf Arab states. Chapter Four analyzes the background, 
substance and outcome of the naval arms control negotiations 
between the US and the USSR in 1977-78. In Chapter Five is 
investigated the beginnings in 1979 of America's major 
adjustment of its strategic policy and also its security 
policy for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area. Chapter Six 
discusses America's modified strategic policy as it was 
elaborated in 1980. The response of the Soviet Union and 
principal Indian Ocean states to the United States' adjusted 
strategic policy is the subject of Chapter Seven. Chapter 
Eight presents findings and conclusions about the efficacy of 
that policy's contribution to the achievement of America's 
regional security objectives.
The Indian Ocean Area/South-West Asia.
Its Strategic Definition
Historically strategic unity was imposed on the Indian 
Ocean area from outside, by European powers, principally 
Portugal and, above all, Britain, which in the nineteenth 
century achieved command of the Atlantic and the
11
Mediterranean, colonized India and gained control of the far 
approaches to it.2
To generations of British policy-makers the Indian Ocean 
and the British territories bordering it formed a 
coherent strategic system. As the British consolidated 
their position in India the trading settlements and naval 
stations stretching from the Cape and Aden eastward to 
Singapore took on a broad strategic significance, and 
albeit slowly, a system was fashioned in which India's 
defences began at oceanic gateways far removed from the 
subcontinent itself. ... [T]he parts were interdependent; 
Indian security depended on maintenance of the British 
position at these gateways; and to a less extent 
Britain's ability to hold them and to dominate the sea 
depended on control of the Indian subcontinent and its 
ports, communications facilities, and manpower 
resources.3
Although Britain's Indian Ocean "strategic system" lost its 
raison d'etre when India and Pakistan became independent in 
1947, it did not disintegrate into its remaining regional 
parts. The "east of Suez" area remained a sphere of British 
strategic interest and pre-eminent if declining power. The 
limited strategic integrity given the Indian Ocean area by 
Britain's presence and by its bases from Simonstown in South 
Africa to Singapore ended in late 1971 upon the UK's 
operational military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and its 
Far Eastern Fleet's departure from Singapore. In the 
meanwhile there had not arisen to replace the British "system" 
trans-oceanic security relations among Indian Ocean states
2 Auguste Toussaint, History Of The Indian Ocean, trans. June 
Guicharnaud (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966) 
surveys the area's history from Pharaonic times through its 
European epoch. The strategic aspect of the latter period is 
examined in G.A. Ballard, Rulers of the Indian Ocean (London: 
Duckworth, 1927).
3 Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez. 1947-1968 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. xii. India could 
be approached also by land. Britain's policy for its defence 
in the north-west sought to maintain buffers - Persia/Iran and 
Afghanistan - against the influence and forces of imperial 
Russia/the USSR and of Germany and to thwart enemy operations 
which could threaten India or jeopardize British naval 
supremacy in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.
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involving the significant display, threat or use of their 
naval forces over time necessary to endow anew the Indian 
Ocean area with strategic coherence.4 Thus when America 
created in 1970 a strategic policy for the "Indian Ocean 
area"5, there was latitude for that concept to mean what the
4 A degree of strategic unity has been bestowed on the area by 
India, which since the 1970s has been developing a capability 
for maritime operations beyond the Arabian Sea and the Bay of 
Bengal. Note, for example, Gary L. Sojka, "The Missions of 
the Indian Navy", Naval War College Review 36 (January- 
February 1983), 2-15; A.J. Tellis, "India's Naval Expansion: 
Structure, Dimensions, And Context", Naval Forces. (September- 
October 1987), pp. 36-49; Jerrold F. Elkin, Major W. Andrew 
Ritezel, U.S. Army, "New Delhi's Indian Ocean Policy", Naval 
War College Review 40 (September-October 1987), 50-63.
5 The Indian Ocean area consists of "the Indian Ocean itself, 
its natural extensions, the islands thereon, the ocean floor 
subjacent thereto, the littoral and hinterland States and the 
air space above", according to a meeting at the United Nations 
in 1979 of states deliberating about the Indian Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace. (United Nations, General Assembly, 34th 
Session, Report Of The Meeting Of The Littoral And Hinterland 
States Of The Indian Ocean Supplement No.45 [A/34/45], p. 13.) 
The Indian Ocean and its extensions encompass all bodies of 
water between the Suez Canal and Cape Agulhas in South Africa 
south to 60° south latitude, thence east to the southern 
entrance to the Strait of Singapore, to the western coast of 
Sumatra and the southern coast of Java, Sumba and Roti islands 
in Indonesia south-east to Cape Talbot in north-western 
Australia and to the western perimeter of Bass Strait between 
Australia and Tasmania and the western shore of Tasmania to 
South-East Cape south to 60° south latitude. (This definition 
draws from that offered in Annex IV in UN Report Of Consultant 
Experts On The Indian Ocean - 1. United Nations document A/AC. 
159/1, May 3, 1974, in Indian Ocean Power Rivalry, ed. T.T. 
Poulose [New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1974], p. 291.) 
The International Hydrographic Organization proposes that the 
Indian Ocean reaches the shore of Antarctica. (See United 
States, Central Intelligence Agency, Indian Ocean Atlas 
[Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976], pp. 
4-5.) Besides all the Indian Ocean islands, the Indian Ocean 
area consists in the west of the states from South Africa to 
Egypt, including Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Malawi, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda; in the north of 
the countries from Israel and Jordan to Bangladesh, including 
Afghanistan, Nepal and Bhutan; and in the east of the states 
from Burma to Australia. A study of The Geographic 
Constrictions of the Indian Ocean: Canal. Channels, and 
Straits is provided by Viv. L. Forbes (Perth, Australia: 
Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, Curtin University of 
Technology, 1989).
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US government defined it to be according to its own strategic 
outlook.6
The Indian Ocean area did not become even a nominal 
subject of American strategic policy until the 1960s. Because 
of British strategic predominance there, the US did not view 
it as a place where major military operations might be 
necessary, except perhaps in Iran and Saudi Arabia (see 
Chapter One). During the Second World War the area provided 
a line of communication for supplying, via the US Persian Gulf 
Command in Iran, the Soviet war effort against Germany and for 
moving Allied forces between the European and Asia-Pacific 
theatres. After the war the western Indian Ocean area 
(including East Pakistan) was where three American naval 
vessels (the Middle East Force, stationed in the Persian Gulf 
from 1949) paid representational port visits. The Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East and from 1953 the "northern 
tier” (Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) , not the Persian Gulf region 
or the Indian Ocean area, were the identified theatres of 
potential land operations against an attack by the Soviet 
Union upon the territory and oil of contiguous Iran. The 
northern Persian Gulf, mainly Iran and Iraq, would have been 
the base of allied operations and logistic support. 
Facilities in the southern Persian Gulf and around the Arabian 
Sea and Gulf of Aden would have provided rear logistic 
support; the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean would 
have been a line of communication. "Indian Ocean area" began 
to be used by the US government from about early 1960. It was 
a convenient general term for describing the regions from East
6 For discussions of the Indian Ocean area as a strategic 
entity, consult William L. Dowdy and Russell B. Trood, "The 
Indian Ocean: an emerging geostrategic region", International 
Journal 38 (Summer 1983), 432-458. The Indian Ocean as a 
political and economic as well as a strategic unit is assessed 
by Ferenc A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region The 
Balance of Power (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 24-43, 
and William L. Dowdy, "The Indian Ocean Region as Concept and 
Reality", in The Indian Ocean Perspectives on a Strategic 
Arena, eds. William L. Dowdy and Russell B. Trood (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1985), pp 3-23.
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Africa to South Asia near which the US Navy would begin, it 
was intended in 1963-64, regular display in support of 
American foreign policy and also where US land and air forces 
might be needed to intervene and "police” internal unrest or 
local conflicts.
From 1970 the United States considered the Indian Ocean 
area as a potential theatre of naval operations, however 
modest. Emphasis on the "Indian Ocean area” was appropriate 
because, first, the safety of shipping, an important US 
interest, the potential threat to it from the new Soviet naval 
presence and America's strategic response - resuming visits, 
if only upon occasion and on a minor scale, to the Indian 
Ocean by detachments from the 7th Fleet - were all on the sea. 
Second, on land the Soviet military threat to Iran was latent 
and the US was not prepared to take primary strategic 
responsibility for security and stability within the Persian 
Gulf. More precisely and in practice the "Indian Ocean area" 
meant the regions and seas of its north-western or Arabian Sea 
quadrant, where littoral states, particularly in the Persian 
Gulf, the seat of US interests in the area, were subject to 
American naval display and where the US Navy countered 
politically the Soviet naval squadron. But there was too the 
"greater" Indian Ocean area, extending eastward outside the 
ocean to the Philippines. Subic Bay naval base, Cubi Point 
naval air station and Clark Air Base were the base of 
operations and logistic support for American naval task 
groups, patrol aircraft and supply aircraft respectively. By 
giving passage through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore or 
through Indonesian straits for task groups and by providing 
overflying or staging posts through Thailand for aircraft 
going to Diego Garcia, the "greater" Indian Ocean area, 
incorporating maritime South-East Asia, served as a zone of 
access and transit to the Arabian Sea.
Beginning in 1979 America viewed the Indian Ocean area 
for the first time as a potential theatre of both land and sea
15
operations, because of a perceived more active threat to its 
interests in the Persian Gulf from the USSR's land-based 
forces and because of unrest within that region after the 
Iranian revolution. Although the Soviets' capacity for 
maritime combat had grown in the 1970s, the primacy and 
gravity of potential conflict on land made apposite the term 
"South-West Asia”7, which embraced the states from Pakistan to 
Kenya. "South-West Asia” was employed for treating part of 
several regions - the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and 
South Asia - as a strategic unity also in order better to 
manage American land-based and sea forces and their logistic 
support. But although it was one strategic theatre, until 
Central Command was established in 1983 it was split between 
two US military commands: Pacific Command had responsibility 
for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Arabian Sea; European 
Command held responsibility for Egypt and the rest of South- 
West Asia, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
South-West Asia was part of a larger strategic system. 
The Carter administration recognized, as had previous 
administrations, that a super-power conflict in the Persian 
Gulf could spread to Europe. Indeed it kept open as a means 
to deter potential Soviet attack the policy option of 
deliberately spreading a conflict to Europe or East Asia, 
perhaps both. (Conversely, it was understood, war in Europe 
could spread to the Persian Gulf.) South-West Asia's
7 Largely but not completely coextensive with the Indian Ocean 
area (that is, its Arabian Sea quadrant), "South-West Asia” 
was defined in January 1981 by the US Department of Defence to 
include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, North 
Yemen, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya. 
(United States, Department of Defense, Report Of Secretary Of 
Defense Harold Brown To The Congress On The FY 1982 Budget. FY 
1983 Authorization Request And FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs 
[January 19, 1981], p. 190. (DoD annual reports are referred 
to below as U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 19— .) Maritime 
"South-West Asia” encompassed all the seas north and west from 
Diego Garcia. Egypt, an important de facto part of "South- 
West Asia”, Jordan and Sudan were not added to that area 
formally until America created the Central Command in 1983.
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strategic relation with Europe, Asia and the United States 
itself was given authoritative acknowledgement by the 
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1981. 
Having noted that "the defense of European and Pacific allies, 
including protection of access to Southwest Asian oil vital to 
their security", was the second priority in America's 
strategic policy after deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack 
on the US and its allies, it stated that
[I]n effect, the Western Hemisphere and the three regions 
of greatest importance to US extra-hemispheric interests 
- Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and Southwest Asia - 
comprise a system of interconnecting and inextricably 
linked strategic zones. As US security is closely tied 
to that of its allies in Western Europe and Northeast 
Asia, and as all depend on continued access to the oil 
resources of Southwest Asia, so US strategy in one zone 
must be supportive of and supported by that in the 
others.... It is no longer practical to design 
autonomous regional strategies, for a threat on one 
strategic zone will almost certainly have a serious 
impact on the security of the others.8
Understanding the substance, evolution and utility of 
America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area from 1970 
to 1980, by which latter time that policy had gained great 
importance as a "zone" in global US strategic policy, is the 
purpose of this thesis. A full understanding of America's 
Indian Ocean policy must include an analysis of its rudiments 
and because those rudiments were manifest in the twenty-five 
years up to 1970, Chapter One will survey the history of their 
development.
8 United States, Department of Defense, Organization Of The 
Joint Chiefs Of Staff, United States Military Posture For FY 
1982; A Supplement To The Chairman's Overview. (n.p., 
n.d.[1981]), pp. 3-6. (Referred to below as U.S. OJCS, United 
States Military Posture FY 1982 Supplement.)
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CHAPTER ONE 
RUDIMENTS OF POLICY
Although the United States did not create a formal 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area until 1970, the 
rudiments of that policy, especially as it evolved in 1979- 
1980, developed in the late 1940s, the 1950s and the 1960s. 
Those rudiments were display, deterrence and (preparedness 
for) intervention. Display began in 1949 when the Middle East 
Force was created in order to show American interest in states 
from Portuguese Mozambique to East Pakistan. The US decided 
in 1964 to increase its display in the Indian Ocean area by 
way of initiating regular aircraft carrier task group 
deployments but that "policy” was cut short by the Vietnam 
war. In the 1950s America assumed principal responsibility 
for deterring a Soviet attack against Iran. It emphasized the 
political declaratory aspect of deterrence, with the 
possibility of nuclear retaliation in the background, because 
the perceived direct Soviet military threat to Iran and 
America's conventional capability for defence there were 
small. The United States' concern about a potential Soviet 
land threat became latent in the 1960s. From 1961 the US was 
prepared to intervene in conflicts between Indian Ocean area 
states and to intervene in internal conflicts in order to 
prevent from seizing power forces whose feared pro-Soviet 
orientation would enable the USSR to gain influence at the 
West's expense. In 1968 intervention was discarded as a 
policy option.
This chapter investigates the historical setting of 
America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area. It 
summarizes the United States' security interests in the 
Persian Gulf region, characterizes the threats to them and 
traces the development of the informal US military security 
commitment to Iran, the one country of the Persian Gulf-Indian 
Ocean area contiguous to the Soviet Union. It examines how,
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in light of regional states', Britain's and America's
incapacity for adequate defence against the USSR, the US 
proposed in the late 1940s and in the 1950s to deter a 
potential Soviet attack into the Persian Gulf. Next it
considers the difficulty facing the US in generating credible
deterrence and reviews how early American contingency planning 
envisioned dealing with a Soviet attack. Then is discussed 
the interventionist/limited war role of Strike Command 
(created in 1961), the American government's interest in the 
middle 1960s in naval display in the Indian Ocean and the US 
Navy's interest in an interventionist role there. The chapter 
concludes by detailing the Navy's unsuccessful quest to
establish a logistic support facility at Diego Garcia and its 
changing reasons - support for intervention, then countering 
the new Soviet naval presence - justifying that quest.
Context of llPolicv1 
From November 1947 the American government considered
that
the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the 
Middle East is vital to the security of the United 
States; that the security of the whole Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East would be jeopardized if the 
Soviet Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain 
control of Iran; that the United States would assist in 
maintaining the territorial integrity and political 
independence of Iran....1
Should Iran come under Soviet domination, the independence of 
all states in the Middle Eastern land bridge between Europe, 
Asia and Africa, the West's access to the oil of Iran, Iraq 
and Arabia and important military and naval bases and lines of 
communication between Europe and the Far East would come under
1 From Report of the National Security Council on the Position 
of the United States with Respect to Iran in United States, 
Department Of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 
1949 vol. 6, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), 
p. 546. (Referred to below as State, FRUS 19—
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direct threat. Specifically, according to the National 
Security Council in 1949,
the USSR would (1) acquire advance bases for subversive 
activities or actual attack against a vast contiguous 
area including Turkey, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan; (2) obtain a base hundreds of 
miles nearer to potential US-UK lines of defense in the 
Middle East than any held at present; (3) control part 
and threaten all of the Middle Eastern oil reservoir upon 
which the western (sic) community draws to conserve 
limited western hemisphere resources; (4) control 
continental air routes crossing Iran, threaten those 
traversing adjacent areas, and menace shipping in the 
Persian Gulf, and (5) undermine the will of all Middle 
Eastern countries to resist Soviet aggression.2
The "extension of Soviet control over the Middle East would 
mean a violent shift in the world balance of power”3, found a 
draft study by the NSC in late 1951 on American policy towards 
the Middle East. And in January 1957 President Eisenhower 
spoke of the "near strangulation" of the economic life of 
Western Europe, which was "peculiarly dependent" upon Middle 
Eastern oil, should the Middle East be "dominated by alien 
forces hostile to freedom...." The "free nations of Asia and 
Africa, too, would be placed in serious jeopardy" and "[a]ll 
this would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect 
upon ... [America's] economic life and political prospects."4
2 Ibid., pp. 545- 546.
3 From The Position Of The United States With Respect To The 
General Area Of The Eastern Mediterranean And Middle East in 
State, FRUS 1951 vol. 5, The Near East and Africa (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 258.
4 "President Asks for Authorization for U.S. Economic Program 
and for Resolution on Communist Aggression in Middle East", 
Department of State Bulletin 36 (January 21, 1957), 84.
(Referred to below as DoSB.) For another discussion of the 
expected consequences of Soviet domination of the Middle East, 
see Memorandum bv the Chief of the Division of South Asian 
Affairs on "Considerations In Support Of Policy In Respect Of 
The Eastern Mediterranean And Middle East Drawn Up After 
Consultation With The British Group" in State, FRUS 1947 vol. 
5, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 577.
20
But although the USSR could easily occupy Iran5, according to 
the Secretary of State in 1947, and although it would
continue to apply strong political and psychological 
pressure against Iran in an effort to force the 
government of that country into submission, it is ... 
unlikely that the Soviet Union would be willing to resort 
to direct armed intervention...6
unless the Soviet government had "decided to unleash a new 
world war and the occupation of Iran should be a first step in 
the process.”7 Similarly, in January 1953, the Secretaries of 
State and Defence found that an "armed attack on the Middle 
East could be made only by Soviet forces and is highly 
unlikely except as one phase of a general war.”8 And in 
urging Congress in 1957 to take "steps to prevent 
international communism taking over the Middle East”, John 
Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, characterized 
the "Soviet military threat" as "latent" and "potential".9 
The most probable danger from the Soviet Union was "indirect 
aggression" such as anti-Western propaganda, the use of the 
armed forces to exert pressure and political support for 
Marxist and other "radical" groups.10 This was the US
5 State, FRUS 1947 vol. 5, p. 924.
6 State, FRUS 1949 vol. 6, p. 548. "In the absence of such
armed intervention", the NSC noted, "Iran is expected to 
maintain successful resistance to Soviet pressure and to
strengthen its western (sic) alignment, provided it continues 
to have confidence in U.S. support." (Idem)
7 Ibid., p. 550. See also State, FRUS 1951 vol. 5, p. 258.
8 From Report to the National Security Council bv the
Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual 
Security in State, FRUS 1952-1954 vol. 2, National Security 
Affairs, pt. 1 (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1984), p. 220.
9 "The Communist Threat to the Middle East", DoSB 36 (February 
4, 1957), 170-171.
10 According to a typical evaluation of "Soviet Capabilities 
and Intentions in the Middle East",
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government's abiding assessment, from the 1940s onwards, of 
the nature of the "Soviet threat" to the Middle East.
From the end of World War II the Americans' "general 
strategic concept" for military security in the Middle East 
against the Soviet Union was that Britain and the Commonwealth 
took primary responsibility for defence of the region, except 
for Turkey (from 1947) and Saudi Arabia. Encouraging the 
United Kingdom to maintain its military role and position was 
the cornerstone of US strategic thinking. At the "Pentagon 
Talks of 1947" between Britain and America the latter 
expressed its preference that
the British should continue to maintain primary 
responsibility for the defense of the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East as part of an overall 
concept of resistance to Soviet aggression, and that, in 
order to implement that responsibility, the British 
should have bases from which to operate in time of 
emergency. The maintenance of such bases, together with 
the right of reentry in an emergency, requires in turn 
that the British would have mutually satisfactory 
political and economic relations of a long-term nature 
with the countries of the area, as a foundation for their 
military position.11
America, the State Department noted in 1949,
Soviet rulers probably estimate that Western influence is 
declining, that economic and political deterioration will 
continue, and that the general situation will become 
steadily more favorable to the expansion of Communist 
influence. Soviet rulers may conclude that the area can 
be effectively denied to the West without being brought 
under direct Communist control and without forcing the 
USSR prematurely to accept full responsibility for 
supporting Communist regimes in the area. (From a 
National Intelligence Estimate on "Conditions and Trends 
In The Middle East Affecting US Security" in State, FRUS 
1952-1954 vol. 9, The Near And Middle East, pt. 1 
[Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1986], p. 339.)
11 From a State Department memorandum in State, FRUS 1947 vol. 
5, p. 579.
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should continue to coordinate the handling of our common 
strategic interests ... with the British as it would be 
unrealistic for the United States to undertake to carry 
out its policies unless the British maintained their 
strong strategic, political and economic position in the 
Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and they and we 
follow parallel policies...,12
But in talks between the UK and the US in 1950, while the 
Americans "pointed out that the defense of Iran must be 
primarily a British responsibility", the
British representatives pointed out the difficulties 
considering the forces now available, of their assisting, 
other than to a certain extent with air forces, in the 
defense of the outer ring of the Middle East, that is, 
primarily Iran and Turkey. In spite of the fact that the 
loss to the Soviets of either of these countries might 
have a fatal effect on other countries, such as Iraq, the 
U.K. would be obliged, in case of general war, to 
concentrate on the defense of the inner core which is 
centered in and about Egypt.13
Britain's "difficulties" were summed up in a memorandum to the 
Secretary of State from his Assistant for Near Eastern, South 
Asian and African Affairs: "the UK, which has primary
responsibility for the defense of the area, lacks both 
manpower and resources successfully to defend it and has no 
plans for defense of the Saudi Arabian oil fields and the 
Dhahran Air Base"14, which were paramount American regional 
economic and strategic interests respectively. The UK's 
political influence in the Middle East was declining and, the 
US feared, a too rapid abandonment of its economic and 
military positions by Britain "would leave a military vacuum
12 From a Memorandum bv the Politico-Military Adviser in the 
Bureau of Near Eastern. South Asian, and African Affairs ... 
on "U.S. Strategic Position In The Eastern Mediterranean And 
Middle East" in State FRUS 1949 vol. 6, p. 59.
13 From Agreed United States-United Kingdom Memorandum of 
Discussions on the Present World Situation in State, FRUS 1950 
vol. 5, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 190.
14 State, FRUS 1951 vol. 5, p. 4.
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which the US would have difficulty in filling, and which would 
accentuate insecurity and create further opportunities for 
Soviet or local Communist exploitation.”15 In particular 
Britain's waning influence was harming its negotiations to 
retain access to military bases such as those in Iraq but, 
above all, at Suez in Egypt. Britain's definitive loss of 
access to Suez in 1956 led Dulles to remark early in 1957 upon 
a "change in the possible deterrent role of certain Western 
European nations. Until recently they provided a serious 
deterrent to Communist aggression against the Middle East. 
But ... this no longer meets the needs."16 There was "now no 
adequate deterrent"17 against potential Soviet attacks.
Within the Middle East there was only a weak political 
basis for strategic cooperation against the USSR among the 
regional states and among them, Britain and America because 
the "divisive elements ... exceed the integrative forces."18 
Most Arab states and Iran were politically, socially and 
economically unstable and there were many rivalries among 
them. The existence of Israel since 1948 was a major source 
of regional conflict. Nationalism, pan-Arabism and
"neutralism" (non-alignment) had engendered strong and growing 
political movements, championed chiefly by Egypt after its 
revolution in 1952. Middle Eastern states sought to protect 
their independence and eliminate as far as possible Western 
influence, troops and bases. Britain was the principal 
subject of anti-Western sentiment but America was resented for 
its association with the UK and also France and for being the 
main creator and supporter of Israel. These "unfavorable 
trends", the National Security Council concluded in 1954, were
15 State, FRUS 1952-1954 vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 339.
16 DoSB, 36 (February 4, 1957), 170.
17 Ibid., p. 171.
18 From State Department Draft Minutes of Discussions at the 
State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting. January 30. 1951 in
State, FRUS 1951 vol. 5, p. 30.
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a greater "current danger to the security of the free world 
... than the threat of direct Soviet military attack ...,1,19 
and they led by way of opposition from Egypt to rejection of 
the British and American proposal in 1951 for a Middle East 
Command organization. That attempt to obtain Arab military 
cooperation for defence against potential Soviet military 
action in the Middle East was "also handicapped by the fact 
that the Arabs do not feel immediately threatened by the 
Soviet Union or recognize an immediate personal stake in the 
East-West struggle.1,20 Accepting Western military support 
against the Soviet Union when the Israelis and other Arabs 
were the main political and military foes would sustain 
Western domination, compromise their independence and hinder 
use of the USSR as a counterbalance against the West. The 
above "unfavorable trends" accounted for why only one Arab 
state, Iraq, joined the Baghdad Pact (discussed below) and why 
it underwent a nationalist, republican revolution in July 1958 
and withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. Iraq's withdrawal further 
weakened that already brittle organization by removing the 
territorial base for "defence in depth".
Unstable and given to rivalry, the regional states were 
also unable to contribute substantially to their own or their 
mutual defence. "Middle East armed forces", it was clear to 
the US, "are incapable, individually or collectively, of 
effectively resisting attack by a major power"21 because they 
had "learned neither the value of unity nor the collective 
strength they might attain by banding together."22 Of the 
regional members of the Baghdad Pact, Turkey, whose forces
19 From Statement of Policy bv the National Security Council on 
"United States Objectives And Policies With Respect To The 
Near East" in State, FRUS 1952-1954. vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 526.
20 Ibid. , p. 339.
21 Ibid., p. 342. Indeed "local forces [we]re not even capable 
of manning and maintaining adequate bases for quick and 
effective use by Western forces in the event of war". (Idem)
22 State, FRUS 1951. vol. 5, p. 260.
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were dedicated to NATO, would only look after its own 
territory; Iraq was weak and, as noted, withdrew from the 
Pact; and Pakistan, too far away to give more than minor 
support, was preoccupied with India. Only Iran was left and 
its "plan of defense ... outlined by ... the Shah envisage[d] 
a delaying action” against a Soviet attack towards the Persian 
Gulf, "making maximum use of mines, demolitions and other 
defensive means, with a final withdrawal to a defensive area 
in the rugged Zagros mountains in the southwest”23 from where 
guerrilla warfare would be conducted. The Americans did not 
think that Iran could delay a large Soviet attack for more 
than a brief time. Even with a "long and costly" US military 
aid programme "involving considerable training and equipment", 
"effective Middle East defense will continue to depend for the 
foreseeable future on substantial Western force 
contributions. "24
The United States, however, was unable to make up the 
deficiency between possible British and regional force 
contributions and those needed for "effective defense" against 
a Soviet attack. Moreover, it was unwilling until 1957 to 
commit itself to defence of the Middle East although, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) acknowledged in 1950, "the Middle 
East in war is of importance second only to Western Europe
23 From Memorandum bv the Chief of Staff. United States Armv. 
to the Secretary of the Army in State, FRUS 1950. vol. 5, p. 
508.
24 From a National Intelligence Estimate on "Prospects For 
Creation Of A Middle East Defense Grouping And Probable 
Consequences Of Such A Development" in State, FRUS 1952-1954 
vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 519. Similarly, in Ibid., p. 342, "defense 
of the Middle East against Soviet Bloc aggression will 
ultimately depend on employment of Western armed forces." In 
the case of Iran, US military aid, intended primarily to help 
the government uphold internal security, was meant as well to 
give it confidence to resist temporarily Soviet military 
pressure and action short of an "all-out" attack.
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. ...,|25 In 1949 the US told Iran that "in the event of war 
with the Soviet Union involving both Iran and the United 
States, Iran may count on all assistance compatible with U.S. 
resources in a global conflict" but that it was "not in a 
position to make any commitment as to action if the Soviet 
Union should take aggressive measures against Iran...."26 And 
"[s]o far as the State Department [wa]s aware" in early 1950,
the Department of Defense is not prepared to plan on 
giving any military assistance to the Iranian forces in 
time of war and does not have a very high opinion of the 
potential effectiveness of those forces. Furthermore, we 
are not prepared to enter into any political defense 
arrangement with Iran.27
In October 1950 the JCS informed their British counterparts 
"that the US 'will be unable to commit forces to [the Middle 
East] during, at least, the first two years of war.'"28 In 
the view of the Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, "this statement" by 
the JCS
clearly implies that the United States contemplates the 
abandonment, without even a token defense, of most if not 
all of the Middle East in time of global war.
The JCS decision rests, of course, on the unpleasant 
fact that United States capabilities are inadequate to 
protect our vital interests everywhere at the same time: 
the Middle East has been written off reluctantly in favor
of theaters of higher priority. ... [P]lans to abandon the 
Middle East fail to provide for our security interests
25 From Record of Informal United States-United Kingdom 
Discussions. London. Thursday Morning. September 21 in State, 
FRUS 1950 vol. 5, p. 611.
26 State, FRUS 1949 vol. 6, p. 547.
27 From Memorandum bv the Director of the Office of Greek. 
Turkish, and Iranian Affairs to the Deputy Under Secretary of 
State in State, FRUS 1950 vol. 5, p. 474.
28 State, FRUS 1951 vol. 5, p. 8. (Brackets in text.)
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there....29
Preoccupied with Western Europe and East Asia, America lacked 
the troops, money and equipment to fight in the Middle East30 
and "present US planning” was based on the assumption that 
Persian Gulf "oil would not be essential for the Allied war 
effort for the first two years of a global war."31 But 
"present plans to do without Middle East oil are based not so 
much on an estimate of oil requirements as on the fact that 
whichever side might hold the area the oil fields would be 
neutralized through air bombardment."32 The oil would not be 
available to either the Soviets or the West. Further, the US 
Army Chief of Staff commented in 1951, even if the Americans
29 Idem.
30 See remarks in June 1952 by General Bradley, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Department of State Minutes of State- 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting in State, FRUS 1952-1954 vol. 9, 
pt. 1, p. 239.
31 State, FRUS 1951 vol. 5, p. 8. The strategic value of 
Middle Eastern oil was a major issue in the "protracted debate 
between the State and Defense Departments and among the three 
branches of the armed services over the issue of whether the 
Middle East is 'vital' or merely 'critical' for purposes of US 
strategic planning...." The
position of the Defense Department is motivated in part 
by two tactical considerations. In the first place, 
Defense hopes that by adopting a lower priority for the 
area than the British do, the result will be that the UK 
will exert itself to do more for the defense of the 
Middle East than would otherwise be the case. In the 
second place, the priority assigned to the Middle East 
substantially affects the ... competition between the ... 
armed services for ... military appropriations. Thus, if 
the Middle East is deemed 'vital' and ground forces are 
committed to its defense, the Navy would require very 
considerable equipment and facilities to supply and 
defend the sea and air lanes on which such ground forces 
would be dependent. Such an increase in the Navy's share 
of appropriations would be at the expense of the other 
service branches. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.)
32 From Memorandum of Conversation, bv the Regional Planning 
Adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern. South Asian and 
African Affairs in State, FRUS 1950 vol. 5, p. 23 3.
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"lose temporarily in the Middle East and hold on to 
Western Europe we will be in a satisfactory position. Once 
the job is done in Western Europe, we can go down later to the 
Middle East and clean up whatever problems we find there."33
US involvement "in a Middle East security pact or in a 
commitment of combat forces..." was ruled out too by the 
Secretary of State.34 His Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs was proposing at the 
turn of 1950-1951 to take new measures to safeguard "vital" US 
security interests in the Middle East and thereby to reverse 
the deterioration of regional states' support for America 
after the start of the Korean war. That decline had been 
caused by their perception of its relative indifference to 
their defence in war. But a proposal to "prove" America's 
interest in regional defence and its determination to assist 
in it - to station soon "a battalion of US Marines at Dhahran 
Airfield in defense of the air field and oil wells, as a means 
of meeting [Saudi Arabia's] needs for American assurances and 
for the morale effect upon the Near East generally"35 - was
33 State, FRUS 1951 vol. 5, p. 39.
34 From The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense in 
Ibid., pp. 22.
35 Ibid., p. 5. The proposal for stationing a US land force in 
the Persian Gulf originated in Britain, which in talks with 
the Americans in 1950 tried to persuade them "to give the 
Middle East a higher priority, particularly in the cold war 
stage", and to play a larger role in defence of Iran and Iraq. 
The UK wanted America to station troops at Dhahran for the 
"tremendous psychological benefits which U.S. forces would 
bring about in the Middle East" and for "the importance of 
their presence there in time of war." The US would need 
stationed forces for "when the Soviets really put the heat on 
the area." If they could come into a "Korea-like situation" 
quickly, "a strong area reaction could be assured ... which 
would help to prevent such a situation from arising and help 
to prevent the outbreak of global war" and the loss of the 
Middle East. A small American contribution to a British 
brigade dispatched near or into Iran in the event of internal 
unrest there perhaps involving the USSR would be useful as a 
demonstration and would exert a stabilizing influence. State,
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turned down. Nor would the US take up a proposal to "show the 
flag" by sending US Air Force formations on visits to the 
Middle East and occasionally deploying US aircraft carrier 
task groups to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.
While avoiding a direct strategic commitment to Middle 
Eastern defence, the United States sought in the 1950s to 
reassure regional states about its interest in their security 
and to contribute to it by indirect means. It intended by way 
of economic and military aid to help Iran and other countries 
cope with and reduce domestic instability, the principal 
threat to their security, and embark upon economic and social 
development. In consequence, it was hoped, the USSR would be 
less able to exploit internal unrest and anti-Western forces 
would not gain power and turn towards the Soviets. Because of 
the weak capacity on the part of all parties for defence of 
the Middle East against the USSR, the US initially (1951) had 
sought to organize that defence on a collective basis. 
However, after proposals for a Middle East Command36 or a 
Middle East Defence Organization, in which the US had intended 
to participate, were rejected by Egypt and other Arab states,
FRUS 1950 vol. 5, p. 232; United States Minutes of United 
States-United Kingdom Political-Military Conversations. Held 
at Washington. October 26. 1950 in State, FRUS 1950 vol. 5, 
pp. 234-235.
36 By promoting in 1951-1952 the Middle East Command America 
wanted to coordinate through one organization British, 
American, other Western and regional defence programmes under 
a concept of defence of the Middle East as a whole against 
external (Soviet) aggression. The Middle East Command would 
"assist and support” regional states in developing their 
military capability and its "task” "at the outset" would 
consist primarily of "planning, the provision of advice and 
training missions to the Middle East states upon request, and 
the coordination of arms supplies and the training programs 
for Middle East nationals...." From Draft Statement of the 
United States, the United Kingdom. France. Turkey. Australia. 
New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa on the Basic 
Principles of the Middle East Command in State, FRUS 1951 vol. 
5, pp. 241-242. A more informal American purpose for the MEC 
was to encourage Britain to maintain its leading role in 
regional defence while easing the burden of its responsibility 
and keeping America's role secondary.
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America encouraged from 1953 the "northern tier" states - 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan - to form with Britain the 
Baghdad Pact. Created in 1955 and called formally the Pact of 
Mutual Cooperation, it obliged the contracting parties simply 
to "cooperate for their security and defence". America's main 
reason for sponsoring the Baghdad Pact was to create a 
political and ultimately a military barrier against Soviet 
influence and power37 and fill the gap in "containment" 
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the South- 
East Asia Collective Defence Treaty organization, SEATO.* A 
"loose regional defense grouping", the US understood, would 
not result in a sizable "reduction of the area's military 
vulnerability" to the Soviet Union. But "backed by US 
military aid programs", it would "create greater opportunities 
than in the past for reducing Middle East defense 
deficiencies. The requirements for outside ground forces 
might eventually be significantly reduced."38 American 
military aid, an inducement notably to Iran to join the 
Baghdad Pact, would in time enable it better to resist Soviet 
aggression until the US made an appropriate response. The 
Americans refrained from joining the Baghdad Pact, only 
liaising with its Military Committee, because they wanted the 
Pact to be viewed as an "indigenous" security initiative and 
because they hoped to reduce friction in their relations with 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and India, which opposed it. They 
probably hoped as well to reduce the Soviets' opportunity to 
take advantage of that opposition and increase their 
influence. But by staying out of the Baghdad Pact the United 
States suggested that the states objecting to the Pact were 
more important to it than those which had joined it, that
SEATO and also the Australia, New Zealand, United States 
(ANZUS) security treaty were oriented towards South East Asia 
and the Pacific respectively, not the Indian Ocean area.
37 For the expected immediate "primarily political and 
psychological" effects of the inchoate (1954) Baghdad Pact, 
see State, FRUS 1952-1954 vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 519.
38 Idem.
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regional politics were (in fact, correctly) more important 
than the USSR, that the Soviet Union was not really an urgent 
military threat and that political competition with the USSR 
to influence regional affairs was more important than the 
purpose of the Baghdad Pact. By not joining the Baghdad Pact 
America undermined it and failed to reassure its member 
states.
The United States' sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact and 
its refraining from joining it were essentially political in 
purpose, and so were in 1957 the enunciation of the 
"Eisenhower Doctrine" and the US Congress's "Joint Resolution 
to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East" (House 
Joint Resolution 117). By declaring its preparedness to use 
the armed forces in order to help regional states resist 
Soviet aggression, the US government made its first major 
public expression of commitment to defence of the Middle East.* 
Fearing the advance of Soviet influence into the "vacuum" left 
by the decline of British deterrence after the Suez crisis in 
autumn 1956, America assumed primary responsibility for 
deterring a potential attack by the Soviet Union. It
considered deterrence to be a long-term precaution rather than 
an immediate requirement in expectation of an imminent attack. 
In a "special message" to Congress on January 5, 1957
President Eisenhower judged the "greatest risk" to be
that ambitious despots may miscalculate. If power-hungry 
Communists should either falsely or correctly estimate 
that the Middle East is inadequately defended, they might 
be tempted to use open measures of armed attack. If so, 
that would start a chain of circumstances which would 
almost surely involve the United States in military 
action.39
America was ready to cooperate with its friends in the Middle
The Truman Doctrine of 1947 had proposed to give economic and 
indirect military assistance to Greece and Turkey.
39 DoSB 36 (January 21, 1957), 87.
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East in defence of their independence and territorial 
integrity and the very fact of proclaiming clearly and 
promptly its willingness to do so would, Eisenhower believed, 
"serve to halt any contemplated aggression."40 He sought 
legislative support from Congress because, according to 
Dulles, the Soviets would feel more deterred and the Middle 
East states more reassured and secure if Congress spoke and 
cooperated with the Executive in showing unity of national 
purpose.41 In March 1957 Congress passed House Joint 
Resolution 117 authorizing the President
to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, 
military assistance programs with any nation or group of 
nations ... desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the 
United States regards as vital to the national interest 
and world peace the preservation of the independence and 
integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this 
end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, 
the United States is prepared to use armed forces to 
assist any such nation or group of nations requesting 
assistance against armed aggression from any country 
controlled by international communism: Provided, that
such employment shall be consonant with the treaty 
obligations of the United States and with the 
Constitution of the United States.42
After Iraq announced in 1958 its withdrawal from the 
Baghdad Pact, America signed in March 1959 with Turkey, Iran 
and Pakistan identical bilateral executive agreements, 
"Agreements of Cooperation", which it intended would reinforce 
House Joint Resolution 117 and reassure the signatories. In 
its agreement with Iran the US acknowledged the preservation 
of Iran's independence and integrity "as vital to its national 
interest and to world peace" and both parties agreed that
40 Idem.
41 DoSB 36 (February 4, 1957), 173; "Middle East Proposals", 
DoSB 36 (January 28, 1957), 129.
42 "Congress Passes Joint Resolution on Middle East", DoSB 36, 
(March 25, 1957), 481.
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[t]he government of Iran is determined to resist 
aggression. In case of aggression against Iran, the 
Government of the United States of America, in accordance 
with the Constitution of the United States of America, 
will take such appropriate action, including the use of 
armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is 
envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and 
Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the 
Government of Iran at its request.43
The "Agreements of Cooperation” did not create new obligations 
for the US. They and House Joint Resolution 117 were only 
very "loose” commitments to the security of the regional 
states: America was not bound automatically to take specific 
military action in the event of a Soviet attack upon Iran, for 
example. In effect it had simply to be prepared to use its 
armed forces as agreed with the state requesting its help.
In order to show from 1957 a somewhat more active 
"commitment” to defence of the "northern tier” states against 
a potential Soviet attack, the US joined the Military 
Committee of the Baghdad Pact (renamed the Central Treaty 
Organization, CENTO, in August 1959). The Military 
Committee's principal purposes were "joint contingency 
planning for regional defence against aggression, the 
coordination of national defence plans for that purpose, and 
assistance in training and equipping regional forces."44 The 
general planning concept was that Turkey, Iran, Iraq until its 
withdrawal and Pakistan as
'indigenous forces' were to have the principal initial 
role in meeting any Soviet attack on the ground, but they 
would be stiffened with Western (British) forces already 
based in the Middle East and supported by American and 
British air and sea power. In time, additional Western
43 "U.S. Signs Agreements of Cooperation With Turkey, Iran, and 
Pakistan", DoSB 40 (March 23, 1959), 417.
44 Guy Hadley, CENTO - The Forgotten Alliance A Study of the 
Central Treaty Organization ISIO Monographs First Series, 
Number Four, Institute for the Study of International 
Organization, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, Sussex, 
1971, p. 7.
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forces could be brought in. For practical purposes the 
plans were built around holding, as a minimum, eastern 
Turkey and the natural barrier of the Zagros Mountains.43
The Military Committee's planning was unrealistic, because 
without an integrated command structure, a fully agreed 
strategic concept, combined forces and joint bases and without 
Arab political, military and logistic support or readily 
available reinforcements from Britain and America, CENTO could 
not contrive a credible policy for conventional deterrence and 
defence against a large Soviet attack.
From the 1950s into the 1960s and 1970s the political 
directive on which military planning in CENTO was based 
depended
on hopes of deterrence embodied in America and/or British 
nuclear retaliation, and in this CENTO plays only a very 
small part. Its military requirements and proposals are 
embodied in a series of agreed defensive plans, but the 
nuclear decisions in London and Washington, and the 
choice of targets, are determined as part of a wider 
defensive strategy which embraces NATO.46
CENTO lost much of its raison d'etre in the 1960s, when there 
was detente between the USSR and Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, 
making the likelihood of Soviet aggression in the Middle East 
quite remote, and when the latter states became even more 
preoccupied with regional security issues. But it continued 
to hold annual exercises such as SHAHBAZ, for air defence, and
45 John C. Campbell, Defense Of The Middle East Problems of 
American Policy rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 
p. 188. Campbell, Idem, observed that
planning based on defense of the Zagros rather than the 
Elburz Mountains would leave most of Iran on the 
undefended side of the line. The Iranian Government has 
therefore found it necessary to state the purpose of the 
[Baghdad] Pact as the defense of all the territory of its 
members, and thus to disavow a strategy not based on 
defense of the Elburz, at least initially.
46 Hadley, CENTO, p. 8.
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MIDLINK, for maritime operations in the Persian Gulf or 
Arabian Sea, in which the US participated. It organized study 
groups on topics such as mountain warfare.
Levels of "Policy11 
From the latter 1940s through 1960 American strategic 
"policy” consisted of deterring, mainly by threat of nuclear 
retaliation, a Soviet attack upon Iran and, secondarily, Saudi 
Arabia and demonstrating modest US interest in the area from 
Portuguese Mozambique to East Pakistan. The US never 
stationed land or air forces in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere 
in the Indian Ocean area; its only continuous operational 
presence was the three-ship Middle East Force, which was 
established in 1949 and which had access to logistic support 
facilities at HMS Jufair, the Royal Navy's base at Manama, 
Bahrain. Among the MEF's "missions” were preservation of the 
freedom of the seas, search and rescue, administration of 
military assistance programmes, communications and 
intelligence gathering. Its more active roles, when needed, 
were escort and protection of shipping and help with emergency 
evacuation.47 As suggested by its negligible fighting 
capability, the Middle East Force's pre-eminent purpose was 
political and representational: by paying port visits, it
helped to show America's attentiveness to regional states and 
its wish for good relations with them. Saudi Arabia allowed 
the United States use of the air base at Dhahran until 1962 
and the US used the large Kagnew communications, monitoring 
and, later, satellite tracking and relay station near Asmara 
in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea. Pakistan provided 
monitoring and air reconnaissance facilities to America into 
the 1960s.
47 See Beth F. Coye, ed., "An Evaluation of U.S. Naval Presence 
in the Indian Ocean”, Naval War College Review 23 (October 
1970), 46.
The United States gave relatively little emphasis in the 
1950s to armed intervention as an option for dealing with 
conflict between or within states of the Persian Gulf and 
Indian Ocean area and it did not possess a significant 
capability for intervention there. The prevailing strategic 
concept of "massive” strategic nuclear retaliation against the 
Soviet Union discounted the possibility of "little" wars and 
many states, in the Arabian peninsula and East Africa, were 
still under British protection. Internal security was the 
responsibility of the central government of a state and, 
according to Dulles, US "military force was not a proper 
weapon against Communist subversion of a Middle Eastern 
country."48 American support for friendly governments was 
given mainly through economic and military aid but clandestine 
intervention was not precluded, as shown pre-eminently by the 
Central Intelligence Agency's restoration of the Shah of Iran 
to power in 1953. Earlier, in 1950, the US had considered 
sending an aircraft carrier task group to Iranian waters as 
part of a show of force with Britain in case of an uprising in 
Azerbaijan, because in "the event of a revolution within Iran 
a show of force might assist in maintaining the status quo."49
Intervention by the United States in inter-state 
conflicts was unlikely because it sought to avoid direct 
involvement. But an informal "American security guarantee" to 
the Saudis to come to their defence if necessary, formed, 
along with geography and Saudi diplomacy, the deterrent 
against an invasion of Saudi Arabia by potentially hostile
48 Noted by Campbell, Defense Of The Middle East, p. 180.
49 From Approved Summary of Conclusions and Agreements Reached 
at a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and 
United Kingdom in State, FRUS 1950 vol. 3, Western Europe 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1977),
p. 1688.
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neighbours.50 At the time of the Lebanon crisis, in which the 
US did intervene, and the revolution in Iraq in summer 1958, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff made plans to protect (British oil 
interests in) Kuwait. Probably
in response to British urgings, [Eisenhower] approved a 
recommendation from the Joint Chiefs for a seaborne 
movement of a Marine Corps regimental combat team then 
stationed on Okinawa to the Persian Gulf. There, in 
Eisenhower's view, it could help deter an Iraqi move into 
Kuwait or help protect other friendly governments. 
Twining was ordered to 'be prepared to employ, subject to 
Einshower's approval, whatever means might become 
necessary to prevent any unfriendly forces from moving 
into Kuwait.' It seems clear that Eisenhower was 
referring to the possible use of nuclear weapons, an 
issue that was discussed several times during the 
crisis.51
The most serious conflict likely to occur in the Persian Gulf 
after 1958, and one in which Britain would not be committed to 
intervene, was between Iraq and Iran. America's preparations 
for it were confined to reassessing its military assistance 
programme for Iran and to modifying its contingency planning 
to take into account a potential simultaneous Soviet and Iraqi 
attack upon Iran.
The possibility, however unlikely, of a relatively small 
and limited local conflict between the US and the Soviets 
caused by the entry of Soviet forces into Azerbaijan or other 
parts of northern Iran was foreseen by the National Security 
Council in 1949, among other times. Such an incursion was
50 Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia The Ceaseless Quest for 
Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 197.
51 William B. Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970”, in 
Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War 
U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 238. General Twining was 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1958.
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perhaps the one that would offer the greatest temptation 
to the USSR, and the one with which it would be the 
hardest to cope. The situation would be particularly 
difficult if the Russians should re-occupy the northern 
province of Iran swiftly and with very little bloodshed 
and then stop there and go no further.52
If the United Nations "confirmed the fact of Soviet 
aggression”, the United States would have to decide whether to 
help Iran. In recommending a course of action to Congress, 
the President
would have to take into account a number of variable 
factors, including the international situation at the 
moment, the state of international opinion as reflected 
in the United Nations, [America's] own analysis of 
Russian motives, the state of [its] commitments 
elsewhere, and the reactions of [its] closest allies. 
Therefore, no hard and fast course can be prescribed at 
the present time.53
A Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan, strategically the least 
objectionable Soviet military action in Iran54 and the most 
difficult with which to deal, might (along with an inadequate 
conventional military capability) cause America to confine its 
response to political measures and to make no more than a 
token military response.
52 State, FRUS 1949 vol. 6, p. 551.
53 Idem. As a draft NSC study in December 1951 on America's 
policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East 
generalized, America should not commit forces to the area "but 
should retain flexibility ... and arrive at a decision on the 
employment of U.S. forces only in the light of particular 
circumstances as they may exist." State, FRUS 1951 vol. 5, p. 
262.
54 That occupying Azerbaijan was the least objectionable Soviet 
action was the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Memorandum 
bv the State-War-Naw Coordinating Committee to Major General 
John H. Hilldring in State, FRUS 194 6 vol. 7, The Near East 
and Africa (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1969), p. 531.
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In principle the "maximum deterrent effect” upon a minor 
Soviet aggression
should come from creating in the minds of the Soviet 
leadership a mixture of uncertainty and certainty: 
uncertainty whether a local aggression might not result 
in general war, and certainty that even if it did not, 
the United States could and would react with such force 
locally that it would be clear in advance that aggression 
would not pay.55
It would desirable to keep the Soviets clearly aware of the 
risk of a general war in order
to establish the conviction that any attack in the Middle 
East could bring devastating nuclear retaliation, and 
that, even if it did not, limited hostilities would not 
be likely to remain limited; at any rate, the decision to 
keep them limited would not be solely within Soviet 
control.56
The US would have to manipulate the Soviets' fear that a small 
war would escalate to a general war whose cost would outweigh 
inestimably the benefits of the limited war. If, however, the 
Soviets thought that America's nuclear capability was not a 
credible deterrent against a minor aggression by them, because 
of the USSR's acquisition of a counterbalancing nuclear 
capability, they might be sufficiently tempted to launch an 
attack. Too great a dependence by America on its nuclear 
deterrent would deprive it of flexibility of response. The US 
had
every reason, therefore, to remove the temptation by 
developing and maintaining the means of meeting a 
"controlled” aggression successfully without resort to 
all-out war. The mere existence of those means should
55 Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, pp. 177-178.
56 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
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have the effect of discouraging Soviet adventures and 
lessening the risk that the Soviet leaders may come to 
count on a paralysis of American will,57
A substantial conventional US capability to
take counteraction on the spot would constitute a warning 
that any aggression up to a certain magnitude would meet 
certain and effective resistance and accordingly would 
not pay. It would thus be desirable to maintain a
military posture that, in its effect on Soviet 
calculations, would narrow or eliminate any gap that 
might exist between an aggression too small to be worth 
the hard fighting required and one too large to be worth 
the mortal risk58
of US nuclear retaliation. In order to deter limited Soviet 
aggression
at least one division of ground forces with high mobility 
and firepower, able to use tactical nuclear weapons but 
also to fight without them if necessary, should be 
maintained either in the Middle East or at points from 
which they could quickly be brought into it by air ..., 
points where they would be stationed, to Moscow's 
knowledge, for the specific purpose of being ready in 
case of aggression....59
The relative proximity of an American division would show that 
the US would indeed reinforce Iranian resistance against a 
Soviet attack. In Iran, where
the Soviet Union's own forces would be engaged, it is 
doubtful whether an aggression on the Korean scale could 
be kept within limits, as Moscow must recognize; and even 
if the American forces on the spot were inadequate in the 
beginning, as the conflict developed and if it remained
57 Ibid. p. 177. The rest of this paragraph is policy 
recommendation by Campbell which reflects the general trend of 
strategic thinking in the United States in the latter 1950s 
against the Administration's policy of "massive” strategic 
nuclear retaliation (see below).
58 Ibid., p. 193.
59 Ibid., p. 194.
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limited, additional forces could be sent to assist them. 
A central reserve of such forces should be kept in being, 
to be drawn on for that type of emergency, whether it 
should arise in the Middle East or elsewhere.60
The US 6th Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean with a strong 
Marine detachment and also a "similar force in the Indian 
Ocean and Persian Gulf area [as] a necessary supplement to 
it”61 would be "a large part of the answer” to the need "to 
show strength inconspicuously, to have military power present 
and taken into account in the calculations of all concerned 
but without raising political difficulties....”62
An American policy for use of conventional forces in a 
limited war against the USSR in Iran was unrealistic and 
confined to "principle" because, as noted above, the US lacked 
the capability and the regional political and logistic support 
necessary to fight and thwart, much less defeat the Soviets. 
In practice America's strategic policy intended to deter a 
Soviet attack by heavy reliance on the threat of retaliation 
with nuclear weapons. The difficulty in this policy lay in 
forging a credible link, without regionally-based conventional 
US forces to reinforce that link, between a limited war and 
America's "global”, strategic nuclear deterrent. The problem 
was how to persuade the Soviet Union that introducing forces 
into Iran would lead to US nuclear retaliation and perhaps 
general war when the American government doubted that 
Azerbaijan was "vital” to the US, Britain and the West, that 
loss of it alone to the Soviets would be "fatal"63 and that 
therefore it would not be conceded. But deterrence against 
the Soviets would be successful, America assumed, because the 
USSR's unwillingness to risk military action which might
60 Ibid., pp. 194-195.
61 Ibid., p. 194.
62 Ibid., p. 197.
63 Note, for instance, State, FRUS 1950 vol. 5, pp. 190-191.
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provoke US nuclear retaliation was greater than America's 
bluff/risk in proposing to protect a lesser interest, one not 
"worth” a nuclear response, by jeopardizing higher interests 
in other regions. If the Soviet Union did call the Americans' 
bluff, because its defensive interests in Iran were perceived 
to be clearly at stake and to be more important than US 
defensive interests there, then probably the US would have had 
to concede the Soviets' occupation of Azerbaijan.
The United States' strategic policy from the late 1940s 
until the early 1950s in the improbable case of a major Soviet 
attack upon Iran* and perhaps other Middle Eastern states too 
tended towards indirect defence. It would forgo an 
impracticable direct defence of Iran and respond with 
conventional counter-action in other regions. But, as shown, 
in actuality it would rely mainly on retaliation with atomic 
weapons, whether in Iran or in another theatre. According to 
a memorandum in 1947 by the Chief of the Division of South 
Asian Affairs in the State Department, a
policy of full support of the Eastern Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, and particularly of Italy, Greece, 
Turkey, and Iran, does not necessarily mean that 
machinery would be set in motion for the direct defense 
of the threatened area, but rather that counter measures 
would be taken wherever and whenever it may be determined 
that they could be most effective.... Whereas we propose 
to take a political stand against Soviet aggression on 
the Italy-Greece-Turkey-Iran front, ...in the event of 
the necessity of recourse to arms, our military effort 
might be concentrated elsewhere with a view to most 
effective use of the forces employed.64
”In the event of Soviet-Iranian hostilities”, the Secretary of 
State told the American ambassador to Iran in 1947, "basic 
Iranian interests would be helped or hurt primarily by
In a major attack Soviet forces would attempt to occupy the 
oilfields and installations in Khuzistan province in south­
western Iran.
64 State, FRUS 1947. vol. 5, pp. 578-579.
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military and political developments in other theaters.”65 The 
US thus accepted the risk of initiating fighting in regions of 
higher priority than Iran - and incurring harm to its and its 
allies' security - in defence of a lesser, more indirect 
“vital" interest. This risk was the same as that involved in 
attempting to deter the Soviets' entry into Azerbaijan alone. 
But it possessed somewhat less bluff because the value 
bestowed on Iran by the US was more credibly worth general war 
and resort to nuclear weapons, if still not decisively so, 
than Azerbaijan alone. (In 1950 America agreed with Britain 
that "an overt Soviet attack on Iran would raise an immediate 
question of general war."66) The United States would have 
been willing to use the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command 
in an effort to help defend Iran and also Saudi Arabia against 
a Soviet attack67 or to impede the movement of Soviet forces 
in Iran and delay their occupation of the Persian Gulf coast 
south to Dhahran.
From about 1952-53, when America had assumed at least 
informally from Britain primary responsibility for Iran's 
security against the USSR and when "massive retaliation" was 
becoming the cardinal US strategic concept, the United States 
proposed to deter a Soviet attack by resort almost exclusively 
to use of nuclear weapons, whether tactical ones in Iran or 
strategic ones against the USSR itself, if not both.
Contingency Planning to the Early 1950s
In 1950s the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and their 
British counterparts addressed the desirability, should there 
be war with the USSR, of demolishing the oil fields and 
installations in the Persian Gulf, particularly Iran, in order
65 Ibid., p. 925.
66 State, FRUS 1950 vol. 5, p. 190.
67 State, FRUS 1950 vol. 3, pp. 1686-1687. Note also State, 
FRUS 1950 vol. 5, p. 474. US Navy tactical air support might 
also have been employed, according to State, FRUS 1951 vol. 5, 
p. 33.
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to prevent their exploitation by the Soviet Union.68 But 
because of the very difficult lines of communication through 
western Iran, they doubted whether, even if the Soviets 
captured the oil facilities intact, much oil could be got back 
to the USSR. And if the refineries were destroyed, a task 
easily done according to the Air Chiefs of Staff, the Soviets 
would not be able to supply even their expeditionary forces in 
the Middle East with Persian Gulf oil. In view of the limited 
value of Gulf oil to the Soviet Union and of the harmful 
effect on morale in Iran and other regional states and on the 
West's Cold War position which would result from knowledge of 
UK-US plans to demolish the oilfields, the British and 
American Chiefs of Staff doubted seriously whether they should 
proceed with making plans for demolition.
In contingency planning in the latter 1940s and the early 
1950s for resistance, if not defence against a Soviet advance 
to the Persian Gulf and also to the Suez Canal, the US 
attended first to the defence of Saudi Arabia. America's most 
important regional interest, its oil concessions, lay in Saudi 
Arabia and as the US position there was paramount, unlike in 
Iran, Britain did not plan to defend it. While considered 
important in its own right, Iran was viewed by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff as a British responsibility and as a shield 
for Saudi Arabia: from "the standpoint of defensive purposes” 
it offered "opportunities to conduct delaying operations 
and/or operations to protect United States-controlled oil 
resources in Saudi Arabia."69 From a broader, regional
68 This paragraph draws upon State, FRUS 1950 vol. 5, pp. 236- 
237.
69 State, FRUS 1946 vol. 3, p. 530. For Britain's plan to deal 
with a German attack from the Caucasus Mountains into Iran in 
World War II, consult G.H.O.. M.E.F. Operation Instruction No. 
118. Operations in Persia, in "Operations In The Middle East 
From 1st November 1941 to 15th August 1942" A despatch 
submitted to the Secretary of State for War on 27th January, 
1943 by General Sir Claude J.E. Auchinleck, Commander-in- 
Chief, the Middle East Forces in Supplement to the London 
Gazette. 15th January, 1948, no. 38177, pp. 388-390. General
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perspective, defensive action which used Iran's territorial 
depth and difficult terrain was necessary "for preventing a 
Soviet attack overrunning the whole Middle East including the 
Suez-Cairo area ... before sufficient defensive forces could 
be interposed.1,70 "Holding" the Middle East was important 
because it was "one of the few favorable areas for 
counteroffensive action"71 against the USSR. The JCS well 
understood that the
most desirable course of action would be to hold the oil- 
bearing areas since it would obviate the necessity for 
their recapture and the 3l/3 divisions and 3 fighter 
groups required would be considerably less than would be 
required to retake them either immediately or 
subsequently. Immediate retaking of the oil areas as far 
north as the Iranian areas at the head of the Gulf would 
require a total of approximately 5 divisions and 5 
fighter groups.72
Auchinleck's object was to ensure the security of bases, 
ports, oil supplies and refineries in Iraq and Persia and he
intended to stop the enemy as far forward as possible.
Maximum loss and delay would be inflicted upon the Germans who 
would not be allowed to establish themselves south of the line 
from Pahlevi through Qasvin, Hamadan, Senna, Saqqiz to 
Rowanduz Gorge, along which line there would be prepared 
defences. In Operation Instruction No. 118 and in 
instructions devoted to defence against an attack into Turkey, 
General Auchinleck proposed to delay the enemy's advance, and 
allow time for reinforcements to arrive, by demolishing
communications and oil stocks in northern Iran; by holding 
delaying positions astride the enemy's main lines of advance 
in country unsuited to armoured fighting vehicles and, because 
the enemy was stronger, avoiding engagement except on
favourable ground; by counter-attacking the enemy's flanks and 
rear when there was satisfactory opportunity; and by
protecting advanced aerodromes from which to launch air
attacks. He would fight delaying actions back to southern 
Iraq, if necessary, and cover the ports on the Persian Gulf.
Training in manoeuvre warfare was essential to success.
70 State, FRUS 1946 vol. 3, p. 530.
71 Idem.
72 Quotation from "formerly top secret analyses by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff" in Joshua M. Epstein, Strategy And Force 
Planning The Case of the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 86. The JCS, Epstein points 
out (fn. 93, p. 87), "noted that 'the forces for holding ...
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But, the JCS calculated, although Britain and America 
"probably could not retain the major portion of the oil- 
producing areas from the outset", they could "deny the enemy 
use of oil-producing facilities...,"73 as indicated above. US 
contingency planning in the late 1940s, unilateral and with 
the UK, envisaged primarily Britain delaying a Soviet advance 
through Iran by destroying roads and railways at critical 
points such as bridges, tunnels and mountain passes.74 
Without adequate deployed forces and reinforcements, the UK 
and the US would have had to concede the northern Persian Gulf 
to the USSR and withdraw to Egypt. From there they would, 
according to short-range US planning, regain in time - before 
the end of the second year of war, when Gulf oil would become 
necessary - "a portion of the Middle East oil resources...."75 
When America's strategic focus narrowed in 1953 to defence of 
the "northern tier", its modification and renaming of the UK's 
"outer ring" concept, its contingency planning concentrated on
would be sufficient ... to protect the oil areas from Soviet 
airborne attacks and overland advances through Iran.'" 
Approximately 23 Soviet divisions were available for 
operations in the Middle East in the late 1940s and the early 
1950s. See Department of State Minutes of State-Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Meeting in State, FRUS 1952-1954 vol. 9, pt. 1, pp. 
522-523.
73 State, FRUS 1948 vol. 5, The Near East, South Asia, and 
Africa,.pt. 1 (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1975), p. 3.
74 See Epstein, Strategy And Force Planning, pp. 49-51, 56-57. 
Beginning in 1949, he observes (p.13), the US devised 
"options" for use of atomic weapons against targets, mainly 
road and rail centres and ports, in the USSR itself as a way 
of retarding a Soviet advance into Iran and Turkey.
75 State, FRUS 1948 vol. 5, pt. 1, p. 2. By 1953 the JCS had 
apparently concluded that Persian Gulf oil would be necessary 
closer to the outbreak of war with the USSR: US military 
planners were studying the defence with Britain in war "of 
such limited areas as may be necessary to permit continued 
exploitation of petroleum of one oil complex determined to be 
the most economically defensible in terms of force 
requirements." Memorandum bv the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 
Secretary of Defense in State, FRUS 1952-1954 vol. 9, pt. 1, 
p. 411.
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"holding" mountain passes along "a line based on the Taurus 
Mountains in Southern Turkey and the Zagros Mountains in Iraq 
and Iran ... [which] would thus safeguard the major oil 
production areas of the Middle East."76 Under the auspices of 
the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, the US made plans 
for mountain defence but more "realistic" planning was 
confined to air strikes with atomic bombs,77 even though in 
1952 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed 
"doubt that it would effective to use them in the mountain 
passes.... "78
"Policy" in the 1960s: Interventionism and Emphasis on
Conventional Forces. Quest for Logistic Facilities
From the early 1960s deterring Soviet aggression against 
Iran and, more immediately and actively as the potential 
Soviet threat was perceived to become latent, preventing 
conflict between and within regional states from producing 
undesirable political change were America's main strategic 
objectives for what it began to call the "Indian Ocean area". 
The Strike Command (STRICOM or STRIKE) was created in order to 
provide an organized conventional capability for better 
deterring or resisting a Soviet attack but mainly for 
intervening in insurgencies or perhaps small wars. It 
competed with the US Navy and the Marines in the 
interventionist role. The United States also increased its 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean in 1963-1964 in order to 
show tangibly more interest in littoral states and to 
reinforce its regional diplomacy, until all 7th Fleet aircraft 
carrier task groups were committed to the Vietnam war. The
76 state, FRUS 1952-1954 vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 320.
77 In the latter 1950s the US Air Force established the 
Composite Air Strike Force (CASF), which emphasized the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars and possessed a 
contingency plan for all conceivable trouble spots. Robert P. 
Haffa, The Half War Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to 
Meet a Limited Contingency. 1960-1983 (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1984), pp. 91-92.
78 State, FRUS 1952-1954 vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 239.
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Americans encouraged Britain to maintain its political and 
military presence in the Indian Ocean area as much as possible 
and they acquired access to British islands. Proposed 
facilities there were intended first for logistic support of 
intervention, until that was discarded as a means of policy in 
1968, and then for helping to counterbalance the new Soviet 
naval presence.
The Kennedy administration came to power in 1961 
sceptical about the credibility and efficacy of nuclear 
weapons for deterrence or defence against limited aggression 
by the USSR, much less for coping with numerous small 
conflicts, inter-state and, even more likely, internal, in the 
Third World. The Soviets had endorsed wars of "national 
liberation" and it was feared that by supporting and 
exploiting unconventional, minor conflicts they might 
ultimately accumulate enough influence to shift the global 
balance of power, or "correlation of forces”, decisively 
against the West. Not easily able to respond to limited 
contingencies without resort to nuclear weapons, the US 
worried about its incapacity to intervene in a Third World 
conflict, whether or not the Soviets were involved, without 
seriously risking a nuclear confrontation with them. 
President Kennedy and his Secretary of Defence, Robert 
McNamara, resolved to develop conventional forces capable of 
waging two large wars, in Europe and in East Asia, and 
fighting a smaller, limited war typified as a Third World 
insurgency perhaps involving Cuba.
In order for the US to be able to fight a limited war 
McNamara ordered the organization of a force which could 
respond to any kind of limited aggression by communist forces 
promptly, with appropriate preparation and in adequate 
strength. Because of the large political and economic costs 
of stationing abroad all the forces needed to fight in several 
theatres and because American forces could be needed for 
concurrent contingencies in places other than the three most
probable ones noted above, the US decided to enlarge its home- 
based strategic reserve forces. In December 1961 it created 
and based at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida the 
Strike Command. STRICOM had access, for the conduct of 
exercises and contingency operations only, to the US Army's 
XVIII Corps (the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Air Assault 
Division and the 4th Infantry Division) and the US Air Force's 
Tactical Air Command fighter, reconnaissance and troop carrier 
wings.79 STRIKE had two general, global purposes: to be ready 
to reinforce by aerial movement of the Army forces US unified 
commands such as the European Command and to be prepared for 
integrated Air Force-Army operations across the entire range 
of limited war, from subversion to tactical nuclear warfare. 
Its capability for rapid intervention, the Kennedy 
administration reasoned, could deter conflicts and prevent 
them from growing by “nipping them in the bud”.80 America 
would achieve economy of force and flexibility in use of 
STRICOM provided that an adequate number of long-range 
transport aircraft and also ships were available to move 
quickly and, with available regional facilities, sustain an 
expeditionary force and provided that US forces were versatile 
in training and equipment for fighting in mountain, desert and 
jungle.
Besides being ready to augment other commands STRIKE was 
intended by McNamara "'as the primary force for use [that is, 
intervention] in remote areas such as Central Africa or the
79 These wings consisted of the "TAC's 19th Air Force and CASF 
capabilities.” Haffa, The Half War, p. 93. The Strategic 
Army Corps, consisting in 1961 of the XVIII Army Corps, was 
intended by the Administration to increase to six and finally 
eight divisions, all of which STRICOM would be able to draw 
upon. Ibid., pp. 31, 100.
80 On Strike Command and its background, see Ibid., pp. 25-38, 
93-105; General Paul D. Adams, "Strike Command", Military 
Review (May 1962), pp. 2-10; Major General Clyde Box, "United 
States Strike Command", Air University Review 
(September/October 1964), pp. 2-14.
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Middle East.'"81 In November 1963 STRICOM was assigned 
autonomous responsibility, previously held by the US Navy, for 
all US defence activities - including the operations of the 
Middle East Force, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, 
exercises and the planning and execution of contingency 
operations - in the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara 
and South Asia.82 The commander of STRICOM became Commander- 
in-Chief MEAFSA. "CINCSTRIKE-CINCMEAFSA" was responsible also 
for reacting to potential Soviet aggression against Iran.
America's strategic contribution to Middle Eastern, 
specifically Iranian, security was discussed in McNamara's 
statement to Congress in 1964 on the US defence "posture”. 
The Middle East was a region ”of great political instability 
and uneven economic development.” Although Iran bordered on 
the USSR and was directly exposed to its military power,
the more immediate danger to the peace and stability of 
the area is internal, and stems from: the deep-seated 
animosities existing between the Arab countries and 
Israel; the power struggles and rivalries among the Arab 
countries themselves; and the existence of powerful 
minority groups within most of these countries, such as 
the Kurds in Iraq, as well as inequalities which require 
social and economic reforms.83
The "internal" danger to Middle Eastern stability "confronted" 
the US with "two sets of problems": to help create a setting 
in which regional states could maintain internal stability and 
develop their economy and society without fear of attack by
81 Haffa, The Half War, p. 98.
82 Idem. Note "Annual Report Of The Secretary Of The Air 
Force" in U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1964. pp. 283-84.
83 United States, Department of Defense, Statement Of Secretary 
Of Defence Robert S. McNamara Before The House Armed Services 
Committee On The Fiscal Year 1965-1969 Defense Program And The 
Fiscal Year 1965 Budget. 1964, p. 15.
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neighbours or of infiltration or subversion by the Communist 
Bloc; and to provide a sense of security to Iran because of 
its direct exposure to Soviet military power. But despite the
strategic vulnerability of Iran, it seems quite unlikely 
that the Soviet Union would, in view of our mutual 
cooperation agreement with Iran, deliberately undertake 
a major aggression against that country in the near 
future. In fact, if Chairman Khrushchev's pronouncement 
of a few years ago regarding Iran can be taken at face 
value, the Soviet Union does not believe that military 
aggression is necessary to bring Iran into the Soviet 
orbit. Given the economic and social conditions 
prevailing in Iran a few years ago, Chairman Khrushchev 
said that Iran would in time 'fall like a ripe fruit' 
into the Soviet lap. Recent vigorous Soviet efforts to 
improve relations with Iran and Communist efforts to take 
credit for the Shah's reforms indicate that Chairman 
Khrushchev may not be so sure today.
... it is certainly clear that the more likely 
contingency is a covert or ambiguous aggression, using 
dissident elements in Iran or neighboring nations to pave 
the way for ultimate Communist takeover. In Iran, as 
elsewhere in the world, the best defense against the 
spread of communism is a steady improvement in economic 
and social conditions, which is the primary aim of our 
economic aid efforts.84
Although secondary to improving Iranian economic and social 
conditions, Iran's military security and America's strategic 
contribution to it were still important. And with regard to 
that security, America's
objective has been to help build up Iran's military 
forces to the point where they could ensure internal 
security and provide at least an initial defense against 
a Soviet attack across borders. Although the Iranian 
military forces, with our aid, have improved 
significantly during the last decade, they are still not 
and never can be a match for even those Soviet forces 
presently deployed along the Iranian borders, even though 
the terrain favors the defense. Thus Iran could not be 
expected to stand alone for very long against a major 
attack from its northern neighbor and would require 
immediate assistance from the United States; and in this 
event, the defense of Iran could not be separated from
84 Ibid., p. 16.
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the larger problem of the collective defense of the free 
world.85
According to a general purpose (conventional) forces 
study and related analyses conducted by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in 1962-63, approximately four Army divisions and six 
Air Force fighter-attack wings from the home-based strategic 
reserve, that is, STRIKE, would be needed to meet a limited 
Soviet attack against Iran.86 Except in the case of a 
"massive” attack by the USSR, McNamara stated in his defence 
report in 1964, America with its allies possessed enough 
"active forces for the initial stages of a conflict, without 
immediately resorting to nuclear weapons."87 Even so, he 
continued, it would be
necessary to mobilize reserve component units rapidly at 
the start of a conflict in order to provide the 
additional forces needed to sustain combat and to 
reconstitute the strategic reserve. And, in all cases, 
it is clear that ultimate allied success would be heavily 
dependent upon achieving early air superiority and upon 
having adequate air and sea lift.88
85 Idem. McNamara recognized that a "direct U.S. military 
intervention in defense of a nation threatened by Communist 
attack ... always carries with it the danger of expanding the 
area of conflict." (United States, Department of Defense, 
Statement Of Secretary Of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before 
The House Armed Services Committee On The Fiscal Year 1966- 
1970 Defense Program And Fiscal Year 1966 Defense Budget. 
February 18, 1965, p. 72.) It was expected that Iran's CENTO 
allies, Britain in particular, would also contribute forces 
against a Soviet attack.
86 See William W. Kaufmann, Planning Conventional Forces. 1950- 
1980 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982),
p. 6.
87 U.S. Defense, Statement Of McNamara FY 1965. p. 60.
88 Idem. Time and economy of force were leading considerations 
in America's planning for a limited war. The US had been 
giving "a great deal of attention in recent years to the 
various ways of reducing its reaction time to limited war 
situations", McNamara pointed out in his defence report for 
1965. (U.S. Defense, Statement Of McNamara FY 1966. p. 72.) 
A capability for a quick response, in days rather than weeks, 
to threatened or actual aggression could, in some cases, serve
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But insufficient airlift and sealift, STRICOM's inadequate 
readiness for quick deployment abroad and insufficient combat 
support for deployed forces impaired America's capability to 
wage a limited war.89 And although the US did procure the C-5 
long-range transport aircraft, those impairments were not 
greatly reduced.* Thus even if a simultaneous contingency did 
not occur and distract its forces, America did not possess 
enough ships and aircraft to reinforce Iran speedily with more 
than a fraction of the four divisions.90 Despite the Kennedy 
administration's emphasis on improving the capability of 
conventional forces to fight a limited war, quite probably the 
US would have had to use tactical nuclear weapons against a 
Soviet attack, for which STRIKE had prepared.91
In addition to its military aid and training programmes 
and its creation of Strike Command, McNamara pointed out that 
the United States had
to halt it before it really got started. Thus it could do 
much to forestall the need to employ much greater force later 
on in order to recover lost ground. (U.S. Defense, Statement 
Of McNamara FY 1965. p. 61; U.S. Defense, Statement Of 
McNamara. FY 1966. p. 72.)
Congress denied money for the "Fast Deployment Logistics” 
ship for fear of encouraging the Executive branch's 
interventionist tendency. Nor did the US preposition 
equipment and supplies at Diego Garcia. (For that proposal, 
see below.)
89 U.S. Defense, Statement Of McNamara FY 1965. pp. 58, 61.
90 Had there been a concurrent contingency in Europe, only two 
Army divisions would have been available for a lesser 
contingency, according to Haffa, The Half War, p. 31. There 
would have been even less transportation on hand to move them 
and possibly Marine forces to Iran. The Vietnam war absorbed 
the strategic reserve forces available in principle for a 
limited war in Iran.
91 See Ibid., fn. 74, p. 136. Epstein, Strategy And Force 
Planning, p. 14, states: ”... a Soviet invasion of Iran was 
among the key scenarios used in deriving U.S. theater nuclear 
force goals in 1968.” Planning by the JCS assumed that 
nuclear weapons were needed in order to defeat ten Soviet 
divisions in Iran.
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undertaken other steps to underscore our interest in 
arresting any deterioration in the security of [the 
Middle East]• Our military forces have engaged in 
military exercises with ... Iran and Saudi Arabia in 
order to demonstrate our capability and determination to 
lend support when and if required. We have also made our 
military presence visible through judicious and periodic 
deployment of elements of our own forces.92
In spring 1964 STRICOM "deployed a joint task force composed 
of an airborne brigade and two fighter squadrons, with 
associated airlift, from the United States through Adana, 
Turkey, to Iran”.93 There "some 6,800 U.S. Army, Navy and Air 
Force personnel participated in the CENTO-sponsored Exercise 
DELAWAR in the Persian Gulf ...1194 and Iran with Iranian 
forces. "DELAWAR provided valuable experience in planning and 
conducting combined operations under Central Treaty 
Organization ... auspices.”95 STRIKE'S involvement was 
intended to show that although detente between Iran and the 
Soviet Union from 1962 had made a Soviet attack upon Iran 
improbable, the US still took seriously that contingency and 
CENTO as a means (or at least a cover) for dealing with it. 
STRIKE served as well to demonstrate a link between America's 
interest in and commitment to Iranian security and its 
conventional forces in the US. The Shah's confidence in 
America's support for him weakened when, in his view, the 
Americans failed to help Pakistan in its war with India in 
1965.
Earlier, in late 1962 and in 1963, the United States had 
sent forces to Saudi Arabia following the outbreak in 
September 1962 of civil war in North Yemen in which Egypt
92 U.S. Defense, Statement Of McNamara FY 1965. p. 17.
93 "Annual Report Of The Secretary Of The Air Force” in U.S. 
Defense, Annual Report FY 1964. p. 295.
94 "Annual Report Of The Secretary Of Defense” in Ibid., p. 54.
95 "Annual Report Of The Secretary Of The Air Force” in Ibid., 
p. 295.
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intervened directly with its armed forces on the side of the 
republican forces and the Saudis intervened indirectly on the 
side of the royalist forces. Egyptian aircraft and destroyers 
struck at Saudi border towns where royalist Yemeni forces had 
support bases. Having declared its support for Saudi 
territorial integrity, the Kennedy administration sent combat 
aircraft on demonstration flights over Jidda and Riyadh as a 
warning to Egypt against further attacks against Saudi 
territory and to reassure the Saudis that the US supported 
them. In January 1963 America reinforced the Middle East 
Force, sending two destroyers to Jidda from the Mediterranean. 
Later it sent a small detachment from the 82nd Airborne 
Division under Strike Command for "training” with Saudi troops 
and in summer 1963 a fighter squadron carried out training 
exercises over Saudi Arabia after further Egyptian air 
attacks. It was a Saudi perception, however, that although 
America had warned Nasser not to "carry the air war to the 
Saudi interior and inflict ... severe damage",
there was no assurance that he would heed the warning or 
that [despite its military display] the United States 
would react effectively if he did not. After all, the 
United States was tolerating the bombing of the border 
areas on the grounds advanced by the Egyptians that these 
were staging points and bases for the royalists.96
But
as the Egyptians continued to bomb and shell the Saudi 
border areas without being molested by the U.S. Air 
Force, it became apparent that the American 'protection' 
extended only to the oil facilities and to an 
'unprovoked' extension of the war into the interior of 
Saudi Arabia. The border areas, insofar as they served 
as bases for the forces opposing the Egyptians, were 
apparently fair game as far as the United States was 
concerned.97
96 Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 200.
97 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
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From 1960 intervention was a principal theme in planning 
for the Indian Ocean area by the US Navy. Anticipating the 
Kennedy administration's interventionist/limited war outlook 
outlined above, the Navy perceived that decolonization would 
lead to instability within newly independent states, to 
conflicts between them and to anti-Western nationalism and 
non-alignment, all of which the Soviets and the Chinese would 
try to manipulate to their advantage. US intervention might 
be necessary in order to support friendly governments, restore 
stability, forestall communist attempts to gain power and 
thereby eliminate the USSR's opportunity to gain influence.98 
According to Navy planners America would have "to sustain a 
military presence in the Indian Ocean, both to support US 
prestige with displays of force, and, when required, to 
'intervene promptly to defeat aggression or subversion, 
restore order and/or evacuate Western inhabitants'".99 The 
Navy and the Marines, they asserted, gave the US independence 
and flexibility of operations for intervention and the 
prosecution of limited wars; and intervention - in fact, a 
traditional proprietorial role of the Navy and the Marines - 
provided a role for aircraft carriers now that Polaris fleet 
ballistic missile submarines would soon take over the Navy's 
contribution to strategic nuclear deterrence against the USSR.
By reviving its interventionist role the Navy competed 
with Strike Command. The USN judged STRICOM to be unnecessary 
because it and the Marines already had an adequate ground and 
air capability for mounting interventions. It resented 
STRICOM's acquisition of the role as primary agent of American 
intervention and of responsibility for all US military
98 For the American Navy's view of decolonization and its 
repercussions, see William Stivers, America's Confrontation 
with Revolutionary Change in the Middle East. 1948-83 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1986), pp. 28-32.
99 Ibid., p. 31. Stivers quotes from a memorandum prepared in 
June 1960 by the Long-Range Objectives Group for the Chief of 
Naval Operations: "Assuring a Future Base Structure in the 
African Indian Ocean Area". Note also Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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activities in the Middle East. A secondary role, in support 
of intervention/limited war operations by STRIKE, would, the 
Navy feared, lead to its subordination, if not ultimately loss 
of autonomy to the Army and the Air Force. Anxious that those 
two services might come to monopolize the interventionist 
"mission”, the USN refused to cooperate and commit forces to 
Strike Command, thereby impairing STRICOM's planning and its 
operational capability.100
The US Navy also entertained plans for increasing its 
presence in the Indian Ocean but the main impetus for that 
measure came from the Presidency and the State Department, 
which thought that more naval deployments would possess 
important political signalling and display value. US aircraft 
carrier task groups had visited the Indian Ocean area in 1960 
and 1961.101 In autumn 1962 America's review of available 
military resources when India asked for emergency air defence 
help during its war with China "revealed serious weaknesses in
100 Haffa, The Half War, pp. 96-97.
101 The American task groups could of course fight as well as 
display. According to Hermann F. Eilts, "Security 
Considerations in the Persian Gulf”, International Security 5 
(Fall 1980), 108,
[d]uring the ... 1961 Iraqi threat against Kuwait, the 
Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations, 
with the concurrence of the President, took the 
initiative to offer augmentation to the British task 
force deployed to Kuwait in the form of a small United 
States naval flotilla, Solantimitv. then visiting 
Mombasa, if such would be needed. The British Cabinet, 
after deliberation, declined the American offer with 
thanks, just in time to permit the lead destroyers to be 
turned back before transitting the Straits of Hormuz. 
The incident underscored Washington's recognition that 
the strategic and economic importance of the Gulf area 
warranted deployment of American forces, if needed, to 
safeguard the political independence of friendly area 
states and to protect American and Western interests 
there.
58
the ability to respond even to limited contingencies....”102 
Partly as a result of that review the State Department "became 
convinced of the need to have a U.S. military presence to lend 
muscle to American diplomacy in the region and to underline, 
for ... friends ..., U.S. ability to meet its commitments.”103 
Its view was reinforced when in March 1963 the US encountered 
difficulty in gaining staging and overflying permission for 
fighter aircraft deploying to Saudi Arabia in response to the 
Saudis' request for help against Egyptian air raids upon their 
territory. The "political problems” caused by the movement of 
the aircraft "roused” Kennedy's "interest in a US carrier 
presence in the Indian Ocean” and he asked the Department of 
Defence to "consider carrier task force cruises as part of its 
strategic planning for the area.”104 Task groups visited the 
Indian Ocean twice in 1963 - the Essex task group took part in 
the annual CENTO exercise, MIDLINK - and consideration was 
given to stationing there an aircraft carrier amphibious group 
or deploying periodically a "small fleet”.105 Because 
McNamara and the Navy commands in the Mediterranean and the 
Pacific opposed an Indian Ocean "fleet”, that proposal was 
rejected. But "periodic cruises were deemed highly 
desirable"106 and in March 1964 President Johnson authorized 
"the beginning of what was to be a policy of introducing U.S.
102 Gary Sick, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategy Toward the Indian 
Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions", in The Great Game Rivalry in 
the Persian Gulf and South Asia, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 54. Walter K. Andersen, 
"Emerging Security Issues in the Indian Ocean: An American 
Perspective", in Superpower Rivalry In The Indian Ocean 
Indian And American Perspectives, eds. Selig S. Harrison, K. 
Subrahmanyam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 
19-20, notes that the US "dispatched the U.S.S. Enterprise to 
the Bay of Bengal in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian war to 
help provide air cover to Calcutta if ... necessary."
103 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 54.
104 Stivers, America's Confrontation, p. 44.
105 Christian Science Monitor. December 22, 1962; New York 
Times, December 13, 1963.
106 Stivers, America's Confrontation, p. 44.
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military power into the Indian Ocean region on an intermittent 
but regular basis.”107 Only two deployments, in April-May and 
August-September 1964, took place before this “policy” was 
discontinued when the 7th Fleet, from which the deploying task 
groups were drawn, became preoccupied with the second Vietnam 
war.
Although a support base was unnecessary for aircraft 
carrier task groups making routine peacetime cruises and 
paying port visits, US Navy planners had identified by 1960 a 
need to acquire secure access to logistic facilities in the 
Indian Ocean area. They would support potential contingency 
operations, whether intervention or a sustained "show of 
force" in a crisis, in which the tempo of operations would be 
much higher than usual. The essential condition for secure 
access was that facilities be free from the danger that the 
Navy could be evicted from them for political reasons. The 
availability of mainland bases was declining and it would 
continue to do so as British colonies became independent. 
Access to those bases was politically unreliable: a new state 
was unlikely to support intervention against another Indian 
Ocean area state. And even if the purpose of US contingency 
operations proved to be acceptable to it, arrangement of 
access to its facilities might be slow and their use would be 
strictly ad hoc and of limited scope and duration. If America 
waited until the need for logistic support facilities was 
immediate and compelling, it might be "too late" to acquire 
access either to bases or to safe sites where dependence on 
the host state could be avoided and facilities could be 
constructed.
The US Navy's "solution" to the identified requirement 
for secure logistic facilities was the "strategic island" 
concept, formally proposed in June 1960. Its rationale was 
that only small, lightly populated islands of British
107 Sick, "Evolution of Indian Ocean Strategy", p. 54.
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archipelago colonies
could safely be held 'under the full control of the West 
in face of the currents of nationalism'. Prompt action 
should be taken to segregate these territories from 
larger political units due for independence. This was 
particularly important in the case of Diego Garcia, 'a 
large atoll ideally suited to be the primary Western 
fleet base and air staging position in the Indian 
Ocean'108
because of its position in the centre of the ocean roughly 
equi-distant (2,000 miles) from potential operating areas. 
Aldabra, about 500 miles south-east of Dar es-Salaam in (then) 
Tanganyika, and other islands were "possible links in a 
strategic chain stretching from Ascension in the South 
Atlantic through ... the Indian Ocean to Australia, and thence 
to Subic Bay in the Philippines",109 the main base of the 7th 
Fleet. The Navy submitted a proposal for detaching and 
"stockpiling" "strategic islands" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
who early in 1962 "recommended making arrangements with the 
British that would assure the availability of selected islands 
in the Indian Ocean; by 1963, Defense had firm plans for 
facilities in Diego Garcia."110
The Navy's proposal was supported by the State 
Department, which viewed it as an important way to encourage 
Britain to maintain its traditional political and military
108 Stivers, America's Confrontation, p. 34, quoting further 
from "Assuring a Future Base Structure in the African Indian 
Ocean Area". Note also Sick, "Evolution of Indian Ocean 
Strategy", p. 53. Diego Garcia lay about 1,100 miles south- 
southwest from the southern tip of India. It had an area of 
6,710 acres and its lagoon was 13 miles long and 5 i/2 miles 
wide.
109 Stivers, America's Confrontation, p. 35.
110 United States, General Accounting Office, Financial And 
Legal Aspects Of The Agreement On The Availability Of Certain 
Indian Ocean Islands For Defense Purposes. Report Of The 
Comptroller General Of The United States (January 7, 1976), p. 
4.
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presence in the Indian Ocean area. Island military facilities 
would help the United States to bring its military power to 
bear, intervening if necessary, and enhance regional 
stability. But they would also enable the US to avoid new 
security commitments and to keep its security - and 
interventionist - role secondary to that of Britain, which was 
more acceptable and knowledgeable in mounting "peacekeeping" 
operations. Current British strategic policy "envisioned 
stationing at Aden mobile forces, which would move to trouble 
spots on commando carriers or transport aircraft.1,111 And in 
light of the fact that "the territorial and financial bases of 
British power were withering away",
Anglo-American joint development of island facilities 
would accord with British thinking and permit [the UK's] 
mobile forces to remain effective when the Aden base was 
lost. This was crucial, American officials thought, to 
US hopes for strengthening the 'overall Western military 
posture in the Indian Ocean' with moves 'to complement 
(but not in any way to replace) the existing British 
effort in the area'.
The strategic islands would serve an economic 
purpose as well. ... An American share in the cost of 
constructing island facilities would subsidise the 
British presence....1,112
When in February 1964 formal discussions started between
111 Stivers, America's Confrontation, p. 46.
112 Idem. Stivers draws from a State Department memorandum, 
'Proposed Note to the British Government Concerning Possible 
Long-term Development of Base Facilities in the Indian Ocean 
Area', 25 April, 1963; a joint memorandum by the State 
Department and the Defence Department, 'Defense Problems in 
the Indian Ocean Area', 21 January, 1964; 'U.S. Defense 
Interests in the Indian Ocean. Memorandum of U.K./U.S. London 
Discussions, February 1964', State Department, 3 March, 1964; 
and a letter from the State Department to the Defence 
Department, 7 December, 1966. A "power vacuum" in the Indian 
Ocean area filled by the USSR and China if and when Britain 
withdrew (and the US did not respond) was used by the Johnson 
administration as a general justification for Diego Garcia, in 
addition to "the perceived need for future support facilities 
in the context of long-term contingency planning." Note Sick, 
"Evolution of Indian Ocean Strategy", p. 55.
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British and American officials about the feasibility of 
establishing joint staging posts in the Indian Ocean, both 
sides understood that "any new facilities would be 
complementary to the British bases at Aden and Singapore, 
which the United States continued to regard as essential for 
the security of the area."113
Neither party wished to station large, permanent forces 
in the region. But both saw the need to back up vital 
Western interests with military power. The strategic 
scheme would let them have things both ways, providing 
logistics centres and staging posts for sea or airborne 
forces which would make up in mobility what they lacked 
in numerical strength.114
Britain favoured Aldabra for supporting airborne forces 
intervening in East Africa while the American negotiators, 
keen that the islands selected should be detached promptly and 
placed under British sovereignty,
had a primary interest in building facilities on Diego 
Garcia. If surveys confirmed US expectations, the island 
would support a wide range of military actions. The navy 
had an immediate need for a communications centre. But 
over the long term, more extensive development was 
contemplated. Harbour dredging would provide anchorage 
for 'a carrier task force, and amphibious and support 
ships'. Fuel, equipment [and] ammunition might be 
prestocked (either on the ground or on 'floating depots') 
for subsequent 'marrying with mobile combat units which 
might be deployed into the area'. Such stockpiles could 
supply 'a substantial portion of an army division ... An 
airbase might support cargo, carrier, and tanker
113 Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez. 1947-1968.
p. 265. McNamara had at first opposed the project for joint 
facilities, because "it would be disastrous if the navy got 
hold of another ocean". (Idem) But he was prepared to support 
a small-scale undertaking once it became clear that the Indian 
Ocean area would remain primarily a British responsibility and 
that the arrangement could not lead to the creation of an 
American Indian Ocean fleet.
114 Stivers, America's Confrontation, pp. 47-48. According to 
the Washington Post. August 29, 1964 and the Cleveland Plain 
Dealer. August 30, 1964, Diego Garcia was designated for 
construction of an airstrip, anchorage and communications 
station at a cost of $25 million.
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aircraft.' Aerial surveillance, anti-submarine patrols 
and air logistics operations could be conducted from such 
a base.115 (Brackets in text.)
A survey by Britain and America in summer 1964 of 
possible sites for facilities confirmed Diego Garcia and 
Aldabra as very good possibilities. Talks between the two 
sides in April 1965 narrowed the choice of sites and the 
Americans reiterated their sense of urgency that the 
administrative transfer to direct British sovereignty of the 
islands selected had to be completed before the UK and 
Mauritius began to confer in late 1965 about that colony's 
independence. In autumn 1965 the British reached agreement 
with the Seychelles, another colony, for detachment of 
Aldabra, Desroches and Farquahar islands and with Mauritius 
for detachment of the Chagos archipelago, of which Diego 
Garcia was part. In November 1965 the UK formed those islands 
into the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT).
The selection of the islands to make up BIOT had been 
governed by the planning requirements of the Royal Air Force 
and the USAF and Strike Command on the one hand and of the US 
Navy on the other hand, and the conflict of emphasis between 
those requirements led to contention about whether facilities 
should be constructed first on Diego Garcia or Aldabra. But 
when in February 1966 the RAF won a debate with the Royal Navy 
about the predominance in future British defence of land- 
versus aircraft carrier-based air power, the informal alliance 
of the RAF and the USAF prevailed and Britain and America 
concurred "that Aldabra should be the first island ... 
developed".116 Planning by Britain and America for Aldabra 
was delayed in 1967 because, although the conditions for the 
US to lease BIOT and construct facilities there had been
115 Stivers, America's Confrontation, p. 48.
116 Kim C. Beazley and Ian Clark, The Politics of Intrusion The 
Super Powers and the Indian Ocean (Sydney: Alternative 
Publishing Cooperative Ltd., 1979), p. 7.
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negotiated and an agreement had been signed at the end of 
December 1966,117 the two sides differed about what should be 
built on it and how construction costs, higher than first 
estimated, should be divided. Underlying those differences 
was disagreement about the nature and extent of political and 
military cooperation between the US and the UK "east of Suez". 
Heavily engaged in the Vietnam war, the Americans could not 
offer Britain the collaboration it sought or the money it 
needed in order to buttress its military capability in the 
Indian Ocean area. In Britain plans for the Aldabra staging 
post were held up while the Ministry of Defence tried to 
recast its strategic policy for the area within the limits of 
a straightened budget. Also there was opposition to the 
Aldabra project at home and abroad from conservationists who 
campaigned to protect the island's unique natural environment. 
Finally, when the pound sterling was devalued in November 
1967, the Wilson government had to enforce further economies 
and the plans for Aldabra were cancelled.
In February 1967, well before the Aldabra project was 
abandoned and the competition from its service rivals was 
eliminated, the US Navy had proposed an "austere support 
facility” at Diego Garcia costing $26 million. The "main 
thrust" of the Navy's proposal "was to create an oiling 
station for carrier task forces transiting from Norfolk,
117 In an exchange of notes on December 30, 1966 Britain and 
America agreed on the "Availability Of Certain Indian Ocean 
Islands For Defense Purposes" of both governments "as they may 
arise". BIOT would remain under British sovereignty and after 
an initial period of fifty years, the agreement would continue 
in force for a further twenty years unless one party informed 
the other of its intention to end the agreement. Both 
governments had to approve in principle the construction of 
all facilities on BIOT. The text of the agreement is in 
United States, Congress, House, Committee On International 
Relations, Diego Garcia. 1975; The Debate Over The Base And 
The Island's Former Inhabitants. Hearings Before The Special 
Subcommittee On Investigations. 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 
pp. 50-55.
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Virginia to battle stations off Vietnam.1,118 A memorandum in 
July 1967 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 'Proposed Naval 
Facility on Diego Garcia' - evaluated favourably the Navy's 
proposal in the broad context of the interventionist ethos 
which informed US strategic planning for the Indian Ocean area 
in the 1960s.119 That memorandum
provided a list of situations in which US military power 
might be deployed from a Diego Garcia staging post. 
Twenty possibilities were listed - all comprising 
internal and regional crises, none involving Soviet 
military action in the area. Disturbances in India, 
political unrest in Ceylon, secession of East Pakistan 
from West Pakistan, an Iraqi attack on Kuwait or Iran, 
hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia, and between 
Somalia and Kenya, domestic upheaval in Ethiopia - these 
and more were presented as cases requiring US 
interventionist capabilities in the Indian Ocean.125
On Diego Garcia the JCS
envisioned a multi-purpose staging area to support US 
military action throughout the littoral. The $26 million 
facility proposed by the Navy could provide a basis for 
massive movements of US forces into the region in 
'contingency situations'. Moreover, although 'the 
initial project would be primarily a naval facility, the 
bulk of investment would provide improvements of a
118 From "American Strategy In The Indian Ocean: The Proposed 
Base On Diego Garcia”, prepared statement by Dr. Earl C. 
Ravenel in United States, Congress, House, Committee On 
Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion Of U.S. Military 
Facilities In The Indian Ocean. Hearing Before The 
Subcommittee On The Near East And South Asia. 93rd Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1974, p. 86.
119 See Stivers, America's Confrontation, pp. 54-56. The 
memorandum repeated the points made (and discussed above) by 
the USN in 1960 and noted, as had other memoranda, that 
America had to develop Diego Garcia quickly in order to avoid 
paying an even higher political price in opposition from 
Indian Ocean states and the USSR.
120 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
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general purpose nature which could be developed further 
to meet additional future requirements' - such as air 
force operations.121
The American navy's proposal was rejected by McNamara in 
October 1967 after it had been shown in a study by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that refuelling at Diego 
Garcia would be more costly and time-consuming than refuelling 
from an oil tanker from the Persian Gulf. More importantly 
the OSD study
rebutted the notion that any of the two dozen 
contingencies mentioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
would require or respond to the use of Diego Garcia. In 
some cases it was reasonable to assume that a country 
that had been attacked would offer us ports, airfields, 
and staging places if it wanted or deserved our help. In 
other cases Diego Garcia ... would be too remote to be of 
any direct use at all. In still other cases military 
intervention, from any base, could not control certain 
kinds of trouble, such as slowly developing political 
instability. We also pointed out that an American 
initiative ... would promote an American-Soviet arms race 
in yet another geographic area that had ... been spared 
that affliction.122
But in June 1968, the new Secretary of Defence approved a Navy 
proposal to construct a “modest logistic support base” at 
Diego Garcia with five functions: support of aerial
surveillance of Soviet naval activity which had begun in the 
Indian Ocean in March 1968; communications; a low profile and, 
it was hoped, politically unprovocative presence; support, for 
example, re-fuelling, for aircraft carrier operations in 
crises; and provision of a fall-back base for the Middle East
121 Ibid., p. 55. According to Ravenal, U.S. House, Proposed 
Expansion, p. 87, “the whole list of functions” for Diego 
Garcia “originally conceived by the Joint Chiefs of Staff” 
consisted of “oil storage, communications, air staging and 
operations, staging of ground forces, forward basing of 
submarines and other vessels - at a cost of about $55 
million.” He does not indicate whether the submarines
envisioned to be based in the Indian Ocean were strategic 
nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
122 Ibid., p. 86.
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Force, should it be evicted from Bahrain.123 According to the 
Navy's "Indian Ocean Base Study" from which the proposal was 
derived, America needed an ability to operate in the Indian 
Ocean "for two purposes":
1. Surveillance. To keep an eye on ... Soviet vessels, 
for intelligence ..., and for deterrence: police patrols 
deter armed crime, and fear of untimely discovery deters 
political and economic skullduggery.
2. Influence. To make it clear to the peripheral nations 
that the U.S. retains interest and power in the area, and 
does not intend to abandon the Indian Ocean to the 
status of a Soviet lake.124
Specifically, Diego Garcia would provide berthing for an 
aircraft carrier task group and oilers, an air strip and 
facilities for communications, oil storage and minor repairs. 
The proposal was accepted despite another OSD study's findings 
that a facility still was unnecessary because, besides the 
reasons noted above, satellites would soon come to provide 
communications; "all the political liabilities" - opposition 
from the littoral states and the Soviets - "remained"; and "ad 
hoc and temporary" deployments by 7th Fleet "contingents" 
could "handle" contingencies amenable to US intervention at a 
lower cost.125
In January 1969 the Navy through the Department of 
Defence requested authorization from Congress for the first 
increment of funding for the proposed $26 million "austere 
logistic support facility" called Project "Rest Stop". A 
facility had become necessary, according to the USN, in order
123 See William H. Lewis, "How a Defense Planner Looks at 
Africa", in Africa: From Mvsterv to Maze, ed. Helen Kitchen 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 289; 
letters by Stuart B. Barber in U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, 
p. 175.
124 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 175.
125 Ravenal in U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 87.
68
to insure Navy readiness in the South Atlantic, Indian 
and Western Pacific Oceans. Access to ports for 
bunkering and resupply had diminished.... Communications 
in the Indian Ocean are tenuous without satisfactory 
coverage of the Mid-Indian Ocean area. Lack of fuelling 
facilities and immediately responsive communications, 
while not prohibiting naval operations, limits 
operational flexibility. No military facilities of any 
nature exist in this area and a new facility is required 
for ship refuelling, limited aviation, and 
communications.126
In place of the interventionist rationale abandoned the 
previous year in reaction to the Vietnam war, Project "Rest 
Stop's" wider justification for a facility on Diego Garcia 
proposed that now the US had to respond to the "vacuum" caused 
by Britain's announced withdrawal from "east of Suez" and to 
the increasing Soviet naval presence and to Chinese influence 
both of which were trying to fill that "vacuum".127 The 
Navy's request for funding was rejected in late 1969 as a 
result of strong opposition from the Senate Appropriations 
Committee to the United States becoming committed to "another" 
naval base and to sustained operations in the Indian Ocean 
area. Although thwarted the US Navy resolved to persevere in 
its intention to establish a logistic facility at Diego Garcia 
(see Chapters Two and Three) : at bottom it expected that naval 
or maritime operations and a secure logistic facility for 
their support would be necessary in the future for defence of 
American interests in an area inherently unstable.
Rudiments of Policy 
By the end of the 1960s two of the three rudiments of US 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area had lapsed into 
dormancy: deterrence of a potential Soviet land threat to 
Iran, because of Soviet-Iranian detente and growing detente
126 United States, Congress, Senate, Committee On
Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriations For Fiscal 
Year 1974. Hearings On H.R. 14013. pt. 2, 93rd Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1974, p. 2114.
127 Washington Post. May 19, 1974.
between the US and the USSR; and intervention in conflicts 
between or within littoral states, because it was discredited 
as a policy option in reaction to the Vietnam war.
Naval display, the third rudiment, remained active if 
only in a minor way, and until 1979 it was the core of 
America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area created 
in 1970. Why that policy was created and its purpose, nature, 
substance and the influences upon it are analyzed in the next 
chapter.
CHAPTER TWO
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CREATION OF POLICY, 1970
The United States created in 1970 a strategic policy for 
the Indian Ocean area in response to Britain's announcement in 
1968 of its virtual military withdrawal from "east of Suez" by 
late 1971 and to a new, potential threat posed by the Soviet 
navy's entry into the Indian Ocean, also in 1968. That policy 
was influenced by America's security policy for the Persian 
Gulf region originated in 1969-1970 in light of the Nixon 
Doctrine which precluded new US security commitments. Because 
a direct US military security role in the Persian Gulf-Indian 
Ocean area was neither necessary, the Nixon administration 
concluded, nor wanted by the littoral states, the purposes of 
America's strategic policy were strictly political: to display 
concern for US interests and friends and to counterbalance the 
Soviet naval presence, thereby reassuring friendly states as 
Britain withdrew. The United States' "low profile" presence 
consisted of the small Middle East Force, occasional exercises 
or deployments by detachments from the 7th Fleet and, from 
1973, a communications station and a staging point for 
surveillance aircraft at Diego Garcia. The limited facilities 
at Diego Garcia represented a policy compromise between the 
National Security Council, which had sought to avoid building 
any facilities there as part of keeping America's Indian Ocean 
presence very low and trying to reach an arms control 
agreement with the USSR, and the US Navy, which had wanted to 
establish a standing presence which would "match" its Soviet 
counterpart and to construct at Diego Garcia a logistic 
facility for supporting that presence.
This chapter examines first the context of the creation 
of US strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area: America's 
interests, its assessment of the threats to them and its 
security policy for the Persian Gulf. Then are analyzed the 
objectives and premises of America's strategic policy and the
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conflict between the National Security Council and the US Navy 
about the significance of the Soviet naval presence, what was 
an appropriate strategic policy and whether a logistic 
facility should be constructed at Diego Garcia. Finally, 
littoral states' challenges to America's strategic mobility 
and flexibility in the Indian Ocean are surveyed and the 
response by Indian Ocean countries and the USSR to US policy 
is discussed.
Security Policy 
In devising a strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area, 
the Executive branch of the American government recognised 
that the "Indian Ocean is of less strategic importance to the 
United States than other oceanic regions such as the North 
Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the North Pacific in the 
current context of world security posture.”1 From 1971 
through 1975 US political, economic and military interests in 
the Indian Ocean would "be of a substantially lower order than 
those in ... the Atlantic and the Pacific".2 About 30 of the 
then 126 members of the United Nations with one-third of the 
world's population were littoral or hinterland states of the 
Indian Ocean and of them India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran,
1 From "Statement of Robert J. Pranger, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) For 
Policy Plans and National Security Affairs" in United States, 
Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Indian 
Ocean: Political And Strategic Future. Hearings Before The 
Subcommittee On National Security Policy And Scientific 
Developments. 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 171.
2 From "Statement of Hon. Ronald I. Spiers, Director Of The 
Bureau Of Politico-Military Affairs, Department Of State" in 
Ibid., p. 168. The statements above by Spiers and Pranger 
probably drew from "Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in 
the Indian Ocean Area, 1971-1975", National Security Study 
Memorandum 104, November 9, 1970 and "Follow-on Study of
Strategy Toward Indian Ocean", National Security Study 
Memorandum 110, December 22, 1970. See Stivers, America's
Confrontation. fn. 4, pp. 116-117. Howard Wriggins discusses 
"U.S. Interests In The Indian Ocean", in The Indian Ocean: Its 
Political. Economic and Military Importance, eds. Alvin J. 
Cottrell, R.M. Burrell (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 
pp. 357-377.
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Egypt and, in some ways, South Africa played a significant 
international role. The littoral states' political stability 
and economic development, the peaceful resolution of inter­
state conflicts and good relations with each country were 
America's general interests in the Indian Ocean area, above 
all the Persian Gulf.3 Its interest in the Gulf states' 
orderly political evolution under "moderate” governments 
hospitable to US economic interests derived from their 
possession of oil. Although the Persian Gulf's position as 
part of the Middle Eastern "bridge" for communication between 
Europe, Asia and Africa and as the "backyard" of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict and its proximity to the southern USSR were 
well appreciated by the US, most important was the region's 
immense oil resources, amounting in the early 1970s to more 
than sixty per cent of the world's proven oil reserves. 
Assured continuous access to that oil was a vital economic 
necessity for America's allies in Western Europe, over fifty 
per cent of whose oil imports came from that region, and for 
Japan, over eighty per cent of whose oil imports came from 
there. And it meant that the US had
a major strategic interest in the Persian Gulf oil supply 
to Western Europe and Japan. Interdiction of the flow of 
Persian Gulf oil to Japan and to Western Europe could 
cripple those economies in a very short period of 
time.... Alternate supplies to meet the vast fuel 
requirements of these industrial nations would not be 
readily available, and in any event, major realinement
3 For a review of US interests in the Persian Gulf, see 
"Background Study Of The Persian Gulf Area Prepared By The 
Department Of State" in United States, Congress, House, 
Committee On Foreign Affairs, U.S. Interests In And Policy 
Toward The Persian Gulf. Hearings Before The Subcommittee On 
The Near East And South Asia. 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1972, pp. 
139-141. In regions of the Indian Ocean area other than the 
Persian Gulf, the US had no "critical interests". On South 
Asia, for example, see United States, Congress, House, 
Committee On Foreign Affairs, United States Interests In And 
Policies Toward South Asia. Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
On The Near East and South Asia. 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 
pp. 82-92, 161-175.
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(sic) of supply sources and distribution systems would be
required to keep these economies going without Persian
Gulf oil.4
By the early 1970s America's interest in the Persian Gulf no 
longer pertained only to its allies' oil requirements, to the 
dependence on Gulf oil of its naval forces in the Pacific and 
other US forces in Asia and Europe and to the investments and 
profits of US oil companies which were now yielding control of 
oil production to regional states. Direct American dependence 
on Gulf oil was increasing; it had risen from two per cent of
US oil imports in the middle 1960s to about ten per cent by
1972. By 1980, it was estimated, America would depend on 
Gulf, mainly Saudi and Iranian, oil for one-half of its oil 
imports and for one-quarter of its total oil consumption. Of 
wider importance was the Persian Gulf states' rising income 
from oil and its consequences: an expanding market for US 
goods and services, the regional states' sizable investments 
in the American and other Western economies, their increasing 
holdings of foreign exchange and their new prominence in the 
international financial and monetary system.
The "prime importance" to the US that the Persian Gulf 
states' oil "remain available" gave it an interest in their 
territorial integrity and independence: the "United States
would not want to see the oil, population, territory, and 
other resources of the region fall under the control of any 
adversary or combination of adversaries able to threaten..."5 
it. "Specifically, we would be concerned if Chinese or Soviet 
influence in the area extended to control of the water areas 
or significant parts of the littoral."6 Although "no littoral 
state is of direct strategic importance to the security of the
4 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Future, p. 171.
5 Idem.
6 Ibid., p. 165.
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United States1*7, the Americans did possess an interest in 
containing "Soviet military power within its present borders**8 
and limiting Soviet influence. The sea lanes of the Indian 
Ocean were not vital to America but many of its allies had
essential sea lines of communication that cross the 
Indian Ocean - Australia to the United Kingdom and 
Western Europe, Japan to Europe, Iran to Europe.... 
Twenty percent (sic) of the world's maritime shipping is 
on the Indian Ocean on any one day. Interdiction of sea 
lines of communication, although a wartime threat, is a 
peacetime strategic concern. Capability to maintain 
these sea lines of communication in the event of war is 
a strategic objective of maritime states, and is thus of 
strategic importance to the United States.9
On the other hand America did have an interest in free access 
to the Indian Ocean and free movement across it by its ships 
and aircraft, commercial and military. It was a "fundamental 
strategic interest” that the Indian Ocean "remain available 
for the deployment of naval forces for reaction to 
contingencies affecting U.S. security and vital interests.**10
The threats to America's interests in the Indian Ocean 
area were perceived to be "of relatively low order”11, 
although there was "endemic instability” within and conflict 
between many regional states which in the case of the Persian 
Gulf could jeopardize the availability of oil. Many countries
7 Ibid., p. 171. The US, as noted in Chapter One, had no 
security treaty obligations in the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea 
area.
8 From "Statement of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (ISA) for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian 
Affairs'* in United States, Congress, House, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, New Perspectives On The Persian Gulf. 
Hearings Before The Subcommittee On The Near East And South 
Asia. 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 39. (Noyes retained 
this position until 1976).
9 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Future, p. 171.
10 Idem.
11 Ibid., p. 168.
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were experiencing rapid, unsettling political, economic and 
social change. There were, for example, insurgencies and 
autonomy or secessionist movements in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Iraq, Oman and Ethiopia; rivalries or territorial disputes or 
both between India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, North Yemen 
and South Yemen and the Somalis and Ethiopia and Kenya. A 
Marxist regime in South Yemen and a socialist one in Iraq 
threatened traditional rule in Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab 
neighbours, which were also subject to tensions created by the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The US was aware, as noted above, of 
the USSR's intention to enlarge its influence and presence in 
the Indian Ocean area. There Soviet "influence can grow at 
the expense of Western and, to a lesser degree, Chinese 
influence by exploiting targets of opportunity among the 
revolutionary and nationalist forces....”12 Thus "the 
instability and intra-regional antagonisms that characterize 
much of the Indian Ocean area could serve to promote Soviet 
interests at the expense of...”13 American interests. But 
the Soviets would not make direct use of their armed forces in 
order to achieve policy objectives.
With the gradual improvement in relations between the 
USSR and Iran and between the USSR and [the US], the 
threat of Soviet overt military action against the 
sovereignty and independence of states in the Persian 
Gulf and the Arabian peninsula has lessened and is no 
longer a cause of immediate concern.14
It was ”in the expansion and classic peacetime employment 
of their Navy in the Indian Ocean area” that the Soviets had 
"made a recent dramatic impact."15 They had "moved from their
12 Ibid., p. 165.
13 Ibid., p. 164.
14 U.S. House, New Gulf Perspectives, p. 39.
15 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Future, p. 166. For discussion of 
the sources and purposes of Soviet strategic involvement in 
the Indian Ocean area, consult Geoffrey Jukes, The Indian 
Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy. Adelphi Paper No. 87 (London:
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traditional land-centered, defense of the homeland role to one 
using their Navy worldwide as an instrument of policy”16 and 
they had established a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, 
averaging 10 ships in 1970 (and 14-16 ships by 1973), 
"regardless of [America's] own plans or activities in the 
area.”17 If they succeeded in acquiring access to the naval 
base and air base at Aden in South Yemen or to port and air 
facilities in Somalia or elsewhere such as India or Iraq, they 
would be able to support much better their naval squadron in 
the Arabian Sea, potentially for operations in crises or for 
interdicting the West's sea lines of communication. The 
United States faced
the prospect of enhanced Soviet politico-military power 
flanking Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Australia. 
This calls attention to the growing Soviet naval 
capability in reference to the so-called choke points 
which control ingress and egress to and from the basin. 
These include Bab El Mandab at the southern entrance to 
the Red Sea, the Gulf (sic) of Hormuz at the narrow of 
the Persian Gulf and the politically less vulnerable 
Straits of Malacca and Sunda.
The practical effect of the Soviet presence athwart 
lines of communication would ... be acutely felt in the 
case of all-out hostilities. A Soviet attempt to block 
maritime routes in peacetime could ... lead to a major
International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1972); "Forward 
Deployment In The Indian Ocean”, in Soviet Naval Developments 
Capability and Context, ed. Michael MccGwire (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1973), pt. 5; Ken Booth and Lee Dowdy, 
"Soviet Security Interests In The Indian Ocean Region”, in 
Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual 5. ed. David R. Jones (Gulf 
Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1982), pp. 327- 
377; Bruce W. Watson, Red N a w  at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations 
on the High Seas. 1956-1980 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1982), pp. 147-168; Walter K. Andersen, "Soviets in the 
Indian Ocean", Asian Survey 24 (September 1984), 910-930.
Soviet strategic policy for "The Indo-Arabian Region" is 
analyzed in Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution, 
1987), pp. 183-210.
16 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Future, p. 166.
17 Ibid., p. 174. In 1972-74 other Soviet vessels were engaged 
in port clearance operations in Bangladesh.
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world crisis. Nonetheless, with appropriate basing 
and/or establishment or (sic) political preeminence in 
these funnel areas, Soviet domination of the most 
critical of these choke points falls within the realm of 
possibility. The knowledge that in the event of war or 
great tension the Soviets or their associated states 
might control traffic in and out of the Indian Ocean ... 
could not but exert some influence on the political 
orientation of those nations who would be most affected 
should this contingency come to pass.18
And should the Suez Canal be reopened, the logistic 
complexities of maintaining the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron 
would be much ameliorated.
Supply lines would be drastically reduced, transit times 
foreshortened, rotation of units expedited. Similarly, 
with the canal opened to traffic, the number of Soviet 
naval deployments into the Indian Ocean could take a 
quantum jump inasmuch as the assets of their powerful 
Black Sea Fleet would become available for rapid 
deployment south and east of Suez.19
Reinforcing the Indian Ocean squadron for a show of force or 
for supporting a threatened friendly regime would be much 
speedier. "For the most part”, however, "Soviet naval 
activity in the Indian Ocean has been supplemental to 
political endeavors, and military and assistance programs in 
the region."20 It was "a cautious probing exercise that, over 
time, would probably result in a ... gradually increasing ... 
presence."21 The US did "not envisage an immediate threat" of 
Soviet "control" of land and sea areas of the Indian Ocean22 
and the "Soviet naval threat to U.S. interests ... [there] is 
moderate."23 Although the Soviets were trying to
18 Ibid., p. 166.
19 Ibid., p. 167.
20 Ibid. , p. 172.
21 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 59.
22 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Future, p. 165.
23 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 16.
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"augment their influence” in the Persian Gulf, they were not 
seeking "direct confrontation” with America.24
America's strategic policy for the Persian Gulf-Indian 
Ocean area was governed by its security policy for that area 
according to which the US would not make a direct commitment 
to guarantee Gulf security after Britain's operational 
military withdrawal in late 1971. Instead the friendly Gulf 
states, primarily Iran and also Saudi Arabia, would take 
principal responsibility for ensuring regional security. 
According to the State Department, the US did "not seek to 
intervene in the internal affairs of any of the states nor 
[did it] wish to assume, or to appear to assume, the former 
British protective role, which served the cause of peace in 
its day but is no longer appropriate or desired.”25 
Similarly, in February 1972 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defence for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs 
stated that the
United States has assumed none of the former British 
military role or functions and has no intention of 
seeking or appearing to replace the British presence in 
the gulf (sic). We do not plan to make any security 
commitments to or develop any special military
24 From prepared statement by Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
in U.S. House, New Gulf Perspectives, p. 7.
25 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 141. For details of 
America's security policy for the Persian Gulf, consult Ibid., 
pp. 14-15, 82-84, 141-142; U.S. House, New Gulf Perspectives, 
pp. 6-10, 38-44, 194-196. Except for its CENTO commitment to 
Iran, Britain had not been responsible for the security of the 
major Persian Gulf states. In terms of the Gulf, Britain's 
withdrawal from "east of Suez” meant that it
would terminate its special treaties with Bahrain, Qatar, 
and the seven Trucial states, under which it was 
responsible for these states' defense and foreign 
relations, and that it would withdraw its operational 
military forces, which were charged with carrying out 
these . .. obligations, including a defense understanding 
with Kuwait, from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. 
(U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 13.)
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relationships with any of the newly independent states
[there] .26
The Nixon administration eschewed a Gulf security
commitment because, first and as shown, US regional interests 
and the Soviet military threat to them were thought to be 
moderate. Second the Soviet "threat” to the Persian Gulf was 
mainly political in nature. Third, instability in the Gulf, 
more important than the USSR as a source of insecurity, also 
was viewed as a political problem rather than as a military 
one and it was "unlikely to be responsive to U.S. power."27 
Next a direct American security involvement was unnecessary 
because the United Kingdom continued to play an important role 
in the Persian Gulf. "On the military side", the UK's naval 
and air visits and conduct of exercises there and its
provision of arms, training, advice and personnel chiefly to 
the lower Gulf states meant that the "end of a permanently 
stationed British military presence does not create a 'vacuum' 
which other outside states should fill...."28 And Britain's 
intention "to retain much of [its] political presence in the 
Gulf meant that there was not so much a power vacuum as a 
realignment of the power balance"29 there. Finally a direct 
American security commitment to the Persian Gulf was not
possible because it was ruled out by the Nixon Doctrine and
because, above all, the Gulf states did not want it. The
Nixon Doctrine acknowledged that failure in the costly Vietnam 
war and a weakening economy had sapped America's will and
26 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 14.
27 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 57.
28 From "Supplemental Statement Concerning Background of U.S. 
Presence in Bahrain" in U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests.
p. 23.
29 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 57.
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capacity to manage global security.* It stipulated that 
although the US would observe its extant security obligations, 
new commitments were politically unacceptable and would be 
avoided. The Gulf states did not wish for an American 
security commitment because Iran in particular denied the 
existence of a regional security "vacuum” which had to be 
"filled” by outside forces, because they sought to keep the 
Gulf free from super-power competition or conflict and 
because, the State Department "recognised”, "the states of the 
region have the capability and the will to take the lead in 
providing for security."30
The Nixon Doctrine and the friendly Gulf states' 
aspirations dovetailed and America encouraged Iran and Saudi 
Arabia to take primary responsibility for Persian Gulf 
security after 1971. Iran would counter Iraq, thereby 
contributing to Saudi and Kuwaiti security, and it would 
patrol the sea lanes in the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the
The Nixon Doctrine was the Nixon administration's adjustment 
in 1969-1970 of US security policy and strategic policy in 
response to the Vietnam war and other important changes in the 
international and domestic setting of policy. America would 
continue to maintain a global balance of power with the USSR 
but containment of communist influence and power would become 
more selective and deterrence of conventional wars would 
replace intervention against insurgencies. The US vowed to 
keep its security treaty commitments but it asked its allies 
to assume more of the burden for their defence and to supply 
most of the manpower for that purpose. While the US would 
avoid conflict with the Soviet Union, it would provide a 
"shield " if a nuclear power threatened allies or other states 
essential to US or to regional security. It would help 
against lesser forms of aggression, by regional states, "as 
appropriate" with air and naval forces. American forces long 
"forward deployed" abroad in sizable number as a supplement to 
allies' defences would be reduced to well below their pre- 
Vietnam war level (outside Europe) by the middle 1970s and 
would be reinforced, when required, by contingents from 
America. US strategic doctrine now anticipated resisting a 
major Soviet attack upon Western Europe or a communist attack 
in East Asia and dealing simultaneously with a smaller 
contingency elsewhere. This "one-and-one-half war" strategic 
policy was a contraction from planning by the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations in which America had envisaged 
repelling concurrently communist offensives in Europe and Asia 
while it also coped with a lesser contingency.
30 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 141.
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Gulf of Oman and eventually beyond. Saudi Arabia would take 
the leading role on the Arabian peninsula. (The Shah's rather 
than Saudi Arabia's military involvement in combatting 
insurgency by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in 
the Dhofar province of Oman indicated that the Saudi security 
role would be essentially political.) The United States also 
encouraged joint political and military cooperation as much as 
possible (in view of the Arab states' suspicion of Iran's 
hegemonistic ambitions) among the conservative Gulf states for 
their security and stability. America supported the 
federation of the Trucial states into the United Arab 
Emirates, established diplomatic relations with the lower Gulf 
states and initiated or expanded economic development and 
technical assistance programmes in Gulf states. The most 
conspicuous way it intended to contribute to Gulf security was 
by helping Iran and Saudi Arabia to expand and modernize their 
armed forces.31 It strengthened its military training and 
advisory missions in those states and contracted to supply 
Iran with large amounts of advanced weapons. From 1972 until 
1976 Iran had virtual carte blanche to purchase any US 
conventional weapon system it chose. The Saudis purchased 
less weapons, emphasizing instead US help to construct 
military support facilities.
Strategic Policy
America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area 
consisted of providing by way of the Middle East Force with 
the 7th Fleet in the background
a low profile but nevertheless positive indication of
U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean region [which] ...
31 The Department of Defence noted in 1972 that
Iran is the most determined and best equipped state in 
the gulf (sic) to assert leadership and the Shah sees the 
British withdrawal as an opportunity to do so. The Shah 
views Iranian military power as a stabilizing factor 
which can guarantee the area against possible turmoil. 
(Ibid., p. 14.)
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furnishes psychological reassurance to friendly littoral 
states. Through the conduct of occasional small-scale 
naval exercises..., it demonstrates U.S. naval capability 
and flexibility. The U.S. naval presence in the region 
also serves to counterbalance the political impact of the 
Soviet naval presence and activities.... An absence of 
or an inadequate U.S. counterpoise ... would be 
detrimental to U.S. interests through indicating to the 
littoral states a lack of U.S. interest or capability. 
In addition, we encourage the United Kingdom and 
Australia to increase their own naval presence and 
activities in the region so that the U.S. effort can 
remain complementary.
This policy was based on four premises. First, because
the challenge posed to the United States in the Indian 
Ocean and Persian Gulf areas is to a great extent 
political in nature ..., the principal response to this 
challenge should emphasize political rather than military 
activity. Military instruments can contribute to 
political solutions; they cannot serve as solutions in 
and of themselves.33
Second, the total "current U.S. military effort" "together 
with other U.S. diplomatic efforts - economic, cultural, and 
political - is sufficient at present to safeguard [US] 
interests."34 Also the regional Soviet-American balance of 
military activities favoured the US. Except for the number of 
military advisers and continuously stationed naval vessels, 
the "U.S. military diplomatic effort exceeds that of the 
Soviets."35 Lastly, because there was "no requirement" for 
the United States "to control, or even decisively influence,
32 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Future, p. 173. Beazley and Clark, 
Politics of Intrusion, pp. 5-29, examine the "emergence of an 
American Indian Ocean Policy".
33 U.S. House, New Gulf Perspectives, p. 38. A naval presence, 
Noyes implied (Idem), was secondary in importance to arms 
sales and advisory and training programmes in support of US 
"interests and foreign policy objectives in peacetime".
34 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 16.
35 Ibid., p. 11.
83
any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral”,36 it was 
unnecessary to "upgrade” the US naval presence and "match” the 
Soviet presence. America's strategic policy thus proposed
to inhibit as much as possible military competition with 
the USSR in the Indian Ocean area, while maintaining the 
ability to exert U.S. military influence there in case of 
need.
Well before the ... Indo-Pakistani war [in November- 
December 1971], U.S. policy was to maintain COMIDEASTFOR 
on Bahrain, to conduct naval port visits in the area, to 
maintain communications facilities in Ethiopia and 
northwest Australia and to build a new communication 
facility on Diego Garcia, to conduct maritime 
surveillance of Soviet naval activities in the Indian 
Ocean, and to conduct periodic naval exercises or 
operations in the Indian Ocean. ... [T]he deployment of 
the U.S. naval task force to the Indian Ocean in December 
1971 did not represent a change in our Indian Ocean naval 
policy. This deployment was a unique response to a 
specific contingency. U.S. naval operations and 
exercises had been conducted there before the crisis - 
three had occurred in 1971 - and we plan to continue to 
conduct such operations and exercises there in the 
future.37
In 1971, 7th Fleet detachments had begun to conduct small 
exercises in the Indian Ocean and in autumn 1971 the 
Department of Defence announced that 7th Fleet task groups 
would deploy there from time to time.38 But from early 1972 
until late October 1973, only one brief appearance was made by
36 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Future, p. 168.
37 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 16. The Middle East 
Force also participated with Britain and Iran in CENTO'S 
annual MIDLINK maritime exercise. US naval vessels on inter­
fleet transfers paid visits to Indian Ocean ports. Two of the 
three US naval exercises in 1971 concentrated on anti­
submarine warfare and showed the defensive character of 
America's strategic policy. They took place in the eastern 
Indian Ocean, in the vicinity of Indonesia and north-western 
Australia, and they were probably intended also to reassure 
Australia about America's interest in Indian Ocean security 
after Britain withdrew. The US expressed interest in using 
Australia's naval facilities at Cockburn Sound in Western 
Australia which were planned to be completed in 1978.
38 See, for example, New York Times. September 30, 1971.
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a 7th Fleet task group.39
The emphasis in America's strategic policy for the Indian 
Ocean area on display of interest but without taking on a 
direct security commitment was illustrated by the Nixon 
administration's thinking about the Middle East Force. The 
"mission” of the MEF was "a peaceful and symbolic one - 
goodwill visits to friendly ports on the Persian Gulf, Red 
Sea, and Indian Ocean littoral. In [the State Department's] 
view this concrete demonstration of American interest" and 
desire to maintain good relations with the littoral states 
"makes a symbolic but psychologically significant contribution 
to the continuation of an atmosphere of tranquillity in the 
area."40 After a careful review of US policy towards the 
Persian Gulf, the Administration had decided to keep the MEF 
at Bahrain. Continuation of the "modest naval presence" there 
would, the Defence Department thought, contribute to regional 
stability as the small territories became independent. To 
withdraw the Middle East Force when the British protectorate 
had ended and "the Soviet naval effort was increasing could be 
misinterpreted as evidence that U.S. interest in the gulf 
(sic) is waning."41 The decision to retain the MEF had been 
discussed with principal Gulf states, and friendly 
governments, "including the new states of the lower gulf 
(sic), have accepted the continuing MIDEASTFOR presence as an 
indication of U.S. friendship, good will, and interest."42 
The MEF had no "protective mission" to perform and the State 
Department's statement that it was "not intended to represent 
a commitment to, or threat to intervene in, the area, nor is
39 The US Navy was too heavily engaged in the Vietnam war to 
spare aircraft carrier task groups for visits to the Indian 
Ocean. See Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.), On Watch 
(New York: Quadrangle. The New York Times Book Co., 1976), 
pp. 213-214.
40 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 143.
41 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
42 Ibid. , p. 13.
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it intended as a provocation to any state”43 was reinforced 
when the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs proposed that it was America's intention 
neither ”to alter [the MEF's] role nor indeed to undertake an 
operational American military role in any state in the 
area.1,44 As in the Indian Ocean the US did not wish to 
provoke a naval arms race or a confrontation with the USSR.
In deciding to maintain the Middle East Force in the 
Persian Gulf, the United States might also have had in mind 
that although friendly Gulf Arab states and Iran wanted to 
exclude external naval powers and avoid both entanglement in 
super-power competition and giving the Soviets an excuse for 
gaining regular use of Iraqi port facilities, the Arabs did 
not want to see the Shah turn the Gulf into a political, 
military and, perhaps ultimately, even a legal semi-enclosed 
Iranian sea. The MEF was a long-established and unprovocative 
presence and provided it was kept small, it would be 
acceptable for subtle reassurance against Iran's regional 
aspirations.
The Americans did not add to the three ships assigned to 
the MEF but in 1972 it was provided with a larger, more modern 
flagship, the LaSalle, and newer destroyers served with it on 
the usual six-monthly rotational basis. In December 1971 the 
US and Bahrain concluded an agreement which permitted the MEF 
to use for logistic support a small section of the former 
British naval base. There were "no plans to seek additional 
military facilities for U.S. forces either in Bahrain or 
elsewhere in the gulf (sic).”45 "The suggestion is sometimes 
made", according to the Department of Defence in 1972, that
43 Ibid., p. 143.
44 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 83.
45 Ibid., p. 143. The State Department emphasized that 
America's agreement with Bahrain "does not involve in any 
reasonable meaning of the word the establishment of an 
American military 'base' in Bahrain". Ibid., p. 23.
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the role of MIDEASTFOR could be performed by ships 
operating outside the Persian Gulf - perhaps from Diego 
Garcia or from the Atlantic or Pacific Fleets. Ships 
operating from those areas, however, would be far removed 
from the primary operating area of MIDEASTFOR and could 
not make the same number of port calls, as frequently and 
economically, as MIDEASTFOR. Ships operating from Diego 
Garcia, moreover, could not be homeported there, and this 
would add to Navy's morale and retention problems. To 
operate ships from Diego Garcia, furthermore, would 
require upgrading the austere communications facilities 
there to a logistic support facility.46
The choice of "low profile” political display as 
America's strategic policy represented an outcome in favour of 
the National Security Council of a conflict between its broad 
policy perspective and the views and objectives mainly of the 
US Navy. The conflict was about what was an adequate counter­
balance to the Soviet naval squadron in the Indian Ocean area, 
to what extent that presence, and more generally the USSR 
itself, threatened US and Western interests there and what was 
the political utility of the Soviet presence as an instrument 
of Soviet influence. The US Navy was part of a "small but 
vocal group - centered primarily in the Pentagon but with 
significant support at the State Department and the White 
House” which
felt that the United States had substantial interests in 
the area - investments, oil, and other primary resources 
- and that the increased Soviet political and military 
presence constituted a critical challenge in view of 
anticipated political instability. From their
perspective, the United States and the USSR were in 
global competition in the Third World, and Soviet gains 
would come only at the expense of U.S. and Western 
interests. Consequently, it was argued, the United 
States must make a major effort to exert itself in the 
Indian Ocean as part of a global effort to preserve its 
security interests.47
One element of that "major effort" had to be a continuous US
46 Ibid., p. 12. The flagship of the Middle East Force had 
been "homeported" at Manama since 1966.
47 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", pp. 59-60.
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naval presence in addition to the MEF, according to Admiral 
Elmo Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Soon after 
becoming CNO in July 1970, Zumwalt began to speak of a Soviet 
drive to "dominate" the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean and 
of the danger of the USSR strategically "outflanking" the West 
in the area, where it was filling a "vacuum" of power.48 A 
Soviet naval force's pressure on the shipping routes or 
control of straits such as the Strait of Hormuz could 
influence to the USSR's advantage the policy of states 
dependent on Persian Gulf oil. Also a Soviet naval force 
could have a psychological impact in a regional crisis greater 
than its inherent capability. The reopening of the Suez 
Canal, bringing the Arabian Sea within 3,500 miles of the 
USSR's Black Sea fleet, might lead to a rapid increase in the 
size of the Soviet naval presence and the potential threat 
from it. A Soviet presence not offset by an American presence 
larger than the Middle East Force would be encouraged by US 
"default" towards more "activism" and risk-taking. Urging 
that protecting the shipping routes was an "emerging 
responsibility" which the US Navy could not avoid, by autumn 
1970 Zumwalt was calling for a "continuing and regularized 
U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean"49 of approximately 
ten ships - equalling the size of the Soviet naval squadron, 
for cooperation with allies' naval forces there and for 
"improving" (constructing) naval and air as well as 
communications facilities on Diego Garcia and "upgrading" the 
Middle East Force.
The US Navy's advocacy of a standing force deployment in 
the Indian Ocean was an expression of anxiety not only about 
the Soviet "threat" but about its own general condition. The 
USN feared that because of its declining size, the shrinking 
American defence budget and the high cost of new ships, it was 
losing its margin of superiority over the growing, modern
48 Daily Telegraph. March 4, 1971.
49 Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 3 63.
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Soviet navy. In some cases it might no longer be able to 
fulfil with acceptable risk its global responsibilities in 
war. Thus Zumwalt's leading priorities were to defend and 
enlarge the USN's share of the defence budget and to modernize 
the navy. Accomplishing that depended in part on developing 
a compelling post-Vietnam role: protection of the sea lanes 
through sea control by new classes of ship such as the patrol 
frigate.50 The necessity to counter the Soviet "threat” in 
the Indian Ocean served as an argument to justify the sea 
control "mission" and the Navy's ship-building programme for 
the 1970s. It could be claimed as well to fit in with the 
Nixon Doctrine because it avoided new defence commitments but 
contributed to preserving the global balance with the Soviet 
Union.
The majority in the Executive branch of the US government 
did not agree with the Navy's perception of a serious Soviet 
naval "threat" in the Indian Ocean, for both political and 
military reasons. The foremost military reason was that 
Soviet interdiction of the sea lanes was very unlikely. 
Attacks on merchant vessels were acts of war and would almost 
certainly only accompany general hostilities resulting from a 
major political crisis. Further, a Soviet assault on shipping 
would not come principally from the small Indian Ocean 
squadron, whose combat capability was too slight for much more 
than "showing the flag", which lacked air cover and whose long 
lines of communication to its base at Vladivostok were 
vulnerable to US and allied attack; it would come from Soviet 
submarines in the Atlantic and the Pacific. (In the view of 
the Department of Defence, the more probable threat to the 
safe flow of oil supplies came from the producing states 
themselves.51) Also, in terms of ships and facilities the 
Soviets were already sufficiently countered by America's 
friends and allies in the Indian Ocean area. Britain still
50 Ibid., pp. 71-77.
51 Times, October 21, 1970.
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retained a presence, if on a reduced scale, and France had a 
naval base at Djibouti (in the then French Territory of the 
Afars and Issas) and at Diego Suarez in Madagascar (until 
1975) and it kept an average of six combatants in the area. 
The Iranian navy patrolled the Persian Gulf and Strait of 
Hormuz and Australia and South Africa could add small forces 
to the Western naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The 
ultimate, extra-oceanic counterbalancing force was America's 
aircraft carriers from the 7th Fleet. They still gave the US 
Navy a decisive fighting edge over its Soviet counterpart, 
despite its forebodings. As for the eventual reopening of the 
Suez Canal, the USSR would indeed gain a military advantage: 
its ships in the Arabian Sea could be much more easily 
reinforced and resupplied from the Black Sea, while the 
draught of most US aircraft carriers, but of no other US 
combatant, was too deep to enable passage. Nonetheless the 
Departments of State and Defence welcomed a reopened Suez 
Canal, most of all because it would signify peace between 
Egypt and Israel, which was the paramount American political 
objective in the Middle East and overrode lesser, military 
considerations.
In the political sphere the Nixon administration assessed 
as small the Soviet Navy's contribution to Soviet regional 
influence. Increases in the USSR's influence derived largely 
from political factors such as the degree of the littoral 
states' dependence on the Soviet Union, their responsiveness 
to it or the extent of congruence between their views and 
interests and those of the Soviets. The Indian Ocean states' 
nationalism provided a political entree to the Soviets because 
of its anti-Western orientation in quite a few countries. 
Moreover, Soviet support for the Arab/Palestinian cause had 
added to the USSR's influence with some Arab states. But 
substantial "gains” in Soviet influence were precluded because 
the littoral states valued most of all their independence and 
non-alignment. A Soviet connection was useful for limiting, 
not excluding Western influence. What influence the Soviet
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Union did exert came more through diplomacy, aid, trade and 
arms transfers than through .occasional port visits by ships 
usually at anchor in international waters. In addition to 
military assistance, the Soviet naval presence had supported 
the USSR's foreign policy and helped to expand its influence, 
but it had not initiated that influence.52 A small yet 
growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean was a new 
development to be taken carefully into account and watched 
closely; unless balanced it might play an important part at a 
time of high tension but otherwise its contribution to the 
USSR's attempts to exercise influence was minor and diffuse. 
This assessment led National Security Memorandum 110 (December 
1970) on US strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area to find 
"no need for a large American military presence in the region 
for the foreseeable future. The emphasis will be on political 
activity to counter growing Soviet influence."53
In the absence of a serious naval threat from the Soviet 
Union, the general concepts of US strategic policy for the 
Indian Ocean area were, as indicated above, political: to 
display interest and to counter discreetly the Soviet 
presence. Direct intervention a la the 1960s had been 
discredited as a policy option by the Vietnam war and it was 
ruled out by the Nixon Doctrine. Nonetheless more indirect 
intervention, however inappropriate in the case of the Indo- 
Pakistani war in 1971,54 remained possible. When asked
52 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 9.
53 International Herald Tribune. December 16, 1970.
54 On December 15, 1971, two days before the end of the war 
between India and Pakistan concerning the fate of East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh, a 10-ship American naval task group - 
Task Force 74 - led by the aircraft carrier Enterprise entered 
the Bay of Bengal for a show of force. The US sent the task 
group primarily in order to warn India not to attack West 
Pakistan and to deter that course of action. For analyses of 
America's strategic involvement in the war, see James M. 
McConnell and Anne Kelly Calhoun, "The December 1971 Indo- 
Pakistani Crisis", in Soviet Naval Diplomacy, eds. Bradford 
Dismukes, James M. McConnell (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979),
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pp. 178-192; David K. Hall, "The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971", 
in Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War. pp. 175-218. 
Hall's evaluation (pp. 214-218, from which all quotations 
below are drawn, except where noted) of the US show of force 
is that it was not necessary, prudent or credible and could 
not be efficacious. The Enterprise task group did not 
influence India to refrain from attacking West Pakistan 
because the Indians did not intend to do so for other reasons, 
including discouragement from the USSR. New Delhi interpreted 
the US force presence as an attempt to evacuate Pakistani 
forces from East Pakistan. "The deployment of US forces did 
stimulate hostile political and military responses by India 
and the USSR antithetical to Washington's desire for a cease­
fire and withdrawal ..." of Indian forces from East Pakistan. 
India proclaimed that it would not be intimidated and the
Indian Air Force began destroying the East Pakistani 
ships and airfields that would be needed to evacuate 
personnel to the approaching U.S. task force. The net 
effect of Task Force 74 was to drive India closer to the 
USSR, arouse anti-American passions, and prompt effective 
military countermeasures, without securing for Washington 
any additional leverage over the direction of events in 
East Pakistan.
The appearance of U.S. naval forces did nothing to 
induce greater Soviet cooperation on the war in the East, 
but it did present Moscow with a low-risk opportunity for 
a psychological victory over Washington. Calculating 
that there was a negligible chance of actual U.S. 
intervention, the USSR responded to word of Task Force 74 
with assurances of protection to New Delhi and with a 
large-scale naval deployment, which put twenty-six Soviet 
ships into the Indian Ocean by December 31. The final 
collapse of Pakistani resistance in the East, with both 
Soviet and American naval forces looking on from the Bay 
of Bengal, conveyed the illusion of Soviet deterrence of 
American intervention, and also suggested a lack of 
resolve on the part of the more powerful American task 
force. This imagery was given strength by the U.S. 
failure to communicate intelligibly to India and other 
parties
the actual purpose of Task Force 74. The sailing of the 
Enterprise task group to the Bay of Bengal gave Pakistan false 
hope that the US would intervene and give it succour. And 
when American help "failed to materialize", many Pakistanis 
were disappointed and their sense that America was an 
unreliable friend increased. Also, rather than contributing 
as a show of good faith to an improvement in relations between 
the US and the People's Republic of China, "the U.S. task 
force appears to have interjected a minor discord into U.S.- 
Chinese relations because of Peking's backing for the Third 
World movement to create an Indian Ocean zone of peace barring
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whether there would be a "requirement” for the US to help the 
Saudis in the event of an attack upon them, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
replied that America's "whole policy" was "based on the 
assumption of the Nixon Doctrine that we would like to help 
these people to help themselves wherever they want our help 
and, frankly, it is a way of avoiding our direct involvement
superpower naval forces."
"Even within the context of the Nixon-Kissinger 
[globalist-balance of power] value system little merit can be 
found in the deployment of ..." Task Force 74. Despite the 
"substantial gross military capability" of the US task group, 
including 2,000 Marines, only "a massive introduction of 
American around troops could have reversed the outcome" of the 
fighting in East Pakistan, which had nearly ended. (Italics 
added). Also the Enterprise task group was more than 1,000 
miles from the scene of possible fighting in West Pakistan, 
which "made the actual use of this power impossible." That 
America "did not have effective and usable military options on 
the subcontinent" was a result not only of the naval character 
and the positioning of its forces. The
inappropriateness of US military action to the [Nixon] 
administration's primary diplomatic interest appears in 
part to have been the result of the limited military 
options served up to the White House by Navy planners. 
Classified documents ... indicate that the US Navy was 
primarily interested in demonstrating its capability to 
counter the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean ... and was only marginally attuned to the 
administration's objective of deterring a land and air 
offensive by India against West Pakistan. Thus, the 
Navy's "Outline Plan for Show of Force Operations in the 
Pakistan-India Area" called for shadowing Soviet and 
Indian ships in the Bay of Bengal, but forecast no 
projection of naval power into the Arabian Sea off West 
Pakistan, because of the absence of Soviet operations in 
[that] area. (fn. 188, p. 195)
Hall notes too that the credibility of the American naval 
threat was very doubtful. "The imbalance between the very 
limited US interests on the subcontinent and the very high 
cost of US intervention was simply too great to support a 
credible threat of force" against India. Nixon and his senior 
officials had not threatened to resort to US military power 
and the American public's weariness from the Vietnam war and 
pro-Indian sentiment "made domestic political support 
inadequate for a credible threat...."
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in this kind of situation.”55 The passing of the American 
interventionist tendency into dormancy was symbolised formally 
when in January 1972 Strike Command was stripped of its 
security responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle 
East and South Asia and renamed Readiness Command. ”REDCOM” 
was charged only with deploying US forces abroad, if 
necessary. The European Command took over STRIKE's 
responsibilities for Iran, Iraq, the Arabian peninsula and 
states to the west; Pacific Command took "jurisdiction” for 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and states to their east.
The political concepts of America's strategic policy were 
informed by the restraint inherent in the Nixon Doctrine, by 
detente with the USSR and by an understanding that avoiding 
conflict and limiting competition with the USSR were of higher 
priority than America's other, more direct interests in the 
area. Thus while recognizing that "diplomacy must be 
bulwarked by military strength if it is to be credible”56, the 
United States decided that a strategic policy proportionate to 
its moderate interests and the low Soviet military threat to 
them would eschew maintaining a naval presence roughly 
equivalent to the USSR's Indian Ocean squadron. Instead, 
America would keep a minimal balance with it at a distance, 
from the Pacific. (Also, limited Navy resources could be 
better employed elsewhere than in the Indian Ocean.) The US 
Navy would show interest in the littoral states in a way - 
visits by the Middle East Force and occasional cruises or 
exercises by 7th Fleet task groups - which would minimize 
their apprehension about the intrusion of super-power rivalry 
into the Indian Ocean and militarization of the area. It 
would maintain access to the Indian Ocean and affirm the 
freedom of the seas. Occasional task group deployments would 
display a "general capability” for efficient response to a 
crisis in the area or to the possible growth there of the
55 U.S. House, New Gulf Perspectives, p. 33.
56 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests, p. 9.
94
Soviet naval presence as total Soviet military power 
increased. Displays would indicate America's will to 
counteract politically the Soviet naval squadron: although it 
did not intend to start an arms race, neither would it allow 
the USSR to make cumulative "gains” of influence. Some degree 
of linkage between the Indian Ocean area and global US 
security policy was inevitable and armed forces remained a 
cardinal background element in international politics. 
Occasional demonstrations of naval power as part of the 
general US political and military presence in the area would 
help to show that the balance of super-power forces, to which 
the littoral states were sensitive, was not shifting towards 
the Soviet Union.
Deterrence of potential Soviet military action on land 
against Iran was a quiescent part of US policy. The Nixon 
administration did not link the appearance of a Soviet naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean with Soviet land and air forces 
in the southern USSR which, it recognised (see above), did not 
pose an "immediate" threat to Iran, certainly not one 
motivated by a need for Iran's oil. But although Soviet- 
Iranian relations were "cordial and active", Iran still had to 
consider "on a contingency basis"
how it would defend itself in the event of global or 
local conflict. Here the Iranian strategy would be, as 
has been described by the Shah, to fight a hard delaying 
war of attrition and await a diplomatic resolution of the 
conflict. Although Iran could not 'defeat' a major 
power, its armed forces would have the capability to make 
an attack costly enough to give a potential attacker 
serious reason for pause. [Iran's] first purpose would 
be to deter an attack.57
If Iran's deterrence failed, it would have to look to the 
United States for help. The American security agreement of 
1959 with Iran remained in effect but the US sought to 
contribute to Iranian security in the atmosphere of the early
57 U.S. House, New Gulf Perspectives, pp. 40-41.
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1970s mainly by cultivating detente with the USSR as well as 
by maintaining strategic nuclear deterrence against it. The 
Nixon Doctrine's reference to an American nuclear "shield" for 
states besides its allies to whom it had no binding security 
commitment but which were important to regional security 
probably applied to Iran. America's contribution to the 
protection of Iran in the event of Soviet aggression was 
confined essentially to nuclear retaliation at the global 
level but yet possibly at the regional level "by the presence 
or the availability of some tactical nuclear weapons that 
could be brought into play in the case of need."58 Even had 
circumstances and its policy called for it, the US did not 
possess more than a very limited conventional capability for 
reinforcing Iran, helping to delay a Soviet advance and 
promoting a diplomatic resolution of a conflict.
The emphasis on restraint in America's Indian Ocean 
strategic policy was reflected in the NSC's recommendation 
that the US seek an arms control agreement with the USSR and 
it led to debate with the Navy about the need for a logistic 
support facility at Diego Garcia. The NSC was "highly 
critical"59 of the Navy's plans for a facility there: 
America's limited interests in the Indian Ocean area could not 
be protected by military intervention. Thus the armed forces, 
except the Navy for display, and a facility for their support 
were unnecessary. A facility at Diego Garcia could be the 
first step towards the eventual introduction on a permanent 
basis of an aircraft carrier task group or a small fleet60, 
leading to an arms race with the USSR. Even plans to 
construct a communications station on the atoll ought to be 
abandoned. An arms control agreement would be a radical
58 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Future, p. 177. This was quite 
likely an allusion to the United States' capability to launch 
nuclear strikes from its aircraft carriers.
59 Washington Post. May 19, 1974.
60 Guardian. November 21, 1970.
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preventive measure: it would halt the expected gradual growth 
of the Soviet naval squadron and stop a felt US need to 
respond to that increase. Besides precluding the construction 
of a facility at Diego Garcia, an agreement would stop the 
USSR from acquiring access to support installations and 
strengthening its weak logistic capability. By minimizing 
competition and the potential for conflict with the Soviets, 
it would contribute to the security of American interests and 
of the Indian Ocean states.
The US Navy objected to arms control. It pointed out 
that the new (June 1970) Conservative government in Britain 
was not going to reverse the UK's withdrawal from "east of 
Suez" and that Diego Garcia was required to support an 
American naval presence counterbalancing the Soviet squadron. 
While continuing to call for the construction of a full 
logistic support facility at Diego Garcia, the Navy had had to 
accept Congress's rejection of that project in December 1969. 
Congress did, however, instruct the Navy to return in 1970 
with a revised request for an appropriation for a 
communications facility only; facilities which could support 
fleet units or other forces were to be left out. In March 
1970 the Navy won approval in the Department of Defence for 
establishing an "austere communications facility" at Diego 
Garcia. Its declared primary function was to fill a gap in 
reliable maritime communications in the southern, central and 
Bay of Bengal areas of the Indian Ocean. By linking up with 
the communications stations at Asmara in Ethiopia and North- 
West Cape in Australia and giving navigational guidance to 
ships, aircraft and submarines, it would become part of 
America's "worldwide command and control networks for normal 
and contingency operations in support of the national and 
naval operating requirements."61 Diego Garcia would
61 United States, Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 
Department Of Defense Appropriations For 1972, Hearings Before 
The Subcommittee On Department Of Defense, pt. 1, 92nd Cong., 
1st sess., 1971, p. 997.
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supplement US military communications by satellite and it was 
envisioned as a replacement for the station at Asmara, from 
which the US would in time have to withdraw in order to avoid 
entanglement in the Eritrean insurgency. Diego Garcia would 
also serve as an intelligence/surveillance facility for 
monitoring the Soviet naval presence and radio traffic in the 
Indian Ocean, and long-range reconnaissance aircraft would use 
it.62
The outcome of the debate about Diego Garcia and arms 
control was a compromise - to construct only a communications 
station on the atoll and to discuss with the USSR the 
possibility for arms control* - which reflected America's 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area. The Navy gained 
satisfaction about improving its communications capability: 
Diego Garcia would provide useful redundancy and 
complementarity of communications and it would enhance the 
Navy's flexibility in the event of an emergency. On the other 
hand the Administration deflected Navy pressure for a 
permanent commitment of forces to the Indian Ocean and a 
logistic facility on Diego Garcia, the Navy's abiding 
objective, by pointing out that a communications station would 
provide a minimum of "infrastructure” in the area and that it 
would be independent from the littoral states. It could be 
expanded if necessary, enabling the US to retain a degree of 
strategic freedom of action in the future. Perhaps most 
important was the symbolic value of Diego Garcia for keeping
* According to the public record it was the Soviet Union which 
in March 1971 approached the US about Indian Ocean arms 
control. But when the US tried to follow up on the issue in 
summer 1971, the Soviets did not respond. (See below and 
Chapter Four, in which it is noted that by summer 1971 the 
USSR probably had decided to consolidate its naval presence in 
the Indian Ocean and acquire routine access to Somali port 
facilities, whether or not the US planned to expand its naval 
presence.) Certainly the Americans' start of construction on 
Diego Garcia in March 1971 could not have encouraged a 
positive Soviet response.
62 New York Times. December 16, 1970.
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watch over the Soviets in the Indian Ocean. Its planned 
capability for monitoring Soviet maritime activities, by 
staging reconnaissance flights, would help to show that the
United States was not "leaving” the area to the USSR and
giving a "free ride" to it in attempts to increase its
influence. But like expressing interest in the Soviets'
suggestion about arms control, the facility's minimal, passive 
function would signal America's caution and restraint.
In December 1970, as Britain and America reached 
agreement in principle (formalized in October 1972) for the US 
to construct a communications station on Diego Garcia, 
Congress approved the first of three consecutive annual 
fundings for the project whose grand total was $20.45 million. 
That money was used for building a transmitter and receiving 
facility, petroleum, oil and lubricants storage tanks of 
60,000 barrels total capacity, an 8,000 feet airstrip, parking 
facilities for two aircraft, housing for about 300 men, and 
for dredging a channel and small turning basin in the lagoon 
for supply ships. Construction at Diego Garcia began in March 
1971 and the communications station began operation in March
1973.
Challenges to Mobility and Freedom of Action
In an attempt to reduce perceived growing great power 
military threats to their independence and security, Indian 
Ocean states took three initiatives in late 1971 which, if 
realized, would have constricted seriously the US Navy's 
timely, efficient and flexible operation in the Indian Ocean 
area. Two of the three initiatives struck at unrestricted 
naval and air access to the Indian Ocean and its legal basis, 
the customary international right of freedom of navigation. 
The most far-reaching initiative, put forward by Ceylon (Sri 
Lanka) and co-sponsored by Tanzania, was the United Nations 
General Assembly's declaration of the Indian Ocean as a "Zone 
of Peace". Littoral states were anxious about the potential 
for an arms race between the US and the USSR, which might put
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pressure on them for access to their military facilities, and 
they were apprehensive also about possible entanglement in the 
Soviet-American rivalry and about competitive super-power 
interference in their affairs. The IOZP declaration called 
upon the "great powers”
to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral 
States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:
(a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of 
their military presence in the Indian Ocean;
(b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, 
military installations, logistical supply facilities, the 
disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction and any manifestation of great Power military 
presence ... conceived in the context of great Power 
rivalry.
• • •
(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the 
Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of any 
littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in 
contravention of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations....63
According to a Sri Lankan memorandum, the major powers' 
respect for a "Zone of Peace” would mean, "among other things, 
that the freedom of the high seas will be subject to important 
voluntary limitations.”64
63 The "Zone of Peace” declaration is in K.P. Misra, Quest For 
An International Order In The Indian Ocean (Bombay: Allied 
Publishers Private Limited, 1977), pp. 135-136. For the Sri 
Lankan thinking informing the IOZP concept, see Poulose, 
Indian Ocean Power Rivalry, pp. 215-224. Hedley Bull, "The 
Indian Ocean as a 'Zone of Peace'”, in Poulose, Indian Ocean 
Power Rivalry, pp. 177-189, provides a critical assessment of 
the concept.
64 Poulose, Indian Ocean Power Rivalry, p. 217.
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America opposed the "Zone of Peace" proposal, for three 
general reasons.65 It rejected the idea, in its view, that 
states could establish in their region without the consent of 
all affected parties a legal regime which would limit freedom 
of international navigation and overflight. Nor could a "Zone 
of Peace" abridge the inherent right of states to individual 
and collective self-defence and thus to keeping a military 
presence and support facilities in a region. A "Zone of 
Peace" could damage the fundamental interests not only of 
(external) states "compelled" to maintain military
preparedness in the Indian Ocean but also of regional states 
relying for security on a political and military balance
involving extra-regional powers. Finally although it favoured 
nuclear-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, 
the US did not accept the prohibition on its naval vessels of 
nuclear weapons, whose presence in the Indian Ocean it neither 
confirmed nor denied, because nuclear deterrence was important 
to US security and to global stability. Without America's 
compliance a "Zone of Peace" could not be created.
The second security initiative originated from South-East 
Asia, whose Straits of Malacca and Singapore formed by
peninsular Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia give the
quickest, most direct access to the northern Indian Ocean for 
US naval traffic from Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines.* 
In the "Joint Statement of the Governments of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore" in November 1971, Malaysia and
Thailand provided the US with aerial access to the Indian 
Ocean: it allowed P-3C reconnaissance aircraft and also supply 
flights going to Diego Garcia to overfly its territory and to 
stop off at Utapao air base.
65 See United Nations, General Assembly, 26th Session, First 
Committee, Official Records. (A/C.1/PV.1849), December 10,
1971, p. 3 ; ---, 34th Session, Meeting of the Littoral and
Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean (A/AC.199/SR.2), July 5, 
1979, pp. 6-9. The US held also that a "Zone of Peace" would 
set a dangerous precedent for other areas such as the 
Mediterranean and would hinder chances for a successful United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in the 1970s.
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Indonesia "agreed that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore 
are not international straits while fully recognizing their 
use for international shipping in accordance with the 
principle of innocent passage."66 (Italics added.) Malaysia 
and Indonesia claimed a limit of 12 nautical miles for their 
territorial waters, in contrast to the customary three-mile 
limit for countries fronting straits used for international 
navigation acknowledged by the US, the USSR and other maritime 
powers. If their claim gained international legal validity, 
the Straits, about eight nautical miles wide at their 
narrowest point, would come under Malaysian and Indonesian 
jurisdiction and the basis of international navigation through 
them would change from the right of unhindered passage to the 
more restricted right of innocent passage, of transit not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the 
coastal states. That change would enable Malaysia and 
Indonesia potentially to use international law to limit or 
deny at their discretion inter-oceanic naval movements which 
they considered a threat to their security.* And if Indonesia's 
"archipelago principle"67 also gained international
When in 1963-65 Indonesia "confronted" (the creation of) 
Malaysia and the "imperialist" powers, acquired naval vessels 
from the USSR and called the Indian Ocean the "Indonesian 
Ocean", the possibility of its actual military threat to 
unimpeded passage through its straits became more tangible.
66 The text of the "Joint Statement" is in Michael Leifer, 
Malacca. Singapore, and Indonesia vol. 2: International
Straits of the World (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1978), p. 204. Leifer provides background and 
analysis of the international political, legal and strategic 
issues pertaining to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and 
also to Indonesia's straits in light of the Indonesian 
government's quest for national maritime integrity and 
security.
67 In an attempt to create greater unity of the land and sea of 
the Indonesian archipelago and to enhance national security 
against external interference, the Indonesian government 
enunciated in December 1957 the "archipelago principle": all 
waters within linked straight baselines joining the outermost 
points of Indonesia's outermost islands were internal seas and 
an integral part of the state under exclusive Indonesian 
sovereignty. In effect Indonesia proclaimed that it no longer
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acceptance, Indonesia and Malaysia would be able to impose a 
complete barrier to naval communication between the Pacific 
and the Indian Ocean. The US Navy's response time to a 
contingency in the Indian Ocean area would be much increased 
and its flexibility of operations there would be severely 
reduced because, unless the Americans were prepared to incur 
the costs of running the Indonesian straits and the Strait of 
Malacca against the littoral governments' will, an aircraft 
carrier task group and logistic support ships would have to 
sail more than 9,000 miles south around Australia in order to 
reach the northern Indian Ocean. The US made quiet diplomatic 
representations against the two straits states' challenge to 
its strategic mobility, and the conflict of their interest in 
maritime security with America's interest in freedom of 
movement was resolved (see Chapter Three) in the context of 
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
beginning in 1974. Until then, that conflict was mitigated by 
America's good relations with Malaysia and close ties with 
Indonesia and by those countries' wish that the US play an 
active part in the post-Vietnam war security of South-East 
Asia.
A second security initiative from South-East Asia in 1971 
would, if put into effect, also have undermined America's 
capability to operate in the Indian Ocean. In the Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration of November 1971 Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Singapore expressed their 
determination to try to create a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in South-East Asia in order to insulate it
regarded itself as a cluster of islands within which were 
straits used for international navigation and high seas where 
foreign navies could sail at will without reference to 
Indonesian interests and authority. The right of innocent 
passage would not apply automatically within Indonesia's 
internal waters; the government could grant innocent passage 
as it chose and threatening warships could be excluded. For 
the Indonesian government's formal statement of the 
"archipelago principle”, see the "Government Declaration 
Concerning the Water Areas of Indonesia, 13 December, 1957" in 
Ibid., p. 201.
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from external interference and to keep it out of involvement 
in conflicts among outside powers.68 One consequence of the 
implementation of ZOPFAN would be the removal of all foreign 
military bases from the region, including, for example, the US 
naval base at Subic Bay. The capacity of American naval 
forces to function efficiently in the Indian Ocean would be 
impaired by the increase in time and distance to reach it from 
potential alternative bases such as Guam island 1500 miles to 
the east of Subic Bay. ZOPFAN had little chance of being 
implemented, however. The security interests and perceptions 
among the Kuala Lumpur Declaration states diverged and they 
could not avoid the fact that China's presence contiguous to 
South-East Asia attracted Soviet involvement in the region and 
that they relied on America to balance the communist rivals. 
ZOPFAN was an ideal and its proposal was more a matter of 
diplomatic ritual than reality to which the United States 
needed only to express cautious, low-key interest "in 
principle".
Responses to US Policy 
Although many littoral states responded to America's 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area by supporting a 
"Zone of Peace" as a way to avoid threats from "escalating" 
great power naval rivalry and, ideally, to manage their 
security by themselves, they knew that an IOZP was 
unrealistic. The super-powers intended to counter one another 
and the Indian Ocean states could not prevent their global 
competition from taking hold in the area. At the same time, 
they understood, the small, essentially symbolic American and 
Soviet naval forces did not pose an imminent, direct threat to 
them. The only practical approach was to oppose maritime 
hegemony by any one external power and countenance a balance 
between the Soviet presence and the American presence at as 
low a level as possible.
68 The text of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration is in Dick Wilson, 
The Neutralization of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1975), pp. 198-199.
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How individual Indian Ocean states reached the above 
conclusion depended on their security policy and their 
perception of America's role in it. In the Persian Gulf the 
conservative Arab states had, like Iran and Iraq, a strong 
interest in the safe passage of oil tankers and other shipping 
through the Gulf and out through the Strait of Hormuz into the 
Indian Ocean. Scarcely able to police their territorial 
waters, they had to look to the Iranian navy to patrol the 
Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. They valued the Middle East 
Force for showing American interest and friendship without an 
unwanted direct US military involvement in regional security 
and for subtly qualifying Iran's attempt at maritime hegemony, 
as suggested above. But the MEF's support facility on Arab 
territory, in Bahrain, was an embarrassment in Arab politics 
and Iran as well as Iraq objected to it. The Indian Ocean lay 
beyond the practical security purview of the conservative Gulf 
Arabs and although they noted the new Soviet naval presence 
there, it was of minor concern relative to the USSR's 
involvement in South Yemen or the Soviet-Iraqi alliance in 
1972 and even more so compared to issues such as their 
immediate security and the Arab-Israeli conflict. A small 
American naval presence in the Indian Ocean which countered 
the modest Soviet force was acceptable as part of the United 
States' global balance against the USSR. Iraq opposed the 
Middle East Force, its use of facilities in Bahrain and an 
American presence in the Indian Ocean. They were part of US 
"imperialist domination" of the Arab nation and the Third 
World and in the case of the MEF, it tended to attract a 
Soviet naval presence into the Gulf, intensifying the super­
power competition there and its attendant dangers.
Iran, that is, the Shah, sought to play the paramount role 
in ordering the security of the Persian Gulf and to keep the 
Soviets and the Americans out of the Gulf while it maximized 
its independence from them both. Since the middle 1960s Iran 
had been on good terms with the USSR, which was thought no 
longer to pose a serious military threat to it. The
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occasional Soviet naval visit to the Persian Gulf and the 
"build-up" by Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean were minor in 
importance; they were intended principally for political 
effect. The Shah preferred that Britain and America as well 
as the Soviet Union keep their forces out of the Gulf and that 
the MEF leave Bahrain69 in order to avoid great power 
competition and also "polarization. If one of the countries 
in this region moves too close to either of the blocs, the 
others might be persuaded to move closer to its rival."70 
External naval forces were not necessary because the Iranian 
navy could patrol the sea lanes. In the Indian Ocean Iran 
tolerated a US (and also British) presence as a balance 
against the Soviet squadron: "if the big powers [were] to have 
a naval presence in the [Indian Ocean] region, Iran would not 
wish to see the U.S. become the only one that is excluded."71 
But from 1972 the Shah intended to acquire naval forces able 
to patrol the sea lanes far out into the Indian Ocean, into 
which he had extended Iran's security perimeter. Those forces 
were part of an all azimuths defence capability which he was 
determined to create with large amounts of advanced American 
weapons and which would enhance Iran's strategic self- 
reliance. Greater self-reliance was even more imperative as 
a result of the Vietnam war because the United States had 
become a weaker and more unreliable source of security. It 
might fail to support Iran as it had "failed" to support 
Pakistan in 1971, despite the appearance of the Enterprise 
task group, and in 1965.
69 See Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations 
of Iran A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 261, 
269-270.
70 From a comment by Amir Taheri in Amir Taheri, "Policies of 
Iran in the Persian Gulf Region", in The Persian Gulf and 
Indian Ocean in International Politics, ed. Abbas Amirie 
(Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic 
Studies, 1975), p. 284.
71 Ibid. , p. 274.
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Initially, in 1962-64, India accepted an American naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean, even though in the 1950s the US 
had introduced the Cold War into South Asia by way of its 
security tie with India's chief antagonist, Pakistan. China 
was a foe of the US as well as India, which had fought a war 
against the PRC in 1962, and an American aircraft carrier task 
group in the Indian Ocean was perceived as a stabilising force 
helping to deter further Chinese aggression and to restrain 
Pakistan.72 This consideration mitigated India's opposition 
in the latter 1960s to the British and American intention to 
construct naval and air facilities on the newly created 
British Indian Ocean Territory. India lost its de facto 
maritime defence as Britain began to withdraw from the Indian 
Ocean area in 1968 but until late 1971 it viewed with relative 
equanimity the introduction there of Soviet naval forces and 
of US 7th Fleet detachments. Both sides' presence and the 
potential threat posed by their competition were judged to be 
minor. Although India could not prevent the super-powers from 
sending forces to the Indian Ocean, it could keep a careful 
watch on their operations, try to keep the US or the USSR from 
acquiring logistic facilities in Pakistan and protest against 
America's construction of a communications station at Diego 
Garcia. The principle of balance informed India's view of the 
American and the Soviet naval presence: only
a competitive and balanced presence would prevent either 
superpower from building up its forces to an intolerable 
level. It was the best assurance that conflicts between 
the superpowers in the Ocean would remain under control 
and that intervention in the affairs of the littoral 
states would be minimized.73
A "balance of presence would let India maintain a stance of 
nonalignment in (sic) Indian Ocean power rivalry, and provide
72 From a comment by Ganti Bhargava in Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The 
View from India" in Ibid., pp. 195, 196.
73 Ibid., p. 189.
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nonaligned nations with an opportunity to press for such 
utopian concepts as a zone of peace....1,74
In 1971 the United States' rapprochement with China, its 
diplomatic support for Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani war and 
its dispatch of the Enterprise aircraft carrier task group to 
the Bay of Bengal (see fn. 54 above) reminded the Indians that 
their interests could clash with America's and that the USSR 
was necessary for balancing the US and China in South Asia and 
the US in the Indian Ocean. The presence of the Enterprise 
task group had a "powerful impact on India's perception of 
developments in the Indian Ocean since December 1971. Indian 
policy planners [could] hardly ignore the possibility that the 
US might intervene in a future Indo-Pakistani war from the 
naval base at Diego Garcia.”75 Thus India would strongly 
oppose the Nixon administration's proposal in 1974 to expand 
Diego Garcia into a logistic support facility. The threat of 
American intervention represented by the Enterprise was an 
important factor inducing India to take on two new naval roles 
and to accelerate the expansion of the Indian navy in order to 
fulfil them. Besides defending India's coast, islands and 
territorial waters, protecting Indian shipping and countering 
the Pakistani navy, Indian maritime forces would begin to 
monitor external powers' naval forces in the Indian Ocean and 
would offer protection upon request to small states in the 
Indian Ocean area. A larger navy would enable India to 
present a modest but still useful political counter to 
competing US and Soviet forces and a degree of deterrence 
against a potential American naval threat. It would also 
lessen in time India's dependence on the USSR for naval aid 
and for balancing the American presence. For the near-term, 
however, America's attempted naval coercive diplomacy in
74 Idem.
75 Ibid., p. 191.
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December 1971 made even more remote a basic Indian objective 
of minimizing the super-powers' involvement in the Indian 
Ocean area.
The Pakistanis were anxious that India with its growing 
navy would become the dominant regional naval power in the 
Indian Ocean area and intimidate its smaller neighbours, 
including Pakistan.76 Seeking to minimize Indian naval
hegemony as much as possible and realising that they alone 
could not balance the Indian navy, they wanted an Indian Ocean 
"Zone of Peace" to restrict regional powers, that is, India, 
as well as external powers. But because a "Zone of Peace" was 
not possible, Pakistan hoped that the presence of Soviet and 
American naval forces would moderate India's maritime 
ambitions, in addition to inhibiting aggressive action by one 
of those super-power presences. It was hoped too that outside 
powers would not do anything that would give "overwhelming 
superiority to any single regional country."77
The presence of the Enterprise aircraft carrier task 
group in the Bay of Bengal at the end of the Indo-Pakistani 
war in December 1971 disappointed Pakistan. Helping to raise 
unrealistic hopes of American help, it "showed" that once 
again, as in 1965, the US was an unreliable friend when 
needed. To the extent that the Enterprise caused India, 
assisted in part by its Soviet ally, to accelerate its naval 
expansion programme, it worsened Pakistan's inferiority in the 
naval balance with India. Pakistan began to look to Iran for 
potential help in countering the Indian navy. Nonetheless the 
Pakistanis had to maintain their relationship with the United 
States, even though it was more frayed and "distant" after
76 See Latif Ahmed Sherwani, "Realities of the Indian Ocean 
Area: A Pakistani Evaluation", paper presented to the Indian 
Ocean Conference at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., March 1971, 
p. 17.
77 Ibid. , p. 26.
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1971. The American tie, however imperfect relative to the 
more dependable, if more limited link with China, remained 
necessary for balancing the USSR in South Asia and in the 
Indian Ocean.
The Indian Ocean was part of Indonesia's security 
purview, centred on South-East Asia, within which Indonesia 
wanted the United States to balance the Soviet Union as well 
as China. Staunchly anti-communist since 1966, Indonesia 
considered America as its informal, de facto ally and as the 
Vietnam war drew to a close, the "prospect of the United 
States in a phase of strategic decline aroused profound 
concern"78 among the Indonesian leadership. Uncertain about 
America's future role in regional security and its reliability 
in fulfilling that role, the Indonesians found "the likelihood 
of competition between the Soviet Union and China to fill the 
vacuum left by an abdication of the US military presence [to 
be] extremely disturbing."79
Maritime security was very important to Indonesia because 
of its archipelagic character. The presence of naval forces 
of a communist power, the USSR, sailing through South-East 
Asia to the Indian Ocean underlined to Indonesia its inability 
to control its maritime environment.80 Thus although naval 
deployments through South-East Asia by both super-powers was 
"regarded with distaste" by Jakarta, which also expressed 
critical concern about America's construction of facilities on
78 Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 154.
79 Idem.
80 See Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesian Perspectives On The Indian 
Ocean" in Cottrell and Burrell, The Indian Ocean: Its 
Political. Economic, and Military Importance, p. 230.
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Diego Garcia, "the US navy constituted the only credible 
counterweight [to Soviet naval forces] and had to be tolerated 
in the interest of raison d'etat."81
Australia judged that the United States' strategic policy 
for the Indian Ocean area was insufficient to balance the 
Soviet naval presence there and it encouraged, without 
success, the Americans to make a greater effort to do so. The 
growing economic importance of Western Australia, Britain's 
withdrawal in large part from "east of Suez" by late 1971,* 
Australia's very limited capacity for defence in its west and 
uncertainty about its American ally's defence involvement in 
the Indian Ocean area and the larger US security role in Asia 
as the Vietnam war ended heightened its unease about potential 
danger from the USSR, as suggested by the establishment in the 
area and increase since 1968 of a Soviet naval presence. That 
presence was part of the USSR's attempt to increase its 
influence and prestige among the littoral states. Although 
the main purpose of the Soviet squadron was political rather 
than military82, the Australian government recognised, and
Under the Five-Power Defence Arrangement signed by Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore in April 1971, 
Britain retained several frigates at Singapore and aircraft in 
Malaysia in contribution to those two states' defence.
81 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p. 146. For Indonesian 
views on the Indian Ocean issue, see Ali Moertopo, "The Indian 
Ocean: Strategic And Security Problems", The Indonesian 
Quarterly 5 (April 1977), 33-46; Kirdi Dipoyudo, "Important 
Development In The Indian Ocean Area", The Indonesian 
Quarterly 10 (April 1982), 5-15. Indonesia, both analysts 
note, recognizes that the Soviet-American rivalry in the 
Indian Ocean will continue. The two sides' presence must be 
maintained "in reasonable balance at as low a level as 
possible" in order to "avoid a competitive escalation of 
forces and to guarantee stability, peace and security in the 
region."
82 See p. 131 in Beazley and Clark, Politics of Intrusion, 
which discusses (pp. 127-143) Australia's defence policy for 
the Indian Ocean area from the late 1960s to 1978 and its 
response to the United States' strategic policy there.
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although "Australia alone [could] do little about the Soviet 
presence”, if it did "not pay close attention to the region 
its nations may be encouraged to swing more towards USSR and 
the PRC. This would be detrimental to Australia's potential 
for trade, influence and goodwill.”83
Because Australia by itself could not balance the Soviet 
squadron, it sought help from America and Britain: it hoped to 
persuade them to form with it a joint naval force in the 
Indian Ocean which would be, as expressed by the Australian 
Minister for Defence, "'adequate to demonstrate ... that the 
Ocean does not and will not become a Russian preserve and that 
Western interests there remain positive and will be 
secured.'"84 Australia's attempt to gain the cooperation of 
its allies failed. When the then Prime Minister, Mr McMahon,
from the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Indian 
Ocean Region. 1971 - Parliamentary Paper No. 258, p. 4,
The Soviet surface naval presence, because of its 
size, vulnerability and lack of full naval base 
facilities, cannot, at present, be considered an 
aggressive military force or a direct threat to 
Australia. It can generally be classed as a political 
and psychological tool, which increases uncertainty in 
the region.
The Joint Committee Report concluded that the Soviet squadron 
had the primary purpose of
'showing the flag' - showing the countries of the Indian 
Ocean ... that the Soviet Union has an interest and a 
place in the ... region. By visiting various sectors of 
the region, it has sought to create a feeling of 
goodwill, to display a sense of involvement, and most 
importantly, to gain and consolidate the confidence of 
the littoral states. But ... the influence exercised by 
a naval force, if it belonged to a great power, was 
related more to the latent power it represented, rather 
than to the size of the force itself, (p. 28)
83 Australia, Parliament, Joint Committee Report, p. 35.
84 Beazley and Clark, Politics of Intrusion, p. 131.
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raised the issue during a visit to Britain and America in 
November 1971, the British declined to make a commitment and 
the
response in Washington scarcely came closer to meeting 
Australian objectives. ... [T]he prevailing mood [there] 
was in favour of a low-key approach to the Indian Ocean 
and there was considerable resistance to any large-scale 
commitment of American Naval (sic) forces to the area. 
If anything, the US administration was much less prone to 
emphasise a Soviet 'threat' in the Indian Ocean than was 
its Australian counterpart. This feeling was undoubtedly 
conveyed to the visiting Australian Prime Minister and 
any hopes that he might have had of returning with 
specific plans for a joint Anglo-American-Australian 
naval force for the Ocean were rapidly dashed.85
The US would agree with the Australians only that a "careful 
watch" over the Soviet naval presence should continue, by way 
of its construction of a communications station and landing 
strip at Diego Garcia. Unable to gain reassurance from the 
American position, the Australians had to tolerate it. They 
continued to build at Cockburn Sound near Freemantle in 
Western Australia a naval support facility which, when 
finished, the US was invited to use. They sought to gain use 
of Diego Garcia for reconnaissance flights across the eastern 
Indian Ocean. When the Labor government under Gough Whitlman 
came to power in late 1972, it took a more critical and 
independent view of the US and unlike the previous, 
conservative government it espoused an Indian Ocean "Zone of 
Peace". But that espousal was intended essentially for 
improving Australia's standing in the Third World and the 
Labor government supported America's presence in the Indian 
Ocean, provided that it was kept at as low a level as 
possible.
The USSR's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean 
from 1968 and its acquisition of access to logistic facilities 
in Somalia was not a response to America's strategic policy
85 Ibid., p. 132.
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for the Indian Ocean area. That policy was not created until 
late 1970 and the only US naval presence there was the small 
and long-established Middle East Force. Initially the Soviet 
presence was a logical but mistaken anticipation of the 
deployment by US ballistic missile submarines into the Indian 
Ocean as part of America's global strategic nuclear deterrence 
against the USSR. Although the "Soviets were under no 
illusion that they had the capability to counter Polaris 
[submarines] in the Indian Ocean..., [t]hey wanted to develop 
the operational and physical infrastructure to support 
measures that they hoped would gradually become 
available...."86 But in 1971-72 the primary mission of the 
Soviet force in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea changed 
from countering Polaris submarines to preparing for the 
defence of the Soviet Union in conventional war with the West 
and more immediately, in view of tensions on their mutual 
border, with China.87 As a result the Soviets increased 
further their naval presence and began to enlarge their Somali 
support facilities. Preparing for war contingencies was more 
important than arms control with the Americans, which was 
rejected as a possible course of action not only because of 
opposition by the chiefs of the Soviet land forces as well as 
the Navy but also probably because, it was calculated, the US 
also wanted to, and would, keep its naval presence at a low 
level, notwithstanding the deployment of the Enterprise 
aircraft carrier task group to the Bay of Bengal in late 1971.
Besides area familiarization and gaining operational 
experience, the Soviet naval presence had the collateral, 
political purpose of "showing the flag". That presence helped 
to underline the USSR's importance as a regional and also 
global actor and to enhance Soviet prestige and it made 
carefully selected goodwill port visits. It showed the USSR's
86 MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 
196-197.
87 Ibid., pp. 197-201.
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support for friendly regimes facing political danger, for 
example the new Marxist regime in Somalia in 1969 and 1970. 
It provided minor, non-belligerent support for ’’national 
liberation” when in 1973 Soviet ships carried Dhofari rebel 
forces from Aden to near the border between South Yemen and 
Oman. None of those activities was a response to America's 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area, however. And in 
the one case in which the Soviet navy did counterbalance an 
American naval force, the Enterprise task group in 1971, the 
anti-aircraft carrier detachment came not from the Soviet 
Indian Ocean presence but from the Soviet Pacific Fleet's base 
at Vladivostok.
The Soviet political leadership was concerned about the 
American and Western response to the USSR's presence in the 
Arabian Sea at least as much as about how to respond to 
America's strategic policy for the area. The Soviet presence 
had to be restricted to a minor, low-risk cadre force, too 
slight to be perceived as a military threat, in order to avoid 
incurring yet heavier defence expenditure, provoking 
opposition from littoral states or perhaps prompting the US to 
introduce a significant counter-force. The Soviet deployment 
indeed had to be
delicately calculated; it must be large enough to satisfy 
the naval requirement of area familiarization; it must be 
large enough, and sufficiently eye-catching, to raise the 
spectre of a great-power naval race in the Indian Ocean; 
but it must not be large enough to convince the Western 
governments that the spectre had become reality and that 
they must respond by raising their own involvement. In 
essence, it must arouse non-aligned opinion to the 
dangers of a great-power naval race, so that a hostile 
climate would be created, not for the Soviet presence 
itself, but for the possibility of an American or British 
counter to it, and a consequent raising of the naval 
armaments level. ... Knowing that the American
government was also faced with the problems of rising 
defence costs, and that disillusionment with the 
involvement in Vietnam was creating a climate adverse to 
new commitments, the Soviet leaders probably expected 
that by raising a 'spectre' they could achieve a tacit
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understanding with the American government, in which they 
could together act to limit the aspirations of their 
respective navies.88
The USSR's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area was 
not so much a response to the corresponding US policy as it 
was a compromise between the Soviet armed forces' requirement 
to prepare for war and their political leaders' preference to 
restrain as much as possible the Soviet naval presence in the 
area. Unlike in the US, however, the armed forces' position 
was strong enough for them to block the USSR from entering 
into naval arms control negotiations for the Indian Ocean.
Creation of Policy. 1970 
America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area
created in 1970 - minor naval display and establishing a 
communications station at Diego Garcia for the political
purposes of showing interest, balancing the Soviet naval 
presence and thereby reassuring friendly littoral states - was 
of marginal necessity. The United States' interests were 
moderate, as were the military threats to them on land from 
Iraq and the Soviet Union. The Soviet naval presence was too 
small to threaten shipping or to exert appreciable influence. 
The principal threat to access to Persian Gulf oil was
instability within states, and US armed forces were irrelevant 
for dealing with it. America showed sufficient concern for 
its interests and was able to secure them with policy
instruments other than a naval presence. In the Gulf 
encouraging primarily Iran to take responsibility for regional 
security and selling it arms with which to balance Iraq were 
much more important than retaining the Middle East Force. 
Minor crises, for example that between Iraq and Kuwait in 
1973, were resolved by a combination of Saudi (and, in the 
background, Iranian) military strength in readiness and Arab 
diplomacy, and without a US naval show of force. The 
Americans balanced the Soviets adequately through superiority
88 Jukes, "The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy”, pp. 11-12.
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in the total range of military activities, which was the 
greater source of reassurance to friendly states.
Avoidance was a prominent motif in America's strategic 
policy. Minor naval display was judged to be necessary in 
order to avoid wrong signalling by inaction: Britain's
operational departure from the Indian Ocean area and the entry 
of the Soviet navy were too important to be ignored. A 
response had to be made in order to prevent the littoral 
states from getting a stronger impression as the Vietnam war 
began to draw to an end that America was becoming weak and 
indifferent and was "retreating” relative to the USSR. An 
occasional minimal and defensive deployment by 7th Fleet 
units, retaining the MEF and (the compromise with the US Navy 
of) building a communications station at Diego Garcia would 
avoid the appearance of US indifference to the Indian Ocean 
area and the possibility because of American "default” that 
some littoral countries might become more responsive to the 
Soviet naval presence. But America's strategic policy was 
intended also to avoid provoking littoral countries by 
minimizing the worry that it was "militarizing” the Indian 
Ocean, engaging in an arms race with the USSR and endangering 
their security. The policy objective of inhibiting 
competition with the Soviets was shown by the United States' 
interest, not reciprocated by them in practice, in naval arms 
control negotiations. The above considerations led the Nixon 
administration to reject the US Navy's preferred policy of 
"matching” quantitatively the Soviet naval presence and 
constructing a logistic support facility on Diego Garcia.
That America did balance the Soviet naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean was suggested by the littoral states' response to 
its strategic policy for the area. Except for outright 
opposition by politically and ideologically unfriendly states 
such as Iraq and also Marxist Somalia and South Yemen, 
ambivalence was many states' response to the US policy. 
America was necessary to balance the Soviet presence hut
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balance implied potentially dangerous competition between the 
super-powers, even though America did avoid an arms race with 
the USSR and even though its Indian Ocean strategic policy had 
not caused the introduction of the Soviet presence. Thus most 
of the littoral states voted for the "Zone of Peace" 
declaration which called in effect for both sides to withdraw 
from the Indian Ocean. Ambivalence, caused also in the case 
of Iran and Pakistan by their sense of US unreliability as a 
source of help in a crisis, weakened America's reassurance of 
friendly powers that it was balancing the Soviet presence.
In late 1973 the October war in the Middle East, the 
consequent oil embargo and America's changing perception of 
Soviet behaviour prompted it to make a minor change in its 
strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area. Why and how that 
policy was adjusted is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE 
MINOR ADJUSTMENT OF POLICY, 1973-74
The United States made a minor adjustment in 1973-74 to 
its strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area in response to 
the Arab oil embargo resulting from the Arab-Israeli war in 
October 1973 and to Soviet behaviour during that war. The 
embargo emphasized America's growing dependence on Persian 
Gulf oil, and the USSR's threat to intervene in the war and 
airlift to Arab belligerents suggested a greater Soviet 
willingness to use the armed forces abroad in support of 
policy. The US Navy in particular warned of the Soviets' 
potential to exercise "considerable influence" in the Indian 
Ocean area and globally by way of its increasing naval 
presence there. America began regular naval deployments to 
the Arabian Sea in order to balance more vigorously the Soviet 
squadron and to intensify the display of concern for its 
regional interests, especially access to Persian Gulf oil. 
From late 1973 into 1975 the US made veiled threats to 
retaliate against "friendly" Gulf Arab states if they did not 
end the oil embargo soon and then to intervene in "defence" of 
access to oil should another embargo be imposed. The Nixon 
and Ford administrations' proposal to expand Diego Garcia into 
a logistic facility was part of America's enhanced naval 
display in the Indian Ocean and when completed, Diego Garcia 
would be able to support contingency operations by aircraft 
carrier task groups for 30 days and by long-range combat and 
logistic aircraft. America was not prepared to negotiate with 
the USSR about naval arms control for the Indian Ocean, 
preferring instead to exercise "tacit restraint".
This chapter outlines the setting to the adjustment of 
America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area, 
discusses the rationale and premises for that adjustment and 
examines the United States' threats to retaliate, then to 
intervene against Gulf Arab states. The proposal for a
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logistic facility at Diego Garcia, the vigorous opposition to 
it in the US Senate and the Executive branch's reasons not to 
seek naval arms control negotiations with the Soviets are 
detailed. Finally are reviewed how the US dealt with 
political challenges to its use of bases in the Philippines 
and a support facility in Bahrain and how legal challenges to 
its strategic mobility through maritime South-East Asia were 
resolved.
Setting and Interests
In late October 1973 the United States sent the Hancock 
aircraft carrier task group to the Arabian Sea, where a 
"greatly increased naval presence was maintained until April
1974."1 The Hancock's deployment was "probably related to the 
global alert of U.S. forces in response to the Arab-Israeli 
war and a reaction to the shipping threat, as well as a more 
generalized response to the sudden cessation of oil 
supplies."2 A month later, in late November, the first 
adjustment of America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean 
area was announced by James Schlesinger, then Secretary of 
Defence, who expressed the Nixon administration's intention to 
make "more frequent and more regular naval deployments to the 
region",3 thereby resuming the periodic deployments 
discontinued in 1964.
The modification of America's initial, "minimalist" 
policy for the Indian Ocean area was caused by important 
changes in the setting of that policy. The Middle East war, 
the Arab oil embargo, the resulting four-fold increase in the 
price of oil and economic disruption in the West showed that 
the US had become dependent on Persian Gulf oil to the point
1 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 63.
2 Ibid., p. 64. The "shipping threat" referred to Egypt's 
interference at the Bab al-Mandab strait with shipping bound 
for Israel.
3 Idem; New York Times. November 30, 1973.
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of vulnerability. Contrary to America's assumption before
1973, the growing economic interdependence between the Gulf 
Arab states and the US had not prevented the Arabs from using 
the denial of oil as an economic and political "weapon” for 
exerting pressure on the US in order to influence Israel to 
make more concessions to the "front line" Arab states. The 
Nixon administration became acutely aware not only of the 
close political linkage between the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the oil policy of the Gulf Arab states but also of the
leverage that they could apply on America's allies, whose
heavy dependence on Persian Gulf oil made them a source of 
indirect influence against the US and potentially on the
global balance of power with the USSR. The divergence of 
policy between America and its European and Japanese allies 
during the October 1973 war and the strain on the Western 
alliance as the allies made political concessions to the Arabs 
and separate arrangements for oil supplies suggested that the 
United States could not rely on allied support for its foreign 
and security policies outside Europe or North-East Asia. 
Perhaps the most ominous aspect of the Middle East war was the 
behaviour of the Soviet Union. Its large airlift of war 
supplies to Egypt and Syria while America initially exercised 
restraint in support of Israel, its encouragement of the oil 
embargo and its threat of direct armed intervention in the 
fighting suggested to the US a Soviet view of detente not as 
a process of restrained competition in the Third World but as 
a means of gaining regional advantage at America's expense.
The Soviets' airlift to the Arab belligerents provided US 
policy-makers one of four "lessons" from the war and the oil 
embargo. First, the Soviet Union had "projected" "military 
power on a scale and at a distance sufficient to break 
America's monopoly of the capacity for long-range 
intervention.1,4 It had deployed up to 96 naval ships in the 
Mediterranean during the war. And in response to America's
4 Strategic Survey 1973 (London: International Institute For 
Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 4.
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deployment of the Hancock task group to the Arabian Sea, the 
Soviet naval presence there doubled to 32 ships by December 
1973. Second, the stoppage of Saudi oil from the refinery at 
Bahrain, the usual source of fuel for its naval vessels in the 
Indian Ocean, compelled the US to make hasty oil purchase 
arrangements with Iran and to establish a supply chain of 
tankers from the 7th Fleet's oil depot at Subic Bay, more than 
4,000 miles away. The strain on the US logistic forces 
emphasized the difficulty of supporting emergency operations 
over a long distance. Third, access to military facilities in 
the Middle East and in allied states was unavailable when, as 
in the case of US support for Israel, America's interests were 
opposed politically. On October 20, 1973 the Bahraini
government ordered the Middle East Force to leave Bahrain by 
October 1974 and all of America's European allies except 
Portugal refused to give it use of their facilities and 
overflight rights for its aerial resupply of Israel. Fourth, 
Egypt's interference at the Bab al-Mandab with shipping bound 
for Israel, especially oil tankers from Iran, demonstrated the 
vulnerability of shipping to hostile action at "choke points".
The changes in the setting of America's strategic policy 
for the Indian Ocean area in late 1973 underlined the 
importance of its already well-defined interests there which 
centred on the Persian Gulf. The most compelling interest was 
the assured availability of oil in sufficient quantity and at 
a "reasonable" price. The dependence of America's allies on 
Gulf oil was heavy, as noted, and its own imports of Gulf oil 
- about 15% of all its imported oil in 1974 - were growing.* 
The US government's earlier estimate that by 1980 50% of 
America's oil imports would come from the Persian Gulf seemed 
to be coming true. As the balance of trade with that region 
now weighed heavily against the US, the vigorous export of 
goods and services there became more urgent.
The US government was also becoming aware of the West's 
expanding need for the metals, minerals and other raw 
materials of southern Africa.
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Accessibility of oil was connected with the independence, 
stability and security of the Persian Gulf as well as with a 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would prevent 
another oil embargo. The United States continued to encourage 
the pro-Western orientation and regional influence of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. Mending relations with the Saudis after the 
oil embargo, keeping close links with the Shah and sustaining 
its help for both countries' economic and military development 
programmes would enable them to maintain primary 
responsibility for security in the Gulf and to contain 
pressures from South Yemen and Iraq. America supported the 
idea of a Gulf security system and it sought to restrict 
Soviet interference and influence while avoiding military 
competition or confrontation with the USSR. The United 
States' interest in assured air and sea access to the Indian 
Ocean area and free movement across it, the security of 
shipping routes along which oil was carried to Europe, Asia 
and America and the safety of its citizens, an increasing 
number of whom were resident in the Gulf, were steadfast.
Rationale and Premises of Policy 
In 1974 America undertook a "comprehensive reevaluation" 
of its Indian Ocean area strategic policy. Its reassessment 
was guided by the recognition that Persian Gulf oil was now a 
much more direct and vital national interest, that events in 
the Gulf could affect American security quite seriously - 
which recognition was itself a major watershed in US strategic 
thinking - and that the "oil had been turned off” for 
political reasons, not as a result of a military threat.5 
National Security Study Memorandum 199, the principal policy 
document (completed in autumn 1974), answered the questions of 
what level of naval presence in the Indian Ocean would now 
best serve US interests and how that presence could be 
combined most effectively with diplomatic and other policy
5 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy”, p. 64.
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instruments, including possible arms control initiatives, to 
achieve American objectives. Its main decision was
to institutionalize the actions that had been taken 
almost a year before, in the heat of the crisis. These 
actions had proved operationally feasible, and much of 
the political cost had already been paid. Thus, it was 
decided to maintain a contingency naval presence in the 
form of periodic deployments from the Pacific Fleet. ...
... Diego Garcia was to be expanded from its genuinely 
austere status as a communications station to an 
intermediate facility capable of supporting major naval 
and air deployments for limited periods of time. ...
Finally, it was determined that no new initiatives 
on Indian Ocean arms limitations would be undertaken with 
the Soviets for the time being. Rather, the United 
States would pursue a policy of 'tacit restraint,' ... 
asserting its rights to operate military force in the 
Indian Ocean at the new, but still relatively modest 
levels that had emerged from the 1973 crisis.
There was general recognition that this increased 
level of military activity was not in itself a solution 
to the stubborn political issues facing the United States 
in the area, nor was it a substitute for other diplomatic 
or economic policies that might be pursued on a bilateral 
basis with various states of the region. ... TTIhis 
enhancement of U.S. military capabilities and presence 
was regarded as a symbol of U.S. political interest, 
reinforcing other policy instruments, as well as an 
assertion of American intent to maintain access to the 
region.6 (Italics added.)
The rationale for the first policy initiative, the 
periodic deployment by 7th Fleet task groups to the Indian 
Ocean, had been set out in February 1974 in a letter to the 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from 
Schlesinger, who urged that ”it is imperative for the U.S. to 
maintain a balance in the Indian Ocean area vis-a-vis the
6 Ibid., pp. 65-66. Beazley and Clark, Politics of Intrusion, 
pp. 30-49, discuss "The October War and American Approaches to 
an Indian Ocean Policy 1973-1976".
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Soviets.”7 American naval deployments there since November 
1973 had been prompted by the Soviets' growing naval presence 
and their ability to introduce additional forces into the area 
quickly. "Broadly speaking” they had demonstrated during the 
October war an increased readiness to use military aid and 
shows of force to influence events in which major American 
interests were at stake. They were prepared to project 
military power into distant areas such as the Indian Ocean as 
their naval forces and airlift capabilities grew. The 
prospective reopening of the Suez Canal would enable the USSR 
to augment its Indian Ocean forces from the Black Sea rather 
than from the Pacific and a larger Soviet presence in the 
Indian Ocean would be possible and probable at a time when the 
importance of the oil routes from the Persian Gulf had been 
re-emphasized.
More frequent deployments to the Indian Ocean by American 
naval forces were needed in order to offset growing Soviet 
influence. Their presence underscored US strategic mobility 
and provided a clear signal to the USSR of America's resolve 
to ensure a credible military capability in the area. 
Balancing the Soviet squadron communicated the United States' 
intention to continue to play a role there, to support 
friendly states and to deter potential threats or harassment 
to major international straits and shipping routes. America's 
naval presence was not tied to a narrow military mission; it 
was intended as tangible evidence of US national interest - an 
interest shared by allies and regional states - in security 
and stability in the Indian Ocean area. The American presence 
was not a threat to any state or group of states and no 
specific tasks had been given it except to maintain general 
operational proficiency while on station. The presence of its
7 This and the next paragraph draw from Schlesinger's letter 
and an enclosure, "Rationale For Naval Deployments In The 
Indian Ocean And Proposed Expansion Of Diego Garcia”, in 
United States, Congress, Senate, Committee On Armed Services, 
Selected Material On Diego Garcia. Committee Print, 94th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 12-15.
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naval forces assured the US of an adequate capability to meet 
contingencies involving friendly governments around the Indian 
Ocean littoral.
Schlesinger's rationale was complemented by a statement 
in April 1974 by Admiral Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval 
Operations until July 1974, in which he proposed that recent
events such as the Arab-Israeli war, the oil embargo, and 
the worldwide economic dislocations which flowed from 
that embargo and ensuing price rises have served to focus 
attention on the Indian Ocean area.
The impacts of these events have brought home 
clearly the interrelationship between what goes on in the 
Indian Ocean area and the well-being of the rest of the 
world.
I think it is evident, as a result of those 
experiences, that our interests in the Indian Ocean are 
directly linked with our interests in Europe and Asia; 
and, more broadly, with our fundamental interest in 
maintaining a stable worldwide balance of power.
• • •
In the judgment of many observers, the Indian Ocean 
has become the area with the potential to produce major 
shifts in the global balance of power over the next 
decade. It follows that we must have the ability to 
influence events in that area, and the capability to 
deploy our military power in the region is an essential 
element of such influence.
That ... is the crux of the rationale ...8
for increasing America's naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 
And in June 1975 George Vest, Director of the Bureau of 
Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department, declared 
that America's
periodic deployments reassure ... friends in the area, 
and serve as a reminder that we are able to respond to
8 From "Statement Of Adm. Elmo Russell Zumwalt, Jr., Chief Of 
Naval Operations, U.S. Navy" in U.S. House, Proposed 
Expansion, p. 130.
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threats against our interests and those of our allies. 
We firmly believe that an effective capability to deploy 
and support U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean area 
helps to deter attempts to disrupt the vital sea lines of 
communication which traverse it, and also underscores the 
importance we attach to the right of countries to 
navigate freely on the high seas. These deployments also 
highlight the flexibility and mobility of our military 
posture, thereby demonstrating the efficiency and 
effectiveness of our forces in a wide variety of 
circumstances and enhancing their deterrent credibility. 
We believe the periodic demonstration of our ability to 
operate in the Indian Ocean reinforces our diplomatic 
efforts to maintain stability in the region, and in 
contiguous areas such as the Middle East. In that area, 
during the October 1973 hostilities, our naval 
deployments exemplified military power in its traditional 
role of effectively supporting diplomacy.9
Balancing the Soviet Naval Presence 
The United States' strategic policy for the Indian Ocean 
area concentrated on the Soviet naval presence there, the 
implications of its growth and its perceived uses in war, 
crisis and peace and on the US Navy as the chief means by 
which to counter that presence. Since 1968, noted Zumwalt, 
repeating many of the themes he had articulated in 1970, there 
had been "a pattern of steady buildup in the Soviet naval 
presence, in Soviet military assistance to some of the 
littoral states, and in the Soviet infrastructure for support 
of military operations in the Indian Ocean.”10 The 
"impressive” Soviet "buildup" could not be "related, either in 
time or scope, to any comparable expansion of the U.S. 
activity", which had "remained at a relatively low level." 
The "USSR's military logistics infrastructure" in Somalia,
9 From "Prepared Statement Of Hon. George S. Vest, Director, 
Bureau Of Politico-Military Affairs, Department Of State" in 
U.S. House, Diego Garcia. 1975 Debate, p. 4.
10 Except where noted, all quotations in the remainder of this 
and the next paragraph are taken from "Statement Of Adm. Elmo 
Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations ..." in 
United States, Congress, Senate, Committee On Foreign 
Relations, Briefings On Diego Garcia And Patrol Frigate. 
Hearings With Adm. Elmo Zumwalt. Jr.. U.S. Naw. Chief Of 
Naval Operations. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, pp. 5-9.
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South Yemen and Iraq, which "already is capable of supporting 
a much greater presence than now exists", and a much shortened 
transit time from the Black Sea to the Arabian Sea when the 
Suez Canal was reopened led him to expect the Soviet presence 
to keep growing, regardless of America's plans to expand Diego 
Garcia. It would continue to increase despite the USSR's 
"asymmetrical" geographical advantage over the US: the "most 
important military fact" was the Soviet Union's "domination" 
of the Eurasian land mass. It bordered on "some key" Middle 
Eastern states and its "land-based forces can already be 
brought to bear in the region." Unlike America the Soviet 
Union had the "proximity necessary to influence events in the 
Indian Ocean littoral, without the employment of naval 
forces...."*
The objectives of the Soviet naval presence were the 
enlargement of "Soviet influence with countries of the region; 
the enhancement of the Soviet image as a great power; and the 
checking of Chinese political influence through the expansion 
of Soviet power to China's southern flank." Implicitly the 
Soviet navy's main objective in the Indian Ocean in wartime 
was interdiction of oil shipping from the Persian Gulf. This 
was suggested, first, when Zumwalt noted the USSR's "awareness 
that the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf, and the sea lanes 
over which they must pass to the economies of the world, are 
of absolutely vital importance to [America's] most important 
allies, and are of growing importance to [the US]." In 
contrast the Soviets were "virtually self-sufficient in oil, 
and the Indian Ocean littoral consequently is of considerably 
less economic importance to Moscow than to ..." the West. 
Second, because the Soviet navy was expanding and the US Navy 
was contracting, the USN "could not control all of the seas in 
a conventional war with the Soviet Union today."11 A
This reasoning explains why the US armed services rejected 
both a "Zone of Peace" for the Indian Ocean area and 
negotiations with the USSR for arms control there.
11 Ibid., p. 23.
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declining American ability to exercise sea control might also, 
the US Navy worried, encourage the USSR to use its Indian 
Ocean squadron to support more aggressive and interfering 
foreign policy initiatives. The Soviets might be emboldened 
to exploit regional tensions and to take larger risks for gain 
in crises, while America's strong emphasis on conflict 
avoidance and its limited naval forces might retard 
appropriate counteraction. Ready access to the Arabian Sea 
via a reopened Suez Canal and ample regional logistic 
facilities could give the USSR an advantage over America in a 
crisis by enabling and supporting the quick reinforcement of 
its Indian Ocean squadron from the Black Sea. The Soviets 
would be able to reach the Arabian Sea in about four days, 
while the US Navy would take about ten days to reach it from 
Subic Bay.* According to Admiral C.D. Grojean, then Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy),
the rapidity with which the Soviets could reach a 
potential hotspot in the region of the Persian Gulf could 
well be a deciding factor should the outcome of such a 
crisis be influenced by the presence of a major naval 
force standing offshore.12
The general peacetime political purpose of the Soviets' 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean was, in Zumwalt's view,
the use of military power, to convert that to political 
influence, and to marry a combination of political and 
military pressures in such a way that they can gradually 
shift the balance of power, prevail on regimes which are
The US Navy pointed out that its forces responding to a 
crisis in the Arabian Sea area probably would not be taken 
from the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, because of its 
responsibilities there.
12 From "Statement Of Rear Adm. C.D. Grojean, U.S. Navy, Deputy 
Chief Of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy), Politico-
Military Policy Division" in United States, Congress,
Committee On Appropriations, Military Construction 
Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1975. Hearing Before A
Subcommittee on H. R. ---. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974,
p. 346.
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neutral to tilt in their direction, erode them, 
radicalize them, and change the world to one more nearly 
in their image, hopefully as peacefully as they can.13
It was not so much the actual use of armed force as the larger 
psychological •'shadow” cast by a military presence which was 
thought to make an impact on political relations between 
states. That was the case in the Indian Ocean area whose 
states were particularly sensitive to naval power. The US 
Navy expected that the Soviet squadron would be employed to 
try to modify the littoral states' perception of great power 
relationships in the area. When seen against a backdrop of 
Western decline - Britain's withdrawal and America's weakness, 
indecisiveness and passivity after the Vietnam war - and in 
combination with Soviet ”gains” such as ”Friendship” treaties 
with India, Iraq and, in 1974, with Somalia, the gradually 
increasing Soviet naval presence would ”demonstrate” the 
USSR's "advance” towards regional predominance. To the extent 
that the Soviet presence and prestige contributed to altering 
the expectations of the Indian Ocean countries, they would 
defer more to the USSR's interests and demands. They would 
lose confidence in America as a serious regional actor and, 
for some, the ultimate guarantor of their military security. 
Their ties with a United States felt to lack the resolve to 
look after its own interests would weaken. The US would be 
taken less into account politically and it would lose 
influence. A "substantial” Soviet naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean, Zumwalt feared,
would come to be regarded as a normal and acceptable part 
of the political landscape, while any augmentation of our 
forces from their present levels might be regarded as 
unacceptable if not provocative. We might then find 
ourselves being squeezed out of the Indian Ocean area
..., while Soviet influence would grow over those nations
13 U.S, Senate, Second Supplemental FY 1974 Appropriations, 
p. 2127.
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which heretofore have been important and friendly to 
us.14
US strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area proposed to 
counterbalance politically the USSR's naval presence and, more 
tacitly, to deter potential threats by the Soviet squadron 
against American interests. There had been a growth of Soviet 
naval capability in the Indian Ocean, Schlesinger remarked in 
June 1975. That "growth ... does concern us, and we must 
counterbalance it"15 because an "effective military balance is 
essential to the preservation of regional security and 
stability...."16 The United States "would not want [littoral 
states] to be overshadowed by the naval presence of the Soviet 
Union."17 And according to Seymour Weiss, Director of the 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department in 
1974, an American presence was necessary because although "the 
Soviets have generally been prudent in their actions", the US 
did
not believe that it is in our interest, that it gives the 
correct political thrust to our national interests and to 
our foreign policy, to have the states of the area reach 
the conclusion that it is the presence of the Soviet 
Union which counts when issues are raised where political 
pressures may be brought to bear....18
There were "military ways" "the oil can be cut off" by the
14 U.S. Senate, Briefings On Diego Garcia, p. 7.
15 United States, Congress, Senate, Committee On Armed 
Services, Disapprove Construction Projects On The Island Of 
Diego Garcia. Hearing On S. Res. 160 To Disapprove 
Construction Projects On The Island Of Diego Garcia. 94th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 44.
16 From a prepared statement by Hon. James R. Schlesinger, 
Secretary Of Defense in Ibid., p. 11.
17 Ibid., p. 26.
18 From "Statement Of Hon. Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau Of 
Politico-Military Affairs, Department Of State" in U.S. House, 
Proposed Expansion, p. 28.
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USSR, Zumwalt pointed out, and the US ought to be "very sure" 
that it had "the capability to prevent those military ways 
from coming to pass and if we have that capability, we are 
much less likely to see political interference [from the 
Soviets]. The one flows from the other."19
Balancing and deterring the Soviet naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean was thought by the US government to require the 
periodic display of a naval force sufficient to defeat it in 
battle. An aircraft carrier task group was a credible 
counterbalancing presence not only because of its recognised 
superiority in combat with the Soviet force* and because of the 
value of US interests and the seriousness of American purpose 
it demonstrated but also because of its flexibility. In 
contrast with the USSR only naval forces enabled the US to 
"project" and, if needed, sustain relatively efficiently and 
independently its military power at a great distance from its 
territory.
Maintaining a continuous aircraft carrier task group 
presence in the Indian Ocean was considered20 but National 
Security Study Memorandum 199 concluded that intermittent 
naval deployments would be just as satisfactory for display as 
a standing deployment, perhaps more so. Periodic cruises of 
a "passive" nature, with no specific purpose other than to 
maintain operational proficiency, were less liable to prompt 
an increase in Soviet naval activity than might a "matching" 
permanent presence while they would still manifest superiority 
in combat. At the same time as they showed a capability and 
resolve to protect US interests greater than could be shown by 
the Middle East Force or the single brief visit by a task
The aircraft carrier task group might have to contend with 
an anti-carrier force in addition to the usual Soviet 
squadron.
19 Ibid., p. 147.
20 Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 455.
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group between early 1972 and late 1973, they would better 
express to the Indian Ocean States the careful modulation of 
US strategic policy, suggesting caution and restraint rather 
than threat or provocation. Also an intermittent presence 
would allow wider scope for signalling in crises by keeping 
forces "in reserve” in the Western Pacific, unless a 
simultaneous crisis there prevented their possible deployment 
to the Arabian Sea. Following the continuous presence in the 
Arabian Sea of US naval forces from late October 1973 to April 
1974 primarily in response to the oil embargo, regular cruises 
started from July 1974 and in 1975 a pattern had evolved of 
three, on average six-week deployments a year consisting in 
alternation of an aircraft carrier task group and a ”surface 
action group” led by a cruiser. That pattern lasted until 
late 1978 when more continuous deployments began in response 
to the Iranian revolution.
Periodic deployments to the Indian Ocean were in fact all 
that the US Navy could afford because, as it had planned for, 
by 1976 the number of aircraft carriers in the 7th Fleet
declined from three to two. And a continuous Indian Ocean
presence would have reduced the 7th Fleet's contribution to 
America's more important security commitments in East Asia. 
Factors such as the long distance to the Arabian Sea and the 
technicalities of the "deployment cycle” in which three 
aircraft carriers were used as a unit also ruled out a 
standing presence.
Limited Soviet Naval Threat and Influence
In elaborating upon the rationale for America's strategic
policy for the Indian Ocean area, the US Navy exaggerated the 
Soviet navy's threat to American interests and the degree of 
influence it was likely to exert there. When asked whether 
the Soviet presence was a threat to US interests, Noyes 
responded that it was "not so much ... a direct immediate
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threat” as it was a "potential” one.21 Weiss concurred,
declaring that a Soviet threat was ”[a]bsolutely potential"; 
he did not expect active uses of the Soviet squadron.22 
According to William Colby, then Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Soviets recognised "the importance to 
the west (sic) of Persian Gulf oil, and the sea lanes between 
the Gulf and Europe or Japan. Moscow also perceives a causal 
relationship between the oil question and recent increases in 
the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean."23 The USSR 
would be concerned should there be a "major threat to Soviet 
security posed from the Indian Ocean"; Soviet writings had 
reflected "concern over the possibility of the United States 
sending nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to the 
Indian Ocean, but so far the activities of Soviet naval units 
there have not indicated an anti-Polaris mission."24 The 
Soviets also had "a certain interest", Colby continued,
in posing a possible counterthreat to American or western 
pressure on the Soviet Union by posing a threat to the 
oil sources of Western Europe. But it is certainly not 
in priority anything like their relationships with the 
United States, Western Europe or China.25
And the "normal composition of the Soviet force" in the Indian 
Ocean - "particularly the lack of a significant submarine 
capability - suggests that interdiction of western commerce, 
particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been
21 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 62.
22 Ibid., p. 28.
23 From "Statement Of W.E. Colby, Director Of Central 
Intelligence Agency ..." before U.S. Senate, Subcommittee On 
Military Construction, Of The Committee On Armed Services, 
Hearing on July 11, 1974 on Military Construction. Fiscal Year 
1975, in U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 32.
24 Idem.
25 Ibid. , p. 34.
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a major objective.1,26 Nor did ’’direct military intervention 
... appear to figure prominently in Soviet plans."27 Zumwalt 
himself acknowledged that if the Soviet and American "fleets" 
in the Indian Ocean "became involved in an action, [the 
Americans] are superior."28 In some global war scenarios, 
according to Schlesinger, the USSR might conclude that a 
withdrawal of its naval forces from the Indian Ocean would be 
desirable.29
The Soviet naval "threat" was much more political than 
military in nature. The "symbolic significance" of the Soviet 
presence concerned America the most, in the opinion of 
Weiss,30 and that presence, Noyes pointed out, enabled the 
Soviets "to exert political force, potential coercion...."31 
The cardinal assumption of US strategic policy was that unless 
counterbalanced, the Soviets' naval capability and their 
willingness to use it might lead to greater Soviet influence 
in the Indian Ocean area. This premise was stated most 
clearly by Zumwalt:
It cannot have escaped the Soviets' attention that 
... any nation which is able to project significant naval 
power into the Indian Ocean automatically acquires
26 Ibid., p. 32. Of the five or six combatants of the 18 to 20 
Soviet naval vessels deployed in the Indian Ocean in 1974-75, 
only one or two were submarines, whose main purpose in wartime 
was to attack shipping.
27 Idem.
28 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 140. More precisely 
Zumwalt meant that a US aircraft carrier task group with P-3C 
anti-submarine warfare aircraft could defeat the Soviet 
squadron (and presumably a Soviet anti-aircraft carrier force 
too). But, he warned, the Soviets could "overfly the littoral 
countries with their long-range air and associated cruise 
missiles and ... join the battle. That would make it a much 
closer proposition." (Idem)
29 U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 59.
30 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 31.
31 Ibid. , p. 62.
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considerable influence with the littoral countries as 
well as with those countries elsewhere which depend on 
its oil resources and ocean trade routes.32 (Italics 
added.)
But too strong and direct a causal link was presumed between 
naval presence and influence. The Soviet squadron was only 
one of an ensemble of policy instruments used by the USSR to 
pursue its objectives. Indeed, Colby observed, the "roles of 
military, and particularly naval forces, have been secondary 
to diplomatic efforts and aid programs in promoting Soviet 
interests in the Indian Ocean area.”33 Henry Kissinger, 
appointed Secretary of State in September 1973, also regarded 
the Soviet naval presence as a secondary factor. He observed 
at a news conference in November 1973 that
Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean will not depend 
primarily on the number of ships it can deploy into the 
Indian Ocean. And I am confident that to the degree that 
power becomes the principal factor in the Indian Ocean, 
we will be able to generate a fleet of sufficient size 
... so that we could counterbalance anything that the 
Soviet Union might put [there], as the recent visit of 
the Hancock .. . has demonstrated.34
The best way to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East, 
Kissinger suggested, was not so much by a naval balance as by 
diplomacy - negotiating a peace settlement between the Arabs 
and the Israelis.
The Soviet squadron's acquisition of "considerable 
influence" in the Indian Ocean area depended in part on
32 U.S. Senate, Briefings On Diego Garcia, p. 6.
33 U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 32. The "principal 
objective of the [Soviet] naval force" was, he seemed to 
imply, defensive: "to maintain an adequate military strength 
to counter - or at least provide a political counterweight to 
- moves made by western naval forces there, particularly those 
of the United States." (Idem)
34 "Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of November 21", DoSB 
69 (December 10, 1973), 708-709.
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reaching a size enabling it to mount a sustained interdiction 
of shipping. Ultimately its "influence”, insofar as numbers 
of ships mattered, depended on the resources available to it 
from the entire Soviet navy. But here a practical limit was 
set: for all its growth the Soviet navy was still a finite 
force which had higher priorities in the Atlantic, 
Mediterranean and Pacific. Thus even with advantages from the 
reopened Suez Canal such as quicker access to the Arabian Sea 
from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and better logistic 
support, the Soviets could expand their presence only up to a 
limit. According to Colby, they "probably would not be able 
to sustain an Indian Ocean force significantly larger than 
that presently deployed there without reordering their 
priorities and shifting naval forces from other areas"^^) 
which they gave no sign of doing. Other restraints on the 
USSR's capability to deploy and support a larger presence in 
the Indian Ocean included "the requirement to maintain a 
strategic reserve in home fleet areas, a large deployed force 
in the Mediterranean, plus the economic and political costs of 
operating a sizeable naval force...."36 One political cost 
derived from the fact that although sensitive to external
35 U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 32. The USSR would 
not draw from its squadron in the Mediterranean, Colby
proposed, because it "probably recognizes" that the Suez Canal 
"is subject to closure in a crisis. The Soviets would not 
want to be caught with a substantial portion of available 
units on the wrong end of a blocked canal...." (Idem) Apropos 
of the prospective reopening of the Suez Canal and the
"greater ease" it gave to "movement of the Soviet Fleet from 
the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean", Kissinger remarked 
in late 1973 that
there is a great danger of looking at the developments in 
this area in terms of a strategy that is more appropriate 
to the previous century than now. ...
... the future of the Middle East should not be deduced 
from the steaming time of the Soviet Fleet from the Black 
Sea into the Indian Ocean and whether adding 10 days to
it, or cutting 10 days off it, will ... be the
determining factor. (DoSB 69 [December 10, 1973], 709.)
36 U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 33.
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naval power, the littoral states also opposed potential 
threats to their independence and security, as shown by the UN 
"Zone of Peace" declaration. Nor were the Soviets likely to 
obtain in the near future access to facilities substantially 
better than those at Berbera and the more limited ones in 
South Yemen and Iraq. India, for example, would not give the 
Soviets special access to its naval bases. A final factor 
discouraged a larger Soviet naval presence: the restrained 
deployment by the US Navy. Were there no substantial 
expansion on a permanent basis of American forces in the 
Indian Ocean, a further rise in the level of the Soviet
presence would be gradual, perhaps one or two ships a year.37
In fact the ceiling of the average Soviet naval presence 
in the Indian Ocean proved to be quite low - about 18 to 20
ships. It had been reached in 1974 and except in 1977-78 when
the Soviet presence almost doubled in support of Ethiopia 
against Eritrean secessionists at the time of the Ethiopian- 
Somali war, it would remain stable until late 1979. The 
Soviet squadron thus did not grow to a size sufficient to 
generate "considerable influence" or to engage in coercive 
diplomacy. America's Indian Ocean strategic policy had been 
revised, of course, at a time of crisis in late 1973-early 
1974, and in view of events such as the first transit through 
the Indian Ocean to the Pacific of the Soviet ASW aircraft 
carrier Kiev and the practice of interdiction operations in 
the northern Arabian Sea as part of the global Soviet naval 
exercise OKEAN in spring 1975, the Soviet presence had not 
seemed to reach a stable level. For OKEAN. Schlesinger 
observed,
the number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean was 
approximately doubled. Activity was centered ... at the 
crossroads of the tanker lanes from the Persian Gulf. 
The exercise was supported by long range aircraft 
operating from the Soviet Union, and, for the first time, 
by maritime patrol aircraft operating from airfields in
37 Ibid., p. 32.
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Somalia.38
Moreover, until it was able to ascertain that the USSR would 
refrain from using the reopened Suez Canal to help support its 
Indian Ocean presence, the Department of Defence could not 
readily determine that the size of the Soviet squadron would 
be less than it had expected.
Planning for a Potential Soviet Attack 
upon Iran
America's Indian Ocean strategic policy vis-a-vis the 
USSR also possessed, however latently in the middle 1970s, a 
land dimension. Schlesinger had spoken of the Soviets' 
readiness to project their military power to distant areas as 
their airlift and naval capability grew and Zumwalt had 
mentioned political pressure on Indian Ocean states near the 
Soviet Union by land-based forces in the southern USSR. But 
as its involvement in the Angolan civil war in 1975-76 
indicated, the Soviet Union's military intervention in distant 
places was likely to be only requested and indirect. Neither 
did Soviet forces exert noticeable pressure on countries near 
the USSR nor was there an active threat of direct Soviet 
military action against Iran. Detente continued between the 
Shah's regime and the Soviet Union, which, virtually self- 
sufficient in oil, did not intend to seize Iran's oilfields. 
The Soviet land threat to Iran was sufficiently improbable for 
Grojean to claim in 1974 that "the presence of the U.S. Navy 
on the southern border of Iran ... is an effective counter to 
the Soviet Army and Air Force presence on the north as well as 
the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean."39
The United States' deterrence of the Soviet Union 
depended not so much on the US Navy as on America's general, 
global military capability, conventional and nuclear.
38 Ibid., p. 11.
39 U.S. Senate, Military Construction Appropriations FY 1975. 
p. 358.
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Although it was the ultimate deterrent against the Soviets, 
that capability remained a secondary factor in US contingency 
planning to meet a Soviet attack upon Iran in the sense that 
according to the Nixon Doctrine, Iran itself would take 
primary responsibility for that task, at least initially. 
America's "[sjecurity assistance and development of 
cooperative military relations ... [with] friendly states 
...", Donald Rumsfeld, Schlesinger's successor as Secretary of 
Defence, pointed out in January 1977, would continue to 
contribute to the "development of reliable friendly forces 
(for example, Iran ...) capable of ... deterring or combating 
outside intervention.1,40 But despite the Shah's expenditure 
of many thousands of millions of dollars to create a virtually 
all-armoured and -mechanized army and a sophisticated air 
force, Iran's armed forces, which the US envisioned 
reinforcing in the event of Soviet aggression, were inadequate 
to combat a Soviet attack. Further, the assumptions guiding 
their use were inappropriate. Consistent with "long-standing 
American notions on the containment of the Soviet threat", it 
was "believed that ... Iran could at best delay a Soviet 
invasion, until the arrival of large-scale US reinforcements. 
... [T]he decisive battle would then be fought on the central 
Iranian plateau.... "4l For
an armoured defence of the plateau to the workable, the 
Iranians would have had to delay significantly a Soviet 
advance across the northern mountains in order to gain 
time for the redeployment of their own armoured divisions 
arrayed on the Iraqi border and for US reinforcement 
(sic) to make up for a shortfall in forces.42
But armoured forces were not suitable for delaying and
40 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1978. p. 42.
41 Steven L. Canby, "The Iranian Military: Political Symbolism 
Versus Military Usefulness", in The Security Of The Persian 
Gulf, ed. Hossein Amirsadeghi (London: Croom Helm, 1981),
p. 102.
42 Ibid., p. 104. From the middle 1960s Iran was preoccupied 
with the military balance against Iraq.
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defensive operations in mountains43 and Iran lacked sufficient 
light forces to retard a Soviet advance. Even had Soviet 
forces been delayed long enough before reaching the 
Iranian plateau, the Iranian forces awaiting them were not 
adequately skilled in manoeuvre warfare and they
would probably have been deployed piecemeal, in separated 
blocking positions; consequently, they would have been 
quickly outflanked and defeated even by quantitatively 
inferior Soviet armoured forces. The situation could 
only have been stabilised by a rapid and large-scale US 
reinforcement. But until enough American forces arrived 
to form a significant share of the total allied force, 
any American units in the field would also have been 
jeopardised by the collapse of Iranian units on their 
flanks.44
For its part the United States possessed neither adequate 
forces - at most probably only about four lightly armed 
brigades, from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Air 
Assault Division - nor the aircraft to carry them and 
reinforce Iran quickly and in strength.
In short, an armoured defence on the central plateau 
was not ... militarily feasible. For the Iranians,
American reinforcements were too uncertain, if only 
because of the NATO contingency. For the US, ... the 
option amounted to a foolish reinforcement race with the 
USSR. The time factor was not an independent variable; 
under the circumstances, it was largely dependent on the 
quality of Soviet planning and the size of their forces 
committed. There was thus very little likelihood that 
the defence could have held long enough for significant 
US reinforcements to arrive. ... If the situation did 
stabilise because of US reinforcements, the United States 
would have been saddled with an unattractive protracted 
conflict in circumstances apt to favour Soviet rather 
than American persistence.45
43 It "was believed that Iranian forces (and particularly 
armour) placed well forward on the Soviet frontier itself 
would only be lost early on, and could also be provocative in 
peacetime." (Ibid., p. 102.)
44 Ibid., p. 104.
45 Ibid., p. 105.
141
In view of Iran's inappropriate planning and forces, which 
tended to weaken the credibility of its deterrence against the 
USSR, and of America's very limited reinforcement capability, 
US strategic planning had to (continue to) rely heavily on 
strategic nuclear deterrence. Wishing to plan for putting 
nuclear weapons to more tactical use, Kissinger asked the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in spring 1974 "to devise a limited 
nuclear option that the President might order in the 
hypothetical case of a Soviet invasion of Iran."46
Policy at the Regional Level: Display.
Reassurance and Deterrence
America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area at 
the regional level, principally the Persian Gulf, continued to 
be pursued within the context of the Nixon Doctrine as well as 
of balancing the Soviet naval squadron. According to Weiss, 
the US had an interest in maintaining a naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean even "if there were no Soviet naval forces ... 
whatsoever ....1,47 The purposes of America's strategic policy 
were display of greater interest in access to oil and regional 
stability after the October 1973 war and of resolve and 
capability to protect US interests if threatened; reassurance 
of littoral states that America would counter the Soviet 
presence; and deterrence of threats to shipping and, as the 
last resort, of local aggression against US friends. From 
late 1973 into 1975 deterrence also involved threatening 
indirectly friendly Gulf Arab states with retaliation should 
the oil embargo begun in October 1973 be protracted and then, 
late 1974-early 1975, with intervention in order to "protect" 
access to oil should another embargo be imposed. US naval 
forces in the Arabian Sea were thought to reinforce American 
diplomacy, notably in the Arab-Israeli disengagement 
negotiations initiated in late 1973.
46 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1983), p. 370. The JCS suggested the option of 
exploding nuclear devices on Soviet territory. Ibid., p. 371.
47 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 34.
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As indicated above, balancing the Soviet naval presence 
was intended to sustain friendly states' confidence in 
America's will and ability to limit Soviet influence and to 
counter potential Soviet attempts at coercive diplomacy. A 
super-power military balance was crucial for preserving 
security and stability in the Indian Ocean area: "it certainly 
[would] not lend to the political stability we would like to 
see if the Soviet Union has a deployed capability which is 
substantially in excess of our own,”48 Weiss declared.
Of the regional threats to American interests in the 
Indian Ocean area, the primary one, the Arab-Israeli conflict 
- the October 1973 war being the cause of the oil embargo and 
Egypt's interference with shipping at the Bab al-Mandab - lay 
outside it. The danger of another war had abated in 1975 as 
a result of negotiations for disengagement agreements between 
Arab "front-line" states and Israel conducted by the U.S. 
Reflecting a constant American perception, Rumsfeld pointed 
out in January 1976 that "[p]olitical and military instability 
within the Gulf area itself if it were to disrupt the supply 
of oil, would be damaging to U.S. and allied interests.”49 
And in the view of General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in 1975, "political stability in a number of 
countries” was likely ”to be a continuing problem during the 
mid-range period as a result of the increasing popular 
expectations of economic advancement and the inability of 
existing governments to satisfy many of these 
aspirations....”50 Earlier, in 1974, Noyes had suggested that 
"implied coercion by ... even [a] minor power could disrupt 
the flow [of shipping] without an actual outbreak of
48 Ibid., p. 28.
49 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1977. p. 9.
50 From "Statement Of Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs Of Staff ..." in U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia.
p. 22.
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hostilities.1,51 There was as well the danger of terrorist 
action against shipping. But, Noyes acknowledged, both 
threats were "nonexistent”,52 only potential. As for tensions 
between states, they remained more political than military in 
character and to the extent that they were military, they were 
relatively small-scale, for example Iraq's temporary 
occupation of Kuwaiti territory in 1973, and limited, as in 
the case of the sporadic fighting between Iran and Iraq in 
Kurdistan from late 1973 to early 1975.
Because of the limited threats to its interests and the 
evident ability of friendly regional powers to cope with those 
threats,53 the United States continued to adhere to the Nixon 
Doctrine and play a secondary role in fostering Gulf security. 
The State Department's position paper in 1974 on "The United 
States And The Persian Gulf" explicitly disclaimed "any 
commitment ... to assume new defense responsibilities in this 
area."54 And General Brown knew of "no commitment that would 
be binding on the United States to (sic) call for military 
action in the Persian Gulf."55 America continued to encourage 
Iran to play the leading role in upholding Gulf security and 
patrolling Gulf waters and the Strait of Hormuz and to 
cooperate for regional security with Saudi Arabia and the 
lower Gulf states. Large purchases of American arms 
facilitated by the rise in the price of oil would enable Iran
51 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 58. Action by South 
Yemen at the Bab al-Mandab was a hypothetical case in point.
52 Ibid., p. 59.
53 "The Iraqi threat to Kuwait in March 1973, and a nearly 
simultaneous upsurge of tension between Saudi Arabia and South 
Yemen, had been managed without the need for ... direct U.S. 
intervention", indicates Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 62.
54 United States, Congress, House, Committee On Foreign 
Affairs, The Persian Gulf. 1974; Money. Politics. Arms. And 
Power. Hearings Before The Subcommittee On The Near East And 
South Asia. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p. 73.
55 U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 50.
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and Saudi Arabia to balance Iraq, deter military adventures by 
it and contribute to regional order. Stability in the Persian 
Gulf was much improved by the rapprochement between Iran and 
Iraq from March 1975. Also the insurgency in the Dhofar 
province of Oman by the Marxist Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Oman was quelled by the end of 1975.
Naval deployments for political purposes remained the 
central part of US strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area. 
An "American naval presence", proposed Grojean,
fulfils important political and military needs in the 
U.S. national interest. It is a substantial symbol of 
active U.S. support for our trade routes, for friendly 
countries, and for the stability and peaceful evolution 
of our relations with countries ... "56
of the area. America's "capability to deploy a ... force into 
the Indian Ocean ... provides a tangible reminder of our 
interest in security and stability in the region."57 By 
giving concrete evidence of America's determination to protect 
its "legitimate interests", naval display guaranteed that US 
"interests continue to be factored into the regional political 
equation. Otherwise [America] could find that [it] had been 
excluded from the region by default."58 A US naval presence 
helped as well to provide a "stabilizing influence" reassuring 
to friendly states, and not just at the inter-state level, in 
Zumwalt's view. America had
as a vital national interest the preservation of regimes 
which are friendly to the United States through 
encouraging them by [its] presence. The absence of U.S.
56 From "Statement of Rear Adm. C.J. Grojean" in United States, 
Congress, House, Committee On Appropriations, Second 
Supplemental Appropriation Bill. 1974. Hearings Before 
Subcommittees. pt. 2, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p. 55.
57 Idem.
58 From "Statement Of Rear Adm. C.D. Grojean, U.S. Navy, Office 
Of The Chief Of Naval Operations" in U.S. House, Second 
Supplemental Bill 1974. p. 561.
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force [in the Indian Ocean] ... makes it likelier that 
they would succumb or be replaced by regimes less 
friendly in nature. ... This is a psychological and 
political problem and not a military problem, but it 
flows from the presence of [US] power there.59
Supporting America's foreign and security policy in the 
Indian Ocean area by expressing determination to preserve a 
stable power balance and "backstopping" US diplomacy 
initiatives were the purposes of the dispatch of an aircraft 
carrier task group to the Bay of Bengal in December 1971 and 
to the Arabian Sea in October 1973, according to Zumwalt.60 
In the latter case the specific reason for sending the 
Hancock, he claimed, had been "to stabilize the Middle East 
insofar as the Arab-Israel confrontation is concerned...."61 
Weiss described its presence as
a reinforcement for the signally successful efforts of 
Secretary Kissinger to bring the parties in the conflict 
to the peace table. It impressed upon both sides that 
the United States was interested in a resolution to the 
conflict. In short, it played the traditional role which 
military power should play, that of supporting diplomatic 
initiatives. By this I do not mean to suggest that 
military power was used to lend coercive force to our 
diplomacy. Rather, our visible military presence in the 
area demonstrated the importance we attached to our 
diplomatic objective of bringing the parties together to 
seek a peaceful resolution to the issues that have 
produced so much discord and strife in the Middle East.62
One appreciable way in which the Hancock task group might 
have helped to "stabilize" the Arab-Israel conflict and to 
reinforce Kissinger's diplomacy was by providing a tacit 
guarantee of a condition for Israel's acceptance of a cease­
fire agreement with Egypt on November 11, 1973: that Egypt end
59 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 152.
60 U.S. Senate, Briefings On Diego Garcia, p. 3.
61 U.S. Senate, Second Supplemental FY 1974 Appropriations, 
p. 2128.
62 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 24.
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its undeclared blockade at the Bab al-Mandab of shipping bound 
for Israel.* Egypt had established the blockade during the 
October war in order to prevent ships reaching the Israeli 
port of Eilat. Ending the blockade was most important to the 
Israelis because the Bab al-Mandab was the only access route 
for tankers with Iranian oil, which accounted for about 40 per 
cent of their oil supplies and would become critical in a 
protracted war, and because the southern Red Sea was too far 
away for Israel to reach it with effective force.
America's attention had already been drawn towards the 
Bab al-Mandab by two events to which its response served in 
effect as the tacit "guarantee” to Israel. First, South Yemen 
had declared that the Bab al-Mandab now came under its 
national jurisdiction, contrary to the strait's recognised 
international status. If the Bab al-Mandab were part of South 
Yemen's territorial waters, the government in Aden could in 
principle exercise discretionary control over, indeed deny, 
the passage of warships perceived to threaten its security. 
Second, in late October 1973 an Egyptian destroyer fired a 
shot across the bow of an American merchantman near the Bab 
al-Mandab. A destroyer from the Middle East Force was sent to 
escort the ship south through the strait and it patrolled the 
southern Red Sea for a week. Then, in late November, the 
Hancock task group entered the Gulf of Aden and the aircraft 
carrier provided air cover for the transit through the Bab al- 
Mandab by several destroyers, which paid a brief visit to 
Ethiopia. In light of the United States' responsibility to 
see that the conditions of the cease-fire agreement between 
Egypt and Israel were fulfilled, the MEF's protection of US 
shipping, the Hancock task group's assertion of freedom of 
navigation through an international strait and the continuous 
presence of US naval forces in the Arabian Sea might have been
Egypt's agreement not to blockade the Bab al-Mandab was a 
term of the Egypt-Israel disengagement of forcess agreement in 
January 1974.
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sufficient to assure Israel that shipping could again sail 
safely to it through the Bab al-Mandab. In this way the 
American naval presence possibly helped indirectly to sustain 
the Egypt-Israel negotiations with less complication.
Deterrence and the Threat of Retaliation 
and of Intervention
An American naval presence was intended to support US 
diplomacy in the Indian Ocean area also by deterrence, however 
tacit. The “deterrent effect of a military presence” was one 
diplomatic "lever” available to "discourage conflict and 
contain it when it occurs", in the opinion of Weiss: the 
Middle East Force supplemented by more frequent deployments by 
7th Fleet task groups served those purposes.63 "Rather than 
waiting until a threatening situation develops and then 
seeking a military solution", Grojean asserted, "the very 
presence of our forces ... will help to forestall such 
situations and thus avoid the need for military confrontations 
which could be costly and dangerous."64 But deterrence could 
not be efficacious unless the United States was prepared to 
some extent to employ its armed forces. Thus although Noyes 
had said in March 1974 that a US naval presence was not 
intended to keep the peace between littoral states or to 
enforce America's will upon them by way of threats65 and 
although similarly Schlesinger had stated (see above) that US 
naval deployments were "not a threat" to any state, the active 
use of the armed forces could not be precluded. Perhaps with 
that consideration in mind, Schlesinger had declared further 
that America's naval force presence assured it of "an adequate 
capability to meet contingencies" involving friendly littoral 
states. (Italics added.) And Vest's statement, noted above,
63 Ibid., p. 25.
64 U.S. House, Second Supplemental Bill 1974. p. 561. In June 
1975 General Brown proposed that a "moderate U.S air and naval 
presence provides a counter to adventurism from any source." 
U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 22.
65 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 74.
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about (naval deployments demonstrating) the effectiveness of 
US forces in a wide variety of circumstances was meant to 
maximize the credibility of naval presence as a deterrent. 
The more convincing a deterrent force seemed, the less likely 
it would be needed for actual use. If there were no potential 
at all for the active employment of the US Navy, if it were 
only a symbol for show, friends and foes would take it much 
less into account, naval display would lose whatever deterrent 
value it possessed and its ability to reassure, and to 
threaten, would be undermined.
From late 1973 into 1975 the United States used its naval 
deployments in the Indian Ocean in order to threaten friendly 
Gulf Arab states in "defence” of access to their oil. And in 
late 1974-early 1975 naval forces contributed to America's 
deterrence of a possible new oil embargo, that deterrence 
involving the potential, as a last resort, for intervention in 
the Persian Gulf with land forces. Not an explicit, active 
factor in the application in 1969-1970 of the Nixon Doctrine 
to US security policy for the Persian Gulf at a time when 
access to cheap oil was not in question, the threat or use of 
the armed forces nonetheless inhered in America's objective of 
assuring the continuous availability of oil. The potential 
for the use of force became manifest when in late November 
1973 Kissinger warned that the US would have to consider 
retaliatory action if the oil embargo begun the previous month 
went on "unreasonably and indefinitely". Simultaneously the 
Hancock task group approached the entrance to the Persian Gulf 
in order to underline and give greater substance and 
credibility to Kissinger's indirect threat. Sustaining the 
threat of reprisal - another veiled threat, of "danger" for 
oil producing states if the industrialized world were 
"crippled", was made by Schlesinger in January 1974 - and 
subtly intimidating the Gulf Arabs, making them more 
responsive to America's demand that the embargo be lifted, 
were purposes of the continuous US naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean from late October 1973 to April 1974, shortly
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after the embargo was lifted.
The US began a second round of veiled threats of military 
action in September 1974, when President Ford remarked that 
historically states had gone to war over natural resources and 
Kissinger hinted at intervention in order to deter the Arabs 
from imposing another oil embargo in the event of a new Middle 
East war. The most graphic warning came in late November 
1974: the aircraft carrier Constellation and two escorts broke 
away from a large CENTO "Midlink" exercise and steamed 
unannounced into the Persian Gulf, one year after Kissinger's 
initial hinted threat to use force and the Hancock's approach 
to the Gulf. This first visit by an American aircraft carrier 
for twenty-five years was ostensibly for "familiarization". 
But the probable intention of the brief, 36-hour visit, during 
which aerial exercises were conducted, was to "remind" Gulf 
Arab states that the US would not accept an interruption of 
oil supplies and that it had the military capability to seize 
regional oil fields.66
The Constellation's excursion into the Persian Gulf, the 
entry of the Enterprise task group into the Indian Ocean in 
January 1975, publicity about the "Operation Petrolandia" 
military exercise in the US for desert warfare training and 
reports of contingency planning in the Department of Defence 
for military operations in the Persian Gulf67 formed the 
background for interviews with Kissinger in late December 1974 
and in January 1975 in which was expressed the Ford 
administration's position on the possibility for American 
intervention in the Gulf.68 He did not expect an oil embargo
66 Christian Science Monitor. November 26, 1974.
67 Sunday Telegraph. December 15, 1974.
68 See United States, Library Of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, Oil Fields As Military Objectives A 
Feasibility Study. Prepared For The Special Subcommittee On 
Investigations Of The Committee On International Relations, 
Committee Print, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 79-80.
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in the absence of another Arab-Israeli war and perhaps not 
even if one did occur. The US would consider a resort to 
force "only in the gravest emergency", should there be "actual 
strangulation of the industrialized world". However, that 
contingency was "absolutely hypothetical" and was not going to 
happen. America would think about the use of force only if 
"warfare were originated" against it. Kissinger's remarks 
were reinforced by Ford and Schlesinger but in May 1975 the 
latter said that the US "might not remain entirely passive to 
the imposition of [a new oil] embargo"; he would not indicate 
a "prospective reaction" by the US "other than to point out 
there are economic, political and conceivably military 
measures in response.69
America's attempts at naval coercive or at least minatory 
diplomacy were unsuccessful. According to a former commander 
of the Middle East Force, the presence of the Hancock aircraft 
carrier task group in the Arabian Sea in late 1973 and the 
Constellation task group's excursion into the Persian Gulf in 
November 1974 were politically "neither appropriate nor 
helpful" because they
merely serve[d] to harden attitudes, thereby rendering 
achievement of the desired political solution either more 
difficult or impossible. ... [K]nowledgeable observers 
predicted that the [Hancock] battle group's entrance into 
the Indian Ocean would produce precisely the opposite 
effect they inferred lay behind its dispatch. That is 
to say, it most certainly would not intimidate the Arab 
states; on the contrary, it was more likely to anger 
them. Nor would it make them more amenable to those 
compromises which might further the search for peace. 
Seen by the Arabs as an attempt to coerce them, it would 
merely stiffen their resolve not to be pressured into an 
unfavorable settlement dictated by the traditional 
benefactor of the Israeli enemy: the United States.
Finally, the implied American threat to the oil 
installations could be expected to provoke counterthreats 
to blow up the wells and loading terminals as an assured 
means of keeping them out of alien hands. These and 
other forecasts proved to be painfully accurate. Here 
... was an example of the military presence which was
69 Ibid., p. 82.
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ill-conceived... .70
This assessment applied, for example, to Saudi Arabia, which 
announced that it would destroy its oil installations if the 
Americans attempted reprisals or, later on, intervention. It 
resented their threats and doubted their rationality and their 
reliability as a ‘'friend”. (And when Saudi Arabia and other 
Arab states did lift the embargo in March 1974, they did so 
not because they feared US retaliation but because some oil 
was reaching the embargoed states and because the US had made 
progress in negotiating disengagement between Egyptian and 
Israeli forces.) The Americans' behaviour suggested a 
fundamental contradiction in their relations with Saudi 
Arabia: they valued it as a pillar of Gulf security yet, in 
the media at least, they discussed it as an object of 
potential attack and occupation.
Besides being politically provocative and unproductive, 
the indirect threat of US intervention as a deterrent against 
friendly Gulf Arab states' imposition of another oil embargo 
was of dubious necessity and credibility. As noted, the 
United States acknowledged that it would intervene only if it 
were subjected to "actual strangulation". But an "airtight" 
embargo would be very difficult to arrange and sustain and all 
the Arab oi1-producers recognized clearly that a new embargo 
could lead to international political and economic 
consequences which would harm more than advance their own 
interests and the prospects for an independent Palestinian 
homeland. Also the US had too much oil of its own, if not at 
a relatively cheap production cost, to be "strangled"; it was 
less dependent on Gulf oil and would be less harmed by its 
stoppage than would its European allies and Japan. If America 
did decide to "secure" access to foreign sources of oil for
70 Robert J. Hanks, The U.S. Military Presence in the Middle 
East: Problems and Prospects Foreign Policy Report
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute For Foreign Policy
Analysis, 1982), p. 22.
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itself alone, probably it would use its armed forces as near 
to home as possible rather than go the long distance to the 
Persian Gulf. Moreover, after the Vietnam war US public 
opinion did not support intervention while America's allies, 
preferring to make their own political and economic 
arrangements with the Arabs, would not countenance its 
intervention in the Gulf in order to '’protect" access to oil 
"on their behalf". An American intervention would create a 
serious rift between the US and its allies and alienate the 
Third World en masse.
The operational feasibility of US intervention in the 
Gulf was in doubt too. Although Schlesinger claimed that 
intervention there was possible, it would be successful only 
if the United States could
-Seize required oil installations intact.
-Secure them for weeks, months, or years.
-Restore wrecked assets rapidly.
-Operate all installations without the owner's 
assistance.
-Guarantee safe overseas passage for supplies and 
petroleum products.71
An aircraft carrier task group or one with a Marine Amphibious 
Brigade would be inadequate for mounting a "defensive" seizure 
of oilfields and there were insufficient airborne forces for 
seizing and securing the oil facilities quickly. Two to four 
divisions with support would be needed indefinitely in order 
to provide security for 600 oil installations in an area of
10,000 square miles in Saudi Arabia. It would be necessary, 
and costly, to bring in from the US specialized civilian 
manpower for operating the facilities and for repairing or
71 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Oil Fields As 
Objectives. p. xi. Saudi Arabia was the subject of this CRS 
case study of a hypothetical American intervention from which 
this and the next paragraph draw. For a brief analysis of 
'military intervention to secure oil supplies', see Strategic 
Survey 1974 (London: The International Institute For Strategic 
Studies, 1975), pp. 30-32.
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replacing damaged ones. American military action might cause 
a Soviet counter-intervention in the guise of "protecting" the 
Persian Gulf, in which case more US forces would be needed. 
American forces would have to deal with local harassment and 
perhaps guerrilla action. The desert climate and terrain 
presented difficult operational conditions and there would be 
heavy demands on logistic support,72 which would be much 
hindered by insufficient numbers of transportation ships and 
aircraft and by the refusal of America's allies and friends 
and the Arab states to provide facilities for its use and to 
allow overflying.
Because the US could not assure the two main 
prerequisites for a successful intervention - slight damage to 
oil facilities and the USSR's abstention from counter­
intervention, it would face high costs and large risks. It 
would "so deplete its strategic reserves that little would be 
left for contingencies elsewhere. Prospects would be poor, 
with plights of far-reaching political, economic, social, 
psychological, and perhaps military consequence the penalty 
for failure",73 as suggested. Probably more harmful than 
beneficial, American military intervention in the Persian Gulf 
"could not secure for Western countries reliable access to oil 
in volume at less cost than present prices"74 in 1974-75.
Intervention with ground-based forces in support of 
friendly states in an extreme case was part of America's 
regional deterrence policy at the level of contingency 
planning. Although in January 1976 Rumsfeld judged America's 
"modest naval forces" to be "sufficient to support" current US 
objectives for the Middle East, nonetheless the US had "to be
72 On the difficulties facing occupying forces, see New York 
Times. January 10, 1975.
73 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Oil Fields As 
Objectives. p. 76.
74 New York Times. September 25, 1974.
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prepared for unforeseen developments" there. Thus current 
"military planning for the [region] stresses flexibility and 
the maintenance of a military capability to meet a wide range 
of contingencies extending from symbolic support of U.S. 
diplomatic efforts to major conflict.1,75 A leading scenario 
in America's contingency planning for the Persian Gulf was an 
Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia. The US would supply the 
tertiary, "final resort" force against it, after Saudi Arabia 
itself and Iran. When at its request the Americans surveyed 
in 1974 Saudi Arabia's long-term defence requirements, their 
survey
recognized that even the best-designed forces that the 
Kingdom could aspire to develop could not, by themselves, 
meet all the anticipated contingencies, and therefore 
built into its defense concept the basic premise that the 
Kingdom would have to depend in some situations on 
friendly foreign powers to deter or overcome threats. 
Specifically, the survey relied on Iran to deter an 
outright Iraqi invasion; and if such an invasion 
nevertheless took place, it envisaged a Saudi capability 
to fight a delaying action until Iranian, and ultimately 
American, forces came to the rescue.76
General US force planning too envisioned the potential 
for military operations in the Persian Gulf. Other than an 
attack by the Warsaw Pact against NATO or a North Korean 
attack upon South Korea, Rumsfeld indicated in January 1977, 
the contingency to which "most attention is given in 
considering the design of the general purpose forces" was 
"what in the past has been described as a lesser contingency 
such as might arise in the Caribbean or the Middle East, and 
initially involve US but not Soviet forces."77 A conflict in 
the Persian Gulf was "an example of a case which could make 
demands on the U.S. force posture not brought out by ... the
75 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1977. p. 10.
76 Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 207.
77 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1978. p. 53.
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base cases.”78 Dealing with a ”lesser contingency” would 
require forces, ground and air contingents, much stronger than 
an aircraft carrier task group in the Gulf of Oman but those 
forces were unprepared to meet the potential demands on them.
Dieao Garcia and Naval Arms Control 
Proposal to Expand Diego Garcia 
In the same letter of February 1974 in which he presented 
the rationale for America's adjusted strategic policy for the 
Indian Ocean area, Schlesinger proposed that Diego Garcia be 
expanded into a logistic facility for the better and assured 
support of US naval deployments.79 It was in America's 
interest for its forces to ”have the ability to operate 
routinely on a sustained basis in the Indian Ocean ...” but 
maintaining naval deployments there was ”not without 
difficulty”. The communications station at Diego Garcia had 
not been designed to provide logistic support for task groups 
operating at "extended distances" from the western Pacific. 
In order to sustain them the US had had to obtain access to 
bunkering and limited facility support from friendly countries 
and to resort to more inefficient support from Subic Bay naval 
base. Inadequate logistic facilities now limited its capacity 
to demonstrate American interest in the Indian Ocean area by 
routine presence. If the United States wished to assure a 
continuous capability to move or maintain its ships there, 
"development of more practical support facilities seems 
essential. An obvious solution is Diego Garcia, with some 
supplemental bunkering and aircraft landing rights elsewhere 
in the area." The facilities requested for Diego Garcia would
78 Idem.
79 All quotations in this paragraph are drawn from U.S. Senate, 
Selected Material, pp. 12-15. On the role and value of Diego 
Garcia in America's foreign policy and defence policy for the 
Indian Ocean area, see United States, Library Of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, United States Foreign Policy 
Objectives And Overseas Military Installations. Prepared For 
The Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate By 
The Foreign Affairs And National Defense Division, Committee 
Print, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, pp. 84-121.
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provide maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging and enhanced 
communications and enable American forces to operate from a 
"facility on British sovereign territory in the outer reaches 
of the Indian Ocean with minimal political or military 
visibility.” In light of America's broad political purposes 
- to provide tangible evidence of its interest in security and 
stability in the Indian Ocean area and to "offset growing 
Soviet influence” - the US government did not see
expanding the Diego Garcia facilities as an event which 
drives our foreign policy. A more accurate view is that 
a perception of clear deficiencies in U.S. military 
capabilities in the region could cause us to lose 
political and diplomatic influence to the Soviets by 
default. Therefore, a support facility in the Indian 
Ocean is in response to our actual foreign policy needs 
rather than being a potential motivator of policy.
Schlesinger's proposal was reinforced by President Ford's 
justification to Congress in May 1975 for constructing limited 
support facilities on Diego Garcia. The President stated that 
the
credibility of any US military presence ultimately 
depends on the ability of our forces to function 
efficiently and effectively in a wide range of
circumstances. Currently, the US logistic facility 
closest to the western Indian Ocean is in the
Philippines, 4,000 miles away. At a time when access to 
regional fuel supplies and other support is subject to 
the uncertainties of political developments, the
establishment of modest support facilities on Diego 
Garcia is essential to insure the proper flexibility and 
responsiveness of US forces to national requirements in 
a variety of possible contingencies. The alternative 
would be an inefficient and costly increase in naval 
tankers and other mobile logistics forces.80
By shortening the supply line to a task group in the Arabian 
Sea, the proposed facilities at Diego Garcia would enhance 
America's "capability to provide support to US forces
80 From "Justification For The Presidential Determination On 
The Construction Of Limited Support Facilities On Diego 
Garcia” in U.S. Senate, Selected Material, p. 20.
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operating in the Indian Ocean.” But there was "no intent to 
permanently station operational units there. and the 
installation would not imply an increase in the level of US 
forces deployed to that region.”81 (Italics added.)
Diego Garcia would
serve as an outpost base where ships may perform 
limited in port upkeep, receive periodic repair services 
from a tender and receive critical supplies via 
M[ilitary] A[irlift] C[ommand] airlift. Diego Garcia 
will also serve as a base for patrol aircraft providing 
air surveillance support to the ships in the Indian 
Ocean.82
The major planned improvements to Diego Garcia were an 
enlarged anchorage capable of mooring a six-ship aircraft 
carrier task group; an airstrip lengthened from 8,000 feet to
12.000 feet, giving it the capacity to receive KC-135 resupply 
and aerial refuelling aircraft; an extension of the aircraft 
parking apron in order to accommodate four P-3C ASW patrol 
aircraft on station for several months at a time and larger 
numbers of other aircraft; an aircraft maintenance hangar; a 
550 feet fuel and general purpose pier able to load and unload 
a 180,000 barrel Navy tanker in 24 hours and at which ships 
could perform repairs; an expansion of the petroleum, oil and 
lubricants (POL) storage capacity from 60,000 barrels to
640.000 barrels of aviation fuel and oil for ships, the 
equivalent to more than three Navy tankers; an enlarged 
communications station; and more living quarters, for a total 
of about 600 men.83 These and other projects for Diego Garcia 
would cost $37.8 million from Fiscal Year 1975 through Fiscal 
Year 1977 and they would be completed in 1979. The 
Administration and the Navy denied that there were additional
81 Idem.
82 U.S. Senate, Military Construction Appropriations FY 1975. 
p. 366.
83 Idem and U.S. Senate, Selected Material On Diego Garcia, 
pp. 7-8.
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plans to change Diego Garcia from a limited support facility 
into a full-scale base. Zumwalt was "of the view that in the 
absence of a major change in world affairs ..• this program 
ought to suffice....”84
Four themes were apparent in the Department of Defence's 
more specific arguments about the utility of the proposed 
logistic facility at Diego Garcia: political signalling,
independence and reliability of operational support, 
flexibility and economy. A logistic facility in the Indian 
Ocean area would provide in its own right a concrete signal of 
America's willingness to protect its interests. It would 
signify, General Brown noted, "a commitment to ensure that we 
are able to respond wherever and however our important 
interests are challenged.1,85 Without ”the presence of a fixed 
support installation”, ”more frequent ... deployment of 
combatants utilizing mobile logistic support could be needed” 
as "unmistakable evidence" of the United States' ability to 
support its combat forces,86 according to the Department of 
Defence.
Whether or not additional facilities were constructed at 
Diego Garcia, the US Navy acknowledged that it would still 
have an ability to operate in the Indian Ocean.87 However, an 
expanded Diego Garcia would enable the USN to avoid dependence 
in crises on regional states for politically uncertain access 
to fuel and facilities, with the risk that access to them 
might be denied or delayed to the point of danger to 
operations. Diego Garcia was "ideal", in Zumwalt's view, 
because it could satisfy the Navy's support requirements 
without hindrance: centrally located, uninhabited and
84 U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 141.
85 U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 23.
86 Ibid., p. 71.
87 U.S. Senate, Second Supplemental FY 1974 Appropriations, 
p. 2155.
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politically available, it was far enough from Asia not to 
threaten or appear to threaten any country88 and it put "our 
base astern of our offensive power where we can protect the 
base and be supported by it."89 Its freedom from involvement 
in the affairs of the littoral states made Diego Garcia 
consistent with the Nixon Doctrine.
Greater flexibility would be a major advantage bestowed 
by an enlarged Diego Garcia because "you can maintain a larger 
number [of ships] for a longer period of time in the Indian 
Ocean if you have this facility."90 By enabling an aircraft 
carrier task group to operate longer and protect itself better 
in crisis or war, Diego Garcia would, in Zumwalt's judgement, 
add to "the total deterrent capability" of the US, help to 
forestall aggressive actions by the USSR91 and thereby 
increase the US Navy's political efficacy in peacetime. A 
"key point" about the proposed facility was that it would 
avoid the need for a naval force to resort initially to 
replenishment by logistic ships from Subic Bay. As
a logistics facility it gives the National Command 
Authority a surge capacity for up to 30 days of intensive 
operations by a Carrier Task (sic) group in an Indian 
Ocean crisis ... without concern for the establishment of 
an adequate logistic pipeline. This substantial degree 
of added flexibility should be considered as a primary 
benefit that accrues from the Diego Garcia expansion.92
The "added flexibility" would enable combat vessels to avoid 
arriving in the Arabian Sea "with only 35 percent fuel and not
88 U.S. Senate, Briefings On Diego Garcia, p. 4.
89 U.S. Senate, Second Supplemental FY 1974 Appropriations, 
p. 2126.
90 U.S. Senate, Briefings On Diego Garcia, p.34.
91 U.S. Senate, Second Supplemental FY 1974 Appropriations,
pp. 2127-28.
92 Ibid., p. 2142.
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enough aviation gasoline to carry out ... operations ....1,93 
Besides enhancing the combat readiness and endurance of an 
aircraft carrier task group, Diego Garcia would provide a 
'•margin of time”, the 30 days, which could make the 
'•difference between the orderly resupply of our forces and a 
hasty improvisation which could place unwieldy demands on our 
supports in other areas. The same is true of the repair and 
maintenance which could be performed on ships and aircraft.1,94 
This was important because supplying an aircraft carrier task 
group in the Indian Ocean at the end of 1971 and in late 1973 
had strained severely the 7th Fleet's scarce logistic ships 
and reduced support for fleet units in the western Pacific. 
The decline of the latter's preparedness for combat and time 
on station prevented the Navy from being able to meet a crisis 
in East Asia simultaneous with one in the Indian Ocean area, 
according to Zumwalt.95 A further "flexibility”, which would 
be afforded by the increase of the parking apron at Diego 
Garcia, was suggested by the Director of Plans in the 
Department of the Air Force. If an aircraft carrier were not 
available to deploy to the Indian Ocean and substitute forces 
were needed, Diego Garcia could act as a temporary base for 
half a tactical squadron of F-lll fighter-bombers with tanker 
aircraft.96
America's naval deployments in 1971 and 1973 were 
reminders that although "Soviet activity [in the Indian Ocean] 
adds to the rationale for Diego Garcia, that rationale would 
exist independently of anything the Soviets are doing."97 One 
reason why "Diego Garcia should be increased as a logistics
93 U.S. House, Second Supplemental Bill 1974. p. 62.
94 U.S. Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 10.
95 U.S. Senate, Briefings On Diego Garcia, p. 9.
96 U.S. Senate, Second Supplemental FY 1974 Appropriations, 
p. 2190.
97 U.S. Senate, Briefings On Diego Garcia, p. 7.
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facility even if the Soviets weren't there”98 was because, 
Zumwalt claimed, it was "a very important factor” in America's 
"ability to stabilize the Middle East insofar as the Arab- 
Israeli confrontation is concerned.1,99 By using Diego Garcia 
KC-135 tankers would enable the United States to resupply 
Israel in the event of another Middle East war. According to 
the US Air Force, KC-135s operating from the atoll "could 
provide in-flight refueling support for an airlift resupply of 
friendly nations in the Middle East coming westward across the 
Indian Ocean."100 The US would not have to seek staging or 
overflight rights from European allies whose policy towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict differed from its own. (In April 
1974 the revolution in Portugal raised the possibility that 
Lajes airfield in the Azores, vital for the resupply of Israel 
in 1973, might not be available in the future. But the US 
would still have to obtain overflying and staging permission 
from South-East Asian states.) There might be other future 
occasions in which Diego Garcia could support American forces: 
it "could be used as a staging point for C-141's or C-5's from 
Southeast Asia or ... the Philippines enroute to a friendly 
country such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, and not just 
Israel "101
Finally the proposed logistic facility at Diego Garcia 
was intended to reduce the cost in ships and money of support 
operations by "shifting to less expensive shore-based 
facilities a portion of the support burden now borne wholly by
98 U.S. Senate, Military Construction Appropriations FY 1975. 
p. 360.
99 U.S. Senate, Second Supplemental FY 1974 Appropriations, 
p. 2128.
100 U.S. Senate, Military Construction Authorization FY 1975. 
p. 157.
101 Idem. B-52 bombers could not stage at Diego Garcia but 
aerial refuelling by KC-135 tankers from Diego Garcia would 
enable them to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean area.
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... afloat logistics resources."102 "With a logistic facility 
at Diego Garcia", Zumwalt pointed out, a "task group could 
sustain operations with the support of one AOE and 3 chartered 
MSC tankers, plus three stores/ammo ships."103 Without it 
nine ships would be needed,104 the two extra ships being 
tankers which, compared to Diego Garcia, could provide less 
fuel. He considered Diego Garcia to be an "economy measure" 
because otherwise the United States would have to spend from 
$400 million to $1,000 million over four to five years for 
extra replenishment ships to support an aircraft carrier task 
group.105
In planning to enlarge Diego Garcia, the Administration 
calculated that additional logistic facilities would not be 
important enough to harm America's relations with the littoral 
states seriously or for long. Friends would not be lost nor 
enemies made. In surveys by the State Department in 1974 and 
1975 of littoral state opinion about US naval deployments and 
Diego Garcia,106 many governments favoured a "Zone of Peace" 
in the Indian Ocean in order to prevent further militarization 
of the area; some did not offer a response; a few, among them 
India, objected strongly to the proposal for Diego Garcia for 
fear of a super-power arms race and an increase in tension. 
Several states, for example Iran and Singapore, tolerated the 
prospective facility because they viewed it as part of the 
regional US military balance against the USSR. American 
officials claimed that privately a majority of the countries 
which advocated a "Zone of Peace" "understood" the necessity
102 U.S. Senate, Second Supplemental FY 1974 Appropriations, 
p. 2155.
103 Ibid., p. 2142. An "AOE" is a fast combat support ship and 
"MSC" is the Military Sealift Command.
104 Idem.
105 U.S. Senate, Briefings On Diego Garcia, p. 34.
106 See U.S. Senate, Selected Material, pp. 9-11.
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to counter the Soviets107 and would tolerate the balancing 
process provided it was kept at the lowest possible level. 
The most spirited opposition to the expansion of Diego Garcia 
seemed to come from within the US Senate.
Opposition in the US Senate to Diego Garcia,
Advocacy of Arms Control
Opposition to the proposed enlargement of Diego Garcia 
came from Senators who tried to persuade their colleagues to 
reject the Executive branch's request for money for the 
project. Opponents contended that an expanded facility was 
not necessary to help protect US interests in the Indian Ocean 
area and that it could start an arms race with the Soviets 
which would pose grave risks of conflict and impair prospects 
for peace in the Middle East. Both super-powers had an 
interest in avoiding a costly competition, and a resolution in 
March 1974 by several Senators urged that America should seek 
direct negotiations with the USSR in order "to achieve 
agreement on limiting deployment of their respective naval and 
other military forces in the Indian Ocean and littoral states" 
and on limiting military facilities. Pointing to the 
importance and complexity of the issues raised by Diego 
Garcia, Congress decided in 1974 not to allot funds for 
expanding the facility until the Ford administration had 
evaluated all foreign policy and military implications of the 
need for it and the President had certified that its expansion 
was "essential to the national interest of the United States". 
In May 1975 Ford made that certification (see above). Then 
both Houses of Congress had to vote specifically not to 
disapprove funds for enlarging Diego Garcia. The House of 
Representatives had always favoured the project, thus the 
crucial vote on the fate of the installation lay in the 
Senate, on July 28, 1975.
107 Note U.S. House, Proposed Exoansion. pp. 29, 37; U.S.
Senate, Disapprove Diego Garcia, p. 38.
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Opponents of Diego Garcia did not see clear evidence of 
a compelling need for logistic facilities on the atoll or 
proof that super-power naval restraint could not be 
achieved.108 The United States did not have formal security 
treaty commitments to any littoral state west of Thailand and 
it was promoting regional security in the Persian Gulf by way 
of large arms sales. Not obliged to deploy its forces in the 
Indian Ocean area, America did not require the expansion of 
Diego Garcia. Freedom of the seas and the safe transit of oil 
supplies could best be preserved not by "unilateral military 
adventures” but by working with other states. The US had 
allies such as France which, more dependent on Persian Gulf 
oil than itself, possessed a naval presence comparable to the 
Soviet squadron and which would help to assure the passage of 
shipping, if necessary. And a US aircraft carrier task group 
alone was much more powerful than the Soviet force. Although 
the USSR was seeking to expand its influence and operational 
capability in the area, there was no strong, immediate Soviet 
military threat to US interests. As for the reopened Suez 
Canal, it reduced the transit time to the Arabian Sea not only 
for Soviet ships but also for all US combatants from the 
Mediterranean except aircraft carriers. During hostilities 
the Suez Canal might again by blocked, rendering Soviet lines 
of communication to the Indian Ocean longer and more exposed 
than those of the US. Prudent Soviet military planners would 
not rely on it. The USSR did have the means for "trouble- 
making” in the Indian Ocean but the risk of escalation would 
weigh heavily against a direct confrontation with America, 
whether or not Diego Garcia were expanded. Nor were the 
USSR's facilities in the area as impressive as the
108 The arguments in the Senate for and against the expansion 
of Diego Garcia on which most of this and the following two 
paragraphs are based are found in United States, Congress, 
Congressional Record - Senate. Proceedings And Debates Of The 
94th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 121 - pt. 20, July 28 to July 
31, 1975, pp. 25317-25363; United States, Congress, Senate,
Committee On Armed Services, Disapproving Construction 
Projects On The Island Of Diego Garcia. Report No. 94-00, 94th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 13-22.
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Administration had claimed. The US Navy and its oilers could 
visit more ports than could the Soviet navy.
As for the utility of Diego Garcia to help "protect” oil 
supplies, those likeliest to interfere with access to oil were 
not the Soviets but the Persian Gulf oil producers themselves. 
The Navy would be of little help in ending another oil embargo 
unless the US contemplated an amphibious invasion. Even in 
that event, with the chance of wider war, Diego Garcia 
probably was too vulnerable and too limited to be depended on. 
If America's goal was simply to be able to "show the flag”, it 
had that capacity already without Diego Garcia. If the 
objective was to be able to conduct major military operations, 
probably the proposed project was insufficient. In addition 
there was the question of whether Britain would permit the 
potential contingency operations important in justifying the 
facility's expansion. If (as it did) the UK retained a veto 
right over "special operations”, the use of Diego Garcia in 
extraordinary circumstances would not be certain. Further, if 
the US went ahead with expansion when there was no real danger 
to its Indian Ocean interests, its relations with the littoral 
states, which publicly opposed the project and preferred 
super-power military restraint,* would deteriorate. 
Improvement of Diego Garcia might also provoke a Soviet 
counter-expansion and that could serve as an excuse for the US 
Navy to press for a fleet which would cost up to $8,000 
million and which in competition with the Soviet navy would 
add to tension and instability in the Indian Ocean area and 
jeopardize US interests. The armed services' desire for 
flexibility seemed to be prevailing over America's interest in 
keeping good relations with the regional countries and in 
sustaining detente with the Soviets.
Opponents of Diego Garcia did not accept the Administration's 
claim that more littoral governments supported, or at least 
tolerated, the proposed expansion in private than in public.
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The Senators who disapproved of Diego Garcia thought that 
defence of US interests, oil particularly, was more a 
political and economic matter than a military one. They gave 
little credence to the political utility of a naval presence 
and the value of an expanded Diego Garcia in support of it. 
Opponents did not ascribe a direct political and symbolic 
value to Diego Garcia in the sense of it showing US capability 
and will to look after American interests and balance the 
Soviet naval squadron. They did bestow on the proposed 
facility a larger, dangerous symbolic importance: it
represented an inversion of America's Indian Ocean security 
policy because it was "leading" US military policy for the 
area and military policy was determining US foreign policy 
there. Some Senators worried that through Diego Garcia 
America would take on new security commitments; it seemed to 
be trying to assume its discredited role of "policeman", which 
could lead to "another Vietnam". They queried the lack of an 
agreement with Britain about expanding the facility which 
Congress, in a mood to reassert its authority after Vietnam, 
could scrutinize and use to influence US policy. Lastly, 
opponents of Diego Garcia observed that the Administration had 
not tried to approach the USSR in order to negotiate an arms 
control agreement for the Indian Ocean and prevent an arms 
race. They urged rejection of the proposed project partly as 
a way to prod the Administration to try for negotiations. If 
the Soviets rejected an initiative, they would take the blame. 
Then the expansion of Diego Garcia could start, with little 
harm done because of the delay. Advocates of Diego Garcia 
repeated the Administration's rationale detailed above and 
with all the arguments in, the Senate voted. The resolution 
to disapprove of the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia was 
defeated by 53 votes to 43 votes.
The Executive Branch's Rejection of Arms 
Control Negotiations
While Senatorial opponents of Diego Garcia wanted the 
Administration to begin arms control talks with the USSR 
before expanding the facility, the Executive branch held out
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the possibility of negotiations after the new phase of 
construction had started. NSSM 199 on America's strategic 
policy for the Indian Ocean area and related inter-agency 
documents had considered naval arms control and there was a 
re-evaluation of the issue before Ford certified to Congress 
that enlarging Diego Garcia was necessary. "On the basis of 
that review, it was decided not to approach the Soviets at the 
present time",109 spring 1975, because there would not be a 
major super-power arms race in the Indian Ocean. The United 
States was exercising caution in its general strategic policy 
and it sought to avoid or at least restrain competition with 
the Soviets at a time when its navy was smaller and when it 
was negotiating with the USSR on SALT II and participating in 
talks on reducing conventional forces in Europe. Avoiding 
competition with the Soviets was an American security 
objective in the Indian Ocean area just as much as balancing 
them by way of a "stabilizing" military presence carefully 
limited to periodic naval deployments. As for the Soviets "it 
would be incorrect to assume that Soviet actions are 
determined exclusively by the level or nature of [the US] 
force presence."110 The construction of new facilities at 
Diego Garcia would not prompt a Soviet force increase in the 
Indian Ocean because that would be caused by ships, not by a 
support facility. And, the Presidential justification for 
Diego Garcia asserted (see above), an expanded facility did 
not signify an American intention to station permanently a 
larger number of ships there. Apropos of negotiations a 
distinction had to be made between facilities and force 
presence: although the United States had expressed willingness 
to consider constructive proposals for arms restraint in the
109 For the Administration's explanation of why it rejected 
naval arms control talks, see in Congressional Record - 
Senate. July 28, 1975 a letter of July 17, 1975 by Robert J. 
McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional 
Relations, to Senator Bartlett, p. 25325, and a 
"communication" to Ford from the Department of Defence quoted 
by Senator John Stennis in Ibid., p. 25347.
110 U.S. Senate, Selected Material, p. 20.
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Indian Ocean, it did "not believe that construction on Diego 
Garcia should be contingent upon the outcome of discussions on 
such proposals. In our view, these are two separate 
issues."111 If negotiations were to be successful, logistic 
facilities at Diego Garcia would have to be constructed first. 
Otherwise there would not be a rough symmetry between the 
super-powers' facilities and the USSR, which would keep and 
expand Berbera whether or not Diego Garcia were enlarged, 
would not have an incentive to negotiate about it.
When the Senate voted to reject disapproval of the Diego 
Garcia project, the Department of Defence's request for FY 
1975 of $18.1 million was released. But in December 1975 
Congress enacted an amendment to approve but defer the FY 1976 
funds, $14.2 million, for Diego Garcia. The amendment was 
intended to provide an example of restraint which would 
impress the Indian Ocean states and "improve" the chance of an 
American initiative for arms control negotiations with the 
USSR. Negotiations, the resolution declared, were quite 
desirable and should proceed at the earliest possible time. 
It expected the Ford government to report to Congress 
regarding an initiative by April 15, 1976.
In response the Administration convened in December 1975 
under the auspices of the National Security Council a
Verification Panel Working Group which made a detailed study 
of the technical difficulties of arms control in the Indian
Ocean. The publicized part of its report in April 1976 on the
issues of arms control and the alternatives to it pertained 
not so much to negotiating initiatives as to why, in a
political context, they were not possible. It concluded that 
although the US "might want to give further consideration to 
some arms limitation initiative at a later date and perhaps 
take up the matter with the Soviet government then, any such
111 U.S. Senate, Selected Material, p. 20.
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initiative would be inappropriate now."112 A successful 
arrangement could occur only within a general political 
framework of mutual restraint in the Indian Ocean region, 
which restraint the USSR had not shown. The situation in the 
area could not be assessed in isolation from past and possible 
events on the African mainland. Soviet "activities” (indirect 
military intervention) in Angola and the Soviets' enlargement 
of facilities in Somalia, referring, for example, to the 
expansion of POL storage capacity and the construction of a 
lengthy airfield and a conventional missile storage and 
handling facility at Berbera, had raised major questions about 
Soviet interests in areas of the Indian Ocean. An arms 
limitation initiative in a region contiguous to Africa might 
convey the mistaken impression to the USSR and to America's 
friends and allies that it was willing to acquiesce in the 
Soviet Union's use of surrogate forces as a means of 
determining the outcome of local conflicts, as in Angola, and 
of exploiting conflicts for unilateral advantage. The report 
noted too that concluding "naval arms limitations would pose 
severe technical problems but would not necessarily be 
impossible to negotiate.11113
Underlying these conclusions about the temporary 
inadvisability of arms control talks were more general 
considerations. Apart from diplomacy, arms aid and naval 
presence were understood to be the Soviets' principal policy 
instruments in the Indian Ocean area and if the level of the 
USSR's naval deployments could be stabilized, the United 
States' competitive position against it would be stronger. 
But arms talks with the Soviets were thought to be 
unnecessary, because, as noted above, there would not be an
112 United States, Senate, Office of Senator John Culver, 
"Culver Criticizes Report On Indian Ocean”, Press Release, 
April 21, 1976. The press release includes a summary of the 
conclusions of the classified document by the Verification 
Panel Working Group.
113 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy”, p. 67.
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arms race in the Indian Ocean. Substantially increasing their 
naval presence would be too onerous for the Soviets and offer 
too little reward. Both sides were already exercising "tacit 
restraint” and their force levels had been stable for two 
years, the Indian Ocean report pointed out. To bring the USSR 
into arms negotiations would be to accept its rights and role 
in the area, to legitimize it and to send the wrong signals to 
the littoral states.114
Upon receipt of the Administration's report, Congress 
approved the FY 1976 funds* for Diego Garcia and its expansion 
finally began. The other prerequisite for undertaking its 
enlargement had been met in February 1976 when Britain and 
America concluded a formal agreement authorizing the project.
Access to Bases and Facility: Defensive Negotiations
The Filipino Bases 
While the Ford administration skirmished with the Senate 
about Diego Garcia, it had to protect American access to 
strategically crucial bases in the Philippines and to the 
small naval support facility in Bahrain. The US bases in the 
Philippines, principally Subic Bay naval base and Clark Air 
Base, provided the material foundation for America's strategic 
policy for the Indian Ocean area. They were the centre of 
operations and logistic support for all 7th Fleet deployments 
from South-East Asia to Africa. They enabled the US Navy to 
"project” and sustain its forces in the Indian Ocean with the 
most efficiency in time and cost compared to possible 
alternatives elsewhere. Owing to their "forward” geographical 
position and relative proximity to the Indian Ocean, they 
facilitated a "force multiplier effect", because fewer ships 
and aircraft were needed to provide an equivalent presence
A further $5.5 million were due to be allocated for Diego 
Garcia in FY 1977.
114 Interview with a US government official.
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than from farther away.115 According to Admiral M.F. Weisner, 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific in 1977,
Clark Air Base and the Subic/Cubi complex are 
strategically located at the hub of converging Western 
Pacific air and sea LOCs. They are key bases in the U.S. 
forward defense strategy and provide an ideal staging 
base for projecting U.S. power into (sic) Western 
Pacific, Indian Ocean and Middle East. There is no other 
geographical location in the PACOM [Pacific Command] area 
which could provide bases with similar strategic 
advantages. Loss of bases would result in decreased 
(sic) contingency response time, reduced forward based 
POL and W[artime] R[eserve] M[ateriel] storage, longer 
logistic pipelines, degraded communications, loss of ship 
repair facilities and loss of training areas.116
At Subic Bay there were repair, supply and bunkering 
facilities. Cubi Point was a "co-located” naval air station 
and San Miguel Naval Communications Station was the heart of 
7th Fleet communications in the western Pacific and Indian 
Ocean. Clark Air Base was the main point of American aerial 
operations, military and logistic, for those areas and it was 
the base of the 13th Air Force, which would be responsible for 
deploying to the Indian Ocean area in a crisis, whenever 
needed. Clark Air Base and Subic Bay were the primary sources 
of support for 7th Fleet task group operations in the Indian 
Ocean: Diego Garcia was a valuable supplementary but limited 
outpost of them, not a substitute. America had access to 
those bases until 1991 under the Military Bases Agreement of 
1947 (amended in 1969) with the Filipino government.
115 Lawrence E. Gr inter, The Philippine Bases: Continuing
Utility In A Changing Strategic Context National Security 
Affairs Monograph Series 80-2 (Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, February 1980), p. 8. For details 
about the bases, see Congressional Research Service, US 
Overseas Installations, pp. 144-149.
116 United States, Senate, Committee On Armed Services, Fiscal 
Year 1978 Authorization For Military Procurement. Research And 
Development. And Active Duty. Selected Reserve. And Civilian 
Personnel Strength. Hearings On S. 1210. pt. 3, 95th Cong., 
1st sess., 1977, p. 2363.
Assured access to the bases was one of the United States' 
most important interests in the Philippines. But by 1975 the 
status of the bases and the terms of their use, if not their 
actual retention by the US were uncertain. In response to 
America's withdrawal from mainland South-East Asia and to 
domestic opinion, the government of President Ferdinand Marcos 
made the conditions for use of the bases the subject of 
negotiations with the Americans and a counter in wider 
bargaining with them. The Filipinos viewed Subic Bay and 
Clark Air Base as a quid pro quo for America's security 
commitment to them founded on the two sides' Mutual Defence 
Treaty of 1951. But after America's withdrawal from Vietnam 
and the communists' seizure of power throughout Indochina, 
Manila questioned the ambiguous nature of the United States' 
commitment to it - against what threat would it respond? - and 
America's dependability and resolve to fulfil that commitment. 
As the commitment was queried, so the purpose and value of the 
bases came into doubt. They could be used when Filipino 
interests were not at stake and be subject to attack, harming 
Filipino people and property. Also the decline of America's 
political and military position in South-East Asia suggested 
to the Marcos government that higher priority be given to 
relations with China and the USSR, with its partners in the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with the 
Third World. US bases on its territory would lessen the 
Philippines' standing and credibility as an independent state.
Independence and sovereignty were major issues in 
Filipino domestic politics because the "American bases” had 
long been a focal point for nationalist and, closely related, 
anti-American sentiment which derived from the Filipinos' 
political and psychological sense of being the "exploited” 
junior partner of the US. Nationalists objected to the 
qualification of Filipino sovereignty symbolized by the bases. 
The Americans had virtually complete legal jurisdiction over 
them, redolent of the extra-territorial enclaves in China 
during its colonial period. Political prudence and his own
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inclinations required Marcos to satisfy his domestic and 
international "audiences" and demonstrate Filipino national 
independence. And in negotiations with the Carter
administration* beginning in September 1977, the Philippines 
pressed the United States for maximum concessions to Filipino 
sovereignty and control of the bases, more military aid as 
"rent" and a more extensive, explicit and automatic security 
commitment to it.
In December 1978 the Philippines and America reached an 
agreement (signed in January 1979) for amending the bases 
agreement. In essence the United States acknowledged that the 
bases were Filipino bases over which Filipino sovereignty 
extended and it accepted the formal command of a Filipino 
officer over their security and administration. At the same 
time the US attained its main negotiating objective of assured 
unhampered use of the bases for military operations. The 
agreement would continue until 1991 but it would be re­
evaluated every five years and America pledged that the 
Executive branch would "make its best effort" to obtain from 
Congress $250 million in military assistance and $250 million 
in military sales credits for the Philippines. As no changes 
were made in the Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951, the US avoided 
additional, more clearly defined obligations to contribute to 
Filipino security. The negotiations were successful because 
US-Filipino relations were mutually beneficial and because the 
Philippines' ASEAN partners exerted pressure on it to 
compromise. Subic Bay and Clark Air Base were prime symbols 
of America's interest and concern for South-East Asian 
security. Measures which advanced rather than arrested the 
unwanted trend of US strategic withdrawal had to be opposed, 
because they would leave ASEAN more vulnerable to pressures 
from China and the Soviet Union individually and in 
competition.
Previous negotiations, with the Ford administration, had 
broken down.
174
The Bahraini Facility
The uncertain prospect from 1973 to 1977 for the US 
Middle East Force's enduring access to the facility at Jufair 
in Manama, Bahrain and the terms of its use from 1977 
reflected the Bahraini government's ambivalent view of the MEF 
and its sensitivity to Middle Eastern, Persian Gulf and 
internal politics. Because of America's airlift of military 
supplies to Israel during the October 1973 war, the Bahraini 
government announced on October 20, 1973 that the Middle East 
Force would have to leave Jufair by October 1974. Saudi 
influence with Bahrain was strong and after the Arab oil 
embargo was lifted in March 1974, the US asked Saudi Arabia to 
hint to Bahrain that it should allow the MEF to remain. 
Representations from the Saudis, after some reluctance by 
them, and also the progress America was making in the conduct 
of the Arab-Israeli military disengagement negotiations in
1974 led Bahrain to indicate by August 1974 that the MEF could 
stay but that the lease of the Jufair facility and the status 
of US defence personnel in Bahrain would have to be 
renegotiated. One reason for renegotiation was opposition 
since October 1973 from the Bahraini National Assembly, some 
of whose members viewed the Middle East Force as an affront to 
Arab nationalism and Bahraini independence which had to be 
removed. This view was heightened in late 1974 and early 1975 
by discussion in America about intervention in the Persian 
Gulf in order to seize oilfields. The renegotiation of the 
US-Bahraini facility agreement of 1971 was completed by spring
1975 and among the changes were Bahrain's assumption of 
jurisdiction over US civil offenses, a rise in the annual 
lease payment from $600,000 to $4 million and loss of priority 
bunkering for the MEF. The number of US defence personnel at 
Bahrain was allowed to increase.
By autumn 1975, however, the Bahraini government told the 
United States that the MEF would have to "phase out" its use 
of Jufair by 1977. Its decision was mainly a response to new 
trends in Persian Gulf politics and security. Most prominent
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was the rapprochement in March 1975 between Iran and Iraq. 
Among its consequences were an abatement of Iraq's support for 
subversive groups in the Gulf, including Bahrain, and an 
improvement in Iraq's relations with the Gulf states. It 
helped to engender greater stability and to open the way for 
discussion of a regional security framework which would make 
the presence of the Middle East Force less relevant. All the 
Gulf governments wanted to take more responsibility for their 
security and it was an important objective to try to reduce as 
far as possible the involvement of external powers. That 
consideration spotlighted the fact, to which Bahrain was quite 
sensitive, that Jufair was the only American military facility 
on Arab territory. The Gulf states were critical of the 
Bahrainis' acceptance of one of the last vestiges of 
"imperialism" and if the MEF left Bahrain, there would be less 
excuse for the Soviet Union to try to seek permanent access to 
facilities in Iraq.117
In negotiations with the Americans from late 1975 
concerning their future use of the Jufair facility, Bahrain 
wanted to avoid the political stigma of "homeporting" the MEF 
command ship, the LaSalle. The US Navy wanted to avoid 
termination of its access to Bahrain because, it claimed, the 
American "presence means more than just showing the U.S. flag 
in the Persian Gulf. It contributes to the stability of a 
highly volatile area. It would be a bad international signal 
to our many friends in these countries if we leave now."118 
Yet representing the US was not as important as when America 
did not have embassies in the lower Gulf and it was ironic 
that the MEF now seemed to be an obstacle to a self-sustaining 
Persian Gulf security system without outside interference,
117 At a conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in Saudi Arabia 
in summer 1975, Gulf Foreign Ministers endorsed the 
principles that foreign fleets be excluded from the Gulf and 
that external powers be denied use of regional military bases. 
Strategic Survey 1975 (London: The International Institute For 
Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 87.
118 Christian Science Monitor. January 10, 1977.
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which was one of America's own regional security objectives. 
Nonetheless the MEF did still have practical uses such as 
helping to monitor Soviet naval movements and providing 
intelligence to friendly states, reinforcing US ties with the 
armed services of various countries and providing training for 
fledgling navies of the Persian Gulf. Nor could goodwill port 
visits showing US interest be ignored.
The negotiations with the Bahraini government resulted in 
a compromise whereby the arrangement of 1975 ended on June 30, 
1977. Under the new agreement commencing on July 1, 1977 the 
MEF became an afloat command and the LaSalle was no longer 
"homeported" at Manama. But the LaSalle and two destroyers 
could spend in aggregate up to four months a year at Manama, 
which was adequate because they would be at sea or visiting 
other ports for the rest of the time. The US Navy could 
continue to visit Bahrain upon request and access was retained 
to the airport and the communications facility and to a 
commercial pier for repairs, refuelling and replenishment. 
The number of US personnel was reduced from more than 500 to 
about 80, whose presence for logistic support was called an 
"Administrative Support Unit". The annual rent paid by the 
US went down to $2 million.119 The Bahraini government got 
the satisfaction of "evicting" the United States but perhaps 
also reassurance about the continuous availability of support 
for shaikhly rule in an uncertain future. That reassurance 
would have come from the feeling that although the ruling al- 
Khalifa family might be toppled if the Middle East Force were 
present, it might be overthrown too if the MEF were absent. 
Externally there could be no confidence that Iran might not 
revive its claim to Bahrain, in which case recourse to the MEF
119 For details of the agreement, see United States, Congress, 
House, Committee On International Relations, Review Of Recent 
Developments In The Middle East. Hearing Before The 
Subcommittee On Europe And The Middle East. 95th Cong., 1st
sess., 1977, pp. 105-107;-----, Review Of Developments In The
Middle East. 1978. Hearing Before The Subcommittee On Europe 
And The Middle East. 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, pp. 136-137.
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as a quiet deterrent and to larger US support with which it 
would be linked could well be necessary. Also an American 
presence might be reassuring and helpful in the future, when 
Gulf security might be less stable.
Resolution of Challenges to Strategic Mobility 
By 1977 America and other major maritime powers had 
reached agreement with Indonesia and Malaysia at the Third 
United Nations Conference On The Law Of The Sea (UNCLOS III) 
concerning the terms of international navigation through 
(South-East Asia's) straits and archipelagos.120 Those terms 
provided for "transit passage", which meant "continuous and 
expeditious" passage through straits, and "archipelagic sea 
lanes passage", the equivalent passage through archipelagos. 
Indonesia and Malaysia accepted those terms, which ensured 
virtually unhindered naval movement through South-East Asia's 
sea passages, rather than the preferred more restrictive term 
of "innocent passage", the basis of their challenge (see 
Chapter Two) to America's strategic mobility. Their 
compromise acceptance was based on the achievement of their 
main maritime policy objectives and on recognition of their 
limited influence. They had little military capability to 
restrict the movements of foreign navies perceived to threaten 
their security. At most they could invoke international 
opinion and support from the comity of nations and hint that 
the offending naval power's relations with them would suffer. 
They had to recognise as well their very limited bargaining 
strength concerning an issue of global importance about which 
America and the USSR were in agreement. Indonesia had to be 
attentive to the preferences of the United States which was 
its informal security "partner" and which balanced Chinese and 
Soviet influence in South-East Asia and provided the only 
adequate counterweight to the Soviet navy within its strategic 
purview. More immediately compelling, Indonesia wanted to
120 For a discussion of the process by which agreement was 
reached, consult Leifer, Malacca, Singapore. And Indonesia, 
chs. 4 and 6.
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secure international recognition of the legal status of its 
islands and waters as an archipelago, in order to reinforce 
its political integrity, much more than it wanted to alter the 
status of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. When America, 
the USSR and the other large maritime powers accepted the 
provisions in the UNCLOS III informal negotiating text which 
established Indonesia's legal status as an archipelago, when 
they accepted 12 miles instead of three miles as the maximum 
breadth of states' territorial waters and when they made 
concessions about the safety of navigation through straits and 
archipelagos, Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to the terms of 
"transit passage” and "archipelagic sea lanes passage".
Minor Adjustment of Policy
The minor adjustment in 1973-74 of America's strategic 
policy for the Indian Ocean area was in essence a continuation 
of the policy created in 1970. Display three times a year by 
a moderate naval force and the (proposed) construction of a 
logistic support facility at Diego Garcia remained political 
and symbolic in character because the Soviet squadron, 
although larger than in 1970, still neither threatened 
shipping nor was able to exert "considerable influence" and 
because the objectives of US policy - showing concern, 
balancing the USSR and reassuring littoral states - were the 
same. Intermittent deployments by an aircraft carrier task 
group sufficed to balance the Soviet presence because a task 
group could defeat it in battle, and their intermittent 
presence, alternating with a surface action group, suggested 
the "tacit restraint" appropriate for avoiding a naval arms 
race.
There were two causes for the adjustment of US policy. 
First the Nixon administration had become anxious and 
uncertain about future general Soviet international behaviour. 
Extrapolating from the perceived aggressive Soviet threats and 
action during the October 1973 Middle East war, it exaggerated 
the potential Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean: the
179
Administration took up the US Navy's argument, which it had 
rejected in 1970, about the danger of MconsiderableM Soviet 
influence and used it in order to persuade Congress to allot 
funding for Diego Garcia. Logistic facilities there were 
unnecessary in normal peacetime conditions because the Navy 
could obtain adequate support elsewhere. Thus, besides 
helping to show that the US would maintain a steady presence 
in the Indian Ocean, basically Diego Garcia's value derived 
from the potential utility of moderate naval display or long- 
range air strike or logistic operations in crises at the 
regional level when access to local support facilities might 
not be readily available. That was, of course, in large part 
the original and main reason for the US Navy's tenacious and 
now successful quest for a logistic facility on the atoll.
The second reason for the adjustment of policy was that 
America wanted to show tangibly a greater concern for access 
to Persian Gulf oil. But concern was shown in other, more 
important ways, by economic policy and diplomacy, and concrete 
demonstration of that concern by naval display did not mean 
that in extremis the US Navy could actually secure access to 
oil; it could not. From late 1973 into 1975 showing "concern” 
had a minatory aspect. Naval display reinforced threatened 
retaliation against Gulf Arab states if they did not end the 
oil embargo and, later, of intervention if they imposed 
another embargo. Those threats failed: inappropriate and of 
low credibility, they caused resentment among America's Gulf 
Arab "friends” for being viewed as potential objects of US 
military action. Ambivalence accompanied resentment now that 
the United States was pointedly seen to be a potential threat 
as well as the ultimate source of their military security. 
However, naval display did contribute successfully to American 
diplomacy when in late 1973 it guaranteed tacitly one 
condition for Israel's acceptance of the cease-fire agreement 
with Egypt: the safety of shipping bound for Israel through 
the Bab al-Mandab. That display also showed forcefully 
America's determination not to tolerate interference with the
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free passage of shipping through straits used by international 
navigation.
The minor adjustment of policy was also a continuation of 
America's original strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area 
because the US still sought, as shown, to avoid a naval arms 
race with the USSR. It succeeded because neither it nor the 
Soviets wanted or could afford to deploy more ships in the 
Indian Ocean. But fear in the US Senate of the potential for 
an arms race almost was strong enough to cause the 
Administration's justification for Diego Garcia to be turned 
against it: if the Soviet navy was going to exert 
"considerable influence”, presumably with a growing presence, 
and as logistic facilities at Diego Garcia suggested an 
ability to support more ships in the Indian Ocean, might there 
not indeed be an arms race?
Although the Ford administration finally gained approval 
and money for constructing a support facility at Diego Garcia, 
worry about the possibility for an arms race remained strong 
enough to move the Carter administration in 1977 to begin arms 
control negotiations with the USSR. An analysis of the 
causes, purposes, substance and outcome of those negotiations 
is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1977-1978
Attempting to negotiate an arms control agreement with 
the Soviet Union in 1977-78 preoccupied American strategic 
policy for the Indian Ocean area during the Carter 
administration's first year in power and distinguished its 
early Indian Ocean policy from that of the Nixon and Ford 
administrations. This first attempt since before World War II 
to negotiate a primarily naval arms control agreement was made 
possible by President Carter's interest in it, a renewed 
Soviet interest in Indian Ocean arms control and stability in 
the US-USSR relationship and in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean 
area. On the US side the negotiations were based on arms 
control proponents' assumption that restricting and eventually 
reducing, if not eliminating the super-powers' forces and 
facilities would bring America more advantage and incur less 
cost and risk than the relatively unnecessary display of arms. 
An arms control agreement would avoid a potentially dangerous 
and expensive arms race, help to extend Soviet-American 
detente into the Third World, give the US a competitive 
advantage over the USSR and improve America's relations with 
the Indian Ocean states. Differences between the United 
States and the Soviet Union concerning their respective 
interests, actual and potential naval and air deployments, 
bargaining objectives and interpretation of detente made the 
negotiations difficult. The USSR's intervention in the 
Ethiopian-Somali war in 1977-78 and its simultaneous naval 
force increase prompted the US to postpone them in February 
1978. America's own force increase in the Indian Ocean in 
1979-1980 in response to the fall of the Shah of Iran, the 
taking hostage of the US embassy staff in Tehran and the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan assured the indefinite 
postponement of the talks.
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This chapter analyzes the Soviet-American negotiations in 
1977-78 for arms control in the Indian Ocean area.1 First it 
notes earlier international proposals for Indian Ocean arms 
control and traces the development of that issue as a subject 
of policy within the US government from 1970 to 1977. Next it 
examines why the US and the USSR sought to negotiate an arms 
control agreement and what their bargaining objectives were; 
it also reviews the American armed forces' objections to the 
negotiations. Then the substance and course of the talks are 
discussed and the areas of agreement and difference between 
the two sides as of the end of the fourth, and last, round, in 
February 1978, are pointed up. Finally the reasons for the 
United States' postponement, first temporarily then 
indefinitely, of the negotiations are set forth.
Proposals for Arms Control 
The issue of arms control in the Indian Ocean area first 
arose in 1964 when the range of US Polaris submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles had become sufficient for them to hit the 
southern USSR from the Arabian Sea and when press reports 
about American plans to construct a logistic support facility 
at Diego Garcia first appeared. The Second Conference of Non­
1 For conceptual and topical background, consult Barry M. 
Blechman, The Control Of Naval Armaments Prospects and 
Possibilities (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution,
1975); George Quester, ed., Navies And Arms Control (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1980); Richard Haass, "Naval Arms 
Limitation in the Indian Ocean", Survival 20 (March-April
1978), 50-57;-- , "Arms Control and the Indian Ocean", in
Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s. Richard Burt 
ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 143-160;
Richard N. Haass, "Arms Control at Sea: The United States and 
the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, 1977-78", The Journal Of 
Strategic Studies 10 (June 1987), 231-247; Beazley and Clark, 
Politics of Intrusion, pp. 50-70; Richard A. Best, Jr., 
"Indian Ocean Arms Control", United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings 106 (February 1980), 42-48; United States, Library 
Of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs 
Division, Means Of Measuring Naval Power With Special 
Reference To U.S. And Soviet Activities In The Indian Ocean. 
Prepared For The Subcommittee On The Near East And South Asia 
Of The (House) Committee On Foreign Affairs, Committee Print, 
93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974.
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aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964, recommended 
"the establishment of denuclearized zones covering ... the 
oceans of the world, particularly those which have been 
hitherto free from nuclear weapons.... The Conference also 
requests the nuclear powers to respect these de-nuclearized 
zones...."2 It condemned the "expressed intention of 
imperialist powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean as 
a calculated attempt to intimidate the emerging countries of 
Africa and Asia...."3 Then in December 1964, with both their 
own security and cultivating favour with the non-aligned 
movement in mind, the Soviets submitted to the United Nations 
a memorandum which "expressed support for the proposal to 
create nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, 
including the Indian Ocean"4, and censured America's plan to 
build a military base there. By the early 1970s signs of 
growing Soviet and American naval activity in the Indian Ocean 
suggested to the littoral states that the US and the USSR were 
starting an arms race which might threaten seriously their 
independence and security and increase international tension. 
Thus in December 1971 the United Nations General Assembly 
passed a resolution sponsored by Ceylon (Sri Lanka) which 
declared the Indian Ocean to be a "Zone of Peace".* Its 
creation would arrest an arms race and eliminate nuclear 
weapons and all bases, logistic facilities and other forms of 
the "great powers'" military presence conceived in the context 
of their rivalry. The United States abstained from voting on 
the "Zone of Peace" resolution, claiming that it had a
On the "Zone of Peace" declaration and America's response to 
it, see Chapter Two.
2 Devendra Kaushik, The Indian Ocean Towards a Peace Zone 
(Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972), p. 198.
3 Ibid., p. 199.
4 V.P. Kozin, "On Limiting Military Activities In The Indian 
Ocean", SSHA: Ekonomika. Politika. Ideoloaiva. no. 10 (October
1979), translated in United States, Central Intelligence 
Agency, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union. 
January 14, 1980, p. 19. (Referred to below as CIA, FBIS, 
Soviet Union.)
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legitimate defensive right to deploy its forces in the Indian 
Ocean as necessary and that it could not accept a legal regime 
which would qualify freedom of navigation on the high seas.
In the US in the latter half of 1970 the National 
Security Council examined the option of naval arms control in 
the course of forming America's strategic policy for the 
Indian Ocean area. At that time Senator Henry Jackson 
proposed that the Nixon administration enter into arms control 
negotiations with the Soviets as a specific condition for 
Congressional authorization of money for a communications 
station at Diego Garcia.5 In March 1971 the Soviet ambassador 
to Washington expressed to the State Department his country's 
interest in limiting super-power naval deployments in the 
Indian Ocean. And in June 1971 Leonid Brezhnev, then General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stated, 
partly with reference to the Indian Ocean:
We have never believed, and do not believe now, that it 
is an ideal situation when the naval fleets of great 
powers engage in lengthy cruises far away from their own 
shores. We are willing to solve this problem, but only 
... on an equal footing.6
The US embassy in Moscow enquired in July 1971 about the 
USSR's specific intentions, but without a response. Indeed 
the Soviets did not show further interest in naval arms 
control until 1976. The principal reason for this 
indifference was resistance to the idea from the Soviet high 
command, not just from the Soviet navy, which, like its US 
counterpart, wanted to consolidate its role and presence in 
the Indian Ocean and acquire access to logistic facilities. 
Nonetheless an "inter-agency working group under joint ACDA- 
Defense Department chairmanship conducted" in 1971 "a series 
of studies to consider possible arms control approaches to
5 Congressional Record - Senate. 121, 1975, p. 25342.
6 Kozin, "Limiting Activities", p. 19.
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this area” and in 1972 and 1973 ACDA examined further the 
"possible approaches which might be pursued if and when the 
Soviets also indicated interest....7
From 1974 to 1976 the Indian Ocean arms control issue was 
linked closely to the Administration's request to Congress for 
money to expand Diego Garcia into a logistic support facility, 
as discussed in Chapter Three. While hinting in its rationale 
for Diego Garcia at the dangers from an increase in the Soviet 
Indian Ocean naval presence, the Executive branch concluded 
that arms control negotiations with the USSR were unnecessary, 
because an arms race would not occur: neither super-power's 
purposes would be served by one. A sizable minority in the US 
Senate, however, feared the potential for an arms race and 
wanted the US to negotiate with the Soviets in order to avert 
a race and remove the need to enlarge Diego Garcia. Although 
the Senate voted in July 1975 for Diego Garcia to be expanded, 
late in the year Congress held back the authorized money in 
order to compel the Ford adminstration to approach the Soviets 
for arms control talks. But in April 1976 the Executive 
branch ruled out an initiative because of the USSR's 
"inappropriate" involvement in the Angolan civil war. 
Congress persisted with its advocacy of arms control and in 
the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976 it stipulated that
the President should undertake to enter into negotiations 
with the Soviet Union intended to achieve an agreement 
limiting the deployment of naval, air, and land forces of 
the Soviet Union and the United States in the Indian 
Ocean and littoral countries. Such negotiations should 
be convened as soon as possible and should consider ..• 
limitations with respect to -
(1) the establishment or use of facilities for naval 
or land forces in the Indian Ocean and littoral 
countries;
7 From ACDA Work On The Indian Ocean in "Statement Of Hon. J. 
Owen Zurhellen, Jr., Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control And 
Disarmament Agency" in U.S. House, Proposed Expansion, p. 19. 
ACDA is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, an autonomous 
part of the State Department.
186
(2) the number of naval vessels which may be 
deployed in the Indian Ocean, or the number of 
"shipdays" allowed therein; and
(3) the type and number of military forces and 
facilities allowed therein.8
Indian Ocean arms control negotiations with the USSR had 
become important enough an issue for Jimmy Carter, Democratic 
Party candidate for President in 1976, to make a commitment to 
it in his foreign policy "platform"•
Even before Carter was elected there was a sign that the 
super-powers might begin negotiations in 1977. In a letter on 
September 28, 1976 to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations about "General and Complete Disarmament", Andrei 
Gromyko, then Soviet Foreign Minister, addressed the question 
of a "Zone of Peace" in the Indian Ocean. The littoral 
states, he suggested, were concerned that distant powers were 
"expanding their military bases and increasing their military 
presence". They considered those actions to be a threat to 
their independence and security and they were putting forward 
the idea of transforming the Indian Ocean into a "Zone of 
Peace", a proposal which the USSR regarded "with 
understanding". The "key question" was, he pointed out,
to ensure that there are no foreign military bases in the 
Indian Ocean, that bases which have been established 
there are dismantled and that no new bases are 
established. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it 
never has and does not now intend to build military bases 
in the Indian Ocean.
In resolving the question of foreign military bases 
along these lines, the Soviet Union would be prepared to 
join with other powers in seeking ways to reduce on a 
reciprocal basis the military activities of non-coastal
8 United States, Congress, House, Committee On Armed Services, 
Indian Ocean Forces Limitation And Conventional Arms Transfer 
Limitation. Report Of The Panel On Indian Ocean Forces 
Limitation And Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation 
(H.A.S.C. No. 95-100), 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1979, p. 3.
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States in the Indian Ocean and in the regions directly 
adjacent to it.9 (Italics added.)
On the American side, in November 1976 a booklet was published 
by the United Nations Association of America entitled 
Controlling the Conventional Arms Race. Involved prominently 
in its preparation had been Cyrus Vance, soon to be appointed 
Secretary of State. Chapter Three, on "Deployment 
Limitations", had been the general responsibility of Paul 
Warnke, who became director of ACDA in 1977. That chapter 
dealt in part with the super-power competition in the Indian 
Ocean area and it recommended that the
United States should press for negotiations with the 
Soviet Union aimed at concluding an Indian Ocean 
deployment limitations agreement including both naval 
vessels and shore facilities. Such an agreement should 
focus on permanent deployments, making allowances for a 
small number of port visits and rescue missions as well 
as limited transit by warships. It should require the 
dismantling of present Soviet and American bases, such as 
those in Somalia and on Diego Garcia.10 (Italics added.)
The Chapter on "Deployment Limitations" stated that naval 
forces were "uniquely valuable" as an instrument of foreign 
policy both as a signal of interest and intentions and as a 
"means of projecting forces" around the world. But the Soviet 
and the American naval forces were also potential sources of 
danger and instability. Limiting the super-powers' force 
deployments in possibly "explosive" regions by reducing the 
size of those forces would enhance political and military 
stability and reduce the chance of naval confrontations.
9 United Nations, General Assembly, 31st Session, "'General And 
Complete Disarmament' Letter dated 28 September, 1976 from 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary General", 
(A/31/232), September 28, 1976, p. 11.
10 United Nations Association-United States of America, 
National Policy Panel On Conventional Arms Control, 
Controlling The Conventional Arms Race (New York: UNA-USA, 
November, 1976), p. 37. The following four paragraphs draw 
from pp. 27, 29-31.
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Deployment limitations would have to take into account 
carefully local political and military circumstances because 
sometimes "great power" military presences might discourage 
conflict between states.
The Indian Ocean had not become "an area of intense naval 
competition between the superpowers" but their interest in 
establishing military bases and increasing their naval 
deployments there appeared to be growing. A deployment 
limitation agreement for the Indian Ocean would help to ensure 
that the Soviet-American naval competition and involvement in 
local disputes would not reach the proportions already 
attained in the Mediterranean. By agreeing to mutual 
disengagement before their arms rivalry gained added momentum 
the US and the USSR "could avoid a potentially costly and 
dangerous new dimension of their arms race." An agreement 
would forestall further attempts on their part to establish 
bases as well as "require the dismantling of existing bases 
such as those in Somalia and Diego Garcia."
An agreement would reduce America's political and 
military flexibility in the Indian Ocean area. "It would be 
more difficult for the U.S. to threaten or to apply force in 
the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Southern Africa either to 
protect the important sea lanes or to aid friendly states." 
However, because a reduction in total naval inventories would 
not be required under an agreement, the "projection of U.S. 
naval power into the area would only be delayed, not 
eliminated, in case of an emergency." In view of the location 
of its bases, the United States could exceed the potential 
"surge" of Soviet naval forces into the area on short notice, 
should an agreement fail during a crisis. Also the greater 
staying power of American naval forces would enable them to 
operate for longer periods without nearby bases. And Soviet 
attack submarines would have much difficulty in sustaining 
effective operations in the Indian Ocean without use of local 
bases. As for potential submarine attacks on the sea lanes.
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they would be deterred more by the incalculable risks of 
military interference with peaceful commerce "than by the 
presence of opposing naval forces."
Prospects for an Indian Ocean agreement "should be 
promising”. Soviet and American deployments had "levelled 
off” after several years of growth. Neither side had "truly 
vital interests in the region (so long as hostile military 
action does not impede Western access to oil supplies)" and "a 
primary purpose of their respective forces ... is to counter 
each other, politically as much as militarily.” Verification 
of violations of an agreement by surface vessels would be 
easy. No other outside power except France had the will or 
capability to deploy naval forces on a sustained basis and the 
littoral states "generally favor the withdrawal of foreign 
bases and naval deployments".
The above analysis and recommendation formed the Carter 
administration's initial policy rationale for Indian Ocean 
arms control, in which the President took a personal interest. 
His administration's strong commitment to arms contol 
reflected both a deep wish in the Democratic party after the 
Vietnam war to do everything practicable to avoid unnecessary 
conflict and Carter's intention to broaden detente with the 
USSR and to extend it into the Third World. Reducing the 
super-power competition there would restrain the Soviet Union 
from increasing its influence and would help to stabilize 
America's relations with it. As part of a wide range of arms 
control agreements, for example on conventional arms 
transfers, an agreement for the Indian Ocean area would also 
help to relegate the rivalry with the Soviets to its proper, 
secondary place in US foreign policy and mitigate its impact 
on the littoral states. Then America could attend to the more 
important tasks of improving its relations with those states 
and encourage the resolution of regional conflicts, which 
would lessen opportunities for interference by the USSR and 
improve the United States' political competitive position
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against it.
The new Administration first expressed publicly its 
interest in Indian Ocean arms control when on March 9, 1977 
President Carter announced a proposal made to the USSR that 
the Indian Ocean be "completely demilitarized". But when he 
was told of the meaning of demilitarization he modified his 
declared intention. Addressing the United Nations General 
Assembly on March 16, 1977, Carter spoke of seeking "to
establish Soviet willingness to reach agreement ... on mutual 
military restraint in the Indian Ocean." At meetings between 
Vance and Gromyko in Moscow from March 28 to March 30 at which 
America's new proposals for strategic arms limitation were 
rejected, the two sides agreed to create eight working groups 
for negotiating on various arms control issues. One working 
group was responsible for the Indian Ocean and its first 
session was arranged to be held in Moscow in June.
In the first half of 1977 both domestic US and 
international conditions were auspicious for Indian Ocean 
negotiations. At home the liberal wing of the American 
political establishment was in power, its more sanguine 
approach to relations with the USSR was ascendant and Congress 
approved of an Indian Ocean initiative. Abroad the USSR did 
not threaten the Persian Gulf nor was it engaged in 
"objectionable" behaviour, such as in Angola the previous 
year, which might prevent the start of negotiations. The 
Soviet and American force levels in the Indian Ocean were 
stable at a low level; there was no arms race. Relations 
among the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean states seemed to be 
tranquil and there was no threat to the flow of oils the 
possibility of a new oil embargo, and American threats to 
intervene in response, had subsided. Thus the United States' 
need for a naval presence to contribute to its security 
objectives in the Indian Ocean area by routine display was 
relatively small. Controlling arms in order to avoid a 
potential arms race took priority over the requirement for
191
display.
American and Soviet Arms Control Objectives 
The United States 
In early April 1977 the Administration began a 
comprehensive inter-agency analysis of the issues involved in 
establishing a super-power arms control regime in the Indian 
Ocean area.11 Taking part in the study, from which evolved 
the US negotiating position, were the Bureau of Politico- 
Military Affairs in the State Department, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defence (International Security 
Affairs), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The review concluded 
that there was in the Indian Ocean
clearly a potential for a major increase in military 
presence. Any increase in the military presence of one 
side could lead to a reactive increase by the other. 
Stabilizing and perhaps eventually reducing military 
levels would pre-empt the development of an arms race.
An arms limitation agreement of the type [the US 
was] seeking would prevent any significant increase in 
Soviet naval force levels in the region....
The study would have begun with an examination of 
America's interests and military presence in the Indian Ocean 
area. Recently that area had become of major economic and
11 Except where otherwise noted, this paragraph and the 
following four paragraphs draw upon “Written Statement Of Dr. 
Leslie Gelb" on Indian Ocean Arms Limitations in United 
States, Congress, House, Committee On Armed Services, Indian 
Ocean Arms Limitations And Multilateral Cooperation On 
Restraining Conventional Arms Transfers. Hearings Before The 
Panel On Indian Ocean Forces Limitation And Conventional Arms 
Transfer Limitation Of The Intelligence And Military 
Application Of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee. 95th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1978, pp. 5-7; "Statement Of Brig. Gen. James M. 
Thompson, USA, Director, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, Office 
Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense, International Security 
Affairs" in Ibid., pp. 27-29; Ibid., pp. 59-60. Dr. Gelb was 
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State 
Department.
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strategic value to the United States. A large percentage of 
the industrialized world's oil supplies originated in the 
Persian Gulf and crossed the Indian Ocean. The unimpeded flow 
of oil shipping to Western Europe, Japan and America was very 
important. Large numbers of US citizens lived in the area and 
American companies were expanding their investment there. 
Several US allies, including Australia and members of CENTO, 
bordered the Indian Ocean.* India was a major actor among the 
more than thirty other independent littoral and hinterland 
states whose stability and economic development America had an 
interest in encouraging. The Indian Ocean countries were 
important in their own right and were becoming prominent in 
international politics. Because they were near the vital 
interests of both super-powers, events in them had a special 
significance for global perceptions of the US-USSR balance of 
power and influence. Strategically the US was interested in 
the "nature and presence” in the Indian Ocean of Soviet naval 
forces, which could threaten the movement of oil shipping. US 
interests would be affected if the Soviets obtained bases 
adjacent to the West's sea lines of communication. The United 
States would be concerned by an increase in the Soviet 
presence, particularly a large and prolonged one.
The purpose of American military forces in the Indian 
Ocean area was to protect US interests by safeguarding the sea 
lanes, ensuring the security of allies, providing a capability 
to perform a wide range of operations, in crises if necessary, 
and by symbolizing America's commitment to its allies. The 
force level and activity of the US Navy in the Indian Ocean 
were comparatively low. The Navy's presence consisted of the 
permanent three-ship Middle East Force and cruises, averaging 
six to seven weeks, three times a year by 7th Fleet task 
groups. They and the MEF conducted routine port visits to 
many Indian Ocean states and US air and naval forces 
participated in exercises with America's CENTO
Only Australia and Thailand were formal US allies.
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associates and ANZUS allies. The communications station at 
Diego Garcia, from where P-3Cs and other aircraft conducted 
reconnaissance, was being expanded into a logistic support 
facility. Bahrain provided a small support facility for the 
Middle East Force and US forces could use the new Australian 
naval facility at Cockburn Sound in Western Australia, which 
could support submarines as well as surface vessels. America 
had access rights to many ports and its P-3Cs enjoyed landing 
rights at airfields from Singapore and the Cocos Islands 
(Australia) to Karachi, Bandar Abbas (Iran), Masirah island 
(Oman), Djibouti, Kenya and the Seychelles. Naval-related 
tankers supplied 7th Fleet task groups with Saudi oil obtained 
at Bahrain.
Then the American arms control analysis addressed the 
Soviet Union's interest and presence in the Indian Ocean area. 
The USSR was among the three leading users of the Suez Canal. 
The Soviets had an interest in protecting their shipping lanes 
across the Indian Ocean which was the only year-round sea 
route from the European USSR to the Soviet Far East. They 
wanted a secure southern border and an outlet to the Indian 
Ocean. Soviet security was directly at stake because US
ballistic missile submarines would be in range to strike at 
the southern USSR, should they be present in the Arabian Sea. 
Western dependence upon Persian Gulf oil made the Indian Ocean 
a possible pressure point against the United States and its 
allies. Although its political activity in the area in order 
to gain influence and support for its policies had been 
growing, the USSR had maintained a fairly small maritime 
presence there, the average Soviet naval deployment from 1975 
to 1977 being 18 to 20 ships. About eight were combatants, of 
which one was a cruiser, three were destroyers and one or two 
were submarines. The rest of the Soviet naval squadron 
comprised four or five oilers and repair, space support, 
oceanographic and cargo vessels. The squadron used anchorages 
in international waters in the Gulf of Aden, near Socotra 
island, off east Afica and near Diego Garcia and one naval
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vessel monitored traffic at the Strait of Hormuz. Soviet 
ships took on supplies and undertook repairs at Berbera, where 
there was also a communications station and an airfield and 
other facilities under construction. Occasionally Soviet 
ships made minor use of port facilities at Aden and in Iraq. 
Although the Soviets deployed more ships in the area than did 
the Americans, their force was no match in combat for an 
American aircraft carrier task group. By early 1976 Tu-95 
aircraft and 11-38 anti-submarine warfare aircraft were using 
Somali airfields and Khormaksar air base near Aden for 
reconnaissance patois over the Indian Ocean.
This was the first introduction of Soviet ground-based 
air[craft] in the region, and it was more than a symbolic 
development. The Soviets had previously lacked any air 
support for their Indian Ocean squadron, and this 
development suggested that the Soviets intended to 
develop an operational naval capability, as opposed to 
the largely symbolic deployments to date.12
America's objective in seeking an Indian Ocean arms 
control agreement with the USSR was, in the first stage of 
negotiations, to stabilize both sides' naval and air presence. 
An agreement would preclude the possibility of an arms race. 
It would keep the Soviet and American forces at a relatively 
low level and reduce the risk of super-power confrontation. 
An agreement would work to the long-term political benefit of 
the US in its relations with the littoral states: it would 
compel the Soviets and the Americans to compete for influence 
mainly by political and economic means, in which the US had an 
advantage. It would allay the Indian Ocean states' anxiety 
about a super-power arms race and it would be consistent with 
their efforts to create a "Zone of Peace". Militarily an 
arrangement which precluded a Soviet naval "build-up" would 
mean that America would not be forced to increase its defence 
budget in order to build more ships and deploy them in the 
Indian Ocean or to transfer forces from other areas for
12 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 68.
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balancing a potential Soviet expansion. Stabilization would 
prohibit the proliferation of military facilities under the 
control or primary use of the USSR. That was very important 
because in order to counter the superior fighting power of an 
American aircraft carrier task group the Soviets would have to 
augment substantially their naval squadron with strike 
aircraft and station them in the Indian Ocean area.
The United States sought to constrain Soviet ability to 
introduce or base fighter and bomber aircraft on the 
Indian Ocean periphery. This was the sine crua non of the 
US position; without such a provision the Soviet Navy 
would have been able to operate under the protection of 
land-based Soviet naval aviation while the Soviet Air 
Force could introduce large and potentially decisive 
amounts of power in the area. Stabilization of force 
levels would limit US air and power projection assets to 
the periodic appearance of carrier task forces; without 
some corresponding ceiling on Soviet land-based tactical 
air power, the United States and its allies in the 
littoral could have found themselves at a marked 
disadvantage.13
An agreement would prohibit the Soviets from "surging” 
forces into the Indian Ocean area in order to intimidate or 
carry out large operations against littoral states and 
threaten US interests. Thus it would minimize concern among 
US friends about an increase in the Soviet military presence 
and assure them that the military balance in the area would 
not swing in favour of the USSR. Lastly there was little risk 
in an arms control agreement: an attempt by the Soviets to 
bring in forces substantially in excess of the numerical 
limits set by an agreement would soon be detected and the US 
would be free to counter the increase. A bilateral agreement, 
adequately verified, which stabilized the two sides' 
respective force level and pattern of deployments and which 
prevented the USSR from acquiring access to further military 
facilities while letting the US keep Diego Garcia would 
maintain the US-USSR force balance and enable America to 
fulfil its foreign policy and security commitments.
13 Haass, "Arms Control At Sea”, pp. 238-239.
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The United States also examined why the Soviet Union 
sought an Indian Ocean arms control agreement. The USSR 
wanted to "restrict” (preferably eliminate) US strategic and 
tactical nuclear weapon systems, to preclude a large increase 
in the level or a change in the nature of the US force 
presence, to limit America's ability to "surge" its forces and 
to stop the US from expanding Diego Garcia. The Soviets 
wanted as well to create difficulties between America and its 
allies and friends and to enhance the image of the USSR as a 
leading proponent of arms control.
Advocates of arms control in the White House, the State 
Department and ACDA assumed that current regional military 
threats to America's friends and interests in the Persian 
Gulf-Indian Ocean area were moderate and could be dealt with 
primarily by those friends. Current Soviet maritime forces 
were too small to threaten seriously US interests. American 
naval forces deployed in and available for operations in the 
area were adequate to display US interest and to counter 
politically and, if necessary, defeat in combat the Soviet 
squadron. But except for balancing the minor Soviet force 
deployment, the US presence was relatively unnecessary: 
American interests were satisfactorily secured by other policy 
instruments, and certainly a smaller US naval presence would 
still be adequate for normal display. Much more valuable, for 
example for showing the United States' commitment to Saudi 
Arabian security, were its participation in developing the 
Saudis' strategic concept and plans, its military sales 
programmes and training and advisory missions. There was, on 
the other hand, the potential danger of a naval arms race with 
the USSR, despite America's intention to avoid conflict with 
the Soviets and to exercise "tacit restraint" in its Indian 
Ocean strategic policy. Policy might not always be able to 
control its instrument, and this danger was greater than the 
need for a US naval presence. In order to avoid an arms race 
and possible confrontation the US and the USSR ought to 
negotiate an arms control agreement. Because the American
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presence was relatively unnecessary and because an agreement 
would in effect remove its primary, counterbalancing purpose, 
an agreement should reduce and lead in time to the elimination 
of the two sides' forces and facilities in the Indian Ocean 
area.
Even if an agreement at first only stabilized the 
Soviets' and the Americans' presence, its benefits (see above) 
were clear and important while its risks and disadvantages 
were small. Provided efficacious means for verifying the 
movement of submarines could be arranged, secret advantageous 
Soviet evasion of the terms of an agreement would be 
difficult. As for the restriction of operational flexibility, 
"the gain to the United States of forestalling a Soviet air 
threat far outweighed the cost of sacrificing American 
flexibility in deploying military power" because by "accepting 
limits based in prior deployment patterns and by agreeing not 
to establish any new bases on the territory of friendly 
littoral states, the Soviets would freeze themselves into a 
position of permanent inferiority ..."14 relative to the U.S. 
Nor would America's flexibility seriously be denied: a
prospective agreement would contain a provision 
permitting the temporary suspension of restraints 
whenever the United States or the Soviet Union determined 
its national interests were at stake. ... [Tjhe two sides 
would respect the status quo as long as conditions did 
not take a drastic turn for the worse. Nothing except 
the political consequences of withdrawing from an arms 
control treaty would stop them from rapidly moving 
additional forces into the Indian Ocean in times of 
emergency.15
14 William Stivers, "Doves, Hawks, And Detente", Foreign 
Policy, no. 45 (Winter 1981-82), p. 133.
15 Ibid., p. 136. According to Stivers, Ibid., p. 135, 
advocates of arms control considered that in the possible 
contingency of a coup or small conflict on the Arabian 
peninsula, the US "would be much more capable than the Soviet 
Union of intervening" because lacking "the mobility of US 
carrier task forces, the Soviets could not move as quickly and 
effectively...." A "massive, direct" Soviet attack into Iran 
to the Persian Gulf was judged to be "the least probable of
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American naval forces could sustain larger operations longer 
without a facility such as Diego Garcia than could Soviet 
forces and US forces providing requested help to a friendly 
state would be given adequate basing support.
Just before the first round of negotiations, in June 
1977, Carter outlined America's general objectives. The 
United States'
first hope, and without delay, is that we might prevent 
any further build-up of military presence in the Indian 
Ocean: later prior notification of any military movements 
there, and perhaps later on, some reduction in the 
present level of military presence, which is fairly low 
at this time.16
More privately, ”at the President's insistence, 
demilitarization would remain the ultimate US objective.1,17
Military Objections to Arms Control
That stabilization, not reductions was the US 
government's initial bargaining objective resulted from a 
compromise between the State Department and ACDA and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who opposed not merely reductions but 
the negotiations themselves.18 In contrast to the enthusiasm 
of the arms control proponents, the public position of the JCS 
on Indian Ocean arms control was tepid. According to the 
Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Organization of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a
bilateral stabilization agreement which permits 
access while holding both the United States and the
all contingencies.”
16 Beazley and Clark, Politics of Intrusion, p. 67.
17 Haass, "Arms Control at Sea”, p. 236.
18 See Ibid., p. 237 and note Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power And 
Principle (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), pp. 174- 
175.
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Soviet Union to present force levels and patterns of 
activity in the Indian Ocean during normal periods would 
tend to stabilize the naval and air forces of both sides 
and still be in keeping with our low but discernable 
presence profile strategy.19 (Italics added.)
The JCS had opposed formal arms control even before 
negotiations began. Then, in August 1977, the Chairman of the 
JCS issued a memorandum objecting to the US negotiating 
proposal which would have "restricted” naval deployments. And 
in January 1978 he recommended suspension of the talks.20
The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed a stabilization or 
reduction agreement because it would increase the USSR's 
regional military advantage over the US: America's strength, 
its naval presence, would be constricted while the Soviets' 
strength, land-based forces in the USSR which were proximate 
to the Persian Gulf, would not be regulated. Also an 
agreement would reduce America's strategic freedom of action 
in crises. The JCS envisioned aggression by the Soviet Union 
or conflict within the Persian Gulf which, despite its 
tranquillity in 1977, was inherently unstable. Depending in 
an emergency principally (at least at first) on the Navy to 
carry out its strategic policy for the Persian Gulf-Indian 
Ocean area, the US might need to employ naval forces in larger 
number than an arms control agreement would permit. A narrow 
agreement, on however "equal” terms, governing naval or at 
most maritime deployments might prevent America from "surging” 
more forces and would curtail the operational flexibility of 
those forces allowed.
19 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, p. 30. For a 
general analysis of Indian Ocean arms control from a military 
perspective, see Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn, Naval 
Race Or Arms Control In The Indian Ocean? (Some Problems in 
Negotiating Naval Limitations) Agenda Paper No. 8 (New York: 
National Strategy Information Center, 1978).
20 See United States, Congress, Senate, Committee On Armed 
Services, Department Of Defense Authorization For 
Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1981. Hearings On S. 2294. 
pt. 1., 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, p. 443.
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A potential case in point was a Soviet attack into Iran 
in order to seize its oilfields. Although quite remote that 
contingency was given greater prominence by two US government 
analyses. A CIA report in April 1977 on Soviet oil production 
by the middle 1980s concluded that the USSR would not be able 
to meet the domestic and international demands for its oil 
with its own supplies. Presidential Review Memorandum 10 
(PRM-10) "identified the military domain as the one in which 
the Soviets were making the greatest strides ... and also 
identified the Persian Gulf as a vulnerable and vital region, 
to which greater military concern ought to be given.*'21 From 
PRM-10 followed Presidential Directive 18 in August 1977 which 
called for maintaining a "deployment force of light divisions 
with strategic mobility" which, along with "moderate" naval 
and tactical air forces, could meet contingencies in the 
Persian Gulf, Korea and elsewhere.22 But that force was not 
then organized and land-based forces in the US did not have 
the mobility to reach the Persian Gulf quickly in response to 
a Soviet attack or to a crisis at the regional level.* The 
United States' only readily available and reliable power 
"projection" capability was the Navy, which could sustain a 
high tempo of combat operations only with at least two 
aircraft carrier task groups. An arms control agreement which 
confined the US to one aircraft carrier task group but did not 
restrict the USSR's land-based forces would hinder seriously 
America's initial ability to deal with a Soviet attack or 
regional aggression against a friend of the US.
An arms control agreement which reduced Soviet and 
American forces in the Indian Ocean could compromise the 
United States' political and symbolic naval counter in
Implicit in the requirement for a "rapid deployment force" 
was the recognition that the US Navy alone would be 
insufficient for managing a major crisis or conflict.
21 Brzezinski, Power And Principle, p. 177.
22 Idem.
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peacetime to land-based forces in the USSR and if it banned 
nuclear-capable aircraft carriers, it would diminish US 
deterrence against potential Soviet aggression. An agreement 
might enable home-based Soviet forces to exert more influence 
in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area. At the regional level 
a reduction agreement would weaken America's capability to 
display and signal and to help friends deter the land-based 
forces of potential foes. (A stabilization agreement would do 
so too, by preventing the US from increasing its regional 
force presence.) America's negotiation of an arms control 
agreement, the JCS feared, might be interpreted by Persian 
Gulf-Indian Ocean states as evidence of American weakness, 
indifference and passivity, as a further symptom of its post- 
Vietnam decline and as a convenient way to manage the 
withdrawal of the US presence from the area. Negotiations 
might thus be perceived to show the diminished importance of 
friendly states' security and stability to the US and a 
reduced American commitment and resolve to play a role in 
regional affairs. As a result a distancing from the US by its 
friends, greater regional instability and more active 
involvement by the USSR, if not also more regional 
accommodation to it, would jeopardize US interests and 
influence. The US military were aware that an Indian Ocean 
arms control agreement could set a precedent which the Soviets 
might use in order to try to curb America's strategic presence 
in other regions.
The JCS were anxious as well about more concrete matters. 
They were concerned, for example, that long-range aircraft 
with maritime applications based in the USSR would not be 
subject to an agreement. The JCS wanted to prevent the basing 
of Soviet strike aircraft in littoral states yet at the same 
time they were wary about fixing limits on potential American 
land-based strike aircraft deployments to the area: they were 
not certain how much air power might be needed, whether as a 
complement to the Navy in a crisis or as a partial substitute 
for it in peacetime. The Navy supposed that the Soviets would
202
try to negotiate at least a reduction of its use of Diego 
Garcia and other facilities in order to minimize America's 
capacity to support operations and it opposed restrictions on 
construction of facilities. Restrictions would favour the 
Soviets because they did not rely on extensive shore support. 
Also a bargain equating Berbera with Diego Garcia was risky: 
Diego Garcia was politically secure; Berbera was not. If 
under the terms of an agreement the USSR lost access to 
Berbera, the US might be obliged to curtail its use of Diego 
Garcia. At the technical level the asymmetry between the two 
sides' respective presence and consequent difficulties such as 
of definition, measurement, comparability and verification 
made the JCS sceptical about the possibility of reaching and 
implementing an arms control agreement which imposed equal 
restrictions on both sides. An agreement might well require 
America to give up more and get less than the USSR, in the 
view of the military, according to whom the armed forces were 
being undervalued as a necessary part of America's ability to 
protect its interests.
The Soviet Union 
Avoiding an arms race with America, reducing as much as 
possible, if not eliminating the US military presence and, 
above all, preventing (further) deployment of weapons systems 
capable of launching a nuclear attack against it were the 
Soviet Union's general objectives for arms control in the 
Indian Ocean area. Those objectives derived from a political, 
ideological and strategic analysis which recognised the 
importance of the size, many states, large population and 
immense natural resources, particularly oil, of the area. The 
Indian Ocean's sea lanes linked Europe, the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean with Asia and the Pacific. They were vital to 
the USSR, which was "compelled" to use the Indian Ocean for 
military and commercial movement between its European and East 
Asian territory. Since World War II many littoral states had 
gained independence from the imperialist powers and the Indian 
Ocean basin had become an autonomous political, economic and
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strategic region. The national liberation movement had become 
a "determining factor" there,23 making it the heart of the 
Third World, of the "national liberaton zone" of new states 
engaged in progressive social and economic development. Yet 
many of those countries were incorporated in the international 
capitalist economy because the West depended on them for oil 
and raw materials and because Western powers kept a military 
presence in the Indian Ocean in order to maintain "neo­
colonialist" domination over them. The American presence in 
the Indian Ocean was not meant to protect sea lanes or to 
counter a fictitious Soviet "threat". The real reasons for US 
military activity were, to exert pressure on the policy of the 
non-aligned countries and the oil-producers by way of 
"stabilizing presence" and to encourage the surviving racist 
and reactionary regimes and assure them of support in 
crises.24 Nor did the USA "exclude further use of military 
force as a 'deterrent' against the national-liberation 
struggle and a safeguard for the interests of American big 
business."25 Moreover the American presence threatened 
directly the security of the USSR itself in the south, with 
the most acute threat coming from ballistic missile-firing 
submarines in the Arabian Sea.
Despite being "under pressure" from the national 
liberation movement, the United States was nonetheless 
intensifying its naval activities in the Indian Ocean and 
creating a "ramified system of military bases ... so that the 
U.S. naval formations can operate more efficiently and ... so
23 B.D. Yashin, "Some American Approaches To Problems Of Peace 
And Security In The Indian Ocean", SSHA: Ekonomika. Politika. 
Ideoloqiva no. 1 (January 1978), translated in United States, 
Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Publications Research 
Service, USSR, no. 70707 (March 1, 1978), p. 32.
24 A typical Soviet view of America's presence in the Indian 
Ocean is expressed by Sergei Vladimirov, "Indian Ocean: 
Dangers And Hopes", New Times, no. 29 (July 1977), pp. 18-20.
25 Yu. Lugovskoi, "Pentagon Activity in the Indian Ocean", 
Soviet Military Review (March 1978), p. 51.
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that the everyday activity - and also the combat activity, 
should hostilities break out - of the Soviet navy is 
complicated in every way possible.1,26 America was forging a 
chain of bases in the Indian Ocean in order to link up with 
those from NATO Europe to Simonstown in South Africa and from 
Japan through Guam island and the Philippines to Australia, 
all of which bases, along with China, served to encircle the 
Soviet Union and intensify the danger to its security. The 
main Indian Ocean bases of the US and its allies consisted of 
North-West Cape and Cockburn Sound in Australia, Manama in the 
Persian Gulf and Masirah nearby and French bases at Djibouti, 
Mayotte (Comoro islands) and Reunion island. America's 
principal base was Diego Garcia, whose role was to •'integrate" 
and reinforce the other US bases in the area. Diego Garcia 
was being expanded in order to support B-52 bombers and 
aircraft carriers which could strike at the USSR with nuclear 
weapons.27 As a springboard for "gunboat diplomacy" and 
intervention, the US and allied system of bases threatened the 
security of the Indian Ocean states and added to regional 
tension.
The USSR's interests in the Indian Ocean comprised the 
security of its southern sea route and of its southern 
territory against potential attack by US ballistic missile 
submarines and all other weapons systems capable of delivering 
nuclear armaments over a medium or long range; supporting 
progressive states and the wider "national liberation" 
movement; and weakening the West's and also China's presence 
and influence. The Soviets sought greater political, economic
26 Yashin, "American Approaches", p. 34.
27 Dimitri Kasatkin, "Imperialist Plans For The Indian Ocean", 
Asia & Africa Today, no. 4 (July-August 1977), pp. 16-18, 
examines the role of bases in Western strategic policy for the 
area.
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and military access28 to the area and they were "sympathetic" 
to a "Zone of Peace", especially if it might lead eventually 
to their proposed (in 1969) Asian collective security system. 
Extending detente to the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area was an 
important interest. Because US forces were a source of 
tension and a threat to regional and Soviet security, detente 
in its military aspect meant arms control as a way to minimize 
the American presence, avoid conflict and lessen the chance of 
nuclear war. Arms control would allow the USSR to maintain a 
balance with US forces at a low level in order to retain 
sufficient ships for deployment and reinforcement in areas of 
higher priority but it would still enable the Soviet Union to 
display a global military capability, to assert parity with 
the United States and to help advance Soviet regional status 
and foreign policy.29
The Soviets' objectives in Indian Ocean arms control 
negotiations with the US were, to prevent an arms race, 
thereby minimizing the danger of a direct military 
confrontation; to bring about the permanent removal from the 
area or prohibition of entry into it of all US nuclear 
weapons-capable systems - SSBNs, B-52 bombers, F-lll fighter- 
bombers and aircraft carriers, whose "dual capable" combat 
aircraft could carry nuclear as well as conventional
28 Vladimirov, "Indian Ocean Dangers", p. 19, repeats the 
standard denial in the middle 1970s that notwithstanding its 
use of Berbera in Somalia, the USSR did
not have and never had military bases in this region, and 
never set up and does not propose to set up stationary 
military installations.... Soviet naval ships ... call 
from time to time at Indian Ocean ports, but only to 
replenish their supplies of food and fresh water or on 
official friendly visits.
29 For background on Indian Ocean arms control from the 
perspective of Soviet naval policy, see Anne Kelly Calhoun and 
Charles Petersen, "Changes in Soviet Naval Policy: Prospects 
for Arms Limitations in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean", 
in Naval Power in Soviet Policy, ed. Paul J. Murphy, Studies 
in Communist Affairs, vol. 2 (n.p.: Published Under the
Auspices Of The United States Air Force, 1978), pp. 233-245.
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munitions; and to obtain the dismantling of Diego Garcia and 
other US and allied bases and to prevent America's acquisition 
or construction of other bases. Eliminating all Western 
military bases was a crucial prerequisite to avoiding an arms 
race and it would in effect deny America the ability to 
introduce land and air forces, whether against regional states 
or the USSR itself. That objective became even more important 
when in summer 1977 the Soviets became aware of the United 
States' decision to create a "rapid deployment force". The 
USSR also wanted at least to reduce the conventional forces of 
the US and its European allies to a level which the Soviet 
Indian Ocean squadron could better counter politically and 
militarily. In the negotiations the USSR would want to pay 
close attention to the superior qualitative characteristics of 
American naval combatants, their tonnage, weaponry, overall 
performance and endurance and their political and symbolic 
impressiveness. It would seek to reduce the comparatively 
larger number of political US port calls while avoiding the 
imposition of lower limits on the relatively larger number of 
logistic port visits which its ships made. Transits by ships 
across the Indian Ocean on inter-fleet transfers were more 
important to the Soviets than to the Americans and Soviet 
ships deployed there for longer periods than did US vessels. 
Thus the USSR would try to gain generous provision for the 
permissible length of time for deployments and for the number 
and duration of transits, which enhanced the display of Soviet 
power.
The fundamental motives of the United States and the 
Soviet Union for engaging in Indian Ocean arms control 
negotiations - to help advance detente and to avoid an arms 
race - seemed very similar on the surface and suggested that 
an agreement on mutually satisfactory terms was possible. But 
differences in the two sides' interpretation of detente and 
their negotiating objectives and marked asymmetries between 
their maritime presences posed thorny bargaining difficulties 
which made a successful outcome to the talks quite uncertain.
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In the Soviet view detente meant continuing the political and 
ideological competition with America while reducing the risk 
of direct military conflict and eliminating "sources of 
military tension" and danger to regional and Soviet security, 
above all US nuclear weapons-carrying forces and Diego Garcia. 
Detente did not exclude forms of military intervention in 
support of a Marxist government. For the US detente meant 
mitigating the super-power rivalry, non-intervention in 
regional affairs and restraint in use of the armed forces in 
support of foreign policy. (Yet, as noted, the proponents of 
arms control perceived it also as a way to give America a 
competitive political advantage over the USSR.) The US sought 
initially a stabilization of the two sides' forces and 
facilities and it was interested in a later phase of 
negotiations which would concentrate on reducing their 
respective forces. But unlike the Soviets the Carter 
administration had not agreed among themselves about what 
America's ultimate bargaining objectives were, because of 
opposition from the military and civilians such as Brzezinski: 
they were reluctant to embark on negotiations which would 
regulate America's relative strength, its naval forces, but 
not the large land-based forces in the southern USSR. In the 
negotiations themselves many complex technical asymmetries 
would have to be dealt with, such as between ship 
capabilities, squadron and task group size and composition, 
length and frequency of deployments, operations and capability 
of land- and sea-based aircraft, transit patterns and logistic 
needs, support practices and availability of basing and 
support facilities.
Arms Control Negotiations 
Round One
The first round of the negotiations took place in Moscow 
from June 22 to June 27, 1977. The leader of the Soviet
delegation was Ambassador L.S. Medelevich and its principal 
military representative was Admiral V.N. Amel'ko. The head of 
the American delegation was Ambassador Paul Warnke; the chief
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military representative was Admiral Thomas Hayward and, in 
subsequent rounds, Admiral Marmaduke Bayne. The purposes of 
the first round for each side were, to set forth its own and 
to probe the other's general negotiating position and 
objectives - to "exchange views on possible steps by the two 
parties which would promote arms limitation in the Indian 
Ocean area" and to gain "a better understanding of the 
parties' position on the problem and of the difference between 
them."30 They agreed that arms control would not affect their 
rights and freedom of action under "the universally 
acknowledged rules of international law relating to the 
freedom of navigation and overflight, the unimpeded conduct of 
commercial navigation and oceanographic and other scientific 
research.... "3l
The Soviets' main objects of negotiation were Diego 
Garcia and the "network" of US military bases in the Indian 
Ocean, strategic nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers.32 
An agreement would have to take into account America's naval 
and air bases in adjacent areas, notably those in the 
Philippines, which supported its operations in the Indian 
Ocean. The bases there of France and Britain were subject to 
negotiation because those states were US allies. Simonstown 
naval base in South Africa was important too. In addition to 
aircraft carriers and other, conventional-only US forces in 
the Indian Ocean, American forces in the Mediterranean (the 
6th Fleet) and in the Pacific (the 7th Fleet) had to be
30 United Nations, General Assembly, Meeting Of The Littoral 
And Hinterland States Of The Indian Ocean Summary Record Of 
The 3rd Meeting (A/AC.199/SR.3), July 9, 1979, p. 9.
' 31 Idem.
32 This paragraph draws partly from Alexei Petrov, "Peace For 
The Indian Ocean", Soviet News (London), July 12, 1977. Rear 
Admiral Robert J. Hanks, USN (Ret.), "The Indian Ocean 
Negotiations: Rocks And Shoals", Strategic Review 6 (Winter 
1978) , implies (p. 26) that the USSR sought "a complete ban on 
submarines in the Indian Ocean", not just on ballistic missile 
submarines.
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reckoned with: they would be crucial to America's ability to 
"surge” forces into the Arabian Sea during a crisis and 
reinforce them. British and French forces had to be included 
in an arms control agreement too. Although America and its 
allies had started an arms race, that had not gone too far and 
it could be stopped. First there must be no deployments by 
aircraft carriers, SSBNs or B-52s. Next there must be no 
foreign bases in the area; established ones such as Diego 
Garcia and the Middle East Force's base at Manama, Bahrain 
must be removed and no new ones built. Then in
solving the question of foreign military bases on these 
lines, the Soviet Union would be ready, together with 
other powers, to look for ways to reduce on a mutual 
basis the military activities of states without 
coastlines in the Indian Ocean and in areas adjacent to 
it.33
The Soviets would not give factual information about 
their presence in the Indian Ocean area, refusing to 
acknowledge, for example, their important use of Berbera.
33 Petrov, "Peace For The Indian Ocean". Alexei G. Arbatov, 
"Arms Limitation And The Situation In The Asian-Pacific and 
Indian Ocean Regions", Asian Survey 24 (November 1984), 1114, 
offers a retrospective outline of the Soviets' bargaining 
position. The first stage of an agreement, in which the 
levels of military presence would be "frozen" or stabilized,
should include the levels of military presence of the 
parties' allies (the 'allies factor') and the 
availability of military bases for the U.S. and its 
allies, including their bases in the region directly 
situated in the Indian Ocean (the 'neighboring areas 
factor'). During the first stage, the parties should 
make a commitment not to send their strategic forces to 
the Indian Ocean and to refrain from creating an 
infrastructure there to support the operation of their 
strategic forces.
The US and the USSR could decide "not to send large naval 
forces to the Indian Ocean, not to hold military maneuvers, 
and not to create new military bases there. No power should 
try to establish its sphere of interest or influence in the 
Indian Ocean." A second stage in the negotiations would 
involve "the gradual and consecutive reduction of military 
activity and liquidation of foreign military bases."
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They interpreted the United States' interests in the area 
narrowly - defence of sea lanes - in order better to justify 
strict limits on permissible US deployments34 and they 
proposed that limits be applied only to warships, not to (the 
relatively more numerous Soviet) logistic and naval-related 
vessels. They proposed too that those limits be determined on 
the basis of the number of "ton-days" each side's naval forces 
could spend in the Indian Ocean annually.* Finally, as part 
of bringing militarily pertinent "adjacent areas" into 
consideration, the Soviets sought to enlarge the United 
Nations' definition of the Indian Ocean. It occupied an 
expanse, according to one Soviet account, from
the southern tip of Africa in the west to Tasmania in the 
east, from the southern approaches to the Suez Canal to 
Torres Strait south of Papua New Guinea, and from the 
mouths of the Tigris and the Euphrates to the Antarctic 
ice-cap. This area includes the Persian Gulf and the Bay 
of Bengal, and the Red, Arabian, Andaman, Timor and 
Arafura seas.35 (Italics added.)
By including the Timor and Arafura seas in its definition of 
the Indian Ocean, the USSR intended to incorporate most, if 
not all of Australia into the Indian Ocean area. In 
consequence the Soviet version of Indian Ocean arms control 
would impose restrictions on Australian military forces, bases
The application of that criterion would allow the Soviets to 
keep more ships in the area longer than America, because US 
aircraft carriers were much heavier than all classes of Soviet 
combatant. An 80,000-ton aircraft carrier deploying for 30 
days would accumulate 2.4 million "ton-days". This number of 
"ton-days" would permit a Soviet cruiser, two destroyers and 
a frigate to deploy for about three months. Depending on at 
how low a level an aggregate the "ton-days" allowance was 
fixed, the US Navy could be forced to cut back severely an 
aircraft carrier's deployment time in order to allow time for 
ships accompanying the aircraft carrier and for surface action 
groups, the Middle East Force and possible crisis responses.
34 This point is adapted from Jack Fuller, "Dateline Diego 
Garcia: Paved-Over Paradise", Foreign Policy, no. 28 (Fall 
1977), p. 186.
35 Vladimirov, "Indian Ocean Dangers", p. 18.
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and activities as well as Australian facilities used by the US 
to support strategic nuclear operations and conventional naval 
operations, notably North-West Cape and Cockburn Sound 
respectively. Australian-American defence cooperation under 
the ANZUS treaty such as joint exercises would be affected 
too.
The US side noted the absence of significant military 
competition between the Americans and the Soviets in the 
Indian Ocean and agreed with the USSR that an arms race ought 
to be avoided. It preferred stabilization of the super­
powers' presences and, later on, their reduction. It rejected 
the Soviets' view of Diego Garcia as a "base”; that would be 
completed and used as planned, which did not include support 
for strategic nuclear submarines or B-52 bombers. Therefore, 
the matter of solving the "bases" issue before reducing 
military forces did not arise. Aircraft carriers would 
continue their usual Indian Ocean deployments and the US 
delegation neither confirmed nor denied the presence of 
nuclear weapons aboard them. Similarly it would neither 
confirm nor deny the operation of SSBNs in the Indian Ocean. 
The US would not discuss the activities and facilities in the 
area of regional states and its European allies. It could not 
negotiate for them; the talks were bilateral only. It was not 
prepared to discuss its bases in the Philippines and it 
rejected the inclusion of Australia within a definition of the 
Indian Ocean area. The ocean itself washed only that state's 
western coast. The US would not negotiate in a way that would 
infringe upon the sovereignty and security of its Australian 
ally.
Stabilization of the Soviet and American presences meant 
to the United States that both parties would not do anything 
which they were not already doing in terms of deploying 
aircraft, ships and submarines and using bases and facilities. 
The US called Berbera a Soviet base and sought to prevent the 
USSR from obtaining further bases or facilities. The American
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side wanted also to stop the possible stationing at Berbera of 
Soviet attack aircraft. It defined broadly the Soviet 
maritime presence in the Indian Ocean, including non- 
combatants such as naval auxiliaries and space event support 
ships as well as fighting ships. Non-combatants and also some 
fishing trawlers had military-related uses such as 
intelligence gathering and monitoring of communications and 
could sometimes be used for political purposes. The Americans 
considered transits through the Indian Ocean as part of the 
USSR's presence in the area and thus subject to negotiation; 
transits must not be manipulated in order to side-step an arms 
control agreement. Submarines were, of course, to be counted; 
the way to verify their compliance with an agreement was a 
difficult problem which would have to be solved. For the 
United States the most satisfactory general measure of naval 
presence was "ship-days": because the Soviets maintained more 
ships in the Indian Ocean for a longer time than did the US, 
an arms control agreement based on an aggregate annual 
allowance of "ship-days” would curtail the Soviet presence 
more than the American presence.
Round Two
The second round of the negotiations was held in 
Washington from September 26 to September 30, 1977. The talks 
"had entered an advanced and practical stage" in which the two 
sides expressed "interest in achieving practical 
results...."36 There had been
a further exchange of views on the approaches to arms 
limitation in the area. Various aspects of the problem 
under consideration had been specified, elements of 
similarity in the positions of the two sides had been 
explored and questions which required a further effort to 
overcome the remaining differences had been clarified.37
36 United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee On The
Indian Ocean, Summary Record Of The 49th Meeting 
(A/AC.159/SR.49), October 10, 1977, p. 3.
37 Idem.
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The American side put forward a draft proposal for an 
agreement which would stabilize at their June 1977 level the 
two parties' military presence, activities and facilities: the 
US and the USSR would not increase the size of their naval and 
air forces or alter significantly their pattern of deployment; 
neither would engage in forward deployment of forces "in a 
fighting mode", that is, neither would maintain more than one 
task group or squadron in the Indian Ocean at any time;* and 
they would not acquire further logistic facilities. The US 
said that it would undertake no further construction at Diego 
Garcia, once current projects were completed, if the USSR 
would agree to a similar restriction on Berbera. An initial 
agreement of five years duration would leave the Americans 
free
to continue our routine pattern of activities. We would 
maintain our Middle East Force and continue our pattern 
of periodic task group deployments to the Indian Ocean. 
Our ships could continue to transit the area and to make 
routine port calls in littoral countries. We would 
maintain our facility on Diego Garcia. Our military 
forces would continue to participate in military 
exercises with our ANZUS and CENTO partners. The 
military forces of our allies would not be limited by the 
agreement.38
Equally the Soviets would be free to use Berbera and to 
continue their operational practices such as port visits, 
training cruises, oceanographic research and submarine 
movements. Among the subjects the agreement would not cover 
were "the deployment of ground forces or the provision of 
military equipment to littoral states. The agreement would 
apply only to United States and Soviet forces...."39 After an 
adequately verifiable agreement had been reached, the US would
That would mean that the USSR would not be allowed to 
introduce an anti-aircraft carrier force, as it had done in 
1971 and 1973, in addition to its usual deployed squadron.
38 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, p. 6.
39 Ibid., p. 7.
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be "prepared to consider mutual reductions in force levels 
during a second phase of the talks".40 The American proposal 
avoided "more precise methods of limiting naval forces” such 
as "ceilings on overall ship tonnage and limits on the length 
of time that fleets could remain in the area" because they 
benefited either the Soviet or the American presence.41
The USSR apparently accepted the American approach of 
first "freezing", then in time reducing both sides' 
presence.42 In their communique at the end of the second 
round the parties mentioned the "possibility of a step-by-step 
implementation of appropriate measures...;" the "initial 
steps should contribute effectively to preventing the build-up 
of arms in the ... area."43 But the Soviet "concession" in 
accepting the US approach was only tactical and temporary: in 
the communique the delegations had also "expressed their 
intention to move promptly in the period of implementation of
40 Idem. An oblique indication of the nature of proposals for 
reductions already considered by the US, if not made by it in 
round two, came from Morarji Desai, then Prime Minister of 
India. He is reported to have alleged in early 1978 that the 
US and the USSR had agreed "on no increase in their bases or 
force levels in the area. It was then to be their objective 
to lessen their presence every year thereafter until it 
disappeared." Lieutenant Commander J.F. Giblin, U.S. Navy, 
Indian Ocean NALT: An Exercise In The Revision Of U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Newport: Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War 
College, June 1979), p. 30. Further, by the time of the 
second round of negotiations, ACDA had contracted for a 
"preliminary comparative assessment of the relative impact on 
the U.S. and Soviet Union of a mutual complete basing denial 
of superpower General Purpose Naval Forces (GPNFs) in the 
Indian Ocean". (Italics added.) See memorandum (Serial 73- 
78) of May 4,1978 from Systems Planning And Analysis, Inc. to 
ACDA on Summary Report for Contract Number AC7WC120. Indian 
Ocean Naval Arms Control Assessment, p. 2.
41 New York Times. September 26, 1977; ---, November 20, 1977.
42 However, according to the New York Times of November 20, 
1977, the Soviets and the Americans had not yet resolved the 
sensitive issues of what changes could be made to existing 
facilities and how free the two sides would be to establish 
facilities at other ports.
43 United Nations, Record Of The 49th Meeting, p. 3.
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such initial steps to further talks on reductions.1,44 Then 
the USSR would press for its substantive objectives.
Round Three
Round three of the US-USSR talks took place in Berne, 
Switzerland from December 6 to December 10, 1977. The Soviet 
side presented proposals for an arms control agreement which 
called for important reductions quite soon after the phase of 
stabilization. Those proposals indicated the Soviets' retreat 
from apparent acceptance of the timing of the US "freeze” 
approach back to their initial negotiating position. Probably 
that retreat was caused by the Somali government's expulsion 
of the Soviets from Berbera and their other Somali facilities 
in November because of their support for Ethiopia in the war 
with Somalia.
Although the State Department later denied that the 
Soviet Union had raised unexpected difficulties leading to a 
”snag" in the negotiations, a TASS report on December 20, 1977 
suggested that the USSR had indeed become less flexible. At 
the negotiations the Soviet delegation had "agreed with a 
stage-by-stage approach..., but did so only to help bring 
closer the USSR-USA positions, since the United States proved 
to be not ready for radical steps in the sphere of military 
detente...."45 The Soviet stand was well-known:
"Daring, radical steps are required to have a 
fundamental solution of the question of consolidating 
peace in the Indian Ocean area —  it is necessary to 
eliminate all foreign military bases there and reduce the 
military presence of the non-coastal states."46
According to American sources the Soviet negotiators now 
insisted that an agreement to stabilize the super-power naval
44 Idem.
45 CIA, FBIS, Soviet Union (December 20, 1977), A9.
46 Idem.
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balance
would have to be coupled with a pledge by both parties to 
reduce their forces significantly in the near future. In 
addition, Moscow is said to have restated that an accord 
would have to ban nuclear-armed vessels - surface ships 
and submarines - from the region.47
Both proposals were unacceptable to the US side: the former 
because although the Carter administration did not oppose 
reductions in principle, negotiations on that matter were 
intended to follow a stabilization agreement; the latter 
because it would not permit America to send aircraft carriers 
into the Indian Ocean.48 On the issue of facilities the 
Soviets wanted the US either to dismantle Diego Garcia or to 
accept an agreement whose provisions would permit them to 
compensate for the lost Somali facilities with ones in South 
Yemen, Ethiopia or both. (The USSR's interest in acquiring 
Indian Ocean facilities was shown before the loss of Berbera 
by its request in summer 1977 to the Maldives for use of Gan 
island, whose air facilities had been vacated by Britain in 
1976. The Maldivan government rejected the Soviet request.) 
Further, the Soviets were reported to want again an agreement 
to govern French and British forces and facilities and to 
include Australia in the definition of the Indian Ocean 
area.49
A month later, on January 18, 1978, an article in Pravda 
intimated a somewhat moderated Soviet bargaining position, one 
which was nearer the US position in that it did not call for 
a quick reduction of the two sides' military presence or for 
the elimination of bases. A
radical approach to the solution of disarmament questions
47 International Herald Tribune. December 20, 1977.
48 Idem.
49 Christian Science Monitor. January 24, 1978.
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always promises greater effectiveness. But if one side 
is not ready for that, then a gradual approach, by stages 
can also be used. This can also prove useful and to a 
certain extent effective. But then it is necessary in 
applying this approach for the sides to agree on real, 
serious steps for the first stage. Consequently, the 
first stage —  the stage of "stabilization,'• "freezing" 
or "mutual restraint" —  must include provisions banning 
the entry into the Indian Ocean and deploying in its 
waters, on its shores and on islands those weapons 
systems which have not been there previously, restricting 
the presence of warships in the ocean and military 
aircraft in its airspace and at airbases to the present 
level, renouncing the construction of new military bases 
there and ending the expansion of existing bases.
the "stabilization" or "freeze" should be the 
beginning of a process leading to a real reduction in the 
level of military activity in the Indian Ocean, 
including, of course, corresponding measures with respect 
to military bases.50
The article might have been intended to communicate that the 
USSR would be somewhat more accommodating in round four, thus 
keeping the US interested in the talks* and mitigating 
criticism by the JCS that the negotiations would give the 
Soviets an advantage over the United States.
Round Four
At the fourth session of the negotiations, held at Berne 
from February 7 to February 17, 1978, the US and the USSR 
delegations "continued to discuss proposals put forward by 
both sides." There had been a "certain measure of agreement 
on a number of questions, including the desirability of a 
staged approach beginning with an agreement not to increase 
current military presence and moving on promptly to
Brzezinski and Brown had lost interest when the Soviets lost 
access to the Somali facilities and could no longer bargain on 
an equal basis.
50 S. Vladimirov, "An Urgent Problem", Pravda, January 18, 1978 
in CIA, FBIS, Soviet Union (January 24, 1978), AA 4.
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negotiations on reductions.1,51 A drafting group had begun 
work on initial joint draft texts of several segments of the 
agreement and two working groups had been established in order 
to examine and resolve technical issues. The discussions were 
characterized as f,frank and useful."
"Frank" referred to the American delegation's expressed 
disapproval of the USSR's provision to Ethiopia of military 
advisers and equipment and its introduction of more than 
10,000 Cuban troops in order to help the Ethiopian war effort 
against Somalia. The US side objected as well to the Soviet 
Indian Ocean squadron's increase from about 18 ships to about 
35 ships in early 1978 and its operations in the Red Sea in 
support of Ethiopian troops fighting against Eritrean 
secessionist forces. The Americans' thinking was that
Soviet naval operations in support of their political 
activities in the Horn [of Africa] called into question 
whether we had a common understanding of how a 
stabilization agreement would actually affect the 
behavior of our two sides. ...[P]olitical competition 
... will continue. But the intention here was to limit 
the degree to which that competition would be supported 
by military activities. For our part, the way the
Soviets supported their political activities in the Horn 
by increasing the level of their naval forces in the 
Indian Ocean was not consistent with a stabilization 
agreement. Unless we understand such an agreement in the 
same way, it would be meaningless.
We have made it absolutely clear to them that any 
agreement we sign will not permit increases in their 
military presence in the Indian Ocean.52
After considering a complete withdrawal from the negotiations, 
US officials "decided to downgrade efforts to achieve an 
agreement."53 That decision marked a "shift" in policy
51 United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee On The 
Indian Ocean, Summary Record Of The 52nd Meeting 
(A/AC.159/SR.52), April 12, 1978, p. 3.
52 U.S. House, Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, p. 7.
53 New York Times. February 10, 1978.
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reflecting
a belief that Congress would be unlikely to approve any 
agreement as long as the Soviet Union continued to play 
an active role in the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. 
Officials said that the downgrading of the negotiations 
was also meant as a signal of the potential adverse 
consequences for Soviet-American relations.54
At the end of the fourth round the US delegation declined to 
arrange a date for a fifth round. Although the Soviet naval 
force increase was the immediate reason for America's 
postponement of the talks, the USSR's wider military 
intervention in the Horn war was the main cause. The Soviet 
role there raised, in the US view, a "key dilemma”: "the
inability of an essentially naval agreement to deal with the 
more basic issues of regional intervention by other military 
or non-military means."55
The "useful" character of round four alluded to a degree 
of progress reportedly made by the two working groups 
established to resolve technical problems rooted in the 
asymmetry between the structure, level and pattern of the 
Soviet and the American presence.56 But problems still 
exceeded progress. Two of the most important ones were how to 
reach a common definition of "Indian Ocean", "presence", 
"stability", "strategic", "base" and "transit" and how to 
achieve balanced, comparable limits on the two sides' forces 
and facilities. The USSR accepted that only the western coast 
of Australia was part of the Indian Ocean but it did not agree 
with the US about the delimitation of the hinterland of the 
Indian Ocean area, which definition would govern the 
emplacement of Soviet land-based strike aircraft. Rejecting 
the Soviet proposal for excluding from the Indian Ocean
54 Idem.
55 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 69.
56 This paragraph draws in part from interviews with current 
and former US government officials.
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aircraft carriers because they were part of US strategic 
forces, the Americans sought to work out how limits on 
aircraft carrier deployments could be translated into equal 
limits on Soviet forces, which did not include aircraft 
carriers. There was contention between the two sides about 
the distinctions between a "base" and a "facility". The 
definition of a "base" hinged on how much access to a port and 
use of it a side enjoyed and on the kind and quality of 
facilities a port had to possess in order to make it a "base". 
There was difficulty in distinguishing between a port call and 
a semi-permanent base57 for the support of operational units. 
As in round three, the American delegation stated that the US 
would proceed with the expansion of Diego Garcia but it did 
not intend an agreement to prevent the Soviets from obtaining 
facilities compensating for those they had lost in Somalia. 
Questions quickly arose, however, about the acceptable number, 
type and use of those compensatory facilities and their 
comparability with Diego Garcia and the Middle East Force's 
use of facilities in Bahrain.
Among the differences between the two sides concerning 
"presence" was the definition of combatants. The Soviets 
wanted to limit all vessels with guns: American naval
auxiliaries had guns; Soviet auxiliaries did not. The US 
wanted to count warships and submarines, including towed 
vessels, transiting the Indian Ocean. It wanted to take into 
account as well Soviet naval-related but non-auxiliary ships 
such as elements of the Soviet merchant marine which were part 
of the wider Soviet maritime military organization and which 
reflected the relatively greater Soviet dependence on afloat 
support. The Americans sought to determine what was an 
acceptable time for a transit before it became a presence. 
Sensitive about the USSR's possible use for political 
advantage of lengthy transits as quasi-deployments, they 
rejected a Soviet proposal for an allowance of 90 days for
57 Los Angeles Times. February 5, 1978.
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transiting the Indian Ocean. By the fourth round of the 
negotiations the US and the USSR had only begun to consider a 
formula for the measurement of "presence”, which was necessary 
as a reference point for a stabilization agreement. That such 
a formula would consist of a compromise involving a 
combination of "ship-days” and "ton-days” was easy to 
recognise but complex to elaborate satisfactorily. Also, 
submarine verification remained a difficulty: neither party 
wished to divulge information about its submarine movements. 
It was reported that flights over the Indian Ocean by patrol 
aircraft and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons 
"would be subject to control”58 but how to achieve equivalence 
on this point was not clear. Did it mean no B-52 or F-lll 
deployments in return for no deployments of Soviet "Backfire" 
strike bombers and other land-based strike aircraft, when none 
of the Soviet aircraft had a potential strategic nuclear role 
to perform? The Americans did not know what limits they 
wanted to place on the Soviets' land-based strike aircraft 
because they still had not thought through how the US itself 
might want to use such aircraft in the future.
By the end of the fourth round of negotiations the US and 
the USSR had concurred that an agreement would be bilateral, 
last five years and stabilize the two sides' respective air 
and naval presence at their level in spring 1977.59 An 
agreement would prevent either state from increasing the level 
of its naval presence or changing the pattern of deployments. 
Naval ships, logistic facilities and land-based strike 
aircraft would be subject to control but commercial vessels, 
the deployment of ground forces, the provision of military 
equipment to littoral states, the forces of allies and 
political and economic competition would not be covered. The 
two sides had come to terms about a general framework for an
58 Idem.
59 This paragraph derives mainly from U.S. House, Indian Ocean 
Limitation Report, p. 4.
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agreement; an escape provision which would permit the two 
parties to withdraw legally from an agreement in the event of 
a major crisis or a change of circumstances which jeopardized 
"supreme” national interests;60 and about a provision that 
there would be subsequent consultations on the implementation 
of the agreement and negotiations leading to mutual force 
reductions. But after the fourth round many major issues 
remained unresolved: the definition of the Indian Ocean, the 
scope of each side's current activities and force level, 
methods to measure military presence - no specific proposals 
on numbers and types of ships had been formally exchanged - 
and the number and type of facilities available to the two 
sides and their use of them. Also unresolved was the matter 
of strategic systems: the USSR wanted a provision for their 
prohibition from the Indian Ocean while the US insisted that 
they be left out of an agreement.61 Even the two sides'
60 According to Haass, "Arms Control at Sea”, "an allowance for 
surges was raised with the Soviets . .. but no agreement was 
reached.” fn. 28, p. 247.
61 India. The United States And The Indian Ocean Report Of The
Indo-American Task Force On The Indian Ocean (Washington,
D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, New
Delhi: The Institute Of Defense Studies And Analysis, 1985) 
points out that "the draft agreement would have prohibited 
both sides from altering 'significantly past patterns and 
levels of military deployments' in the region, acquiring new 
bases and expanding then existing facilities.” (p. 95.) Thus 
"since neither side had previously deployed strategic bomber 
aircraft in the region, neither could introduce such 
deployment." (p. 95.) But although the draft agreement
stipulated that "neither side had previously established in 
the Indian Ocean 'facilities dedicated to supporting forward 
deployed submarines' and contained an explicit pledge that 
neither would introduce such facilities in the future", it
did not cover operations by submarines relying on bases 
or support facilities located outside of the Indian 
Ocean.... This would have permitted dual-capable attack
submarines to operate in the Indian Ocean, American and
Soviet alike, and would not have precluded U.S. 
deployments of nuclear missile-firing submarines.
(p. 101.)
Here "the bargain was going to be that the U.S. would give 
some assurances on strategic deployments to the Soviets, and
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agreement that an initial accord would stabilize their 
presences concealed a formidable bargaining difficulty. The 
Soviets made their acceptance of an initial agreement 
conditional on US acceptance of their objectives for 
reductions which were incompatible with America's objective of 
stabilization (and perhaps reductions later on), about which 
it was not prepared to compromise.
Eclipse of Negotiations 
In April 1978 Vance pointed out that the Indian Ocean 
negotiations had only been postponed and would be resumed. 
But resumption was prevented by important new developments and 
their consequences which led to a change of emphasis in US 
strategic policy away from arms control. First, in 1978 the 
opinion began to prevail in the US government that the Soviet 
Union was not observing (America's version of) the "code" of 
detente. By continuing to interfere in Africa - intervention 
in the Horn, alleged support for an attack by Katangan rebels 
into Zaire from Angola and military assistance to the 
Patriotic Front guerrilla forces in Rhodesia, the USSR was 
showing unwillingness to moderate the competition with the US. 
At home it was repressing dissidents and its military "build­
up" was proceeding unabated. Dwindling tolerance of the USSR 
and growing doubt about detente within Congress and the 
Executive branch led to increasing opposition to SALT II and, 
by association, to other initiatives to regulate arms. That 
opposition generated division among proponents of arms control
the Soviets in turn would provide some assurances about land- 
based aircraft in the region.” (p. 97.) But the USSR viewed 
aircraft carriers as strategic systems and was not prepared to 
restrict deployments of land-based aircraft, which might be 
needed against aircraft carriers, unless the US curbed its 
aircraft carrier deployments. The US, on the other hand, "was 
reluctant to accept limits on its carrier deployments in the 
absence of restrictions on Soviet land-based aircraft 
capabilities." (p. 105.) The super-powers disagreed also
about "how to define the geographic boundaries of the Indian 
Ocean in such a way as to permit the U.S. to continue to use 
its bases in Western Australia for communication and other 
support of naval units, including submarines, and to upgrade 
and expand these bases as desired." (p. 96.)
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which weakened their advocacy of the Indian Ocean 
negotiations. Some sought a renewal of the talks when in June
1978 the size of the Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean 
returned to its "normal", lower level as of spring 1977. On 
the other hand a more influential group decided to abandon the 
negotiations in order better to concentrate on the highest 
priority: completing the SALT II treaty and gaining its 
approval by Congress.
Second, the relative stability of the Persian Gulf was an 
essential condition for resuming the negotiations but in light 
of growing unrest in Iran, the US rejected the USSR's request 
in September 1978 to reconvene them. And when the Shah of 
Iran fell from power in January 1979, all realistic prospects 
for Indian Ocean arms control ended. By then the National 
Security Council and the Department of Defence had begun to 
devise a larger, more direct and active American military role 
in upholding Persian Gulf security. Soon, in summer 1979, the 
Executive branch decided as a matter of policy to increase the 
US naval presence in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area and to 
expand further the facilities at Diego Garcia. In December
1979 the US took initial steps to acquire access to regional 
military facilities in order to support the enlarged American 
naval presence and potential contingency operations by the 
"rapid deployment force". By that time two US aircraft 
carrier task groups were on station in the Arabian Sea in 
response to the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 
November, and their deployment was made continuous after the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Their presence and the 
deployment of six other task groups during the previous year, 
not in response to a Soviet naval force increase but in order 
to signal America's greater concern for regional security and 
resolve to protect its interests, greatly exceeded the three 
cruises a year allowed by the arms stabilization concept. Its 
much enhanced naval presence was the most concrete indication 
that the United States had abandoned arms control for the 
Indian Ocean area.
225
The Arms Control Negotiations
The Indian Ocean arms control negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union began in June 1977, when 
the likelihood of a naval arms race was negligible. Both 
sides were already practising de facto arms control and they 
were exercising "tacit restraint" because they realized that 
introducing more naval forces into the Indian Ocean area 
served no purpose in the then relatively stable conditions. 
Reaching an arms control agreement seemed feasible, even if 
one did not appear to be necessary. On the US side necessity 
was bestowed on arms control by its proponents in the Carter 
administration who were deeply reluctant to use the armed 
forces. A naval presence, they felt, had low utility for 
supporting US security policy in the Indian Ocean other than 
for counterbalancing the Soviet naval squadron. Preventing an 
increase in the super-powers' naval presences and in time 
negotiating their reduction would bring more benefit to US 
security policy for the Indian Ocean area than routine display 
by the US Navy. Nor would an arms control agreement 
critically impair America's maritime capability to respond to 
crises. An agreement would provide a stronger, more formal 
barrier to a possible arms race than would "tacit restraint".
Apart from an initial stabilization of the Soviet and the 
American forces and facilities, the US had not thought 
through what its negotiating objectives were. Stabilization 
was a compromise between arms control advocates and the US 
armed services and some civilian officials who opposed arms 
reductions, indeed the negotiations themselves. At bottom 
opponents thought that because the US depended more on its 
maritime forces than did the USSR in the Indian Ocean area, an 
agreement would impose more disadvantage and restraint on 
America than on the Soviet Union. Negotiations widened to 
encompass the USSR's strength, its geographically proximate 
land-based forces in the southern USSR, would not be 
acceptable to it.
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Even had the clashing Soviet and American negotiating 
objectives been reconciled, serious technical difficulties 
overcome and an "equal" bargain made, an arms control 
agreement would have been of narrow relevance and uncertain 
efficacy. As the escape clause in the draft agreement 
suggested, neither side was prepared to accept an agreement 
inhibiting its capacity to respond to threats to its vital 
interests with a higher level of naval forces, even though 
that response might cause an arms race. ("Vital" could be 
interpreted broadly.) An agreement which stabilized forces 
already adequate to deal with minor threats tended to be 
superfluous. Of course that might not be so: if several minor 
crises occurred within a year, the US would be "compelled" not 
to respond perhaps to one of them in order to keep within its 
annual quota of three deployments by 7th Fleet forces. But if 
the US or the USSR did breach an arms control agreement at a 
low level, that violation would be the least likely to evoke 
a response by the other party. The case for an agreement 
implicitly had to postulate an intermediate range of interests 
and potential threats to them which were more than a party's 
routine naval forces could cope with. Here the Americans and 
the Soviets would have had to be willing to forgo increasing 
their naval presence because the advantages of observing an 
agreement - avoidance of a possible substantial long-term 
force increase by the other side and the moral and political 
approval by the Indian Ocean states - would still be perceived 
as greater than the interests at stake. On an occasion when 
one side's apparently less than vital interests were involved, 
the war in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78, the USSR's naval 
force increase indicated that it might not always be willing 
to exercise the restraint required by an arms control 
agreement. More restrained behaviour by the US if its 
intermediate interests were challenged would be questionable 
too.
America's willingness to be bound by an arms 
stabilization agreement or to reach an agreement which reduced
the two sides' maritime forces and facilities was never 
established. It postponed the negotiations initially because 
it objected to the Soviets' intervention in the Horn war and 
their simultaneous naval force increase in the Red Sea. But 
more importantly, as security and stability in the Persian 
Gulf began to decline from late 1978, the US assumed that 
increased naval display would make a more valuable 
contribution to achieving its security objectives at the 
regional level than would preventing a potential maritime arms 
race with the USSR. Why and how the United States modified 
its strategic policy in response to changing conditions in the 
Gulf will be discussed in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MAJOR MODIFICATION OF POLICY, 1979
In 1979 the United States adjusted its strategic policy 
for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area from minor naval 
display to increased display and more direct and active 
deterrence against the Soviet Union. It was prepared also to 
deter Iraq more actively, if still tacitly, by the latter half 
of 1979, when intervention in the Persian Gulf in order to 
"protect” access to oil in the event of "turbulence” within 
(friendly) states became an acceptable policy option. The 
modification of policy was a response to deteriorating 
security and stability in the Gulf after the Iranian 
revolution and fall of the Shah and to the view, held chiefly 
by Brzezinski, that the USSR was becoming stronger, more 
adventurist and influential and was prepared to exploit 
regional instability at the West's expense. As part of 
signalling greater concern for its interests, reassuring 
friends that it was a dependable security actor and countering 
the Soviets politically as well as deterring potential 
aggression by them, America enlarged its naval presence in the 
Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, planned to approximate a 
land-based force presence in South-West Asia, began to 
organize a "rapid deployment force", decided to expand further 
Diego Garcia and made initial arrangements to gain access to 
military facilities in Oman, Somalia and Kenya. The United 
States' modified strategic policy was weakened by the 
unwillingness of friendly Gulf states, except Oman from 
December 1979, for political reasons to cooperate with it and 
provide access to their military facilities and by its slight 
readily available combat and logistic capability.
This chapter examines first the setting in 1979-1980* of 
America's policy revision and the initial adjustment of its
For continuity of analysis the setting in 1979-1980 of the 
policy modification process is discussed in this chapter. 
That incremental process, not completed when the Carter
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strategic policy for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area 
and the security policy governing it. Next it investigates 
the origin and early conceptual development of the "rapid 
deployment force" and surveys the debate within the Executive 
branch of the US government about the armed forces7 role and 
value in contributing to America's regional security policy. 
After discussing the Carter administration's policy decisions 
in summer 1979 and the "rapid deployment force" concept it 
created, the chapter concludes by noting why, in response to 
the "hostage crisis", America became more willing to use the 
armed forces and by outlining its additional strategic policy 
decisions in late autumn 1979.
The Setting of Policy Revision 
America, and its European allies and Japan to a critical 
extent, depended on oil from the Persian Gulf which had become 
less stable and less easily able to manage its security after 
the Iranian revolution and fall of the Shah in January 1979.1 
Whether by "turbulence" within the Gulf states or by conflict 
between them as in the case of the Iran-Iraq war beginning in 
September 1980, the possibility had increased that the flow of 
oil to the West would be interrupted and cause serious 
economic disruption. In the Gulf America's political position 
and influence declined markedly in 1979-1980. Of the three 
major Gulf states, its relations with Iraq and now Iran, 
particularly after the seizure of the US embassy staff in 
Tehran in November 1979, were unfriendly. And Saudi Arabia
administration left office in January 1981, was lengthy and 
complex and in order to avoid unwieldiness of presentation, 
the analysis of policy is divided between this and the next 
chapter.
1 Two useful sources which discuss the momentous events of 
1979-1980, and from which this section draws, are Strategic 
Survey for 1979 and 1980-81 (London: International Institute 
For Strategic Studies, 1980, 1981); Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, 
Daniel Dishon, eds., Middle East Contemporary Survey vol. 3, 
1978-1979; vol. 4, 1979-1980; vol. 5, 1980-1981. The Shiloah 
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv 
University (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1980, 1981, 
1982) .
230
considered conspicuous and closer association with the US to 
be a liability because it had sponsored the politically 
unacceptable Camp David accords (September 1978) and peace 
treaty (March 1979) between Egypt and Israel. The ensuing 
diplomatic isolation of Egypt and limitation of the Saudis' 
freedom of political action undercut the moderating influence 
in the Middle East of the United States' two main Arab 
friends. As a result of the above developments, America's 
Gulf security policy founded on the Nixon Doctrine collapsed 
and the political basis for a modified security policy was 
weak. As the Gulf, above all Iran, became less stable, the 
Soviet Union seemed to pose a greater threat to it. The 
USSR's military intervention in Afghanistan from December 1979 
reinforced America's concern that by its nearby military 
presence or by force of arms if it occupied Iran, the Soviet 
Union might come to exert immense influence over the Persian 
Gulf states, their oil and Western security.
The Iranian Revolution
In Iran the revolution starting in 1978 led to the 
overthrow of Shah Muhammad Riza Pahlavi in January 1979, to 
the weakening of the central government and to continuous 
instability as political and religous factions struggled for 
power and to define the direction of the revolution. While 
the armed forces disintegrated, national minorities, notably 
the Kurds, sought to increase their autonomy. The economy 
deteriorated to the point of collapse because sharply 
curtailed oil production resulted in heavy loss of national 
income.
Besides becoming a prominent, if not the paramount factor 
in Iran's domestic politics, Shia Islam transformed its 
foreign policy.2 The pursuit of objectives derived from
2 On the regional and international consequences of the Iranian 
revolution and the setting of Persian Gulf security in 1979- 
1980, consult Shahram Chubin, "Repercussions of the Crisis in 
Iran", Survival 21 (May-June 1979), 98-106; Valerie York, The 
Gulf in the 1980s Chatham House Papers No. 6 (London: Royal
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secular nationalism and raison d'etat gave way to a commitment 
by Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Shias, and 
his mullahs to unifying the Islamic world and asserting its 
independence from East and West. The overthrow of Iraq and 
the other Sunni governments in the Persian Gulf was called for 
because they had failed to obey Islamic law and the 
monarchical basis (exept for Iraq) of their rule was not 
legitimate. Further they had denied their Shia population its 
political, economic and social rights and they were dominated 
by America. More mundanely Iran declared its non-alignment in 
international politics. It withdrew from the Central Treaty 
Organization and in effect repudiated its bilateral security 
agreements with America and the Soviet Union. It disavowed 
its role as the main guarantor of Persian Gulf security and 
reduced its security perimeter to its frontiers and 
territorial waters: Iranian troops withdrew from Oman and the 
navy ceased to patrol the Strait of Hormuz and the sea lanes 
of the Gulf.
From the vantage point of the Gulf Arab states, the 
Iranian revolution transformed their neighbour from a source 
of stability to one of threat and insecurity. It exacerbated 
tensions within those states because the Shias in Iraq and
Institute of International Affairs, 1980);-- , "Security in
the Gulf: a strategy of pre-emption”, The World Today 36 (July 
1980), 239-250; Eilts, “Security Considerations in the Persian 
Gulf", pp. 79-113; Marvin Zonis, "Exporting The Iranian 
Revolution: United States Security In The Persian Gulf",
prepared statement in U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. 
pp. 123-134; Amirsadeghi, The Security Of The Persian Gulf: 
Shahram Chubin, ed., Domestic Political Factors Security in 
the Persian Gulf 1 (Farnborough, Hampshire: Published for the 
International Institute For Strategic Studies by Gower, 1981); 
Robert Litwak, Sources of Inter-State Conflict Security in 
the Persian Gulf 2 (Montclair, New Jersey: Published for The 
International Institute For Strategic Studies by Allanheld, 
Osmun, 1981); Avi Plascov, Modernization. Political 
Development and Stability Security in the Persian Gulf 3 
(Aldershot, Hants.: Published for The International Institute 
For Strategic Studies by Gower, 1982); Shahram Chubin, The 
Role of Outside Powers Security in the Persian Gulf 4 
(Totowa, New Jersey: Published for The International Institute 
For Strategic Studies by Allanheld, Osmun, 1982).
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Bahrain, where they were a majority, and in Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia were incited by Iranian clerics to demonstrate and riot 
in protest against their position inferior to the Sunnis. The 
revolution heightened uncertainty about the resilience and 
stability of societies in transition to "modernity” because it 
showed that political unrest generated by modernization could 
undermine the authority of the conservative Gulf rulers if 
they did not respond astutely to demands for change. On the 
other hand the seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca in 
November 1979 by Muslim extremists suggested the necessity to 
accommodate to change carefully, within an Islamic context.
The Iranian revolution also altered the balance of power 
and pattern of relations among the Gulf states. It dissolved 
the informal association between the Saudi and Iranian 
monarchies intended to curb the influence of republican, 
socialist Iraq and prompted an improvement in relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Saudis had neither the 
inclination nor resources to take on greater responsibility 
for Gulf security and because Iraq was now more powerful than 
Iran and Iran was more a threat than Iraq, caution required 
them discreetly to increase collaboration with the Iraqis, for 
instance by exchanging information about internal security. 
Most explosively the Iranian revolution shattered the detente 
between Iran and Iraq and reactivated the complex historical 
conflict between them. Having become the strongest regional 
military power, Iraq intended to assert its primacy not only 
in the Gulf but also, after the unacceptable "separate" peace 
between Egypt and Israel, in the wider Arab world. From the 
middle of 1979, friction between Iraq and Iran grew steadily 
as each tried to undermine the other. By summer 1980 Iraq had 
decided to attack Iran, intending to induce the collapse of 
its cleric-dominated regime and to establish Iraqi regional 
paramountcy. The danger to the other Gulf states from the 
Iraq-Iran war, which would last for almost eight years, was 
that they might be caught up in the conflict: the Iraqis would 
make heavy demands for their political and financial support
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and the Iranians would threaten reprisals, bombing their oil 
installations, attacking their shipping or both if they 
continued to help Iraq.
The principal danger from the Iranian revolution at the 
international level, it was feared in the Gulf, was that 
greater regional instability might draw in more actively the 
super-powers individually and in competition; as a consequence 
the Gulf states' independence might be jeopardized. The USSR 
had intervened in the war in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78 and 
signed a "Friendship” treaty with Ethiopia in November 1978. 
One month later it signed a similar treaty with Afghanistan, 
Marxists having seized power in Kabul in April 1978. A coup 
by the pro-Soviet faction of the Marxist government in South 
Yemen in June 1978 was followed in autumn 1979 by a Soviet- 
South Yemeni "Friendship" treaty. As a result the USSR gained 
access to military facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia. 
Because the Soviets always sought to "safeguard" the security 
of their southern territory as well as to increase their 
influence, they might be tempted to meddle in Iran, for 
instance by helping the communist Tudeh party to seize power. 
As for America it might be more prone to rash military 
intervention in a crisis within a friendly Gulf state in order 
to "protect" the West's access to oil. Military action by the 
leading "imperialist" power and abettor of Israel would be 
much more dangerous than helpful. Conversely America's 
"abandonment" of the Shah when somehow it could have done 
"more" to save him posed acute questions about the relevance 
and value of the US to the conservative Gulf Arab states' 
security, specifically about its means, will and dependability 
to help them, if requested. Already raised by America's 
inaction during the war in the Horn of Africa, their doubts 
about the United States' seriousness and resolve to pursue its 
own interests, much less to protect its "friends" (except 
where the USSR was clearly involved), weakened its influence 
and reputation. The failure of the US attempt in April 1980 
to rescue the US diplomatic hostages in Tehran served to
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reinforce the impression that the US was "ineffective”.
From the US perspective the Iranian revolution was "the 
greatest setback for American interests in the Middle East in 
the post-war era."3 First, Iran was no longer a reliable 
supplier of oil to the West and a lucrative market for Western 
goods and services, not least US arms. Besides leading to a 
doubling of the price of oil in 1979, the revolution 
highlighted the vulnerability of oil production to internal 
political disturbances and intensified the sense that other 
Gulf states were now more fragile and less able to assure 
their stability. As America's European and Japanese allies 
depended heavily on oil from the Gulf, the revolution was an 
acute reminder that a lengthy interruption of a sizable 
fraction of oil production there would trouble the entire 
Western economy. Second, Iran seemed more susceptible, if not 
actually subject to Soviet interference. Thirdly, withdrawal 
from the Central Treaty Organization by Iran and then by 
Turkey, whose political and economic instability was a large 
worry to NATO, and Pakistan, whose indifferent relations with 
America reached a nadir in late 1979, resulted in the formal 
demise of CENTO and the "northern tier" security concept on 
which it had been predicated. By economic and military 
support for and political association with the three "norther 
tier" states contiguous to or near the southern USSR, the US 
had tried to block Soviet political and strategic access to 
the Persian Gulf region. More immediately and importantly 
Iran ceased to be a close US friend which in accord with the 
Nixon Doctrine took primary responsibility for Gulf security 
and thereby protected generally parallel American regional 
interests and enabled the US to avoid an unwanted more direct 
strategic role. Losing Iran's willingness to cooperate with 
it and provide access to its bases in a contingency, America 
suddenly found its capacity to use and support its armed 
forces in the Persian Gulf reduced to a minumum. The collapse
3 Chubin, "Repercussions", p. 101.
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of the Nixon Doctrine induced by the Iranian revolution and 
Iran's sudden change into a threat to regional stability 
compelled the US government to redefine its security policy 
for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area.
The principal outcome of the fall of the Shah for the 
Soviet Union was the serious political and strategic reversal 
to America rather than direct advantages for itself. The 
Soviets could not overlook the passing of a predictable, 
stable (until 1978) regime with which they had maintained 
detente and advantageous economic relations since the middle 
1960s. Although Iran had adjusted its foreign policy in some 
ways happening to favour the USSR, the revolutionary 
"government” in Tehran did not become more compliant to it. 
History, contiguity, nationalism, Islam and strong anti­
communist sentiments made Iran suspicious of the Soviets' 
avowed respect for its independence, as did their 
reaffirmation of articles 5 and 6 of the Soviet-Iranian treaty 
of 1921 which gave them the right of defensive intervention in 
Iran against a third party potentially threatening Soviet 
security. Rather than present dramatic "opportunities” to the 
USSR, instability in Iran required it to exercise caution and 
patience in order to put the two states' relations back on a 
steady footing.
The Egypt-Israel Treaty
As their sponsor the United States viewed the Camp David 
accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as a major stage 
towards a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arabs and 
the creation of an autonomous Palestinian homeland. The 
Middle East "peace process" would prevent a fifth Arab-Israeli 
war and another oil embargo. An informal coalition of Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and, as the Carter administration 
had expected in 1977-78, imperial Iran would provide security 
and stability throughout the Middle East and help to check the 
Soviet Union's involvement there. America's role in regional 
security and its military presence could remain relatively
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limited and inconspicuous. Egypt saw the "peace process" as 
a way to assert its "natural" leading role in the Arab world 
and to negotiate to resolution the outstanding issues between 
the Arabs and the Israelis: the latter's occupation of East 
Jerusalem and other Arab territories and the right of the 
Palestinians to an independent state. Egypt would also avoid 
further costly conflict with Israel, regain the Sinai 
peninsula, consolidate its informal alliance with America and 
obtain aid from it in order to rebuild its economy. The 
Israelis gave up the Sinai peninsula, important for its oil 
and their defence, but they gained diplomatic recognition from 
their most imposing foe and minimized the military threat from 
it. Having secured its southern front, Israel would be better 
able to deter Syria and achieve its security interests in 
Lebanon. The Israelis did not intend to make fundamental 
concessions about Palestinian autonomy or the status of East 
Jerusalem; nor would they change their settlement policy for 
the West Bank, all of which led to an impasse by 1980 in 
negotiations on those topics with Egypt.
Nearly every Arab state and all the Persian Gulf states 
except Oman found the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel 
peace treaty politically unacceptable, opposed them and cut 
diplomatic relations with Egypt.4 The accords and treaty did 
not provide the framework for Israel's withdrawal from the 
Arab lands occupied since the 1967 war, the restoration to 
Arab sovereignty of East Jerusalem or the rights of the 
Palestinians to self-determination. By removing itself as a 
major source of pressure on the Israelis and concluding a 
"separate" peace with them, Egypt had broken unity on the most 
important general issue in Arab politics.
4 For Arab and particularly Saudi views about the "peace 
process" and the implications of those views for America's 
standing in the Persian Gulf, see Wall Street Journal. June
11, 1979;  , December 14, 1979;  , July 17, 1980;
"Prepared Statement Of William B. Quandt" in U.S. House, U.S. 
Gulf Interests 1980. pp. 139-146 and his subsequent testimony.
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The failure of the Camp David approach to deal 
satisfactorily with the Palestinian question threatened to 
compromise the security of the conservative Gulf Arab states 
at both the regional and internal levels. Most of those 
states were host to sizable numbers of Palestinians a possible 
outburst of whose frustration they had to anticipate. 
Especially if it fused with grievances related more directly 
to Islamic issues and modernization, that anger could cause 
widespread domestic unrest and endanger the survival of 
governments and the steady production of oil. Managing 
internal security was linked closely with inter-state Arab 
politics in which the March 1979 treaty had strengthened the 
influence of "radical" states such as Syria and Libya and of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization. Their view now 
predominated that President Sadat had capitulated to 
"imperialist and Zionist diktat" and "betrayed" the Arab 
nation and its interests and in response to that view the 
Saudis broke their informal "alliance of moderates" with Egypt 
and aligned with the "radical" powers in rejecting the Egypt- 
Israel treaty. They did so not only to oppose the treaty in 
their own, more cautious right and to preserve as far as 
possible their moderating influence on the "radicals" but also 
to protect themselves politically. Arab solidarity was the 
best defence against what otherwise would be heavy criticism 
that as a US "pawn" Saudi Arabia was qualifying both Arab 
resistance to the Camp David "peace process" and its Islamic 
legitimacy as the guardian of the Muslim holy places, which 
included Jerusalem. In the future, unrelieved frustration in 
the Arab world about the Palestinian issue could lead to calls 
for another oil embargo of the West as a way to exert pressure 
on Israel to make real concessions. The conservative Gulf 
states could be caught between subversion, terrorism and 
sabotage of their oil installations if they refused to 
cooperate and, on the other hand, Israeli air attacks or 
American military intervention in "protection" of access to 
oil if they did launch another embargo. In either case the 
consequences for their security, stability and independence
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would be dire.
America's sponsorship of the Egypt-Israel treaty strained 
its relations with all the conservative Gulf Arab states 
except Oman. In their view, by mistakenly expecting Saudi 
Arabia and its lower Gulf neighbours to support the treaty, 
America seriously misunderstood their interests and 
predicament. It wanted them to produce oil at a higher level 
than necessary for their needs and to restrain OPEC price 
rises but it did not try genuinely to resolve the Palestinian 
question. The United States had failed to use its leverage on 
the Israelis in order to bring them to conclude the 
comprehensive peace which it had promised in 1978. By 
sustaining the most inflammatory conflict in the Middle East, 
its “peace policy” endangered the conservative Gulf 
governments' rule and contradicted some of its own policy 
objectives. Besides creating an anti-American mood and 
helping to radicalize Arab politics, the "peace policy" gave 
the Soviets a further opportunity to increase their regional 
influence. Generally, the "peace policy" implied, the Arabs' 
outlook and sensitivities were not as important to the US as 
those of Israel and that made conspicuous political 
association with the US much more a risk than a benefit. The 
conservative Gulf Arab states' rejection of America's "peace 
policy" pointed up the differences in threat perception and 
policy priority between them and the US and that difference 
prevented closer security cooperation with it after the fall 
of the Shah. The Gulf states emphasized internal, then 
regional issues of a political character, above all the Arab- 
Israeli conflict and the issue of the Palestinians, as the 
primary threats to their security. For all its efforts to 
resolve the Arab-Israeli impasse, the US identified, 
particularly from 1979, the Soviet Union with its 
"adventurist" tendency and close-by military power as the most 
serious potential threat to the Persian Gulf, if not the most 
immediate threat to it.
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The Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan 
The Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan 
beginning in December 1979 was the first Soviet occupation of 
a state outside the Warsaw Pact since World War II, According 
to the USSR its intervention was intended to defend the 
Marxist regime in Kabul beleaguered by ••counter-revolutionary" 
forces and to ward off "outside aggression" from America, 
China and Pakistan.5 By preventing Afghanistan from becoming 
an "anti-Soviet stronghold" possibly with US bases, the Soviet 
Union had averted a security threat on its southern border. 
The Soviets did not plan to stay permanently in Afghanistan, 
provided a political solution - international acceptance of 
the Karmal* government and normalization of relations with it, 
particularly by its neighbours - was reached. Nor would they 
turn Afghanistan into a "springboard" for military action
Babrak Karmal was the leader installed by the Soviets in late 
December 1979 after they had murdered President Hafizullah 
Amin.
5 This and the following paragraph draw on Georgi A. Arbatov, 
Willem Oltmans, Cold War Or Detente? The Soviet Viewpoint 
(London: Zed Books, 1983), pp. 2-3, 164-197, for the USSR's 
explanation of its intervention in Afghanistan and its 
declining relations with America in 1979. Raymond L. 
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation American-Soviet Relations 
from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1985), pp. 887-965, discusses "Afghanistan: 
Soviet Intervention and the American Reaction, 1979-80". 
Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1984) seeks to explain "Why the Soviets 
Invaded Afghanistan" (pp. 130-147). See also Henry S. 
Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1983). A range of views
about the USSR's policy towards and relations with the Persian 
Gulf states and the broader South-West Asian region around 
1980 is provided by Fred Halliday, Threat From The East? 
(Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1982), rev. ed.; Shahram
Chubin, Soviet Policy Towards Iran And The Gulf. Adelphi 
Paper No. 157 (London: International Institute For Strategic 
Studies, 1980); Adeed Dawisha, Karen Dawisha, eds., The Soviet 
Union In The Middle East (London: Published by Heinemann for 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982); Alvin Z. 
Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey. Iran And Afghanistan
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982); , "Soviet Policy
Toward South and Southwest Asia: Strategic and Political
Aspects", in Rubinstein, ed., The Great Game, pp. 81-114.
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against Iran and Pakistan. That they were trying to obtain 
direct access to Persian Gulf oil and to a "warm water" port 
on the Indian Ocean was "baloney even from a purely military 
viewpoint."6 The USSR would never have chosen Afghanistan and 
its difficult terrain as the way to draw closer to the Gulf 
and the Arabian Sea; a military push to "warm water seas" 
would invite World War III. The denial of an offensive motive 
underlying the intervention was given highest authority by 
Brezhnev in January 1980:
...absolutely false are the allegations that the Soviet 
Union has some kind of expansionist plans with respect to 
Pakistan, Iran or other countries in [South-West Asia]. 
The policy and psychology of colonialists are alien to 
us. We don't covet other people's land and we don't long 
for other people's wealth. It is the colonialists that 
are attracted by the smell of oil.7
An important consideration in the USSR's decision to 
intervene in Afghanistan was that it had "nothing to lose": 
America's foreign and defence policies had already taken a 
change harmful to the Soviet Union and detente. Among the 
actions showing the United States' return to the Cold War were 
the Senate's refusal to ratify the SALT II treaty of June 
1979, the Carter administration's entente with China, its 
decision to make an additional increase in its annual defence 
budgets and to create a "rapid deployment force" and the NATO 
states' decision to increase their annual military budgets and 
to approve the emplacement of US intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles in Europe by 1983. Further, in November 1979 the US 
had sent to the Arabian Sea "a swarm of warships with planes 
and nuclear weapons" which in light of the fall of the Shah 
and the conservative Arabs' rejection of the "peace process" 
signified a dangerous militarization of American foreign 
policy.
6 Arbatov and Oltmans, Soviet Viewpoint, p. 193.
7 From an interview with L.I. Brezhnev in Pravda, January 13, 
1980 in The Current Digest Of The Soviet Press 32 (February 
13, 1980), 3. (Referred to below as CDSP.)
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In America the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
crystallized accumulated public resentment towards the Soviets 
because, it was felt, they had been violating the "code*1 of 
detente at the expense of American influence and prestige8 
since their intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1975-76, 
indeed since the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. And in 
contrast to the United States' self-restraint in the 1970s, 
the USSR continued its "build-up" of strategic and also 
conventional, notably "power projection" forces well above the 
level thought to be necessary for its defence. Within the 
Carter administration the view espoused above all by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski began to prevail that the US had to be more 
vigorous and resolute in countering the Soviet Union's 
aggressive quest for influence; if not opposed more stoutly, 
Soviet "expansionism" in the Third World would undermine 
American and Western security. The Administration's changing 
attitude towards the USSR caused its moral idealism and 
emphasis on the regional dimension of international politics 
to yield primacy as an influence on policy to calculations 
about the balance of power between the USSR and America and to 
the "tighter" linkage of regional politics with the super­
powers' global competition. Detente gave way to confrontation 
and a new emphasis on "containment". Arms control, nuclear
8 For a US government view of the reasons for the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan and its possible ramifications, 
see the testimony by Marshall Shulman, special adviser on 
Soviet affairs to Secretaries of State Vance and Muskie, in 
United States, Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, 
East-West Relations In The Aftermath Of The Soviet Invasion Of 
Afghanistan. Hearings Before The Subcommittee On Europe And 
The Middle East. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, pp. 32-43. For 
unofficial views of the nature, "offensive" or "defensive", 
and significance of the intervention, consult United States, 
Congress, Senate, Committee On The Budget, First Concurrent 
Resolution On The Budget - Fiscal Year 1981. Hearings, vol. 1, 
96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980. Richard P. Cronin, Afghanistan: 
Soviet Invasion And U.S. Response Issue Brief Number IB 
80006, Congressional Research Service, The Library Of Congress 
Date Originated: 01/10/80, Date Updated: 03/26/81; Stuart
Goldman, U.S.-Soviet Relations After Afghanistan Issue Brief 
Number IB 80080, Congressional Research Service, The Library 
Of Congress Date Originated: 08/11/80, Date Updated: 02/20/81 
analyze the state of super-power relations in 1980.
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non-proliferaton and human rights were supplanted in priority 
by issues of security and strategy and by new programmes for 
enhancing the United States' capability for faster and better 
sustained distant military deployment. In contrast to its 
previous passivity, the Carter government was becoming more 
inclined to intervene abroad should the USSR threaten vital 
American interests.
The US perceived Afghanistan as the latest, most serious 
and not necessarily the last instance in a series of Soviet 
interventions in the Third World. The USSR's interventionist 
tendency, its growing military strength, its proximity to the 
weak and unstable Persian Gulf, the expected expanding need 
for oil of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies and its seemingly 
inadequate capacity to supply their need - all these factors 
raised a possibility that America had to take into account: 
even were it a quite unlikely "worst case”, the Soviet Union 
might attack Iran, seize its oil fields and occupy the 
northern side of the Strait of Hormuz, from where it could 
easily interdict oil shipping from the Gulf. Exercising 
predominant influence on the Gulf Arab states and indirect but 
still large influence on Western Europe and Japan, and through 
them America, the Soviet Union could shift the global balance 
of power to its advantage. More concretely, in the US view, 
the USSR's occupation of Afghanistan extended its geopolitical 
position farther around the Persian Gulf region to the 
Pakistani frontier and gave it an ability to conduct combat 
operations throughout South-West Asia and farther out into the 
Indian Ocean. (The USSR's ability to support its naval 
operations in the Arabian Sea had been improved in 1979 when 
it acquired access to naval facilities in Vietnam. This was 
a condition of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship 
signed in November 1978.) The Soviet intervention made even 
worse for America the collapse of imperial Iran as a source of 
security in the Persian Gulf but most of all it pointed up the 
crucial location and importance of Iran which was still a 
national, religious and political "buffer” against the Soviet
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Union. Iran was the state where there was the greatest risk 
of a direct confrontation between the US and the USSR. Both 
had defensive interests there and neither was certain of the 
"rules of behaviour" other than to exercise caution.
In South-West Asia Pakistan, Iran and all the Gulf Arab 
states condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; the 
USSR had sent its armed forces across an international 
boundary and occupied a fellow Muslim state. Already facing 
Indian forces in the east, Pakistan now saw on its north­
western frontier Soviet forces which by raids into its 
territory might try to stop it from supporting the Afghan 
resistance and to exert pressure on it to recognise the Karmal 
regime. Nonetheless the Pakistanis and the Iranians too 
regarded the Soviet intervention primarily as defensive, 
intended to keep a Marxist government in power and Soviet 
influence intact. There was no immediate direct Soviet 
military threat to them. In the Gulf Iraq had been 
apprehensive about the expansion of the Soviet Union's 
presence in South-West Asia since its heavy involvement in the 
Horn war of 1977-78. The USSR's intervention in Afghanistan, 
its "balanced" relations with the Iranian enemy and its 
"Friendship" treaty signed with Iraq's rival, Syria, in 1980 
reminded Baghdad of the limited, strictly expedient nature of 
its own alliance with the Soviets since 1972. Saudi Arabia 
and the other conservative Gulf states interpreted the Soviet 
intervention to be not so much a potential military threat as 
the latest development in the steady expansion of the USSR's 
geopolitical presence and access to military facilities around 
their periphery. The likelier Soviet danger to their security 
was indirect, through attempts by Soviet "proxies", 
particularly South Yemen, to subvert them. The USSR's 
intervention added to the conservative Gulf states' impression 
that the balance of power and influence in South-West Asia 
between the US and the USSR was tending towards the Soviet 
Union. The USSR seemed to be "on the advance" while America 
appeared weak, confused and in retreat. But although the
244
Saudis had become disillusioned and more ambivalent about 
their relations with the United States, they kept their 
political distance from the Soviet Union. Their ties with 
America were still essential in many ways and they continued 
to view the Soviets with deep suspicion and ideological 
aversion.
Initial Modification of Policy 
After the fall of the Shah America's immediate policy 
objectives for the Persian Gulf were to try to limit the 
extensive damage to its relations with Iran caused by the 
revolution and to encourage a stable, secular and moderate 
Iranian republic. The US sought to reassure the conservative 
Gulf Arab states anxious about the new danger to them from 
Iran and uncertain about the nature and credibility of 
America's role in promoting regional security that it would 
play a constructive part. It sought as well to deter military 
action against Iran by the USSR, warning the Soviets to 
respect Iran's independence. Reinforcing President Carter's 
hope expressed in an interview on January 13, 1979 that Iran 
would be "free of any outside domination by the Soviet 
Union",9 the US government's formal statement of policy 
towards Iran after the Shah's departure declared: "... no
outside power should exploit instability in Iran ... for its 
own advantage. The overriding American objective for Iran is 
simply that it should have the freedom to work out its own 
future free from such interference."10 In the Department of 
Defence's annual report issued in late January 1979, Harold 
Brown observed that the Soviets had been "relatively 
restrained and cautious in their policy toward Iran during
9 New York Times. January 17, 1979.
10 From The Present Situation in Iran and its Implications. 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Harold H. Saunders, Assistant 
Secretary of State For Near Eastern And South Asian Affairs, 
in United States, Congress, House, Committee On Foreign 
Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward Iran. January 1979. Hearing Before 
The Subcommittee On Europe And The Middle East. 96th Cong., 
1st sess., 1979, p. 25.
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recent months, particularly as regards direct military 
action.”11 But, he suggested, the "hypothetical contingency" 
of a Soviet military intervention in Iran "could well require 
a U.S. response."12
The politics of the Iranian revolution, the leading 
subject of whose obloquy was the United States, prevented 
improvement in relations between Tehran and Washington. But 
towards reassuring friendly Gulf states about the reliability 
of the US commitment to their security America was able to 
take quick action. In the middle of January 1979, several 
weeks after refraining from sending an aircraft carrier task 
group to the Arabian Sea lest it worsen the political turmoil 
in Iran, reduce even further the Shah's rapidly dwindling 
chances of survival and provoke more active Soviet 
interference there,13 the Carter administration sent, in
11 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1980. p. 106.
12 Ibid., p. 107. In early December 1978, "concerned not only 
by the deteriorating situation in Iran but by signs of growing 
Soviet interest, [Brzezinski had] requested the Defense 
Department to initiate contingency plans for the deployment of 
U.S. forces, if necessary, in southern Iran so as to secure 
the oil fields." Brzezinski, Power And Principle, p. 372.
13 In late December 1978 Brzezinski had tried in vain to 
convince Carter to dispatch the Constellation aircraft carrier 
task group to the Arabian Sea in order to display support for 
friendly Gulf states' security, to allay their fears about 
Soviet regional "advances" and to respond to their complaints 
about insufficient US attention to them and to underline 
America's warning to the USSR not to intervene in Iran. The 
movement of the Constellation from Subic Bay towards the 
Strait of Malacca, in order to be closer to the Arabian Sea if 
ordered to go there, and then the Administration's decision 
not to send it did give an impression of the US as weak and 
indecisive. That decision had been sought by the State 
Department, which had persuaded Carter to turn down an earlier 
proposal, in November 1978, for a strong American show of 
force. The advocate of demonstrating US power had been James 
Schlesinger, a Secretary of Defence under President Ford and 
now Secretary of Energy. He agreed with Brzezinski about the 
geopolitical importance of Iran to the US and the potentially 
very dangerous international consequences should the Shah's 
regime fall, for which reasons they favoured a military 
government, then a military coup in Iran. Schlesinger
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response to a Saudi request, unarmed F-15 fighter aircraft to 
Saudi Arabia on a "demonstration” visit. It had already sent 
a small naval force, without a "provocative" aircraft carrier, 
to maintain a continuous naval presence (October 1978 to June 
1979) and help to signal greater US concern for regional 
security. More importantly, in February 1979 Brown paid the 
first visit by an American Secretary of Defence to Saudi 
Arabia. He presented a personal letter from Carter for King 
Khalid which "'offered to consult more on security issues' and 
was designed to make it clear • • • that the Carter 
administration was seeking a larger role, politicallly and 
militarily, in the Persian Gulf region, especially in view of 
the situation in Iran."14 Brown avowed America's
"'willingness and ability'" to "'provide the extra strength 
needed to meet a foe from outside the region.'"15 Referring 
to the virtual stoppage of Iranian oil production, he 
emphasized the importance of close American ties with Saudi 
Arabia, whose security had become "pivotal" to the US. "In 
the next few months" the American government would take
stressed that it was not only the Shah who was under 
attack in Iran; there was also a direct challenge to the 
United States. He accordingly urged the President to 
demonstrate graphically the American commitment to the 
Shah and thereby discourage other countries - notably the 
Soviet Union and Libya - from meddling in the Iranian 
crisis. He also believed that a convincing show of 
American military power would help bring order back to 
Iran, since it would indicate to the Shah's enemies that 
there were indeed limits to what they could hope to 
achieve, and that demands that the Shah be removed were 
not viewed with favor in Washington.
The Energy Secretary was not talking about a purely 
symbolic act, but arguing that the United States 
undertake to project considerable military force into the 
Persian Gulf, in the form of strengthening American 
forces in places like Diego Garcia, moving aircraft 
carriers into the area, and stationing significant 
numbers of Marines within striking range of Iran. 
[Michael Ledeen & William Lewis, Debacle (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), p. 162.]
14 New York Times. February 12, 1979.
15 New York Times. February 11, 1979.
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concrete steps to defend and arm further the Saudis and other 
friendly Gulf states.16 Arms supplies to North Yemen and 
Sudan would be increased sharply and the delivery of advanced 
fighter aircraft purchased by Saudi Arabia might be 
accelerated. Brown also sought, without success, as shown 
below, to establish the basis for a broad, long-term security 
collaboration with the Saudis.
The most tangible display of America's intention to 
become more actively involved in support of Gulf security came 
in response to an attack into North Yemen in late February 
1979 by Soviet-armed South Yemeni forces. Saudi Arabia became 
alarmed at the possibility of being drawn into the conflict 
and it and the US were anxious about the presence in South 
Yemen of Soviet and Cuban military advisers. By early March 
American military advisers and arms shipments began to arrive 
in North Yemen. The US sent long-range surveillance aircraft 
(AWACS) to Saudi Arabia and dispatched an aircraft carrier 
task group to the Arabian Sea. Those measures were meant to 
help "prevent South Yemen, which the administration sees as a 
client of the Soviet Union, from scoring a military victory 
over North Yemen, a neighbor ... of Saudi Arabia."17 Besides 
showing America's resolve to uphold Saudi security and to 
counter the USSR's involvement in the region, those steps 
represented the beginning of a change of attitude in 
Washington and in Carter himself towards a greater willingness 
to make more active use of the armed forces as an instrument 
of foreign policy. Indeed Carter was "one of the strongest 
proponents of a military response over Yemen...."18 In 
contrast to its abstention from sending an aircraft carrier 
task group to the Indian Ocean during the war in the Horn of 
Africa in 1977-78 (see fn. 27 below), the United States would 
apparently no longer avoid a show and perhaps an actual use of
16 New York Times. February 13, 1979.
17 Washington Post. March 7, 1979.
18 New York Times. March 13, 1979.
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force in order to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf.
In the same interview on January 13, 1979 in which 
he had voiced concern about possible Soviet interference in 
Iran, Carter in effect revoked America's Gulf security policy 
founded on the Nixon Doctrine. He did not view Iran as a 
"policeman” vital to Persian Gulf security: "Well, I am not 
sure the presumption that one nation has to be the policeman 
for a whole area is sound"; one was not needed "in any region 
of the world to maintain order by dominating others on (sic) 
having an overwhelming military force."19 The collapse of 
imperial Iran not only undermined the Nixon Doctrine - 
reliance principally on Iran to protect US regional security 
interests - it also "effectively demolished a decade of U.S. 
strategy in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf"20 premised upon 
it. America was left "strategically naked, with no safety 
net" and "its collection of military assets and bilateral 
relationships ... were largely artifacts of a previous era and 
were bound together by no strategic concept for the protection 
of U.S. regional interests."21 Because there was more 
uncertainty and a greater sense of insecurity in the Gulf 
after the fall of the Shah, because the conservative Gulf Arab 
states did not seem readily able by themselves to compensate 
for their reduced security and because America's interests now 
seemed to be more at risk, enlarging the United States' 
regional security involvement on a long-term basis appeared to 
be necessary. But although the Carter administration agreed 
among themselves that "something should be done" to increase 
that involvement, the State Department and the National 
Security Council and Department of Defence began to "debate 
about the nature and form of the response"22 and particularly
19 New York Times. January 17, 1979.
20 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 70.
21 Idem.
22 Washington Post. January 24, 1980. For the debate, see 
below.
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about the use and utility of America's armed forces for 
protecting US interests. In the case of Iran, the State 
Department probably argued, "internal military power had 
proved ineffective in the hands of the Shah, and external U.S. 
military power irrelevant as the ... revolution proceeded.”23
In contrast to the State Department, too preoccupied with 
negotiations for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty to give 
sufficient attention to revising America's security policy for 
the Persian Gulf, Brzezinski had already identified the 
Soviets as the main threat to the region and begun to advocate 
a larger, more direct and active strategic role there for the 
US. Only America could contribute the extra political, 
economic and military resources needed to check the growing 
power and adventurist tendency of the USSR and help to uphold 
Gulf security. The Soviet Union posed a political more than 
military threat to regional security and to the extent that it 
was military, that threat was more indirect - the use of the 
armed forces for gaining influence or for intimidation or 
indirect intervention - than direct. Brzezinski acknowledged 
that the most imminent threat to the Persian Gulf came from 
within that region and as the Iranian revolution intensified 
in December 1978, he expressed "immediate concern" about 
"regional instability":
An arc of crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian 
Ocean, with fragile social and political structures in a 
region of vital importance to [the US] threatened with 
fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well 
be filled by elements hostile to our values and 
sympathetic to our adversaries.24
Other "key nations in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey, are prone to the same domestic disorders that have
23 Idem.
24 Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. Foreign Policy: A World Review 
Address to the Foreign Policy Association, Washington, D.C., 
December 20, 1978, Official Text International Communication 
Agency, U.S. Embassy, London, December 21, 1978, p. 8.
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struck Iran ...” and the Soviets seemed to be "increasingly 
inclined to exploit these difficulties.1,25 Because it had 
tried to extend detente into the Third World as part of 
reaching a broad accommodation with the Soviet Union and to 
avoid using the armed forces, the Carter administration had 
failed to respond with resolve to the Soviet intervention in 
the Ethiopian-Somali war in 1977-78. America's decision at 
that time not to dispatch an aircraft carrier task group on a 
"show of force" sent the wrong signal to the Soviets, in 
Brzezinski's view. A "show of force" would have convinced 
them that the US was "serious ... that detente should be both 
reciprocal and based on restraint" and that they could not 
"use military force in one part of the world - and yet 
maintain cooperative relations in other areas -”26 without 
endangering detente. The USSR's policy was "indirect 
expansionism" and the United States' passivity during the war 
in the Horn of Africa had "emboldened" the Soviets to be more 
"assertive" and "intrusive" elsewhere. The US government had 
underestimated the "psychological effect" of the Soviet 
intervention in the Horn which, "together with Soviet advances 
in Afghanistan and Southern Yemen, had fed regional fears that 
Moscow was moving to 'encircle' the Gulf."27 Further, the
25 New York Times. Janaury 1, 1979.
26 Brzezinski, Power And Principle, p. 186.
27 New York Times. January 1, 1979. More direct action, a 
"show of force" by an American aircraft carrier task group, 
would have reduced the harmful "psychological effect" on 
friendly states caused by the Soviet and Cuban intervention in 
the Horn war, according to Brzezinski. (All quotations below 
are from Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 182-183, 186.) 
His view then was "that the deployment of an American aircraft 
carrier task force near Ethiopia would send a strong message 
to the Soviets and would provide more tangible backing for our 
strong words" of warning to them "that we did not wish a 
confrontation but that the Soviets were running the risk of 
creating one in a region which was very sensitive to us."
To a great extent our credibility was under scrutiny by 
new, relatively skeptical allies in a region 
strategically important to us. ... [I]f Soviet-sponsored 
Cubans determined the outcome of an Ethiopian-Somali
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combination of Soviet geopolitical '‘momentum” and the end of 
Iran as a stabilizing agent in the Persian Gulf and a 
strategic buffer against the Soviet Union, to which would be 
added in February 1979 the assassination of the American 
ambassador to Afghanistan and the Yemeni conflict, tended to 
strengthen a dangerous impression: "in disarray and retreat", 
"America had lost all capacity to influence regional 
events."28 As a result of losing confidence in the US, the 
major "states of the Persian Gulf would conclude that they 
should accommodate to the rising wave of Soviet influence and
conflict, there could be wider regional and international 
consequences. There would be greater regional
uncertainty and less confidence in the United States.
Because the US was responsible for giving regional powers the 
confidence to "repel" Soviet and Cuban influence, it was 
important that they "not see the United States as passive in 
the face of Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Horn and in 
the potential invasion of Somalia - even if our support was, 
in the final analysis, only for the record." Nonetheless if 
America and also France deployed an aircraft carrier,
it would certainly make the Cubans think twice about 
participating in the invasion of Somalia, while tangibly 
demonstrating our concern and presence. Just placing the 
carrier in the area did not mean that we were going to 
war.
But Vance and Brown opposed sending an aircraft carrier to the 
Arabian or the Red Sea. In fear of being "sucked in" the 
conflict, Vance thought that for America to put its "'prestige 
on the line and to take military steps is a risk we should not 
take.' ... [T]he United States should not put an aircraft 
carrier in the area unless we were prepared to use it" for a 
specific purpose. In Brown's view if Somalia were invaded and 
President Siad Barre overthrown, "it would be viewed as a 
failure of the U.S. task force to do its job, and that failure 
would impair the credibility of such task forces in future 
crises elsewhere - in short, a U.S. bluff would have been 
called." Carter rejected Brzezinski's proposal to send an 
aircraft carrier task group to the Horn of Africa and 
Brzezinski judged his colleagues to be "badly bitten by the 
Vietnam bug and as a consequence [they] are fearful of taking 
the kind of action which is necessary to convey our 
determination and to reassure the concerned countries...."
28 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", pp. 70, 71.
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power before they themselves were swept away.29
The armed forces' contribution to a larger US security 
role in the Persian Gulf region would, in Brzezinski's view, 
be essentially political: increased display and deterrence. 
More display would emphasize tangibly America's very 
important, indeed vital interest in the Persian Gulf and its 
security and it would show US concern about greater 
instability in the region and the USSR's threat to it. More 
display and the preparation of home-based land and air forces 
for distant operations would help to show America's commitment 
to contribute as appropriate to Gulf security, principally 
vis-a-vis the USSR, and the seriousness of that commitment. 
An improved military capability and a revived willingness to 
use it would assist to re-establish America's credibility as 
a major regional security actor and to reassure friendly 
states about US reliability. Measures such the Indian Ocean 
arms control negotiations which suggested that relative to the 
USSR, America was in decline and in retreat strategically and 
was only trying to manage its weakness would be abandoned. By 
signalling America's new resolve to defend its interests by 
recourse to arms if needed, larger regional display and the 
organization of home-based forces would counter more 
vigorously the Soviet Union's political use of its armed 
forces and help to deter their potential more direct uses. 
The more definite probability of a US response would check the 
Soviets' military adventurist tendency.
The modification of America's security policy and 
strategic policy for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area began 
in December 1978 in the National Security Council and the 
Department of Defence when "it became evident that the Shah's 
regime was disintegrating....”30 Brzezinski ordered a series 
of studies by the NSC in order "to identify the elements of a
29 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
30 Ibid., p. 71.
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strategic approach." His initial thinking was that
the Iranian crisis had made a peace agreement between 
Israel and Egypt all the more important and that 
together, the two countries could offer a military and 
political alliance that could substitute for Iran's 
power. 'There is no question that a peace agreement in 
the Middle East is now more urgent in strategic terms.... 
It would bolster the forces of moderation and provide a 
bulwark of moderation against the Soviets.'31
New arms sales to Pakistan, Turkey and Arab countries would 
contribute to their defence. Also, in his "arc of crisis" 
speech in December 1978, Brzezinski had mentioned the United 
States' intention to "develop a more rapidly deployable force" 
better capable of "projecting military power in measured ways" 
for defence of America's "major interests worldwide - as, for 
example, in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or in 
Korea...."32 The United States had to "be able to prevent 
regional instability or conflicts from getting out of hand and 
becoming the causes of a major confrontation"33 between the 
super-powers. In the Department of Defence some officials 
started to consider Israel "with its highly efficient military 
forces" as the new "second pillar" of Persian Gulf security.34 
But others noted the risks of reliance on regional powers for 
protecting US interests and were sceptical about the "second 
pillar" concept. Similar to Brzezinski they "advocated a 
larger military role for American armed forces in the region, 
including an increase in the naval presence and the design of 
special ground and air forces for combat in the area."35 That 
view reflected the conclusions of a position paper on military 
options for safeguarding US interests in South-West Asia which
31 New York Times. January 1, 1979.
32 Brzezinski, World Review, pp. 3, 4.
33 Ibid., p. 4.
34 New York Times. January 1, 1979.
35 Idem.
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had been drawn up in early 1979 by the Organization of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff at Brown's instruction.
The final paper, submitted to the President via the 
Secretary of State, recommended acquisition of regional 
military facilities, emphasized the need for an expanded 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean, called for increased 
military assistance to the regional countries, and, most 
important, underscored the absolute necessity of 
upgrading American capability to intervene with military 
force in the area.36
From December 1978 Brown too had begun to refer to forces for 
intervention in distant regions. In early January 1979, for 
example, he noted the growing danger of super-power engagement 
in a Third World conflict in which access to natural resources 
was at stake. America "might have difficulty in avoiding the 
choice between active participation in the conflict, not 
necessarily with ground forces, or suffer severe damage to US 
interests.1,37 Planning was going ahead, he remarked, for a 
mobile specialized force which could respond to contingencies 
outside the NATO area. However, as Brown made clear in the 
Department of Defence's annual report in January 1979, ”[m]ost 
of the contingencies strictly internal to the Middle East 
would not appear to warrant any direct U.S. involvement."38 
The American forces available for response to a "hypothetical" 
Soviet attack upon Iran "would be neither appropriate for nor 
planned for maintaining internal security and the domestic 
order. These are not the responsibilities of the United 
States, and particularly not of the U.S. military."39
A Persian Gulf security policy to replace the Nixon
36 Maxwell Orme Johnson, The Military as an Instrument of U.S. 
Policy in Southwest Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1983), p. 13.
37 International Herald Tribune. January 4, 1979.
38 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1980. p. 106.
39 Ibid., p. 107.
255
Doctrine was outlined in February 1979 by Brzezinski in an 
NSC memorandum and by Brown during his visit to the Middle 
East.40 That policy proposed to broaden the regional basis of 
Gulf security and to expand America's strategic role - to 
include more active deterrence as well as intensified display 
- primarily against the Soviet Union. First, the US would try 
to forge a closer linkage between local, Gulf security and 
wider, Middle Eastern (Arab-Israeli) security, encouraging 
collaboration among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the conservative 
Gulf Arab states and "moderate*' nearby countries such as 
Turkey. Their co-operation would compensate for the collapse 
of imperial Iran, reverse the deterioration of security in the 
Persian Gulf and enable friendly Middle Eastern powers to 
continue to take primary responsibility for security there. 
America's support for security within the Gulf would be kept 
as limited and indirect as possible and consist of helping to 
advance the Arab-Israeli "peace process", supplying more 
economic and military aid, in order to enhance friendly 
states' capability to manage their security, and participating 
in patrolling the shipping lanes. Second, the US would make 
a larger, more direct and active contribution to regional 
resistance to further expansion of Soviet influence and power. 
The more active potential for a direct American military 
response would deter direct Soviet military action. The US 
would take requested and appropriate military measures such as 
increasing its regional display in order to help regional 
states deal with political uses of Soviet power and indirect 
Soviet military involvement such as support for South Yemen. 
The American naval presence in the Arabian Sea would be 
augmented and a force would be organized and based in the US 
for rapid deployment to South-West Asia, if needed. In order 
to show America's greater commitment to Persian Gulf security
40 For an early assessment of the "new security formula in the 
Middle East", see R.K. Ramazani, "Security In The Persian 
Gulf", Foreign Affairs 57 (Spring 1979), 821-835. Note by the 
same author, "The Genesis of the Carter Doctrine", in Middle 
East Perspectives: The Next Twenty Years, eds. George S. Wise, 
Charles Issawi (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1981), pp. 165-180.
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the US Navy and the "rapid deployment force" would require 
access to regional military facilities for logistic support of 
display in peacetime and contingency operations against the 
USSR.
The justification and guidelines for an expanded American 
strategic role as part of a "security framework" for the 
Persian Gulf were set out by Brzezinski in an NSC policy paper 
in late February 1979.
The crucial problem . •. was the continuing 
dependence of the United States and its allies on oil 
from this vulnerable and volatile region.
Any one of several potential misfortunes, including 
collapse of Carter's Camp David program for Egyptian- 
Israeli peace and internal collapse in Saudi Arabia, 
could gravely damage the position of the West. There was 
no mention of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but the 
possibility was foreseen that the projection of Soviet 
force in unspecified fashion closer to the center of the 
region could bring about a new crisis.
The "security framework" to shore up friendly 
nations and augment U.S. power was conceived as a loosely 
constructed yet clearly cooperative arrangement among 
moderate states, including Egypt, Israel and Jordan. 
Saudi Arabia would be closely associated but treated as 
a special case in view of its sensibilities regarding any 
association with Israel. Peripheral states in the area, 
including Morocco, Sudan and Turkey, would play a 
cooperative role and benefit from U.S. aid and arms.
U.S. forces in the area and facilities for their 
support would have to be increased. Oman would be 
brought into the alliance, and given protection and 
assistance. The overall cost of military assistance 
would be $10 billion to $15 billion over five years, in 
addition to existing outlays, (sic) The greater part of 
the buildup, though, would be in such U.S. elements as 
the "rapid deployment force", based at home but ready to 
move to trouble spots abroad.41
The National Security Council was revising America's Gulf 
security policy as Brown visited the Middle East. The 
purposes of his trip were to convey Carter's recognition of
41 Washington Post. January 24, 1980.
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the importance to the US of the Middle East and its security 
and to lay the groundwork for stronger, long-term security 
cooperation with the Saudis and other "pro-Western” states and 
for a larger American military involvement. Taking a "line" 
it had not espoused since Vietnam, the United States had 
"'made a policy decision about a more active role in the 
area.'"42 According to Brown America was "intent on 'new 
patterns of security cooperation' in the Middle East to head 
off expansionist efforts by the Soviet Union."43 An anonymous 
"senior defense official" observed:
All the governments recognize that the region does 
face serious threats from the outside. They also 
recognize that there are internal problems in each of the 
countries and between some of them. We have been trying 
to draw their attention to the first without 
underestimating the other two problems.
We think we've succeeded.... They see that 
prospects for Iran being a strong pillar of security are 
clouded at best. They see there is a tendency for the 
Soviets to fish in troubled water. They look upon the 
United States to provide protection from direct Soviet 
threat, and they realize that the United States has to 
confine its military commitment and isn't in the business 
of protecting them from one another.44
At the start of Brown's visit an unnamed "high official" 
had stated that the Americans not only "will stand by [their] 
friends in the region ... against external threats" they "will 
also try to help reduce and ... end the internal conflicts in 
the region so that these conflicts don't exacerbate the 
tensions from outside."45 He referred implicitly to a crucial 
part of the regional "security framework", the Camp David 
accords and the imminent peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt. The treaty and the conservative Arab states' support
42 New York Times. February 19, 1979.
43 Idem.
44 Idem.
45 New York Times. February 11, 1979.
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for it - urging their support being a further purpose for 
Brown's visit to Saudi Arabia and Jordan - was considered by 
the US to be even more central to the stability of the Middle 
East after the fall of the Shah. Besides completing the 
initial phase of resolving the most dangerous conflict in the 
Middle East and thus averting a potential oil embargo by the 
Gulf Arab states, the Egypt-Israel treaty was intended to 
encourage the envisioned informal grouping of Israel, "pro- 
Western” Arab states and Turkey for regional security 
collaboration. If followed by a resolution of the Palestinian 
issue, that treaty would remove a leading means by which the 
USSR could gain more influence in the Arab world, while the 
informal "coalition" would generate a political counter and a 
degree of military deterrence against the Soviets and their 
regional "proxies". And if the Americans supplied Egypt with 
large amounts of weapons, President Sadat proposed grandiosely 
to substitute for the Shah; he would take on an 
interventionist role and "assume responsibility for insuring 
stability in a region stretching east from Algeria to 
Afghanistan and south from the Mediterranean to Somalia or 
beyond...."46 The US also foresaw Saudi Arabia "stepping up" 
its military role in the "potentially vulnerable" Persian Gulf 
emirates.47 As a result of the treaty, the creation of an 
informal regional security "bloc" and the assumption of 
greater security responsibilities by individual states, 
America would become more acceptable politically in the Middle 
East as a security partner against the Soviet Union. Its own 
deterrence against the Soviets would be easier and less risky 
to maintain. The US would be more able to gain access to 
regional facilities but otherwise it could remain safely in 
the background.
During its talks with the Saudis Brown's delegation 
offered to expand the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean
46 International Herald Tribune. February 22, 1979.
47 New York Times. February 11, 1979.
259
and the logistic facility at Diego Garcia as part of the "new 
patterns of security cooperation in the Middle East". That 
offer met the Saudis' wish for somewhat larger and more 
frequent American naval deployments, discreetly "over the 
horizon" from where they could protect shipping, display a 
clear capability to counter the Soviet naval squadron and help 
to show steadfast US support for Gulf security. The two sides 
were reported to have discussed "the creation of a 'quick 
strike force' of American paratroopers and marines to be used 
in case of a request for help by Saudi Arabia or other oil- 
producing nations threatened with the turmoil of a Soviet- 
supported coup."48 The US delegation was prepared to consider 
a "specific American involvement in the region, including 
creation of a Persian Gulf command led by Americans or further 
military help..."49 but the Saudis sought only to obtain more 
US arms. The Americans raised as well the issue of acquiring 
access to Saudi military facilities. However, for political 
reasons related most immediately to the unpopularity in the 
Arab world of the impending Egypt-Israel peace treaty with 
which the United States was closely associated, they were not 
willing to permit American troops on their territory or to 
allow the US access to their facilities. This "finding", 
confirmed by US approaches to other regional powers, "led the 
Administration to defer looking for possible bases"50 until 
December 1979 (see below).
Foreshadowing in part the "Carter Doctrine" enunciated in 
January 1980, the first high-level public declaration about US 
security policy for the "post-Shah" Persian Gulf and the 
contribution to it by the American armed forces was made by 
Brown in a television interview on February 25, 1979, shortly 
after his return from the Middle East. The US supported the 
independence of the regional states, he remarked, and
48 New York Times. February 13, 1979.
49 New York Times. February 12, 1979.
50 New York Times. January 25, 1980.
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"[p]rotection of the oil flow from the Middle East is clearly 
part of [America's] vital interest.1,51 The United States saw, 
as did the Gulf states, "a possible threat from outside the 
region”, from a "major power" and it was "prepared to defend 
its vital interests with whatever means are appropriate, 
including military force where necessary...." However, the 
use of force was "not necessarily appropriate in every 
individual instance." In another interview on the same day 
James Schlesinger articulated similar views, but with less 
clear allusion to the Soviet Union. The US had a "commitment 
... to the preservation of stability in the Gulf..." and it 
"must intensify its efforts to bring stability ... and to 
ensure the security and independence of the states in that 
area. This is of vital importance...." America "must move 
in such a way that it protects those interests, even if that 
involves the use of military strength or of military 
presence...."
Beginning with the interviews of Brown and Schlesinger, 
the Administration's ideas for increasing America's military 
presence in the Persian Gulf region began to emerge into the 
public domain. When asked about the potential use of the 
armed forces, Brown said that the "less intrusive and less 
obvious forms of U.S. presence or possibly military influence, 
such as ship visits and so on, are clearly the right way to 
begin such activities, and ... may be as far as we want to 
go."52 Schlesinger remarked that America was "prepared to
51 All quotations in this paragraph are taken from Preserving 
Access To Middle East Oil. Excerpts from Remarks made during 
CBS and NBC television interviews on February 25th, by Defense 
Secretary Harold Brown and Energy Secretary James R. 
Schlesinger..., Official Text, International Communication 
Agency, U.S. Embassy, London, Tuesday, February 27th, 1979, 
pp. 1-2. See also New York Times. February 26,1979; 
International Herald Tribune. February 26, 1979. In March
1979 Vance too asserted that the US had "vital interests" in 
the Persian Gulf. He considered Saudi territorial integrity 
and security to be a "matter of fundamental interest to the 
United States." Washington Post. March 19, 1979.
52 New York Times. February 26, 1979.
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discuss the question of a military presence in the area with 
the states involved, and that would have to be worked out in 
response to their desires and with some flexibility.1,53 The 
US military presence for the Persian Gulf being considered by 
the Administration, he remarked further, "would involve 
military personnel. Whether it would involve a deployment of 
troops as the phrase goes - which usually refers to combat 
arms of the ground forces - is another question.1,54 That the 
American presence would not include military bases was 
confirmed at the highest level, by Carter. On February 27, 
1979, as Saudi Arabia's rejection of the US request for access 
to its military facilities became more widely known, he said, 
"We have no plans to establish military bases..." in the 
Persian Gulf or "to station troops in Saudi Arabia...."55 
Military bases, Carter suggested, would "encroach" on the 
independence of "individual nations". Nor did America "intend 
to become involved in the internal affairs of another 
country.1,56
In the Department of Defence studies were being conducted 
and proposals considered for expanding on a long-term basis 
the usual US presence in the Indian Ocean as part of making a 
stronger show of American commitment to Gulf security.* An 
important measure under examination was the "creation of a 
permanent new U.S. fleet, which would be designated the 5th 
Fleet, to provide a security force for the entire oil region 
... [of] the Persian Gulf."57 A new fleet would be a "very
The possible expansion of America's Indian Ocean presence, 
particularly the Middle East Force, had been under study by 
the US Navy since the end of the war in the Horn of Africa in 
March 1978.
53 International Herald Tribune. February 26, 1979.
54 Idem.
55 New York Times. February 28, 1979.
56 Idem.
57 New York News. March 9, 1979.
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major commitment by the United States to the defense of that 
area” and the "significance of this would not be lost upon the 
Soviets."58 A permanent fleet would provide a continuous 
counter to the Soviet naval squadron in the Indian Ocean, not 
just when intermittently an aircraft carrier or a surface 
action task group was present. It would provide a more 
powerful force which, "based" at sea, would avoid provoking 
regional countries and it would enhance the United States' 
flexibility and speed of reaction in crises. A fleet would 
satisfy
Saudi Arabia's desire to have larger American naval 
forces patrolling in the Indian Ocean, over the horizon 
and out of sight to avoid stirring up political tensions 
in the Arab world but close enough to deter Soviet 
intervention in the region and to be available when the 
Saudi monarchy feels threatened.59
The new fleet might consist of an aircraft carrier battle 
group, if not also helicopter carriers and other amphibious 
assault ships which could be used for requested defensive 
intervention. Other ideas for enlarging America's Indian 
Ocean presence included increasing the frequency of naval task 
group deployments to the area from three to four a year; 
augmenting from three to five ships the Middle East Force, 
which then could better monitor the Gulf sea lanes and make 
more port calls; expanding the logistic facilities at Diego 
Garcia and perhaps stationing a repair ship there so that 
other vessels could operate more efficiently and longer; and 
gaining access to additional facilities for use by P-3C 
maritime patrol aircraft.60 There might be initiated regular 
demonstration visits to the Gulf by US fighter aircraft and 
training exercises might be conducted there, some with the 
host state's forces. Joint military planning with regional
58 Idem. See also New York Times. March 1, 1979; Baltimore 
Sun. March 8, 1979.
59 New York Times. August 3, 1979.
60 Norfolk Virginian Pilot. April 6, 1979.
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countries was another possibility. Proposals for augmenting 
the American naval presence faced the problem of what 
resources could be afforded for the Indian Ocean: the 6th 
Fleet and the 7th Fleet, from which the larger presence would 
be drawn, were at the minimal level for meeting their 
responsibilities in the Mediterranean and the western Pacific 
respectively. How larger deployments could be supported 
without routine access to regional facilities was another 
serious problem.
Origin of the "Rapid Deployment Force"
The ultimate military source of credibility for America's 
Indian Ocean presence, a capability for combat on land, 
depended, in the absence of US forces based in South-West 
Asia, on ground and air forces in America able to move to the 
region quickly and on a relatively large scale and to sustain 
their operations. Those ground-based forces would form the 
core of the "Rapid Deployment Force", for America's 
conventional deterrence of the USSR. Presidential Directive 
18 (PD-18), promulgated in August 1977, had specified that in 
order to respond satisfactorily to a "minor" contingency 
simultaneous with a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 
the US must prepare and maintain a "deployment force of light 
divisions with strategic mobility independent of overseas 
bases and logistical support" and "moderate naval and tactical 
air forces which could be used in the Middle East, the Persian 
Gulf, Korea, or elsewhere.1,61 The requirement for a light and 
mobile deployment force derived from the assumptions and 
conclusions of a study on "global power relationships", 
Presidential Review Memorandum 10 (PRM-10) of June 1977, which 
contained the document "Military Strategy and Force Posture
61 U.S. OJCS, United States Military Posture FY 1982 
Supplement, p. 55. Haffa, The Half War, pp. 50-67, 113-131, 
examines the conceptual and organizational development of the 
"rapid deployment force" from 1977 to 1980. Paul K. Davis 
offers Observations On The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force: 
Origins. Direction, and Mission Rand Paper P-6751 (Santa 
Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, June 1982).
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Review”.62 One source drawn upon by the latter document was 
a review in April 1977 by the CIA of the USSR's medium-term 
need for oil which concluded that the Soviet Union would 
become a net importer of oil perhaps before 1985. "Military 
Strategy and Force Posture Review” expressed concern about the 
Soviet armed forces' ability to threaten the West's access to 
Persian Gulf oil by interdicting tankers or by directly 
attacking the oil-producing states. The Soviets' expected 
need for oil greater than their capacity to produce it, their 
proximity to the Gulf and their growing ability to "project" 
military power farther beyond their frontiers, the heavy 
dependence of America's allies on Gulf oil and the United 
States' own increasing dependence on it meant that the 
contingency in which the USSR attempted to seize part of the 
Persian Gulf had to be taken seriously.
The findings of PD-18 were reflected in Brown's first 
annual defence report, in January 1978. The Persian Gulf, he 
observed, was a region in which America and its allies had a 
vital interest and with whose security their own security was 
linked. There had to be taken into account the contingency of 
"action by the Soviets to deny the United States and its 
allies access to the resources of the Persian Gulf."63 
"Soviet control of the vital oil-producing regions of the 
Persian Gulf ... could destroy the cohesion of NATO and 
perhaps NATO's ability to defend itself"64 and could undermine 
also the security of the entire industrialized world. In the 
Gulf "rival local forces might become engaged initially 
without external involvement. However, the Soviets could 
intervene..."65 there and such "clashes", whether or not the 
USSR was involved, "not only might require the dispatch of
62 New York Times. January 6, 1978.
63 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1979. p. 78.
64 Ibid., p. 8.
65 Idem.
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appropriate U.S. forces to the scene in support of friends; 
they could precede and even set off a crisis or conflagration 
in Europe."66 In expressing concern about a potential Soviet 
attempt to deny the West access to Persian Gulf oil with 23 
"divisions (mostly low readiness at this time)" and 400 
"fighter/attack aircraft ... in the vicinity of eastern Turkey 
and Iran", Brown judged a Soviet attack to be "unlikely except 
as part of a much larger conflict...."67
In January 1979 Brown's next defence report mentioned 
"serious problems" which
could arise in the region of the Persian Gulf. As we 
have been seeing in the case of Iran, domestic 
instabilities constitute the greatest immediate danger 
there. Nevertheless, we cannot preclude the possibility 
of outside intervention following from these internal 
disruptions.
The situation in Iran is illustrative of what could 
happen. Continued instability there could lead to 
attempts by Iraq to settle old scores. Iranian forces, 
if they were not diverted by internal disorders, should 
be more than adequate ... to deal with this possibility. 
If Soviet forces were to intervene, however, either in 
support of attacks by others or under the pretext of 
defending the USSR from threats based in Iran, they could 
certainly overwhelm Iran's capability for defense.68
And there was "always the oil of Iran and the Arabian 
peninsula to tempt forces from the outside."69 Brown 
understood the "events hypothesized" not to possess "imminent 
plausibility" because the USSR's policy towards Iran had been
66 Idem.
67 Ibid., p. 78.
68 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1980. p. 106.
69 Ibid., p. 96. Elsewhere in his annual report for FY 1980 
Brown referred to the "combination of traditional Russian 
interest in ... the Persian Gulf and the growing costs of 
Soviet domestic energy supplies which, under deteriorating 
regional conditions, could propel the Soviet Union toward 
various forms of intervention...." (p. 55)
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cautious and Soviet forces in the Caucasus had "remained at a 
low state of readiness. However, if ... they were to move to 
a Category I state of readiness and attack (which would take 
several weeks of preparation, we estimate), their intervention 
could well require a U.S. response."70 As for "most of the 
contingencies strictly internal to the Middle East", they 
"would not appear to warrant any direct U.S. involvement."71 
The American forces envisioned for responding to a 
hypothetical Soviet military adventure were, Brown declared 
(see above), neither suitable nor intended for maintaining 
political order and security within regional states. Up to 
early 1979 responding to a Soviet military adventure in the 
Persian Gulf was, according to the annual US defence reports, 
the principal, if not exclusive reason for potential American 
military action there. US military planners gave relatively 
little attention to possible intervention in regional or 
internal conflicts because the Gulf seemed to be comparatively 
stable and Iran secure as the regional "gendarme".72
70 Ibid., p. 107.
71 Ibid., p. 106.
72 But according to Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and 
the West The Dilemmas of Security (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 
1987), to the small extent that the Carter administration did 
pay attention to contingency planning for the Persian Gulf, 
"intraregional contingencies, such as Iraqi aggression in the 
lower Gulf", took priority over ones involving the USSR until 
the middle of 1979. (p. 100) In 1977, he points out, "it 
appeared that a quick strike unit for the Middle East would 
deal primarily with domestic unrest, not larger and more 
conventional contingencies." (p. 56) Davis, Observations.
p. 8, indicates that there was minimal contingency planning 
for the Gulf by the Department of Defense except for 
"brushfires". Haffa, The Half War, pp. 54-56, 128, confirms 
the apparent primacy of non-Soviet contingencies, inter-state 
and internal, in the very limited US contingency planning for 
the region and also notes that neglect of the half-war 
contingency "had occurred with the implicit assumption that 
the 'half-war' would occur at a low level of conflict and not 
[become] a high-intensity scenario." (p. 117) On the other 
hand, he observes, "a Joint Chiefs of Staff strategy review" 
completed in summer 1978 which recognized the need for a 
joint-service "rapid deployment force" "questioned the 
reliance on the '1-1/2 war' strategy that had obscured the
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"Protective” seizure of Gulf oil would be made unnecessary, 
and exist only as a hypothetical contingency, because the 
Middle East "peace process" would prevent another Arab-Israeli 
war and Arab oil embargo.
A contingency in the Persian Gulf, "which could involve 
Soviet forces", was "an appropriate case for ... U.S. force 
planning"73 for a minor contingency, observed Brown in his 
defence report in January 1978. That was because the Persian 
Gulf was an area of volatility and importance and "because 
forces committed to this theater could become tied down - and 
therefore not immediately available for transfer to 
Europe...."74 Also the Gulf was "sufficiently distant from 
the United States to make exacting demands" on capabilities 
"such as lift, base structure, and communications...."75 The 
US could visualize a large-scale conflict developing outside 
Europe, Brown generalized in his annual report in January 
1979, but it could not readily imagine "another and separate 
large war with another major power breaking out, 
simultaneously with one in Europe, that would require a large 
U.S. intervention on the ground and in the air."76 But a 
concurrent lesser contingency seemed to be quite plausible, 
and a conflict in the Persian Gulf would subject America's 
force posture to a most rigorous test. That region was one of 
"many areas of the world", Brown declared in his report in 
1978, where "conflict would mean not only conventional warfare 
but also an increased probability of nuclear exchanges.77 
Deterrence of "military violence" was of "utmost importance"
reality that a 'half-war' could also become a counter-Soviet 
conflict of great intensity." (p. 61)
73 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1979. p. 81.
74 Idem.
75 Ibid., p. 92.
76 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1980. p. 98.
77 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1979. p. 79.
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to America and it did
not rule out the use of nuclear weapons if the United 
States, its friends, or its forces are attacked. 
However, we continue to believe that we and our allies 
are best served by basing our collective security on a 
firm foundation of conventional military power. We 
cannot depend on tripwire theories or abstract 
calculations about cool and studied escalation. What we 
seek in conjunction with our allies is a major 
conventional capability sufficient to halt any 
conventional attack.78
While acknowledging that "the feasibility of providing the 
necessary countervailing power” for credible deterrence and 
defence against the Soviet Union was "once again in question", 
Brown continued to "believe" that if the US prepared for "a 
limited number of critical and demanding contingencies" such 
as in the Persian Gulf and deployed its forces "prudently", it 
and its allies could "produce a conventional deterrrent to a 
high standard of confidence.1,79 The defence posture which 
"permitted" the US to respond "effectively" to a "relatively 
minor" contingency involving the USSR in the Persian Gulf and 
to a simultaneous major contingency in Europe was
a limited number of land combat forces, in large part 
relatively light (though their actual configuration will 
depend on the nature of the forces they might be expected 
to encounter), consisting of both Marine and Army combat 
divisions with their support; naval, amphibious lift, and 
tactical air forces; and strategic mobility forces with 
the range and payload to minimize our dependence on 
overseas staging and logistical support bases.80
The light land forces not immediately required for an initial 
defence of NATO - the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Air 
Assault Division and a Marine Amphibious Force - were thought
78 Idem.
79 Ibid., p. 80.
80 Ibid., pp. 9, 92.
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to be "adequate" for a defence of the Persian Gulf.81 Brown 
emphasized the capacity for rapid deployment by the light 
forces because a Gulf conflict could be "short and intense". 
Brzezinski too favoured "such a flexible force" because there 
was "greater likelihood of Soviet involvement in such areas as 
the Persian Gulf"82 than elsewhere, he commented in March
1978. In intimation of the preclusive or pre-emptive
character of America's future regional strategic policy for 
deterring the USSR, he wanted "to insure that American forces 
would arrive ahead of Soviet units", because "speed was 
crucial."83 In the view of Brown and Brzezinski, deterrence 
and defence against the USSR depended not on larger numbers of 
US forces but on America's capability to move its forces to 
the Persian Gulf with sufficient rapidity to prevent a Soviet 
fait accompli.
In 1979 the weaknesses of a "rapid deployment force" 
became clear. The United States' aircraft for speedily moving
81 Brown does not discuss in his defence reports the adequacy 
of the three light US divisions and several wings of aircraft 
for possibly high intensity fighting against heavier 
(armoured) Soviet or Iraqi forces or both together. Although 
American contingency and force planning assumptions tended to 
discount help by attacked friends, the role and efficacy in 
combat of the imperial Iranian, if not as much the Saudi armed 
forces would have been important. Even in 1980, after the 
collapse of the Iranian armed forces and the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, Brown stated: "At present, we 
appear to have enough divisions and tactical air wings to meet 
current demands, even if those demands should comprise 
simultaneous contingencies in Central Europe and the Persian 
Gulf." (U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1981. p. 118.) United 
States, Congress, Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Projection 
Forces: Requirements. Scenarios, and Potions (April 1979) 
suggests (p. 21) that four US divisions, six air wings and two 
aircraft carrier air wings would be needed to assist Iran 
against a "worst-case" attack. A scenario using modified 
assumptions about a Soviet attack "might call for a maximum 
U.S. commitment of two divisions and three air wings, 
supplemented by two carrier groups, to reinforce Iran."
(p. 24)
82 New York Times. March 24, 1978.
83 Idem.
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men, kit and supplies to a crisis in the Persian Gulf alone, 
without a simultaneous contingency in Europe, were inadequate 
in number for carrying much more than a light brigade. And in 
a concurrent contingency many transport aircraft and ships 
would be committed to Europe as the higher priority. Also, 
Brown observed in the US defence report in 1979, although 
America
would expect to deploy fewer forces in any limited 
contingency than in a NATO war, such contingencies differ 
from a NATO war in ways which may place greater demands 
on some of our mobility forces. First, we cannot predict 
where such contingencies will occur. Second, we are 
likely to have fewer mobility assets available for a 
limited contingency. It is possible that we would not 
get help from our NATO allies; there probably will be 
little or no prepositioned equipment and supplies; and, 
at least in some cases, we would be less willing to 
divert civil ships and aircraft from their normal 
business. Finally, operational problems will be greater. 
In particular, we may be operating over longer distances 
with few or no intermediate bases, and reception 
facilities may be limited.84
Thus instead of moving light divisions, much less heavy ones 
possibly needed in the Persian Gulf but committed to Europe, 
the best the Department of Defence could hope for soon as a 
realistic objective in improving its mobility forces was to 
gain ”the capability to deploy quickly (and support) at least 
a small force to distant locations without reliance on foreign 
bases or overflight rights.”85 (Italics added.) Further, 
PD-181s stipulation that US forces be able to operate 
independently from foreign bases was impracticable. As the 
memorandum (see above) from the JCS in early 1979 indicated, 
the US would need access to regional military facilities for
84 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1980. p. 202. U.S. CBO, 
Proi ection Forces. pp. 22-23, 44-45, and United States, 
Congress, Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Airlift Forces: 
Enhancement Alternatives For NATO and Non-NATO Contingencies 
(April 1979), pp. 54-58, discuss the role of airlift in a 
Persian Gulf contingency.
85 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1980. p. 202.
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its force deployments. Finally the "rapid deployment force" 
was not ready to fight: it lacked suitable training,
organization and planning on an individual and joint-service 
basis and there were insufficient amounts of weapons, 
equipment, munitions and spare parts.86 With inadequately 
prepared forces and a deficient capability to move and sustain 
them, the United States could not meet at acceptable risk a 
"minor" contingency in the Persian Gulf involving the USSR 
which was simultaneous with a war in Europe. In his annual 
defence report delivered in January 1980, Brown concluded that
[w]e have never fully acquired the agility and the 
mobility required by ... a reinforcement strategy. We 
have tended to settle for a lower level of combat­
readiness than is desirable for sudden and rapid long­
distance movement and prompt fighting effectiveness. 
Despite our desire to build barriers to the early use of 
nuclear weapons, we have economized ... on the nuts and 
bolts needed to sustain a non-nuclear conflict in a 
particular theater for more than a relatively short 
time.87
America's incapacity to deploy quickly to the Persian 
Gulf and sustain much more than a light brigade was becoming 
apparent as the Shah's regime disintegrated. Its collapse in 
winter 1979 undermined the Iranian armed forces' assumed 
ability to put up a relatively stout resistance to a Soviet 
attack which, in planning terms at least, had long provided
86 John M. Collins, Clyde R. Mark, Petroleum Imports From the 
Persian Gulf: Use Of U.S. Armed Forces To Ensure Supplies 
Issue Brief Number IB 79046, Congressional Research Service, 
The Library of Congress Date Originated: 04/26/79; Date 
Updated: 11/26/79, observe that a
shortage of paratroopers, particularly those with 
technical skills, is posing a problem for the U.S. 82nd 
Airborne Division. The most serious deficiencies are in 
communications, intelligence, field artillery, combat 
support, and administration, especially among the top 
four non-commissioned officer grades. The division is 
taking non-jump qualified troopers rather than leaving 
positions vacant, (p. CRS-21)
87 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1981. p. 99.
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the essential "first line" for the United States' regional 
deterrence against the USSR. Iran's strategic policy towards 
the Soviet Union had consisted of maintaining forces with very 
modern US arms thought to be sufficient to cope with and make 
too costly a limited Soviet attack for limited purposes. 
Imperial Iran had to depend on American help against a large 
Soviet offensive or a Soviet and Iraqi attack, holding it up 
until US reinforcements arrived: the Nixon Doctrine had always 
implied direct American military assistance, with ground 
forces or possibly nuclear weapons, against an attack by a 
"nuclear" power as the other, ultimate part of Iranian 
deterrence against the Soviets. But in the detente of the 
earlier 1970s, the US government had perceived little need for 
American ground forces to contribute to deterrence against a 
Soviet attack the likelihood of which was considered to be 
negligible. Thus the US Navy had felt able to claim in 1974 
that an aircraft carrier task group in the Arabian Sea 
provided an "effective counter" to Soviet divisions in the 
southern USSR. The policy and psychological link between 
America's Indian Ocean presence and its "global" military 
capability - its home-based land forces and the strategic 
nuclear deterrent - could safely remain tenuous and latent.
At the narrow military level in the Persian Gulf in early 
1979, the collapse of America's only friend able to contribute 
substantial forces to its defence resulted in a sudden acute 
deterioration in the perennial imbalance of power between the 
USSR and the Americans and (the now unfriendly) Iranians. The 
United States' conventional forces available for response to 
a Soviet attack into a weaker and more vulnerable Iran were 
too inadequate, if not ultimately in number, in structure, 
preparation, organization and logistic support to generate 
credible deterrence: the US could not inflict an unacceptably 
high cost on an attack by the Soviet Union relative to the 
value of its objectives with a high degree of confidence in 
all circumstances. The balance of power had changed as well 
among the regional states. Iraq had become the strongest
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power and the demise of the Iranian deterrent against a 
potential Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia or Kuwait was 
thought by US military planners to make the Saudis more 
susceptible to Iraqi pressure. The Saudis themselves were not 
confident that America could and would give them the help they 
might need against potential Iraqi and now also Iranian 
military action.
In early 1979 Brzezinski and Brown too recognized that 
the US had to establish credible conventional deterrence 
against a potential Soviet attack into the Persian Gulf; that 
was an essential condition for the security of US interests 
there. America now had to compensate for and exceed Iran's 
lost combat capability instead of tacitly complementing the 
Shah's forces as a distant reserve "ultimately” available to 
reinforce them in a conflict with the USSR. Compelled to 
become more direct, American deterrence had also to become 
more active by way of preparing forces to fight and in their 
display.
While Brown and Schlesinger tried in late March 1979 to 
enhance the political and psychological aspects of deterrence 
against the Soviet Union, declaring America's vital interest 
in the Gulf and warning of its intention to defend its 
interests with force if necessary, the US armed services were 
working on initial contingency planning and on identifying the 
specific force and logistic requirements for a "rapid 
deployment force". It was reported in April 1979 that the 
Department of Defence would "establish a force of 100,000 
troops, including 40,000 combat soldiers, for use in defense 
of American interests in sensitive areas..."88 such as the 
Persian Gulf and North-East Asia. The Navy, the Marines and 
the Air Force were defining their individual role in a quick 
US reaction to crises such as interference with shipments of 
oil from the Persian Gulf, and the Army intended to take the
88 New York Times. April 20, 1979.
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leading part in the "force of 100,000 troops”. Its planners 
envisioned the formation by autumn 1979 of a "'unilateral 
corps' of forces not committed to the defense of Western 
Europe or earmarked for reinforcement of troops there (sic) 
This corps would be the reservoir from which troops would be 
drawn to meet contingencies abroad."89 In studies of logistic 
needs the main emphasis was on improving America's inadequate 
mobility forces, because the "key to success" would be the 
speed with which the "intervention" force moved to the Gulf. 
Although the US had deferred its search for access to military 
facilities in the Middle East, contingency planners expected 
"local help" in crises.
The Department of Defence had taken little concrete 
action to create a combined-service "rapid deployment force" 
and to plan for its use in Persian Gulf contingencies until 
directed to do so by Brzez inski and Brown from December 
1978,90 and even then it moved slowly for much of 1979. Its 
main priority was security in Europe and improving NATO 
defence, which was the focal point of contingency planning and 
competition for scarce budgetary resources by the armed
89 Idem.
90 "Because of the trust it placed in the Shah of Iran's armed 
forces as a stabilizing influence, the [Carter] administration 
ha[d] not paid much attention to the problem" of contingency 
planning for the Gulf. Juan Cameron, "What If? US Military 
Strategy for the Middle East" (Reprinted from Fortune, May 7, 
1979 in) Military Review 59 (November 1979), 10. Before 1977, 
according to Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 84, 
the US armed forces "had done virtually no planning for 
operations in the Middle East. The European Command had drawn 
up contingency plans for the region, but the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff had found them inadequate and failed to approve them." 
And when in 1977 the Program Analysis and Evaluation section 
of the Office of the Secretary of Defence began to carry out 
"analyses of a number of potential conflicts in the region, 
some involving a confrontation with Soviet forces and others 
focusing on hostilities with regional states", its analysis 
was hampered by a "dearth of information about and interest in 
military operations in the Gulf area. Intelligence sources 
could not provide reliable analyses ... simply because they 
did not perceive a need to collect it."
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services. They did not want to become involved in and divert 
limited manpower and materiel to a Gulf conflict that might 
become "another Vietnam", an unconventional war unpopular at 
home.91 The US "military command structure placed a further 
obstacle in the path of the RDF."92 The European Command, 
whose jurisdiction covered the Near East and the Persian Gulf 
region, and the Pacific Command, under whose jurisdiction came 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean, treated the 
Persian Gulf-South-West Asia area as a responsibility 
secondary to Western Europe and North-East Asia respectively. 
Thus they were not willing with sufficient vigour to compete 
for resources for a "rapid deployment force", to organize it 
and to do the appropriate contingency planning. But at the 
same time EUCOM, PACOM and also Readiness Command competed for 
control of the "rdf" in order to keep it from one another and 
their competition delayed its institutionalization. Yet 
further opposition to it came from the State Department. It 
too wished to avoid "another Vietnam" and it sought not to 
provoke an anti-American reaction by Middle Eastern states, 
which might perceive a revived US interventionist tendency. 
Nor did the State Department want to jeopardize detente and 
negotiations with the USSR on issues such as strategic arms 
limitation and arms control for the Indian Ocean area.
Despite opposition to the "rapid deployment force", 
preliminary work for it had gone ahead. As a result of 
earlier requests, in 1977, from Brzezinski and Brown and also 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Program 
Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) section of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defence and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff had made or were completing in 1979
several detailed staff studies on U.S. capabilities for
limited contingencies and on comparisons of U.S. and
Soviet power-projection capabilities. These background
91 Ibid., p. 88.
92 Ibid. , p. 89.
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studies had considerable influence in shaping ideas about 
what should be done if funds and national priorities 
permitted. Although not intended as decision documents, 
they were the origin of most of the RDF-related program 
initiatives in late 1979 and early 1980. They also set 
a framework for much of the discussion of military 
strategies.93
A very important study was Capabilities for Limited 
Contingencies in the Persian Gulf, completed in July 1979. It 
had been commissioned by Brown in early 1978 "after an 
interagency study concluded that the Persian Gulf was the most 
likely flashpoint for a confrontation between the Soviet Union 
and the United States.”94 Prepared by "military officers as 
well as civilian analysts” in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defence, the 70-page report was the "most extensive military 
study of the region ever done by the Government.” It examined 
America's ability to respond to "a number of potential 
contingencies, including a Soviet attack on Iran, an attempt 
by the Russians to bomb major oil facilities in the Persian 
Gulf and a Soviet submarine campaign against Western oil 
tankers in the Indian Ocean” and also a Soviet attack upon 
Saudi Arabia. Then it discussed the various military options 
open to the United States in those contingencies. 
Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf was 
"said to have laid down the groundwork for the 
Administration's [later] effort to bolster local defences and 
to establish a presence in the region by American forces."
The study stated that the Soviet Union's "control of 
Persian Gulf oil would 'destroy NATO and the American-Japanese 
alliance without recourse to war by the Soviets'" and that the 
USSR had military advantages such as proximity to the Persian 
Gulf. It pointed out further that "unlike Western Europe, the 
Soviet-American military balance consisted not of the forces
93 Davis, Observations, p. 14.
94 The following three paragraphs draw from New York Times. 
February 2, 1980.
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that Washington and Moscow kept in the region but the men and 
equipment that each could rapidly move to the area in the 
event of conflict." The contingency involving the Soviet 
armed forces' "'sudden seizure' of Iran” was ”'the worst case 
from the U.S. point of view.'” The USSR "might be tempted to 
exploit political turmoil in the country 'in order to seize a 
historical opportunity to change the worldwide balance.'" All 
23 Soviet mechanized divisions in the Caucasus, Transcaucasus 
and Turkistan military districts, "consisting of about 200,000 
troops", could be "mobilized and moved into northwest Iran in 
about a month." They could be supported by "70 tactical 
fighters, including 35 advanced fighter-bombers code-named 
Fencer by NATO, and 193 longer-range bombers, including 19 of 
the new type code-named Backfire." The USSR had "103 navy 
bombers and about 10 submarines that it could commit against 
American aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean." Although the 
Soviet forces contiguous to Iran were not as well equipped as 
those in Eastern Europe, implicitly they would be adequate to 
deal with the Iranians who "'will not soon be able to 
contribute effectively to their own defense.'" In the
unlikely event that American forces were invited to 
bolster Iranian defenses, the report estimated that it 
would take 30 days to get about 20,000 soldiers and four 
tactical fighter squadrons, a total of about 72 planes, 
to the country, leaving the Russians with more than a 
five-to-one advantage in forces.
The only opportunity for stopping a Soviet thrust 
... would be to impede the invaders in the rugged terrain 
along the Soviet border and in mountains to the 
southeast. 'Unless the mountains can be exploited or 
substantial assistance can be obtained from allies,' ... 
'the Soviets will surely prevail easily because of their 
large advantage ... in ground forces.'
But in considering "the problem of dissuading Moscow from 
attacking Iran", the study concluded that
'[i]n principle, a deterrent based on mountain defense 
should be feasible - especially if the objective is to 
guarantee delays and casualties for the attacker.' To do 
this, it calls for the creation of highly mobile units
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that would be able to fight in rugged mountain terrain.
Otherwise there was the prospect that in order to "'prevail in 
an Iranian scenario'", the US "'might have to threaten or make 
use of tactical nuclear weapons.'"
Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian 
Gulf was "more optimistic" about America's ability to cope 
with attempts to disrupt the movement of oil tankers from the 
Persian Gulf. The USSR could not, as had been believed, close 
the sea lanes reasonably easily by mining the Strait of Hormuz 
and by attacks from submarines and aircraft. In 30 days, it 
was surmised, Soviet submarines and bombers could sink "about 
30 percent of 550 loaded oil tankers in the sea lanes...." 
But by then, when "'Soviet submarines would have severe 
problems because of the long distances between the region and 
their home bases,'" "American antisubmarine warfare planes and 
interceptors flown into the region would quickly produce 
'results favorable to the West.'" The Strait of Hormuz 
"'could be reopened in about two weeks by helicopter sweeping 
forces.'" This assessment assumed, however, that the
United States could make full use of local naval bases in 
such countries as Oman and Djibouti. [The report] also 
noted that it 'would be an ominous development if the 
Soviets built major regional port facilities for 
resupplying submarines' in the area and also maintained 
that [America's] 'ability to deny the Soviets a submarine 
resupply sanctuary near the Cape of Good Hope will depend 
on cooperation from South Africa.'
There was a bigger threat to Western oil supplies from Soviet 
air attacks upon oil facilities in the Gulf states. 
Approximately 65 per cent of all Persian Gulf oil passed 
through only three facilities, Ras Tanurah and Juaymah in 
Saudi Arabia and Kharg island off Iran. In the event of war 
with the Soviet Union, they would be "'prime targets'". By 
destroying eight "'critical'" pumping sites at those 
facilities, raids by "long-range fighter-bombers such as the 
Sukhoi-19 Fencer ... and intermediate bombers such as the
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Backfire" from Soviet bases some 900 miles away would give the 
USSR "'high confidence of virtually shutting down the 
facilities.'" No plans existed for repairing damaged oil 
installations and "'repairs might take months or years.'"
When the report examined the capabilities of America and 
the USSR to intervene in a state not contiguous to the Soviet 
Union, it discussed "'the projection balance'", "the amount 
and rate at which the two sides could send military forces 
into the region by sea and air.'" The Soviets possessed
'several distinct advantages: they are much closer to the 
Persian Gulf (roughly 1,000 nautical miles vs. 7,000 
nautical miles); their initial forces could arrive 
earlier; and they have a substantial number of forces at 
a high level of readiness: seven airborne divisions, in 
particular.'
But America had important advantages too: "'aircraft carriers; 
more reliable sea lines of communication; more effective long- 
range airlift and refueling.'" During the first 30 days of a 
crisis, "for example in Saudi Arabia",
'the United States would probably be able to project by 
air and sea more and more powerful ground forces than 
would the Soviets now and in 1985.' Further, during the 
same 30-day period, the report said that Washington could 
send 432 fighter planes into the country while Moscow 
could only fly in 272 aircraft.
The report said that in the event of simultaneous 
crises in the Persian Gulf and Western Europe, shortages 
of C-5 and C-141 transport planes would prevent the 
United States from flying forces to the Gulf region for 
about two weeks. It also warned that 'under certain 
circumstances,' Moscow might be willing to launch a 
sudden, surprise strike in the Persian Gulf using its 
seven airborne divisions. The divisions ... could be 
flown into the area in two or three weeks and 'the United 
States could not match this type of deployment.'
Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf 
made many recommendations for "improving the American military 
posture in the region, strongly endorsing such efforts as
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creating a special 'rapid deployment force' for use in the 
Persian Gulf and gaining greater access to ports and 
airstrips...” and improving America's mobility forces. It 
called also for the creation of an "emergency repair 
capability” for oil installations. As a means of "shoring up" 
the security of Saudi Arabia and the lower Gulf states, the 
study called for arrangements for "storing military equipment 
in the area as well as Egypt and Israel for use by American 
forces in the event of war." The report was "cautious about 
American involvement in conflicts in the region that do not 
involve direct Soviet or Iraqi aggression" because they were 
"'likely to be low-level affairs with a guerrilla character.'" 
Furthermore there was reason to question America's
current competence to assist local governments in these 
matters - [its] weapons are too sophisticated, [its] 
methods of war inappropriate, [its] knowledge of the 
region scant. The Saudis, British, French and Jordanians 
(and perhaps in a few years, the Egyptians) are all 
potentially better suited to assist such states as Yemen 
and Oman.
Debate about the Role and Utility of the Armed Forces 
In May 1979 debate began in earnest between the State 
Department and the National Security Council and Department of 
Defence about the armed forces' role and utility, political as 
well as military, in a security policy for the Persian Gulf- 
Indian Ocean area which would replace the Nixon Doctrine. The 
debate became more active after May 11 when the Policy Review 
Committee of the NSC acknowledged the Arabs' rejection of the 
Egypt-Israel peace treaty as a basis for a wider settlement 
between Israel and the Arab states and Palestinians. Despite 
the undermining of that essential part of the political 
foundation for America's post-Shah policy for an informal 
Middle East-wide coalition which was to have been the main 
guarantor of security within the Persian Gulf, the State 
Department and the NSC and Department of Defence agreed that 
the "peace process", critical in its own right, should go 
ahead. Disagreement arose, however, as the two "sides" tried
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to determine what ought to be America's strategic contribution 
to Gulf security. That disagreement derived from their 
conflicting emphases, informed by differing institutional 
outlooks, concerning the priority of threat to regional 
security, the ability of friendly Gulf states to deal with 
that threat, the extent to which American armed forces were 
needed to contribute to Gulf security and their likely 
political impact.
From its "regionalist" viewpoint the State Department 
considered that a greater American strategic role was 
unnecessary. Threats to the Persian Gulf came primarily from 
within it and friendly states still could cope with them, even 
if with less safety and certainty than before. A larger US 
force presence was liable to provoke Gulf states and suggest 
American interventionism more than reassure the friendly 
countries about America's interest and commitment to regional 
security. Inappropriately managed, the US forces could add 
to, not reduce tension and instability. Improbable Soviet 
aggression was already deterred adequately by American forces 
from the "global" level. Brzezinski and Brown took a 
"globalist", geopolitical perspective according to which the 
USSR was the most compelling threat to the Persian Gulf. Only 
America could counter politically and deter the Soviet armed 
forces and it could do so best, in a way most reassuring to 
friendly states, from the regional level, with an enhanced 
naval presence, land-based forces in the US ready for 
operations in South-West Asia and visits, demonstrations and 
exercises by the latter forces which would approximate a 
continuous American land presence.
The State Department's view of America's appropriate 
regional strategic role was expressed in an exposition of de 
facto US policy for the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East 
region. Presented to Congress in late July 1979 that 
exposition was entitled Analysis Of Developments In Middle 
East 1978-79 And Their Implications For U.S. Policy; The
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Middle East 1978-79; Forces Of Change.95 The US government 
had supported consistently the security and stability of the 
Arabian peninsular states and was co-operating actively with 
friendly countries towards those ends. It sought to reassure 
friends about its commitment to regional security and to 
"deter adventurism by adversaries". Because of the strategic 
position of the Arabian peninsula/Persian Gulf, the American 
government would be "very concerned about ... destabilizing 
events in any of the states of the region..."96 such as 
internal subversion supported from abroad and about external 
attacks. America's ability to advance the Middle East peace 
process remained the "most effective means" of protecting its 
regional interests.97 That was because the peninsular states 
saw progress towards a durable peace as the "primary 
requirement for long-term security and tranquility".98 The 
United States had engaged in intensified dialogue with the 
peninsular states about regional security in the wake of the 
Iranian revolution and it had tried to foster their confidence 
that it was sensitive to their security concerns. The fall of 
the Shah had "necessarily led to a change in the mix of means 
available ... to assure [US] security interests" but America 
did not believe "that this change will imply a substantially 
greater direct U.S. role."99 Its policy would remain "to 
strengthen the hand of moderate and friendly states in the
95 From "Prepared State of Hon. Harold H. Saunders, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs" 
in United States, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Review of Recent Developments In The Middle East.
1979. Hearing Before The Subcommittee On Europe And The Middle 
East. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, pp. 7-14. This exposition 
of de facto US policy draws also from "Supplemental Questions 
Submitted By Lee H. Hamilton To The Department Of State And 
Its Responses", Ibid., pp. 46-75.
96 Ibid., p. 54.
97 Ibid., p. 53.
98 Idem.
99 Idem.
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area to provide for their own security.”100 It had "modestly 
increased the security role it plays in the Middle East in the 
past year ... in response to the requests of friends for 
support.”101 The US had shown during the Yemen conflict in 
February-March 1979 that it "could and would aid friends 
quickly when faced by attack from outside" and it had begun a 
"new arms relationship" with the Egyptians in order to meet 
their "real defense needs."102 It had decided to increase its 
regional military presence (see below), but only "marginally", 
because a larger US presence - all forces "stationed on the 
ground" - "would be inimical to the interests and desires of 
... friends."103 Military power, "alone or even primarily, 
will be unable to secure and promote anyone's interests unless 
it supports and takes account of the indigenous forces for 
change.... "10*
In the event of danger to friendly states from within the 
Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region the form of a US 
response would depend on an evaluation of the particular 
circumstances, and America would act in close co-operation 
with friendly regimes. Although the US preferred to confine 
its resonse to "diplomatic means" and did "not wish to 
intervene militarily in the Persian Gulf"105, it would 
nonetheless defend its "vital interests in the region with 
appropriate additional means, as necessary."106 The serious 
potential economic and political consequences of recourse to 
"additional means" would have to be weighed with great care
100 Ibid., p. 54.
101 Ibid., p. 14.
102 Idem.
103 Idem.
104 Idem.
105 Ibid., p. 54.
106 Idem.
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before a decision to employ force was made. Also, a military 
exercise that far away from U.S. shores would imply some 
military risks but the US believed that it had "the means 
necessary to reduce those risks to tolerable proportions.'•107
The United States was "keeping a close global watch on 
Soviet intentions and activities" and maintained that no 
outside power should attempt to exploit instability in Iran, 
with which the US wished to improve relations, or to infringe 
upon Iran's independence or territorial integrity. At present 
there was "no evidence of any significant outside 
interference"108 there. Elsewhere increased shipments of arms 
to "certain governments" (South Yemen) from the USSR and its 
supply of advisers and support for their military operations 
created the impression that America might be unwilling or 
unable to help its friends and defend its interests. Harold 
Brown's visit to the Middle East in February 1979 was part of 
an effort to arrest that mistaken impression. There was "no 
lack of understanding of the military power [America's] 
adversaries can dispose over this region"109 and the US was 
"prepared to act purposefully with appropriate responses"110 
against the use of that power, if required. But the 
appropriate military capability for contributing to regional 
states' security "if a situation developed where they felt 
their security was threatened by forces from outside the 
region" was "American global strength.1,111 (Italics added.) 
The US played a critical role in upholding a balance at the 
global level which discouraged outside pressure on the 
security and stability of the Persian Gulf.
107 Idem.
108 Ibid., P- 72
109 Ibid., P* 14.
110 Ibid., P- 46
111 Ibid., P- 15
According to the State Department the role of the armed 
forces in America's post-Nixon Doctrine security policy for 
the Persian Gulf ought to remain quite limited. American 
forces could not and need not substitute for the Shah's 
forces. With relatively minor adjustments they were already 
adequate, within the inherent limits of military power, to 
help assure US interests. The additional protection of those 
interests by the armed forces playing a larger, more direct 
and active role would be small. Indeed a sizable increase in 
America's regional military involvement and presence and the 
organization of home-based forces for intervention were 
inappropriate. Those forces would be unsuitable because they 
had little actual ability to protect American interests and to 
influence events in the most probable "threat situations": 
much of the conflict and instability in the Middle East was 
political, economic and social rather than military and it 
occurred within states. Armed intervention in order to 
"secure" access to oil if regional states became "difficult" 
or if they "lost control" in domestic unrest would only worsen 
the political conditions which in the long-term were the 
principal source assuring uninterrupted oil supplies. Hints 
in public about military intervention (see below) were 
redolent of US threats and attempted intimidation of the Arab 
Gulf from 1973 to 1975. Such threats and, the State 
Department had long claimed, the creation of a "rapid 
deployment force" would suggest a new US interventionist 
policy, provoke states and increase regional tension. 
Further, they would worsen America's relations with the Middle 
Eastern states, make acceptance of even a limited US military 
presence more difficult and damage the United States' 
credibility as "peace-maker" between the Arabs and the 
Israelis. In rejecting proposals for the US to be ready to 
use military force in order to "guarantee" access to oil 
supplies, President Carter reflected the State Department's 
judgement when he commented in late July 1979 that US military 
action would result in the sabotage of the oil fields and make 
America's political and security problems in the Persian Gulf
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more difficult.112 The State Department would have concurred 
too with Brown's observation on July 5, 1979 that the West's 
vulnerability to shortages or disruptions of oil supplies or 
to rises in the price of oil was a serious security issue but 
steady production of oil and access to it were "by no means a 
purely military problem. In fact, the militay (sic) leverage 
that can be brought to bear is very small indeed.”113 More 
important for protecting US security interests in the Persian 
Gulf than the armed forces was a long-term national programme 
for reducing America's dependence on oil.
A bigger US strategic contribution to Persian Gulf 
security was unnecessary for helping to cope with regional 
threats to friendly countries, in the view of the State 
Department.114 After the fall of the Shah those states were 
still able to take primary responsibility for dealing with the 
likely, limited threats to them. Iraq and now Iran were 
perceived as the main threats, individually and insofar as 
their reviving conflict might entangle the other Gulf states. 
However, the nature of the threat posed by them was more 
political and ideological or religious than military. 
Although Iraq was now the strongest Gulf military power, it 
was improving, at least tactically, its relations with the
112 New York Times. August 1, 1979.
113 U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown Discusses The Energy 
Crisis and SALT-2 Excerpts from a TV interview on Thursday, 
July 5th Official Text, International Communication Agency, 
U.S. Embassy, London, July 9th, 1979, p. 1.
114 For aspects of the State Department's reasoning as 
elaborated in this and the next paragraph, see, for example, 
International Herald Tribune. June 23-24, 1979; Financial
Times. July 5, 1979; New York Times. December 1, 1979. Harold 
H. Saunders, The Middle East Problem in the 1980s Special 
Analysis No. 81-8 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute, 1981); Conversations with Harold H. Saunders AEI 
Studies 346 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 
1982); David D. Newsom, "America Engulfed", Foreign Policy, 
no. 43 (Summer 1981), pp. 17-32, discuss retrospectively from 
a State Department point of view the role and value of the US 
armed forces within the context of politics in the Persian 
Gulf and American policy for the region.
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other Gulf Arabs and it was preoccupied with, if not 
militarily balanced by Iran. Regional politics, not US armed 
forces, were the best defence for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
against the contingency of Iraqi incursions foreseen by 
military planners. America's supply of very modern arms to 
Saudi Arabia was appreciated for assisting it to present a 
degree of deterrence against limited forms of Iraqi or Iranian 
aggression. But a bigger regional military presence on the 
part of the American supporter of Israel, rival of the USSR 
and enemy of Iraq and Iran was politically unacceptable to the 
Saudis and would, they feared, compromise their independence 
and regional influence. On the other hand, implicit in the 
State Department's indication noted above that the US would 
defend its vital interests "with appropriate additional means, 
as necessary", direct US armed intervention in reinforcement 
of friends was not ruled out in the case of a relatively large 
and immediate military threat. Should the United States' help 
be sought against the threat of an Iranian air raid or in the 
event of another Yemeni conflict, an indirect American 
military response such as sending advisers and AWACS or 
resupplying munitions and critical equipment would very likely 
suffice. At most in a realistic "bad case", a limited direct 
employment of US air power might be called for and that would 
be readily available. Should an American naval presence be 
required as part of an international response to Iranian 
attempts to interfere with the movement of shipping through 
the Strait of Hormuz, the US could deploy to good effect an 
aircraft carrier and other, specialized ships. In "normal" 
conditions a slightly enlarged US naval presence would be 
useful because, in the case of the Middle East Force, it could 
better help to monitor the Gulf's shipping lanes, show 
America's steadfast interest in regional security and provide 
a more reassuring display of support for friends.
Substantially more US forces deployed in the Persian 
Gulf-Indian Ocean area would add little, in the State 
Department's opinion, to counterbalancing politically and
deterring the Soviet Union because, as pointed out, it 
understood that internal strains and local tensions, not a 
meddling USSR, were the main threats to regional security. 
Nor were the USSR's armed forces, although growing in long- 
range operational capability and enjoying access to “military 
facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia, the principal means by 
which the USSR "challenged" the security of South-West Asia 
and tried to increase its influence there. That "challenge" 
came from the Soviets' political involvement with and economic 
and military aid to ideologically sympathetic states and 
"radical" powers around the periphery of the Gulf region all 
of which had voluntarily and independently sought a Soviet 
connection. The United States' armed forces could not prevent 
Soviet political "penetration" or, for example, the USSR's 
indirect military intervention in the Horn war in 1977-78 in 
response to Ethiopia's request and the subsequent Soviet- 
Ethiopian alliance. Only as part of America's own general 
political, economic and security relationships with regional 
countries could the US Navy in the Indian Ocean and home-based 
forces counter the USSR's regional involvement. As for a 
potential Soviet attack into Iran in order to seize its oil 
resources, that was already deterred by American forces, 
conventional and nuclear, at the global level. The USSR 
recognized the importance of Iran and the Gulf Arab states to 
the West: an attack against them would, like trying to seize 
Western Europe, cause a war. The Soviets would be cautious 
about engaging in lesser direct uses of the armed forces 
because the United States already had a conventional 
capability adequate to respond to those uses. On the other 
hand, America had to remember that a unilateral "defensive" 
intervention by it in the Gulf could evoke a Soviet counter­
intervention and lead to great danger. Similarly a sizable 
increase in the US naval presence in the Arabian Sea could 
prompt a Soviet force expansion and ruin the possibility of 
a regional super-power naval arms control agreement.
Brzezinski, on the other hand, persisted with
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propositions (see above) which he had been expounding since 
early 1979 and urged a larger, more direct and active role for 
the armed forces in America's security policy for the Persian 
Gulf-Indian Ocean area. Their better preparation and enlarged 
regional display would help to show America's heightened 
interest in South-West Asia, specifically the Persian GulfS11^  
to "reassert" US power and influence, to better counter and 
deter the Soviets116 and to reassure friendly countries about 
the United States' commitment and reliability as an actor in 
regional security. The armed forces' greater role would be 
valuable because in showing America's renewed willingness to 
defend its interests they would give necessary substance to US 
policy and strengthen its credibility.
The State Department's judgement that the armed forces 
already contributed adequately to America's security policy 
for the Persian Gulf was mistaken.* Its preferred strategic 
policy - continuing with minor, essentially symbolic naval 
display and depending on the strategic nuclear deterrent and
The discussion below is not attributed directly to 
Brzezinski; it pursues a line of reasoning generally 
conforming to his known position.
115 By early August 1979 Brzezinski was characterizing the 
Middle East as a "vital strategic zone”, equal to Western 
Europe and the Far East in importance to the United States. 
International Herald Tribune. August 4-5, 1979.
116 However remote, the possibility of a Soviet attack into the 
Gulf could not be ignored. The potential for Soviet military 
action seemed to be most serious in Afghanistan, where 
"creeping intervention" by the USSR as the Marxist government 
in Kabul faced widespread rebellion caused Brzezinski 
increasing apprehension. In early May 1979 he had warned
the President that the Soviets would be in a position, if 
they came to dominate Afghanistan, to promote a separate 
Baluchistan, which would give them access to the Indian 
Ocean while dismembering Pakistan and Iran. [Brzezinski] 
also reminded the President of Russia's traditional push 
to the south, and briefed him specifically on Molotov's 
proposal to Hitler in late 1940 that the Nazis recognize 
the Soviet claim to preeminence in the region south of 
Batum and Baku. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 
p. 427.)
290
home-based land forces - was too weak and politically 
inappropriate. That policy relied on the extremes of power 
embodied by the aircraft carrier: one aircraft carrier was an 
important symbol and its aircraft could strike with tactical 
nuclear weapons but it had relatively little power usable for 
conventional ground operations. Also, conventional and 
nuclear forces in the US were too remote physically and 
psychologically from the Persian Gulf to exert an immediate 
impact on the USSR and on regional states in support of 
American security policy. Thus by proposing that the US need 
not adjust its strategic policy and improve the capability of 
its forces to operate in South-West Asia, the State 
Department's "policy" would send the wrong message, that 
America was not serious about Gulf security and its role in 
it, thereby weakening both.
The armed forces had more utility than the State 
Department thought. As the ultimate, physical recourse of a 
super-power, America's military capability was a basic part of 
the setting of international politics. The armed forces were 
a necessary if not sufficient means for influencing states' 
perceptions, policy, expectations and behaviour and their 
calculation of risks and how to deal with them. The Gulf 
states and the Soviet Union respected military power and the 
former were sensitive to its political symbolism. They were 
quite sensitive also to the global and the regional balance of 
power between the US and the USSR and to changes in it. The 
extent to which America improved the readiness of its forces 
for combat and the way it displayed some of them in South-West 
Asia would increase the Soviets' and the Gulf countries' 
responsiveness to US policy: the USSR would exercise more 
restraint and regional states would be less susceptible to 
Soviet pressure and more confident about their security.
In principle the single strongest, most convincing way to 
support America's Gulf security policy would be to base 
conventional land and air forces in the region. Unable to
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withdraw easily, they would be the most appropriate for 
showing that the US was deliberately giving hostages to 
fortune and was willing to share in the fate of friendly Gulf 
states. Their long-term presence would prove tangibly the 
enduring importance of US interests - they were worth defence 
on land - and the constancy of America's commitment to their 
defence. Visible, immediately available land forces would be 
the most credible as a political balance and for deterrence 
against home-based Soviet ground and air units because they 
would be a counter-presence in kind. Although unable to 
"match” the USSR in a balance of forces close to South-West 
Asia, the American capability would still be substantial 
enough in the event of conflict to disrupt operations by 
first-arriving Soviet forces and avoid a fait accompli before 
rapidly deployed reinforcements from the US could be 
introduced. The United States would be able to avoid the 
"compulsion" to launch tactical nuclear strikes from an 
aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea.
However, America had to deploy an enlarged, continuous 
naval force as its main presence in the Persian Gulf-Indian 
Ocean area because political conditions in the Gulf prevented 
it from stationing a ground force there. Naval display was 
less intrusive and provocative than a land presence. 
Enlarged, it would balance more emphatically the Soviet naval 
squadron and, made continuous, it would reassure friendly 
states more than the earlier US naval presence. But naval 
forces were politically less valuable than a land presence. 
They were a weaker indication of resolve than land-based 
forces because at bottom the principal military balance with 
the USSR and among the Gulf states was on the land and even 
much strengthened naval forces possessed less and less 
relevant capability for ground operations than land and air 
forces. Also, naval forces' flexibility, which enabled them 
to withdraw as easily as to stand offshore for a lengthy time,
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suggested less reliability of commitment.117
In order for America to maximize the efficacy of its 
regional display and deterrence it had to approximate as much 
as possible a land-based force presence. Visits,
demonstrations, training and exercises in South-West Asia by 
land and air detachments from the US, prepositioning war 
materiel in the region and acquiring access, however 
conditional, to military facilities there would complement a 
home-based “rapid deployment force" and a naval presence and 
reassure more than provoke friends, otherwise they would not 
allow them. An "approximate" land presence in the form of 
prepositioned materiel and available facilities would expedite 
a "rapid deployment force's" response to a sudden crisis in 
the Persian Gulf. On the other hand it would help America to 
avoid "repeating the heavy-handed intervention of Vietnam or 
incurring the costs of more U.S. bases abroad."118
Policy Decisions 
Debate about the role and value of the armed forces took 
place at meetings of the Policy Review Committee (PRC) of the 
National Security Council on June 21-22, 1979. Those meetings 
were an important part of the Carter administration's review 
of "the implications of and options for U.S. policy in the 
Middle East and Indian Ocean."119 According to Brzezinski a
series of particularly important meetings was held in the 
middle of June 1979, in which the overall strategic 
issues were sharply debated. Vance and Christopher 
generally argued that the United States should not become 
more involved, while Brown, Schlesinger ... and I argued 
for a more active American policy which would combine 
efforts to move the Arab-Israeli peace process forward 
with wider security arrangements. At one point in that 
debate, Schlesinger argued forcefully that American 
military presence in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area
117 See Chubin, The Role of Outside Powers, p. 124.
118 International Herald Tribune. August 4-5, 1979.
119 International Herald Tribune. June 23-24, 1979.
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should 'balance' the Soviets, and when Vance and 
Christopher reacted negatively, I not only backed 
Schlesinger but stated that in fact [America's] objective 
ought to be military preponderance, since the area was 
vital to the United States while not of equal 
significance to the Soviets.120
The PRC meetings considered a study by several government 
agencies of "changes in the region's security situation, 
including the implications of the West's growing dependence on 
oil from the Persian Gulf, political and military gains by the 
Soviet Union ... and turbulence in Iran and elsewhere"121 and 
it discussed a "Pentagon paper" outlining four options for 
increasing America's regional military presence. Reported to 
concur with the National Security Council and Department.of 
Defence in "principle that greater U.S. military strength ... 
was needed",122 the State Department agreed to the most 
gradual expansion of American power offered by the four-option 
Pentagon paper. That consisted of a "modest but symbolically 
significant increase in U.S. military presence in the Middle 
East and Indian Ocean":123 augmenting the Middle East Force 
from three ships to five ships and enlarging the number of 
regular naval task group deployments to the Indian Ocean from 
three to four a year. Also US Air Force combat aircraft would 
stage more routine demonstration visits to friendly Arab 
countries and a new emphasis would be put on military sales 
and high-level contacts with Oman and the smaller shaikhdoms 
of the Gulf.124 New military sales totalling $1.2 billion 
were approved for Saudi Arabia.
120 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 447. Christopher was 
Vance's deputy.
121 New York Times. June 28, 1979.
122 Washington Post. January 24, 1980.
123 Washington Post. July 1, 1979. Carter authorized the
increase in September 1979.
124 Washington Post. January 24, 1980.
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In early July 1979 Brown characterized the intended 
expansion of America's military presence in the Persian Gulf- 
Indian Ocean area as
a series of signals: a signal that we want to cooperate 
with ... friends in that area and when that cooperation 
entails requests on their part for larger presence in one 
form or another, we respond. It is also an indication 
that we have vital interests in that area and are 
determined to respond ... to requests from the countries 
... who may now or in the future be concerned about 
external interference ... with their own future and with 
[US] vital interests.125
The State Department could accept the idea of signalling so 
long as an enlarged presence remained sufficiently limited not 
to appear threatening to the Gulf states or to cause a naval 
arms race with the Soviets. The modest US force increase 
would be "responsive" to Saudi Arabia, which, as shown above, 
had expressed worry about the safety of shipping in the Gulf, 
asked America to increase its naval presence along the sea 
lanes and wanted it to counter discreetly the USSR's regional 
military presence. There was "still deep disagreement", 
however, between the State Department and the NSC and 
Department of Defence about how [much more] to strengthen 
American forces in the Indian Ocean and how quickly to do 
so.126 But " [g]radually, the Pentagon and Brzezinski ... 
[became] the driving forces on many aspects of regional 
policy."127 Thus despite the State Department's caution and 
doubt about the value of further increases in the US military 
presence and although "no dramatic changes in American 
deployment patterns could be expected soon", the increases in 
display decided on in June 1979 were "said by several 
officials to constitute a turning point in American policy in
125 Brown Discusses Crisis, p. 2.
126 New York Times. June 28, 1979.
127 International Herald Tribune. June 23-34, 1979.
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the region."128 They were part of a trend which "was likely 
to result in a gradual but significant augmentation of 
American naval and air forces in the region during the coming 
year."129
The steady expansion of the US military presence 
continued to be sought above all by Brzezinski, who thought 
that the modest force increases approved by the Policy Review 
Committee were not strong and credible enough a signal to the 
Soviets and the Persian Gulf states of the seriousness of 
America's interest in the Gulf and resolve of commitment to 
its security. He wanted to deploy in the Arabian Sea a "Fifth 
Fleet" roughly the size of the 20-ship Soviet squadron but 
superior to it in combat capability. That idea was rejected 
by Brown as "too expensive and not necessary.1,130 The 
formation of a separate fleet for the Indian Ocean "would 
impose heavy strains on the Navy and imply a long-range 
commitment that the U.S. government might prefer not to 
make."131 In view of the finite number of ships in the Navy 
and its other commitments, Brown preferred "the flexibility of 
moving carriers and other vessels more frequently from the 
Western Pacific into the Indian Ocean."132 In two of the now 
intended quarterly naval deployments to the Indian Ocean
not headed by aircraft carriers [there would be] guided- 
missile cruisers as flagships. Some thought also is 
being given to occasional substitution of a Marine 
amphibious force with a helicopter carrier as the main 
ship. This would meet a desire for including aviation in 
the quarterly visits as often as possible and would 
familiarize Marines with the area.133
128 New York Times. June 28, 1979.
129 Idem.
130 New York Times. August 3, 1979.
131 Baltimore Sun. June 6, 1979.
132 New York Times. August 3, 1979.
133 Baltimore Sun. October 19, 1979.
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Deployments by naval, air and also ground forces to the Middle 
East for joint training exercises with Egypt and possibly 
Saudi Arabia were other ways of enhancing America's regional 
military display and the Department of Defence was considering 
them along with "more formal and regular joint military 
consultations and planning exercises.1,134 The US government 
was discussing "gingerly" "an offer from ... President Anwar 
Sadat to open Egyptian facilities for more U.S. aircraft and 
ship calls."135 Also the possibility of prepositioning 
American military supplies in "key states" was under
examination during summer 1979, when plans were approved for 
expanding anew the logistic support facilities at Diego
Garcia. Finally the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
continued to deliberate about establishing a new military 
command structure for the Middle East by detaching 
jurisdiction for US security and strategic activities there 
from the European Command and investing it in a senior officer 
and his staff stationed somewhere in the region. "The Middle 
East commander in chief would probably not have combat units 
under his control but would be able to draw on earmarked 
'assets' from other commands in times of crises."136
Evolution of Purpose and Plans for the 
"Rapid Deployment Force"
The "rapid deployment force", whose creation and
potential use was a major subject of debate at the meetings in 
June of the PRC, was, along with intensified display, the main 
initiative in the modification of America's strategic policy 
for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area envisioned by
Brzezinski. The State Department objected to it strongly but 
Carter's approval of the "rapid deployment force" concept was 
one of the decisions which Brzezinski was determined would 
"ultimately come out of the wide-ranging Middle East review"
134 International Herald Tribune. June 23-24, 1979.
135 Washington Star. July 1, 1979.
136 International Herald Tribune. June 23-24, 1979.
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and manifest the Administration's resolve "to move beyond the 
post-Vietnam era and to use military power abroad again if 
necessary to protect U.S. interests."137 By the time of the 
PRC meetings in June the US Army had announced that it was 
preparing a "Unilateral Corps", a "quick-strike" force of 
110,000 troops from all the armed services for response to 
crises in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere outside the NATO area. 
The concept of the "Unilateral Corps" was
to give the unified commanders, such as the commander in 
chief for the Pacific, a force they can call upon for 
help without going through the time-consuming process of 
identifying and rounding up available units.
The Army plan ... does not envision assembling the 
corps at one place. Instead, the combat troops and 
support units would stay where they are. They would be 
equipped to respond as a corps quickly, however.138
The "Unilateral Corps" was not "a new addition to U.S. 
striking power"; the military had to "make do with the troops 
it already has and work around current shortages of ships and 
[air] transports to send units and weaponry to distant 
[places]."139 In confirming these points on July 5, 1979 
Brown said that the Army's work was only one part of the 
Department of Defence's examination of how much it needed to 
enlarge America's capability for moving its forces to areas 
outside NATO.
Brown's remarks, the announcement about the "Unilateral 
Corps" and the PRC meetings took place against the background 
of a reduction in the output of Persian Gulf oil, rising OPEC 
oil prices and petrol queues and disgruntlement in America. 
When asked on July 5 in what circumstances the United States 
would "commit forces to act" in the Middle East, Brown replied
137 Washington Post. July 1, 1979.
138 International Herald Tribune. June 23-24, 1979.
139 Idem.
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that the US would commit forces if its vital interests, not 
only oil, "were involved". He alluded to a US role in an 
international reaction to a blockage of the Strait of Hormuz 
and referred indirectly to "possible Soviet expansionism" into 
the Middle East, "a strategic area in geographical terms".140 
The "worst case" circumstances requiring American intervention 
in the Persian Gulf were suggested by "several senior military 
and civilian officials in private conversation.1,141 They 
"echoed" the blunt statement by Senator Gary Hart that the US 
"'may be forced to use military force to preserve the oil 
flow/M and should military action be taken against one of its 
suppliers of oil, it "'may be forced to intervene.'"
140 Brown Discusses Crisis, p. 4.
141 This and the other quotations in this paragraph are taken 
from New York Times. July 5, 1979. For a discussion of the 
United States' military capacity to "protect" access to 
Persian Gulf oil, consult Collins and Mark, Petroleum Imports 
From the Persian Gulf. "Protecting Oil Supplies: The Military 
Requirements" is analyzed by General Sir John Hackett in Third 
World Conflict and International Security pt. 1 Adelphi Paper 
No. 166 (London: International Institute For Strategic 
Studies, 1981), pp. 41-51. Geoffrey Kemp discusses 
"Contingency Planning and Persian Gulf Options" in United 
States, National Defense University, Continuity And Change In 
The Eighties And Bevond Proceedings Of The National Security 
Affairs Conference, 23-25 July 1979, (Fort Lesley J. McNair, 
Washington, D.C., November 1979), pp. 61-76. For a view 
counselling against military intervention in circumstances not 
involving the USSR, see The Atlantic Council Of The United 
States, Oil And Turmoil: Western Choices in the Middle East 
The Atlantic Council's Special Working Group on the Middle 
East, John C. Campbell, Rapporteur, Andrew J. Goodpaster and 
Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chairmen (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic 
Council Of The United States, September, 1979), p. 34:
The existence of a stronger US military posture should 
have the purpose, and the result, of deterring military 
action by Soviet or by Cuban or other proxy forces under 
Soviet direction. US forces should not be intended for 
intervention in local revolutions or intra-regional 
conflicts. They should not be seen as the means of 
assuring the West's oil supply through unilateral 
intervention, although they might be called on by local 
states to help protect oil facilities and could have the 
mission of preventing any interference by force by other 
external powers.
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One possibility of constant concern to planners is 
that of a foreign-supported rebellion in Saudi Arabia or 
an invasion of that country by Soviet-controlled forces 
from Southern Yemen. Either would threaten the United 
States' chief source of overseas oil.
Another situation, unlikely but possible, is that 
Saudi Arabia might drastically reduce oil shipments to 
the United States for international political reasons, 
such as dissatisfaction with American policy toward the 
West Bank.
"American sources” "conceded” that there was "no certainty" 
whether the oil fields would be "found intact in the event of 
intervention." The "main problem after a successful landing" 
of US airborne forces, "senior officers" pointed out, was 
sustaining the force with the "necessities of combat or 
occupation. In a largely empty area such as Saudi Arabia and 
the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, great quantities of food, 
fuel, water and ammunition would have to be flown in daily 
until seaborne supply lines were established." "The Soviet 
Union's reaction to an American intervention [wa]s a critical 
issue" too and US defence officials differed among themselves 
about the likelihood and scale of a Soviet response.
Throughout summer 1979, pressed by Brzezinski and 
subjected to memoranda from Brown, the OJCS "conducted 
extensive studies of rapid response force options ...1,142 and 
drew up recommendations for a US command structure for the 
Persian Gulf region. (For Brown's choice of a command 
structure, see below.) In late summer Brzezinski and Brown 
gained acceptance in the National Security Council of the 
"rapid deployment force" concept and of a second purpose for 
the "rdf". It not only had to help deter potential military 
action by the Soviet Union but now the US had also to be 
prepared to intervene with it, preferably upon request, in the 
Persian Gulf (and elsewhere) in order to protect American 
interests in circumstances - increasing "turbulence from 
within" the region - not involving the USSR.
142 Johnson, Military Instrument, p. 62.
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President Carter's acceptance of the "rapid deployment 
force" and its second, interventionist purpose and his 
approval of budget programme "items" for it "emerged ... in 
detail from considerations by the Joint Chiefs [of Staff] 
along with the rest of the Defense Establishment" at meetings 
in August and September 1979 of the NSC's policy and programme 
review committees.143 At those meetings, where America's 
general security policy and "defense posture" were assessed, 
the Carter administration concluded that the US had to be 
better prepared psychologically and materially to use the 
armed forces in support of policy. This new emphasis derived 
from a now more acute awareness, caused in good part by the 
Iranian revolution, of four trends. First, the developing 
world was in "great danger of plunging into chaos"144 and in 
the Middle East "further turmoil" and instability could cause 
a major disruption in the supply of oil and harm the security 
and economic well-being of America and the West. Without the 
oil producers' recognition of the limit to the loss of oil 
supplies which the consuming states and the global economy 
could endure, the danger of international economic disorder 
almost could equal in severity the military threat from the 
Soviet Union. Second, the USSR's capacity to fight on two 
fronts and to deploy power at a distance from its territory 
was growing. Soviet military action and internal or regional 
conflicts, in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, could occur 
simultaneously and would put "heavy pressure" on America's 
conventional military "posture". Third, "future events" would 
create an increasing demand for high combat readiness and 
great speed of movement to theatres of operations but the 
United States' readiness to fight and its capability promptly
143 United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed 
Services, Preview Budget Briefing Fiscal Years 1981-1985 Five- 
Year Program. Hearings. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1980, p. 60. 
The hearings were held on December 13 and 14, 1979.
144 Ibid., p. 28. The four trends justifying the "rapid 
deployment force", its concept, purposes and programmes were 
not articulated in public, by Brown, until December 1979- 
January 1980.
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to mobilize and move large forces over long distances and to 
sustain them in combat without resort to nuclear weapons was 
inadequate. America had been able "to get away with a 
relatively unbalanced posture in recent years" not only 
because of the limited reach and "sluggishness" of 
"potentially hostile forces" but also because of the "aura of 
great U.S. military power". That "aura" had "to some degree" 
"even substituted for its substance and its presence in many 
of the disturbances with which [America has] had to 
contend."145 But, fourth, lately "expectations about the 
availability and effectiveness of American military power" 
might "have fallen too low" and unless reversed those 
expectations could "lead to miscalculations about U.S. will 
and capability, and to a growing temptation to use force 
against the United States, our allies, or our other vital 
interests —  especially if that use can be quick, economical, 
and decisive.1,146 Also, "exaggerated" perceptions of 
declining American military strength compared to that of the 
USSR had had a political impact in the Third World adverse to 
the United States; confidence in it as a serious, steady 
security actor had declined.
In order to be able to respond adequately to possible 
contingencies distant from the US and to help to restore 
America's strategic credibility and reputation in South-West 
Asia, the Executive branch decided to organize and improve the 
armed forces' capability for rapid deployment. By September 
1979 the Department of Defence had devised, in addition to the 
"rapid deployment force" concept, two major projects for 
enhancing strategic mobility. And by December, it had 
identified the units available for the "rapid deployment 
force", worked out, for the short-term at least, the command 
arrangement for it and determined the responsibilities of the 
commander of the "rapid deployment force".
145 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1981. p. 99.
146 Ibid., p. 100.
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On September 19, 1979 Brown presented to the US Senate 
the "RDF concept". Although a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict was
the most serious contingency which the U.S. must plan 
for, it is far more likely that the U.S. will find its 
interests challenged in other parts of the world either 
by the Soviet Union or bv some other power or 
circumstance. The disruption of oil supplies caused in 
part by the turmoil in Iran was a vivid reminder of how 
U.S. interests can be jeopardized by events in the Third 
World. The Middle East, Africa, and Asia remain areas of 
potential conflict. The U.S. must maintain the 
capability to dispatch appropriate forces to remote 
places in support of ... friends and allies.147 (Italics 
added•)
America's objective was "to have forces available which can be 
used to respond to a limited contingency or send (sic) to a 
second theater during a NATO war without degrading NATO 
defense." The US did not intend
to set up a rapid deployment force as a separate unit of 
a given size. Instead [it] will have rapid deployment 
forces which would be available for use in limited 
contingencies. The forces designated for rapid 
deployment would be drawn and tailored to meet the 
requirements of the contingency at hand. The Army 
component, for example, could range from a platoon of 
rangers up to a multi-division corps, numbering over 
100,000 men with supporting units. The Army elements 
would operate in conjunction with Air Force, Marine, and 
naval elements as appropriate.
The Department of Defence was "engaged in a programmatic and 
planning effort to enhance U.S. capabilities to rapidly deploy 
forces to distant parts of the world ..." and the "first step 
in this effort has been to identify units which are not 
earmarked or assigned for early deployment in the event of a
147 The U.S. Defense Budget For Fiscal Year 1981 A review by 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in testimony before the 
Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, September 
19th, 1979, Official Text International Communication Agency, 
U.S. Embassy, London, September 20th, 1979, p. 12. All
quotations in this paragraph come from this source, except 
where noted.
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NATO contingency....” ”The rapid deployment forces include 
right now”, Brown remarked in December 1979, "the greater part 
of the Marine Corps, a number of Army units including, but not 
limited to, the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault division 
and various air and naval units."148
The second step, enlarging America's stock of transport 
ships and aircraft, followed from a recognition that speed of 
response was "likely to be crucial in a limited 
contingency.1,149 As Brown declared in December, the United 
States' needs
in coping with non-NATO crises center not so much on 
additional combat forces as on our ability to move those 
forces over vast distances to where they are needed 
quickly enough to be of use. In some cases, that might 
be to turn the tide of battle; in other ..., most cases 
..., that would be to deter the outbreak of fighting in 
the first place.150
The intention here was "to cut the deployment time for the 
first substantial combat unit by at least a factor of two and 
perhaps by a factor of three from what it now is. The 
subsequent build-up would also be completed much more 
rapidly...."151 To assure that it could "deploy decisive 
force swiftly enough", Brown declared in December 1979, the 
Administration was "undertaking two major airlift and sealift 
enhancement intitiatives", which were given high priority in 
the defence budget for Fiscal Year 1981 beginning in October
148 Establishing America's New Rapid Deployment Force. Opening 
Remarks by U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown at a Press 
Conference at McDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, Thursday, 
December 27th, 1979, Official Text International
Communication Agency, U.S. Embassy, London, December 28th, 
1979, p. 1.
149 The U.S. Defense Budget For Fiscal Year 1981. p. 12.
150 U.S. Senate, Preview Budget, p. 12.
151 Establishing America's New Rapid Deployment Force, p. 2. 
This paragraph draws from Idem; U.S. Senate, Preview Budget, 
p. 11; U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1981. p. 116.
304
1980. The first initiative was 14 Maritime Prepositioning 
Ships that would carry in dehumidified storage the heavy 
equipment and supplies for three Marine brigades. Those ships 
were as important a part of America's capability to '’project" 
military power as were naval combat vessels and they would be 
stationed in peacetime in remote areas near to where US forces 
might be needed. Although not designed for amphibious 
assault, the Maritime Prepositioning Ships would be able to 
disembark their equipment over a beach if a port were not 
available. In a contingency the Marines and their kit not 
suitable for prepositioning such as helicopters would be 
airlifted in; the Marines would "marry up" with their gear and 
be ready for battle in about a week. The second initiative 
was the development and production of a fleet of an aircraft, 
the C-X, able to carry "outsize" equipment such as tanks over 
intercontinental distances. The C-X would be used in a 
conflict
to deliver the outsize equipment of the advance forces 
necessary to secure airbases or the ports or beaches 
needed by the maritime prepositioning ships to deliver 
their heavy gear. After the initial phases, they would 
assist in additional deployments, resupply and, if needed 
(sic) intra-theater movements.152
The need for prepositioning ships and additional cargo 
aircraft contributed to the Carter administration's decision 
in summer 1979 to raise the annual real increase in future US 
defence budgets from three per cent to five per cent beginning 
from October 1980. Part of the two per cent increment was 
intended for expanding the number of ships to be constructed 
for the US Navy over the next five years from 67 to 95.153 
The extra ships would better enable the overburdened Navy to 
provide the "strong maritime component" of the "rapid
152 U.S. Senate, Preview Budget, pp. 11-12. The Department of 
Defence was taking other measures too for improving US 
strategic mobility. See Chapter Six.
153 U.S. Senate, Preview Budget, p. 12.
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deployment force".
The "Hostage Crisis" and its Consequences
The taking hostage of the diplomatic staff at the 
American embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 forced the
Carter administration "to focus more acutely on the 
repercussions" real and potential of the Iranian revolution 
"for stability in the Islamic world and for Washington's 
influence in the Middle East."154 The seizure of the US 
embassy staff re-emphasized the importance and the instability 
of the Persian Gulf and it made intervention there in 
circumstances not involving the Soviet Union politically more 
acceptable to American public and Congressional opinion. The 
"hostage crisis" accelerated the organizational development of 
the "rapid deployment force" and prompted a search for 
military facilities in South-West Asia access to which would 
provide critical support for American military operations in 
a conflict and for larger naval deployments in peacetime and 
crisis. Despite the State Department's continuing doubts 
about the value of a substantially enlarged US regional 
military presence, the Administration decided that deploying 
two aircraft carrier task groups in the Arabian Sea was 
necessary for making a serious and determined response to 
events and trends in the security of South-West Asia in autumn 
1979.
In the Administration's view the revolution in Iran had 
encouraged Sunni as well as Shia fundamentalism, and religious 
ferment, shown, for example, by Shia rioting in Saudi Arabia, 
could strain further the precarious stability there and in 
other Gulf states, Pakistan and Turkey. More worrying to 
officials in the Department of Defence was the "high 
probability that Iran eventually will slide into ever- 
increasing turmoil. A breakdown of central authority ... 
would heighten chances for separatist violence, almost surely
154 New York Times. December 10, 1979.
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involving neighboring Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan.1,155 And it 
could encourage Iraq to attack Iran and seize the province of 
Khuzistan with its Arab population and oilfields. The 
likelihood of Soviet intervention in Iran '’remained small” but 
if the turmoil there worsened seriously, ”a rebellion by 
Azerbaijani separatists could invite Soviet military 
intervention”156 or
Moscow might get 'greedy', throwing its weight behind a 
drive to replace the Ayatollah's mullahs with a more 
disciplined, leftist government. A pro-Marxist takeover 
... would constitute a heavy strategic blow to the West, 
bolstering Soviet influence with radical Middle Eastern 
governments while putting new pressures on Pakistan, 
Turkey, Egypt and Israel.157
The "hostage crisis” in Iran, Brzezinski's assistants in the 
NSC noted, had deflected attention from the USSR's "growing 
intervention in Afghanistan's civil war and from a less-overt 
Soviet drive to expand influence in Yemen and Southern Yemen 
in what is seen as an effort to pressure Saudi Arabia and 
Oman."158 The security of Saudi Arabia was the "chief 
concern" of US defence planners. The Iranian revolution had 
added to the Saudis' "longstanding ... fears over the 
fragility of their monarchy"159 and to doubts about the value 
of America's security commitment to them. An arms agreement 
between the USSR and South Yemen concluded soon after the two 
states had signed a "Friendship" treaty in October 1979 had 
surprised the Americans and "deeply disturbed" the Saudis, 
reinforcing their anxiety about the potential for Soviet 
influence in Iran. Finally, in the "edgy atmosphere" of 
autumn 1979 the
155 New York Times. November 25, 1979.
156 Idem.
157 Idem.
158 New York Times. December 23, 1979.
159 New York Times. November 25, 1979.
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seizure of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia's holy city 
of Mecca, which triggered a lethal mob attack against the 
United States Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, only 
substantiated the belief of many analysts that the 
world's most important oil-producing area was indeed 
caught up in an 'arc of crisis'160
in which US influence seemed as precarious as the security of 
its interests and friends.
The "hostage crisis" was perceived in Washington not only 
as a symptom of unrest and instability in South-West Asia but 
also as a "political and psychological watershed"161 for the 
US. It was closing the post-Vietnam era of America's 
excessive international passivity, its virtual rejection 
because of felt guilt and self-doubt of even the possibility 
of armed intervention abroad. The shock from the seizure of 
the US embassy staff and frustration about the inability to 
secure their release were bringing about
an important shift of attitudes ... that, many believe, 
will have a significant long-term impact on the 
willingness of the United States to project its power in 
the third world and to develop greater military 
capabilities for protecting its interests there.
America's humiliation in Iran had stirred in the "foreign 
policy community" "an acute sense of long-term 
vulnerability...." Feeling that the US had a right to protect 
its legitimate interests anywhere in the world, that 
"community" now was tending "toward more assertive policies, 
expanded military capabilities, and an inclination to treat 
the Middle East as a sphere of influence where Washington must 
be prepared to use its power." The "jolt" to America's pride 
had made "defensive" intervention politically much more 
acceptable even to "liberal" Democratic party critics of
160 Idem.
161 All quotations in this paragraph are from New York Times. 
December 2, 1979.
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America's involvement in Vietnam such as Frank Church, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He was
prepared in principle to endorse military intervention 
even in friendly countries if Western oil interests are 
threatened.
'The highly volatile and unpredictable politics of 
the Middle East, the wave of hysteria in the Islamic 
world, the explosive possibilities of countries like 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq', ... 'all of these have led to a 
mood that we must be prepared to take action to protect 
vital interests.'
'The vital interests of the United States, Western 
Europe and Japan in Saudi oilfields would necessitate 
military action if our interests were threatened....' 
'If that required organization of strike forces, there 
would be strong support ... on Capitol Hill.'
But the more assertive mood, officials in the Executive branch 
and Congress cautioned, signified a shedding of qualms about 
the use of military force, not a "reckless rash of 
interventionism." Although a more active role, including 
direct intervention if necessary, for the US armed forces in 
the Persian Gulf and wider Third World had become politically 
more acceptable, it did
not mean everyone thinks [the Americans] should barge 
around and be interventionists. Nor does it mean that 
all problems are solvable by showing your muscles. But 
it does say that military forces are back in the array of 
Presidential options if things get bad enough and ...
resort to force was judged to be appropriate. By the end of 
1979 the potential need for "defensive" intervention within 
the Persian Gulf could be used to justify increased defence 
spending, specifically for the "rapid deployment force": "now 
... the public can see that defense spending relates to 
protecting oil supplies, and that gives it more of a bread- 
and-butter impact with more public support."
The seizure of the US embassy in Tehran and America's 
inability to secure the hostages' release by peaceful means
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caused the Carter administration to make a careful study of 
the military options for gaining their release and that drew 
high-level attention to the immense practical difficulties of 
deploying and sustaining armed forces in South-West Asia. 
Meeting with Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 
24, 1979, Carter ordered them to prepare a report in which 
they reviewed thoroughly America's military capabilities in 
the region and discussed "what could be done quickly to 
provide emergency U.S. operating access ... - overflights of 
friendly nations, transit and operating facilities available 
to U.S. forces".162 They were directed as well "to draw up a 
list of long-range options for strengthening American forces 
in the area."163 The "sobering conclusions" of their report 
presented at a National Security Council meeting on December 
4 was that "U.S. ability to project military power in the 
region - beyond a show of naval force - was extremely 
limited."164 And just sustaining the two aircraft carrier 
task groups which were in the Indian Ocean by the end of 
November in response to the "hostage crisis" and in order to 
reassure the Saudis, "to say nothing of bringing in the sort 
of major ground combat force which would be required for 
assault operations, was difficult.1,165 At that NSC meeting 
"the deteriorating situation in Iran and the growing evidence 
of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan were carefully 
assessed"166 and Carter "ruled out the use of military force
162 Washington Post. January 24, 1980.
163 New York Times. December 10, 1979.
164 Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 72. Sick observes also, 
Idem, that the high-level review of US military capability 
available for operations in the Persian Gulf "dramatized the 
perpetual dilemma of the inadequacy of military power alone to 
influence internal political events in regional states. In 
fact, it was quickly concluded that indiscriminate show or use 
of force might well be counterproductive to fundamental U.S. 
interests."
165 Washington Post. January 24, 1980.
166 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 446.
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in the crisis in Iran for the time being....”167 Then the 
meeting considered proposals for improving the United States' 
capability for military operations in the Persian Gulf-Indian 
Ocean area and decided to start looking for access to military 
facilities there and "to do so quickly. Success in this quest 
would place the United States in a position to sustain larger 
... forces ... on a routine, regular basis."168 After hurried 
study by the State Department and the Defence Department of 
which countries might provide "host nation support" and after 
consultations among Brown, Brzezinski and Vance and then 
Carter's approval of the initiative, a group of officials from 
the State Department and the Defence Department left America 
on December 17. And in the course of its week's travels it 
made successful preliminary approaches to Oman, Somalia and 
Kenya for access to their facilities.
A major proposal for improving America's operational 
capability approved by the NSC was that preparation and 
organization of the "rapid deployment force" be accelerated. 
As Brown would point out in January 1980 in his annual defence 
report, which reflected the Administration's strategic 
thinking as it had evolved in the latter half of 1979, there 
was a "wide range of contingencies that could arise in the 
Middle East", an "unstable" and "unpredictable" region. Some 
contingencies might result from Iraq's military superiority in 
the Persian Gulf. It would be "unwise to focus ... planning 
on only one specific threat —  especially a Soviet threat to 
countries [Iran] with which our relations are at present so
167 New York Times. December 10, 1979. However, the US did 
begin to prepare the means to rescue the US hostages in 
Tehran. Sick, "Evolution of Strategy", p. 72.
168 Washington Post. January 24, 1980. Access to regional
military facilities, Brown remarked in U.S. Senate, Preview 
Budget, p. 24, would provide "the ability to exert military 
power where that was appropriate and it is not always 
appropriate."
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fluid.”169 The "prospect of renewed turbulence in the Middle 
East ... and the possibility of new demands on [America's] 
non-nuclear posture" required "precautionary actions", in 
addition to increasing the US naval presence in the Gulf and 
the Arabian Sea, for helping to "contribute to regional 
stability...."170 But readying a "rapid deployment force", 
Brown stated in order to lessen worries in the Persian Gulf 
about the reviving interventionist tendency in America, should 
not
be taken to suggest a U.S. intention to threaten the 
sovereignty of any country or to intervene where we are 
not wanted. Rather, mobile, well-equipped, and trained 
conventional forces are essential to assist allies and 
other friends should conditions so dictate, and should 
our assistance be needed.171
On December 14 Brown announced that as a first step 
towards creating a "rapid deployment force" for use in the 
Middle East and other parts of the world, a Joint Task Force 
headquarters of "all elements of the U.S. military" services 
would be established "within the next few months". The Joint 
Task Force HQ would be located at MacDill Air Force Base in 
Tampa, Florida and would do the detailed operational planning 
for "any and all contingencies ... which might require rapid
169 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1981. pp. 114, 115. Kupchan, 
The Persian Gulf and the West, pp. 92-93, 100-101, asserts 
that by the latter half of 1979, America's regional 
"contingency planning had shifted to concentrate almost 
exclusively on operations against the Soviets in Iran", 
although "some planning for smaller contingencies was done on 
a more secretive basis...." The "focus on a Soviet 
contingency was meant to stimulate a more substantive 
response" from the military bureaucracy, thus giving 
sufficient momentum to the process of modifying America's 
security policy and strategic policy for South-West Asia.
170 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1981. p. 115.
171 Ibid., p. 116.
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deployment of forces.172 It would train, exercise and prepare 
units of the "rdf" for deployment and employment and it would 
be subordinate to Readiness Command in peacetime, Brown 
remarked on December 27, 1979. But in the event of a crisis 
the "commander of the Joint Task Force would become the 
deployed forces (sic) operational commander if a deployment is 
mounted" and "he would report either to the unified and 
specified commander in the area [of operations] or else he 
could report under certain circumstances directly to
headquarters in Washington."173 The decision by Brown to 
place JTF HQ under the aegis of Readiness Command but to give 
it a significant amount of autonomy - it had direct access to 
the JCS via a liason office in Washington - had been taken for 
a "political" and a practical purpose: to minimize contention 
within the military bureaucracy about command arrangements 
which would delay establishing a body to take on
responsibility for preparing the "rdf". Readiness Command had 
asserted that its proposed command of rapid deployment 
operations came from what was already its responsibility but 
the Navy and the Marines and other actors, in the Department 
of Defence and the NSC, pointed to the need for an
independent, unified command for the Persian Gulf region which 
would include all the armed services.174
The importance of speed of movement was a constant theme 
in Brown's discussion of the "rapid deployment force". It 
had, he remarked in December 1979,
to be able to move very, very quickly in some cases. In
my judgment, there will be times in which what counts is
172 U.S. To Establish * Rapid Deployment Force' International 
Communication Agency, U.S. Embassy, London, Tuesday, December 
19th, 1979.
173 Establishing America's New Rapid Deployment Force, p. 2.
174 On the compromise arrangement for the US command structure 
for South-West Asia, see Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the 
West, pp. 86, 90, 108; Johnson, Military Instrument, pp. 62- 
63.
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whether [the US] can very quickly be in an area with a 
modest capability because that is ... likely to prevent 
a conflict. I believe as between the super powers 
particularly, the deterrent effect of having ... forces 
there, even in a rather modest size, will be very 
great.175
Brown's view that "getting there first with the right kind of 
capability may be even more important than getting there 
second with the most"176 was shared by Brzezinski. In 
asserting that "the outcome of any Soviet-American military 
confrontation in the Persian Gulf could be determined by the 
speed with which the two sides could send forces to the area", 
he espoused the idea of a "quick-action force ... used not 
only to react to a military crisis but also to strike first to 
prevent one....1,177 (Italics added.) As he stated on 
December 18, 1979
'The Rapid Deployment Forces of the United States, which 
are currently being developed, will give ... the 
capability to respond quickly, effectively and perhaps 
even preemptively in those parts of the world where [US] 
vital interests might be engaged and where there are no 
permanently stationed American forces.'178 (Italics 
added.)
Although he' did not indicate "whether seizure of Middle East 
oil fields by forces hostile to the United States would 
automatically precipitate use of the RDF", Brzezinski was 
"'talking about [hostile invasion] of countries, [blocking] 
access to resources, [and threats to] certain strategic 
areas'.... 'It is up to the president to decide, when 
circumstances dictate it, what action to take.'"179 (Brackets 
in text.)
175 U.S. Senate, Preview Budget, p. 53.
176 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1981. p. 117.
177 Washington Post. December 20, 1979.
178 Idem.
179 Idem.
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Even with "its full complement of programs" enabling it 
to be ready to fight, to move rapidly and to sustain itself in 
combat, the "RDF" was acknowledged by Brown
not [to] be a panacea for all crises. It must function 
within a broader economic and diplomatic policy, one that 
has relevance and support in an area. Then our RDF can 
be a highly effective instrument of US policy which can 
be used especially in crises in which friends look to us 
for a rapid and substantial US force commitment. It will 
not solve all our international problems, but it will 
allow us to better protect our security interests and our 
friends around the world.
• • •
In all cases, even those in which the RDF has little 
direct utility, there is an immeasurable deterrent value 
in having the RDF capability. The knowledge that the US 
has such a capability, and is willing to use it, will 
have a substantial effect on the thinking of any would-be 
aggressor.180
The "little direct utility" of the "RDF" was pointed up by 
Brown in "theoretical assessments of what could have been 
done" with it in several "situations".181 The "RDF would not 
have been useful in controlling the social and religious 
forces which brought down the Shah." There was "little that 
the RDF could have done directly to obtain the release of the 
[US] hostages [in Tehran]" but "with an RDF already in place 
the Iranians could not assume that we would resort only to the 
UN or moral suasion. They would have been faced, from the 
beginning, with a harder choice." Afghanistan's remoteness
180 U.S. Senate, Preview Budget, p. 72. As Brown would observe 
in U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1981. pp. 28, 62, military 
power could support diplomacy, "discourage overt outside 
intervention in a particular dispute", encourage steadfastness 
by friends and even, "at a heavy price", defend America's 
interests and restore the conditions of its security. But 
military power "is never a sovereign remedy for our problems. 
And there are many occasions when its use would be 
counterproductive, or other instrumentalities could be 
profitably substituted for it."
181 All quotations in the rest of this paragraph are from U.S. 
Senate, Preview Budget, p. 72.
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from the US and its proximity to the USSR made it '’doubtful 
that the RDF would have been a viable military response to the 
massive Soviet invasion" beginning in late December 1979. 
However, knowledge of America's rapid deployment capability 
"could have deterred the Soviet Union from acting as it did, 
and, in an area where vital US interests are involved, like 
certain Gulf states, it could be used actively to oppose 
external aggression." Had South Yemen's attack upon North 
Yemen in winter 1979 been larger and directly supported by 
Cuban forces, it could "have required a rapid and substantial 
US commitment. The RDF ... would be ideally suited for such 
a requirement, whether in a back-up role or mobilized in the 
area to prevent a wider war."
Besides preparing a "rapid deployment force" and seeking 
access to facilities in South-West Asia, the Carter 
administration had to decide how best to manage with too few 
ships for the Navy to meet standing American security 
commitments and its new Indian Ocean duties at the same time. 
The two aircraft carrier task groups deployed in the Arabian 
Sea as of December 1979 on what soon became a continuous basis 
were drawn one each from the usual pair of aircraft carrier 
task groups in the Mediterranean and the western Pacific. 
Pending the addition of more ships to the Navy, Brown observed 
in testimony to the Senate in December 1979, "reallocation" 
was "one of the few operational courses" available over the 
next few years for alleviating the strain on it.182 The 
Department of Defence was also "looking at home porting 
additional ships in [the western Pacific] so as to shorten 
transit times, transferring some of the [US Navy's] missions 
to allied navies and locating [American] ships from [the 
western Pacific] to the Indian Ocean...."183 The
Administration deliberated too about asking its allies in 
Western Europe and Japan to take more responsibility for
182 Ibid., p. 42.
183 Idem.
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defence of their home waters and help to compensate for the 
shortage of US naval ships. In its view the American naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean contributed to protecting their 
interests just as much as if the US aircraft carrier task 
groups were back in the Mediterranean and the western Pacific.
Maior Modification of Policy. 1979
By the end of 1979 America had changed the basic emphasis 
in its strategic policy for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area 
from display at sea to preparation for combat on land. It had 
made deterrence against the USSR and also Iraq more direct and 
active and it had taken up intervention as a policy option. 
The US was beginning to prepare a "rapid deployment force" 
with which to strengthen deterrence and to intervene, if 
necessary. It had increased its naval display in the Arabian 
Sea and was starting to introduce an "approximate" land force 
presence in South-West Asia as part of enhancing deterrence 
and display.
The United States modified its strategic policy even 
though it recognised that the threats to its interests were 
more political than military and came more from within the 
Persian Gulf than from the USSR; that America's armed forces 
were inappropriate for dealing with unrest within states; that 
the need for direct US military involvement at the regional 
level was not urgent; and that direct Soviet aggression was
improbable. It was clear too, Brown acknowledged, that the
"rapid deployment force" was "not ... a panacea for all
crises" and in some cases had "little direct utility". 
Nonetheless America had to play a greater strategic role, 
according to Brzezinski's predominant view in the
Administration's policy revision: threats to America's "vital" 
interest in access to oil, whether from "turbulence" within 
(friendly) states, Iraqi aggression or a Soviet Union 
"tempted" by opportunity in a weak Iran, were sufficiently 
more possible and the consequences of loss of that access dire 
enough to be taken seriously. And if an enemy did attack, his
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strike might be very quick and present a fait accompli. Less 
able after the Iranian revolution to provide for their 
military security, friendly states might, it was assumed, 
accommodate to the USSR and to Iraq in ways harmful to US 
interests. Also, only the United States could balance the 
Soviet Union's political use of its armed forces.
Initial preparations for potential operations in the 
Persian Gulf region concentrated on improving the speed of 
movement from the US by land-based forces in order to prevent 
a quick enemy success. But for the near- and medium-term the 
incipient "rapid deployment force” was too small, slow and 
unprepared to meet major attacks. The military basis of 
deterrence was weak and the risk of failure was high. In 
order to "avert” it in a large conflict with the USSR, quite 
possibly America would have had to resort to tactical nuclear 
weapons. The US Navy's role in combat would be secondary but 
it remained important for display and for assuring security at 
sea: the Saudis had asked the Americans to increase their
patrolling of the shipping lanes.
While US combat power available for Gulf contingencies 
was small, the likelihood of actual aggression against direct 
US interests was low. Most of the time the American armed 
forces had primarily political objectives to fulfil: to
impress regional states and the USSR by preparation and 
display that the US had major interests in the Persian Gulf 
and that it had capability and a renewed resolve to protect 
them, thereby fortifying deterrence; to restore a balance of 
"will-power” with the USSR and better balance the Soviet armed 
forces and to reassure friendly states about America's 
seriousness and reliability as a security actor. For America 
to restore its declined strategic reputation was just as 
important as adequate available power for contributing to its 
objectives.
In principle land and air forces emplaced at bases in the
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Persian Gulf would best help to achieve the above objectives 
because they would demonstrate with most substance and 
immediacy, thus credibility, the United States' readiness to 
secure its interests. But friendly inner Gulf states were 
unwilling to cooperate with it and refused to grant access to 
their facilities. They were anxious that a conspicuous 
American military presence would aggravate internal and 
regional politics, which were their primary sources of 
security - as well as insecurity - and more important than the 
Soviet political or military threat. They feared too the 
danger of America's reviving interventionist tendency. From 
the United States' point of view, by compelling it to keep its 
presence at a distance safe to them, inner Gulf states' denial 
of use of their bases weakened politically its display and 
deterrence and further weakened the military basis of 
deterrence. Although strategic nuclear weapons and the home- 
based "rapid deployment force" helped to meet friends' 
preference that the US deter Soviet aggression from the 
"global" level without endangering them, the former was too 
abstract and extreme and the latter was too far away for 
impressive display in the region. And although important, an 
enlarged naval presence alone was inadequate for signalling 
America's greater concern with security on land. Thus the 
best, most acceptable and feasible, way for the US to display 
from "over the horizon" combined an enhanced naval presence 
with a planned "approximate" land presence of intermittent 
visits by land, air and Marine detachments for demonstrations, 
training and exercises, expanding Diego Garcia and 
prepositioning on it equipment for use in emergencies by the 
"rapid deployment force" and making use of acquired access to 
facilities in Oman, Somalia and Kenya.
The general framework of a modified US strategic policy 
for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area had been developed by 
the end of 1979. The next chapter will analyze that policy, 
whose elaboration in 1980 was accelerated by the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER SIX 
ELABORATION 07 POLICY, 1980
In response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 
America accelerated in 1980 the elaboration of its modified 
strategic policy for South-West Asia of increased display, 
more direct and active deterrence and greater preparedness for 
intervention. Deterrence of the USSR would be enhanced by a 
"cooperative security framework" of states which would 
organize informally for collective defence as well as for 
political opposition to it. The US proposed to deter an 
unlikely "worst case" Soviet attack into Iran by the speedy 
movement of a small "trip-wire" force for precluding, if not 
pre-empting Soviet contingents from occupying critical 
positions. Also it would threaten "horizontal escalation" - 
widening the scope of a conflict to regions beyond South-West 
Asia - or "vertical escalation" - raising the level of 
intensity of a conflict perhaps to the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons. The Carter administration intended to prepare a 
capability for sustained conventional regional defence in 
order to enhance the credibility of deterrence. At the 
regional level, should a friendly Gulf state be attacked, the 
US would intervene, if necessary and requested but preferably 
indirectly, without combat forces. Intervention within a 
friendly state subject to major unrest in order to "rescue" a 
regime or to "protect" access to oil was not ruled out in 
private but the suitability, practicability and success of 
military action was much in doubt. The US continued to 
emphasize the important political role of the armed forces for 
influencing the perceptions and expectations in peacetime of 
South-West Asian states and the USSR and it went ahead with 
initiatives for preparing the Rapid Deployment Force and 
acquiring access to military facilities as part of 
establishing an "approximate" regional land presence.
This chapter outlines the "Carter Doctrine" and
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"cooperative security framework" for containing further Soviet 
"expansionism" and reviews America's regional security 
objectives in light of its interests in South-West Asia and 
the assessed threats to them. Then it analyzes the United 
States' strategic policy, its purposes, concepts, assumptions 
and contradictions and the debate within the Department of 
Defence about the appropriate policy to adopt. America's 
military presence in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area is 
detailed and the purpose, organization, weaknesses and planned 
improvements for the "Rapid Deployment Force" are discussed. 
The Chapter concludes with a survey of America's negotiations 
for access to regional military facilities in accordance with 
the "network concept" of logistic support.
The "Carter Doctrine"
The "Carter Doctrine" provided the general justification 
for America's security policy and strategic policy for South- 
West Asia. Its sources were Carter himself and Brzezinski, 
whose views (see Chapter Five and below) influenced him 
strongly. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan changed 
Carter's perception of the USSR's intentions abroad and led 
him to take a globalist view of them. The Soviet Union was a 
military predator more determined to expand its influence than 
to reach an accommodation with the United States. Soviet 
regional involvements formed a dangerous global pattern of 
geopolitical expansion; they were not discrete and local in 
character, with little cumulative general consequence. 
America now had to confront, compete with more vigorously and 
contain the USSR and Carter was more willing to use the armed 
forces in order to deter or meet Soviet military "challenges" 
in South-West Asia and elsewhere. This approach informed the 
"Carter Doctrine's" main strategic principle:
An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the 
vital interests of the United States of America, and such 
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force.1
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Although America could not know fully the Soviets' motives for 
intervening in Afghanistan or their objectives for South-West 
Asia, it had to be prepared for a potential Soviet attack 
intended to seize Persian Gulf oilfields and the best 
preparation was to prevent its occurrence.2
Carter viewed the Soviet intervention in the context of
1 All quotations in this section are, unless noted, from 
President Carter's "State of the Union" address (January 23,
1980) in U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. pp. 468-471.
2 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 960, is scathing 
about the Administration's "over-reaction" to the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan and its failure to assess why the 
USSR intervened.
The punitive, confrontational-containment approach 
adopted by the U.S. government, which did not even 
attempt to weigh the Soviet motivation, led directly if 
unwittingly to a response keyed to the least likely 
Soviet motivation - pursuit of a relentless expansionist 
design.
The administration's cop-out (sic) on the question 
of Soviet motivations was underlined by the careful 
references to the inability to know with "certainty" the 
"precise" Soviet motives, a defensive formulation. It 
became increasingly evident at least to those close to 
the situation that the Soviet motivation had been 
predominantly the shoring up of a slipping existing 
Soviet hegemony in Afghanistan, rather than control over 
anyone's oil or vital sea lanes.
The Carter administration's excessive response to the Soviet 
intervention probably was caused by a confluence of factors. 
An approaching election, a deteriorating economy, a growing 
conservative mood in the US, increasing dissatisfaction with 
detente with the Soviets and a strong revived distrust of 
them, frustration with the unresolved hostage crisis and a 
general crisis atmosphere all put Carter under much pressure. 
Unpopular, identified with America's perceived weakness, 
inconsistency, ineffectiveness and decline in international 
affairs and having "confessed" his naivety about the USSR's 
political intentions, he now had to show that he was "tough on 
the Soviets" and that he was "doing something" not just to 
penalize and discipline the Soviet Union but also to reassert 
America's will and power.
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“three basic developments”: the steady growth of Soviet power 
beyond that required for the USSR's legitimate security needs 
and the increasing capability of Soviet forces to operate 
outside the Soviet Union; the “overwhelming dependence of the 
Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East” and 
America's “excessive dependence on foreign oil [which] is a 
clear and present danger” to US security; and the “press of 
social and religious and economic and political change in the 
many nations of the developing world - exemplified by the 
revolution in Iran.” The USSR's intervention showed its 
readiness to use force against a Third World neighbour and, 
more concretely, by eliminating the Afghan buffer between 
itself and Pakistan, the Soviet Union's armed forces had come 
to
within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the 
Straits (sic) of Hormuz - a waterway through which much 
of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now 
attempting to consolidate a strategic position ... that 
poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East 
oil.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan posed a new threat to 
Pakistan and Iran, which were “now far more vulnerable to 
Soviet political intimidation.1,3 Were that pressure effective 
or if the Soviets used Afghanistan as a stepping-stone for 
further military expansion, they would extend their control to 
"adjacent countries", command the oil resources of the Persian 
Gulf and also reach the "warm water ports" of the Indian 
Ocean.4
In order to warn the USSR and prevent further
3 United States, President, Jimmv Carter 1980-81 Public Papers 
Of The President Of The United States Book 1 - January 1 To 
May 23, 1980 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1981), p. 165. For Brzezinski's analysis of the implications 
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, see Wall Street 
Journal. January 15, 1980.
4 U.S. President, Jimmv Carter 1980-81. pp. 22, 40.
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"expansionism" by it President Carter gave the authority of 
his office to establishing America's vital interest in the 
Persian Gulf and its commitment and resolve to protect its 
interests there with "military force” against an (Soviet) 
"assault”. The United States' immediate, more specific 
response to the Soviet intervention consisted of censuring and 
penalizing it. The US secured a vote at the United Nations by 
a large majority condemning the intervention and calling for 
the USSR to withdraw its forces. It imposed economic 
sanctions such as reducing grain sales and denying the Soviets 
permission to fish in its waters and access to its high 
technology. Attempting to reassure Pakistan about potential 
Soviet aggression against it was a further immediate measure. 
The Americans reconfirmed their security agreement of 1959 
with it under which they would consult with it in the event of 
(a)n (Soviet) attack and take the appropriate mutually agreed 
action, including resort to force, necessary to protect it. 
Buttressing the Pakistanis' defensive military capability was 
"a matter of the most urgent concern" and the US made an 
offer, spurned by them, of arms assistance (see Chapter 
Seven). It sought as well to arrange an international 
consortium for extending economic aid to Pakistan.
Reassurance and aid for Pakistan was also seen by the 
Carter administration as one element of a longer-term response 
based on "collective efforts" for containing and deterring the 
Soviet threat to South-West Asia. Demanding resolute action 
for many years to come, that response required the 
participation of "all those who rely upon oil from the Middle 
East" and "consultation and close cooperation with countries 
in the area which might be threatened." The United States 
"was prepared to work with other countries in the region to 
share a cooperative security framework" and it would further 
strengthen political and military ties with them. Cooperation 
on request with regional states for enhancing their defensive 
capability and coordination of efforts to assure regional 
security between the US and states (US allies) outside South-
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West Asia were critical for complementing America's regional 
military presence and home-based rapid deployment forces. 
That was because America did not possess "the ability 
unilaterally to defeat any threat to [the Persian Gulf] with 
ease.1,5
The perceived immense importance of the USSR's 
intervention in Afghanistan and the Administration's sustained 
high-level response to it galvanized the previously sluggish 
Defence Department and State Department into elaborating and 
beginning to implement a strategic policy for the Persian 
Gulf-Indian Ocean area and a security policy for guiding it.
The "Cooperative Security Framework"
America's strategic policy for the Persian Gulf-Indian 
Ocean area derived from its interests there, the perceived 
threats to them and its security objectives, and that policy 
was part of the proposed "cooperative security framework" for 
the broader multilateral protection of US and friendly 
regional states' interests. According to Harold Saunders, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs and responsible for the detailed articulation of US 
security policy for South-West Asia, "[m]ore significant 
American interests come together [there and in the Middle 
East] than in any other area of the developing world today."6
5 Ibid., p. 241.
6 From U.S. Policy Toward The Persian Gulf. Southwest Asia. And 
Indian Ocean Area —  A Cooperative Security Framework. 
"Prepared Statement Of Hon. Harold H. Saunders, Assistant 
Secretary Of State For Near Eastern And South Asian Affairs" 
in U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 9. For 
discussions of American interests in South-West Asia, the 
threats to them and US regional objectives, see Richard P. 
Cronin, "US Interests, Objectives, And Policy Options in 
Southwest Asia", in U.S. Strategic Interests In Southwest 
Asia, ed. Shirin Tahir-Kheli (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1982), pp. 39-67; Shahram Chubin, "US Security Interests in 
the Persian Gulf in the 1980s", Daedelus 109 (Fall 1980), 31- 
65; Dennis Ross, "Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian 
Gulf", International Security 6 (Fall 1981), 159-180. For 
more recent discussions, consult J.E. Peterson, Defending
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Those interests had "changed little in nature, but ha[d] grown 
in importance"7 since the early 1970s. They took "cognizance" 
of
—  the area's strategic location and its significance to 
maintaining a global strategic balance;
—  the significance [the United States] place on the 
sovereignty and independence of these countries as part 
of a more stable world. (sic)
—  the world's vital need for the region's oil; and
—  the importance of these states in international 
finance and development and as markets for [US] goods and 
technology.8
The US valued the region's freedom from the USSR's 
interference or predominant influence: now more urgent after 
the Soviet "move" into Afghanistan, a "prime interest" of 
America had "long been to prevent the establishment of an 
adversary position which could affect [US] access, undermine 
the region's security and lead to confrontation.1,9 America 
was interested in Israel's security and in the resolution of 
regional disputes, above all in a "comprehensive peace" 
between Israel and the Arab states which would resolve the 
Palestinian issue. Stability was an important US interest and 
it meant "orderly" political, economic and social development, 
channelling change in "constructive directions", the 
continuity of political orientation of states friendly to the
Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 118-138; Thomas L.
McNaugher, Arms And Oil U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian 
Gulf (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 
pp. 1-18, 23-46, 91-126.
7 From The U.S. Relationship with the Arab Peninsula States on 
the Persian Gulf. "Prepared Statement of Hon. Harold H. 
Saunders, Assistant Secretary Of State For Near Eastern And 
South Asian Affairs" in U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. 
p. 338.
8 Idem.
9 Ibid., p. 10.
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West and their continuance as responsible "moderate” actors in 
the international political and economic system. The United 
States had an interest too in human rights and nuclear non­
proliferation in South-West Asia.
The possible threats to America's regional interests were 
discussed by Saunders and by Brown, who viewed those threats 
primarily with reference to the West's access to Persian Gulf 
oil. According to Saunders
[i]n the light of historic Russian objectives and 
expansionism into Central Asia, the Gulf states have good 
reason to be apprehensive about the possibility of direct 
Soviet military intervention. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan gives a tangible quality to this longstanding 
concern.10
"People" in South-West Asia had "long expressed concern that 
the Soviet objective is to achieve a path to warm waters 
through Baluchistan or to move to the Gulf with the additional 
objective of controlling the West's sources of oil."11 If the 
Soviets remained in Afghanistan, they would have "a base of 
operations closer to not only the Strait of Hormuz, but to the 
ocean. They [would] have a basis from which to encourage 
subversion in various tribal areas of Pakistan and Iran, and 
thereby open a corridor to the sea...."12 As for whether the 
"invasion" of Afghanistan was an "initial Soviet step to seek 
access to warm water ports",
the basic point ... is that the threat is there and 
prudence requires that [the US] deal with it as if [the 
USSR were seeking access.] But we are not predicting 
that that is going to happen. We are not even saying 
that the Soviets necessarily went into Afghanistan for 
that larger purpose. But the fact that they are there
10 Ibid., p. 345.
11 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
12 Ibid., p. 51.
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creates the possibility and the capability to go on.13
The "turbulence in revolutionary Iran" offered a "further 
immediate possibility for the Soviets which could give them a 
direct opening into the Persian Gulf and its oil and a further 
lever with which to upset domestic stability in the Gulf 
region."14 There was also worry that the absence of
strong central authority in Iran could lead to repetition 
of Soviet occupation of portions of that country at the 
end of World War II. The growing strength of the 
Communist Tudeh party in Iran could contribute to a 
situation which the USSR could exploit.15
When asked whether America's "chief concern" about the Soviet 
Union was a "direct military threat or an indirect political 
subversion threat", Saunders thought that "maybe the 
subversion is the more likely first step than another overt 
mi 1 itary move. "16
There was further the "Soviet-backed military threat or 
the political pressure such threat can bring to bear"17 on 
Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Gulf Arab states.
Over the years Gulf governments have been concerned 
about Soviet military support for and political influence 
in radical neighboring states with aggressive policies. 
In the last decade the Marxist regime in South Yemen, 
strongly backed and heavily armed by the Soviets, fought 
border actions against Saudi Arabia, supported the 
insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province, and last year 
invaded North Yemen. The Soviet position in Ethiopia, 
combined with a prominent Soviet role in South Yemen, 
increases the vulnerability of the Bab-al-Mandab/Red Sea
13 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
14 Ibid., P- 345.
15 Ibid. P- 11.
16 Ibid. P- 52.
17 Ibid., P- 349.
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access and intensifies the concern of the Gulf 
countries.18
The USSR had also provided "significant support to other 
governments and liberation movements”.19 Of concern was "not 
whether the Soviets control those governments or 
organizations" but "whether the Soviets have positioned 
themselves to take advantage for their own purposes of 
situations in which the interests of both parties coincide."20 
The security of the conservative Gulf Arab states was 
"influenced by rivalries, tensions and violence in the wider 
region - in the Arab/Israel dispute, in Lebanon, in parts of 
Africa, and ... in the current tension between Iraq and 
Iran...."21 Within the Gulf itself, according to Saunders, 
there was "not a great threat of aggression of one nation 
against another..., with the possible exception of Iraq, and 
potentially of Iran once Iran pulls itself together."22 The 
primary worry in the Gulf states was internal subversion and 
the "external component of internal instability."23 They 
faced other domestic "challenges": the modernization process, 
the large influx of foreign workers, large numbers of well 
educated youth with high expectations, developing modern and 
flexible political and social institutions and possible 
opposition to Sunni governments from Shia minorities urged on 
by the Shia regime in Iran.
In the view of Brown and the Department of Defence
U.S. policy with respect to the Persian Gulf faces two
18 Ibid., 348.
19 Ibid., p. 11.
20 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
21 Ibid., p. 350.
22 Ibid. , p. 52.
23 Idem.
329
nightmares. The first is a cut-off of exports [of oil] 
as a result of disruption within the region; and the 
second is that of Soviet political or military control of 
the resources of the region, which would put Europe and 
Japan in the role of Soviet vassals. If the Soviets 
clearly control those exports of the Gulf states, or even 
just control those exports above the level that the Gulf 
states need for their current foreign exchange needs, 
Soviet political influence over Western Europe and Japan 
would clearly be immense. In fact, it would not have to 
be made explicit in order to loosen or even destroy the 
ties of alliance that those countries have with the 
United States. ... The threat of that particular Soviet 
sanction would really work and work well.24
Taking a "worst case” orientation, he identified a ’'hierarchy 
of risks of cutting oil exports” beginning with the most 
likely cases and ending with the more extreme ones. First 
were the conflicts, the "tension and turmoil" within and 
between regional states which were rooted in historical, 
political, religious, national and social factors. The 
"indigenous instability, in some cases fomented and fanned by 
outsiders, poses serious political and military challenges"25 
to the United States. Were there a fundamental change in 
political complexion within one of the major oil-exporting 
states arising from internal conflict, such as had happened in 
Iran, or within a combination of exporting states, it could 
cause a major reduction in the supply of oil from several 
million barrels up to ten million barrels a day. "Even more 
severe could be the result of major wars within the region."26
24 Harold Brown, "U.S. Security Policy In Southwest Asia: A 
Case Study In Complexity", The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy 
Institute In Washington, School of Advanced International 
Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C. (April
1981), p. "4". This address and also Harold Brown, Thinking 
About National Security Defense and Foreign Policy in a 
Dangerous World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 
pp. 141-159, are assumed quite probably to draw from PD-63, 
the last Presidential Directive of the Carter administration. 
Completed in January 1981 PD-63 was its most advanced thinking 
about US security policy and strategic policy for South-West 
Asia. Note Brzezinski, Power And Principle, pp. 468-469.
25 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. p. 22.
26 Brown, "Case Study", p. "4".
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Regional conflicts '’wider-spread” than the Iraq-Iran war, 
"even without superpower participation but involving a number 
of major oil-producing states, could cut oil exports by 10 or 
even 15 million barrels a day, depending on which and how many 
were involved."27 It was conceivable too that in response to 
another Arab-Israeli conflict the oil "weapon" might again be 
used in an attempt to influence the West. Another danger was 
the possibility that some states in South-West Asia might 
acquire a capability to produce nuclear weapons. That would 
intensify tensions and conflicts and neither regional nor 
American security interests would be served by a raising of 
risks to stability. "A third, more severe, scenario involves 
a gradual or creeping Soviet political dominance over various 
elements of the region", "more severe because it's less likely 
to be reversed than the effects of the other developments."28 
"Soviet control" tended to last a long time when it was "of a 
country or a region contiguous to the Soviet Union. Such a 
creeping Soviet political dominance would involve increasing, 
and eventually major, Soviet control over decisions about oil 
exports and about pricing."29 The "chain of events" in that 
process "could involve modest Soviet incursions in border 
areas in the guise of supporting indigenous ethnic or 
political movements, accompanied by major arms transfers and 
by military advisers."30 The fourth scenario presented "the 
most formidable military challenge in terms of what would be 
needed to defeat it. ... This is a massive and direct Soviet 
military attack aimed at military conquest of the Persian Gulf 
oil fields, destroying or gaining control of them."31 Because 
of the unfavourable military balance between the US and the 
USSR in South-West Asia, one less stable than in Europe, "at
27 Ibid., p. "5".
28 Idem.
29 Idem.
30 Idem.
31 Idem.
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least for a time the Soviets could well see less military risk 
in an adventure [there] than they would in Europe.”32 The 
prize was an enormous temptation,
nearly as great as would be offered by a successful 
military move in Europe because control of Persian Gulf
oil would carry the fruits of dominating Europe and
Japan. That combination makes Southwest Asia the most 
dangerous area of the world in terms of the prospects of 
a superpower confrontation.33
Nonetheless a Soviet adventure was ”a rather unlikely 
contingency.1,34 The "chances of early Soviet military action 
... are ... rather low” because the "risks, though not as high 
as in Europe, are still considerable.1,35 The Soviets would be 
deterred by knowledge that the West's response to their 
"mortal threat” to its vital interest in access to Gulf oil 
would by one means or another lead to thermonuclear war.
Moreover the Soviets probably saw "less risky political moves 
in Southwest Asia which also offer the prospect of very
significant advantages to them.”36 The Soviet Union's 
dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf was and would 
remain even less than America's, thus removing the narrow 
economic motive for an attack. And there was "nothing to stop 
them from buying oil and ... there should be nothing to stop 
them from buying oil if they have the foreign exchange.”37 
The Carter administration perceived that although in view of 
its intervention in Afghanistan the USSR seemed more willing 
to use its armed forces, it was unlikely to take direct 
military action against the Persian Gulf states or Pakistan.
32 Ibid., p. ”8”.
33 Idem.
34 Ibid., p. ”5”.
35 Ibid., p. ”9”.
36 Idem.
37 Ibid., p. "13".
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From a global and long-term perspective, the Soviet Union was 
the primary and most formidable military threat but more 
immediately it was mainly an indirect threat: its strategic 
challenge to South-West Asia and the West's interests there 
remained pre-eminently political in nature. The Soviet 
Union's armed forces were intended more for helping to 
influence regional states' perceptions and policies to its 
advantage than for active coercion. HTurbulence” within 
regional states and conflicts between them were likelier 
threats to the security of South-West Asia.
Following from an assessment of its interests in South- 
West Asia and the threats to them, America's regional security 
objectives were to protect access to Persian Gulf oil; to 
assure the safety of shipping; to check the expansion of 
Soviet power and influence: to limit interference in regional 
states by the Soviet Union and to counter the political use of 
its armed forces, to deter further direct Soviet military 
intervention and to avoid war with the USSR; to promote the 
security, territorial integrity and independence of friendly 
states in the Persian Gulf and of Pakistan and to reassure 
them about America's resolute commitment to regional security, 
with particular regard to the USSR; to encourage their 
stability and orderly development; to advance the Middle East 
"peace process"; and to discourage nuclear proliferation.
The Carter administration's assessment of the security 
threats to South-West Asia reflected the outlook of 
Brzezinski, who generated specific propositions underpinning 
the proposed "cooperative security framework". The United 
States, he asserted, was "prepared to use force, if necessary, 
to protect its vital interests"38 in South-West Asia. At 
bottom its commitment to regional security rested on a 
willingness to use its power and there should be no doubt 
about that resolve. For anyone to contest America's vital
38 Wall Street Journal. January 15, 1980.
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interest would be "most unwise", even though unlike in Western 
Europe and the Far East, the US did not possess formal treaty 
relationships, obligatory security commitments which would be 
"automatically triggered" (by a Soviet attack) or a 
"permanent, on-the-ground military presence" which proved the 
serious and sustained nature of its security commitment 
against the USSR. That was because political conditions in 
South-West Asia were "much more nuanced and complex" than 
anywhere else; the regional states' sensitivity about their 
independence and suspicion about any foreign presence, 
ideological differences among them and their values and 
cultures would not allow the creation of a replica of NATO.39 
Aware of this, the US was "prepared ... to work to create a 
cooperative security framework for the region in a variety of 
ways."40 Something "much looser than a formal alliance was 
needed to convey [US] recognition of the political 
sensitivities of the countries in the region and yet at the 
same time provide a sufficiently explicit assurance of 
American involvement."41 Although "physical or formal 
arrangements of the kind ... associated with ... other areas" 
were not required "in all cases", nonetheless the trend was 
"towards increased American military presence in the region, 
towards greater utilization of available facilities...."42 
Brzezinski attached "very great importance" to the "rapid 
deployment force", which was "designed to give the United 
States the versatility which the present situation 
requires."43 Developing a credible structure for security in 
South-West Asia was a "new", "major" and "enduring" US 
commitment and its importance extended beyond that region. By 
moving "to contain a possible Soviet push" into South-West
39 Idem.
40 Idem.
41 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 444.
42 Wall Street Journal. January 15, 1980.
43 Idem.
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Asia and to deter Soviet pressure on it, he concluded, the 
United States was maintaining the global balance of power on 
which stable deterrence of the USSR and "dialogue" with it was 
founded.
In view of the "heightened", if still indirect Soviet 
threat to the Persian Gulf and that region's reduced 
capability for self-defence, the purpose of the "cooperative 
security framework" was to enhance protection of regional 
states' independence and security by organizing stronger 
political resistance to the USSR and military deterrence 
against it. A "framework", informal because of regional 
political sensitivities, would widen the basis of South-West 
Asian security and consist of friendly states, America and its 
European allies and Japan collaborating in political, economic 
and military combinations. Saunders described it as much more 
complicated than CENTO or the Nixon Doctrine because it was a 
"collection" of America's and other states' security policies 
which "built on" and "intensified" those policies.44 And 
although the United States had to take the lead in creating 
the "cooperative security framework" because only it could 
deter a large Soviet attack, it would make "the maximum effort
44 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 46. For two 
documents, from which this thesis has already drawn, setting 
out the "conceptual framework" guiding America's pursuit of 
its security objectives, see U.S. Policy Toward The Persian 
Gulf. Southwest Asia. And Indian Ocean Area —  A Cooperative 
Security Framework, presented to the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee's Subcommittee On Europe And The Middle East on 
March 24, 1980 and found in Ibid., pp. 8-22; The U.S.
Relationship with the Arab Peninsula States on the Persian 
Gulf, Ibid., pp. 338-360. Presented on September 3, 1980, the 
latter document was the "centerpiece of a significant policy 
review". Newsom, "America Engulfed", discusses critically 
America's revised Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area security 
policy and its strategic aspects. Although directed at the 
early policy of the Reagan administration, Christopher Van 
Hollen, "Don't Engulf the Gulf", Foreign Affairs 59 (Summer 
1981), 1064-1078, makes observations pertinent to the Carter 
government's policies for South-West Asia. Steven L. Speigel, 
"Does the United States Have Options In The Middle East?", 
Orbis 24 (Summer 1980) , 395-410, suggests of what a US
"framework" for regional security ought to consist.
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to help nations in the area through military supply programs 
and other devices to defend themselves. That is ... the first 
line of defense...."45 Assisting regional countries to 
generate as much of their own security as possible was an end 
in itself as well as a crucial means by which to limit 
opportunities for Soviet meddling.
Not just Brzezinski recognised the difficulty in 
establishing a "framework". Saunders and Brown noted the many 
conflicts and "complex and cross-cutting issues" in South-West 
Asia which America could neither avoid nor resolve. Also, 
although the US and friendly regional countries had many 
mutual interests and common security concerns, their priority 
of perceived threats and thus of security objectives and 
policy emphasis differed. The US had to take into account, 
remarked Saunders, a "view in the [G]ulf of the security 
threats in that area that does not see the global strategic 
balance as the only security problem ... nor a strong U.S 
military position as the only response to the threats they 
face. ...,|46
Consistently these governments assert that absence of 
peace in the Middle East is the primary threat to Middle 
East security, including the stability of the Gulf 
region. They regard tensions and alienations created by 
a third of a century of conflict between Arabs and 
Israelis as the main source of Soviet influence in the 
region, as a leading contributor to revolution and 
radical political currents throughout the Middle East, 
and as the primary obstacle to developing the sort of 
firm relationships with the US which their national 
interests otherwise call for.47
America's support for Israel and its sponsorship of the 
"separate peace" between Egypt and Israel made closer 
political association between the US and the conservative Gulf
45 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 26.
46 Ibid. , p. 335.
47 Ibid. , p. 352-353.
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states (except Oman) an impossibility which prevented their 
acceptance of a large, land-based US military presence. The 
Soviet-American rivalry thwarted the formation of a 
"cooperative security framework" because while looking to 
America to contain Soviet military threats, the Gulf states 
preferred that the US did so "by actions outside the region 
and in a way that minimizes their involvement. They greatly 
fear that the area will become an arena of superpower 
confrontation.1,48 That a larger, "too visible" US regional 
military presence could increase the risk of internal unrest 
in many Gulf states worried Brown, according to whom in 
"Southwest Asia more than in the other regions, [the] two 
major categories [of a "cooperative framework"] - military and 
non-military - display a degree of conflict with each other in 
any attempt to build a security structure."49 Yet the United 
States' and its allies' vital interests and its precautionary 
prudence about potential Soviet military action gave the US 
"no choice" but to try to form a security framework of "loose" 
and "widespread" arrangements.
The political dimension of the "framework" involved 
consulting with friendly South-West Asian states and with US 
allies about short- and longer-term responses to the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan. Saunders repeated Carter's 
statement in the "State of the Union" address on January 23, 
1980 that there were "'no irreconcilable differences between 
[America] and any Islamic nation'" and that the US was "'ready 
to cooperate with all Moslem countries,'"50 among whom 
Brzezinski mentioned in January 1980 two states unfriendly to 
America: Iraq and Libya. Islam and the regional states'
nationalism were viewed as important "bulwarks" against Soviet 
interference. The Americans looked forward to the eventual 
restoration of working relations with Iran once the US
48 Ibid., p. 345.
49 Brown, "Case Study", p. "6".
50 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 18.
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diplomatic hostages were released and they sought to 
consolidate the rapprochement with Pakistan begun after the 
Soviet intervention. The United States encouraged cooperation 
among the conservative Gulf Arab states for security, with 
Saudi Arabia seen to take the leading role. It supported, for 
example, initiatives begun in late 1980 to establish the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. At the heart of its own political 
contribution to the "cooperative security framework”, America 
resolved to carry on with the Middle East "peace process”, 
which it considered to be the "only practical approach" to an 
enduring peace between the Arabs and the Israelis and a just 
settlement of the Palestinian issue.51 Peace would reduce 
instability within the Gulf states and the opportunities for 
the USSR to exploit those tensions or those between 
conservative and "radical" Arab states. "Not the least of the 
reasons for strengthening the political structure" in South- 
West Asia, in Brown's opinion, was that
the countries that are threatened must be willing and 
must be seen to be willing to fight in their own defense, 
as have the people of Afghanistan. The political 
framework needs to project the perception, and reflect 
the fact, that the U.S. is not trying to dominate the 
area itself, only to offset the threat of Soviet 
domination.52
Further, the United States had to obtain sufficient 
participation in the "framework" by its European allies, 
despite their "differing estimates" of the priority of 
security threats to South-West Asia, in order to "satisfy both 
domestic and international needs for a perception that this is 
not a unilateral U.S.-Soviet matter but a matter that involves 
people in the other parts of the world who get the oil."53 
Satisfying US domestic opinion was necessary for maintaining 
its support for the Administration's commitment to help uphold
51 Ibid., p. 353.
52 Brown, "Case Study", p. "10".
53 Ibid., p. "13".
security in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area.
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In the economic part of the regional security 
"framework", Brzezinski and Brown identified oil as the "key" 
factor. America and the other industrialized democracies had 
to undertake long-term energy and broader economic programmes 
in order to reduce consumption of oil, stockpile it and 
thereby lessen dependence on Gulf oil and reduce the danger 
from a sustained disruption of its flow. The US, its allies 
such as West Germany and Japan and rich regional states such 
as Saudi Arabia had to provide economic development assistance 
for the larger, more populous but poor states of South-West 
Asia, principally Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan. In order to 
help those countries to "resist external efforts at political 
destabilization" America asked the wealthier Gulf states to 
provide them with funds for military assistance.
As for the military element of the regional security 
"framework", Brzezinski indicated that a security structure 
could not be "only or primarily a military structure, although 
the military component is critical."54 Informal,
complementary military collaboration - or, as Brown put it, 
"the establishment of a pattern of quiet consultation and 
parallel pursuit of common security goals"55 - among America, 
its allies and friendly regional states was very important for 
creating a more credible balance of power which would help to 
deter further Soviet intervention in South-West Asia. "Even 
in the probable absence of a Soviet military attack", 
according to Brown, "the likely military prospects in case of 
such a Soviet invasion will influence peacetime political
54 Building A Security Framework In The Persian Gulf An 
Address by the President's National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski to the Canadian Club of Montreal, December 5th, 
1980, Official Text, International Communication Agency, U.S. 
Embassy, London, December 8th, 1980, p. 2.
55 Harold Brown, "Protecting U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf 
Region", DoSB 80 (May 1980), 65.
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attitudes in the region.”56 Thus "the political balance ... 
will be the more favorable to [America] the more the West is, 
and is seen to be able, to offset Soviet military 
capabilities. ”57
Meeting the objective of deterrence will require a 
combination of local forces for self-defense, U.S. forces 
present in the area, and, as appropriate, U.S. and other 
forces capable of rapid deployment to reinforce 
threatened areas.
In most cases - indeed, to some degree in all cases 
- local forces in a country under attack or directly 
threatened would mobilize for its defense. [The United 
States] cannot hope, nor ... plan, to defend peoples in 
the region who will not help defend themselves. By that 
same token, where we are involved, we do not expect to 
stand alone. Because aggression against one could spread 
to threaten all, others in the regions may well - and 
surely ought to - join in the collective defense. The 
kinds of assistance they would contribute would vary from 
case to case, ranging from providing necessary access and 
support facilities to mobilizing forces alongside our own 
to deter and engage an enemy.58
The inadequacy of South-West Asian states' forces for 
defending against a Soviet attack meant that "a larger 
relative force contribution would be required of the United 
States, and perhaps of other Western countries, [in order] to 
establish acceptable ratios of forces with ... the Soviet 
Union"59 and to reassure regional states that there was a 
deterrent and counter to Soviet aggression. But it was
the response of the nations and peoples of the region to 
a Soviet invasion - in the form of political activity, 
conventional military action, or guerrilla operations and 
harassment - [which] would have a major effect - perhaps
56 Brown, "Case Study", p. "8".
57 Ibid., p. "4".
58 Brown, "Protecting Persian Region", p. 65.
59 Brown, Thinking About Security, p. 148.
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the decisive effect - on the outcome.60
US security assistance to Saudi Arabia and some of its 
Gulf neighbours was a “significant factor" in helping them to 
create a "modern defense capability" necessary "to be secure 
from Soviet-backed military threat or the political pressure 
such threat can bring to bear ...,"61 according to Saunders. 
That reasoning fitted in with Brown's general view of American 
security assistance that it was in many cases (not directly 
involving the USSR) needed for enabling "local forces to be a 
preferable and effective alternative to direct commitment of 
U.S. forces to defend shared interests in some parts of the 
world."62 Also the United States' military supply
relationship with countries such as Egypt, Jordan, North 
Yemen, Oman, Somalia and Kenya contributed, in Saunders' view, 
"not only to their own self-defense capabilities, but to their 
feeling of stability and their willingness to share in the 
common security effort."63
Besides supplying arms and other kinds of military aid to 
states in South-West Asia, America's European allies and Japan 
would have to cooperate with it in a "division of labour" for 
defence of their mutual regional interests. "In some cases", 
Brown observed, "their contributions can be direct 
continuing naval presence, airlift and sealift assets, mobile 
forces. In others, it can be indirect - providing access and 
transit rights" for facilitating the movement of a Rapid 
Deployment Joint Task Force "or increasing their share of the 
defense burden in their own area to compensate for [America's] 
greater effort in securing access to Persian Gulf oil."64
60 Ibid., p. 149.
61 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 349.
62 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. p. 30.
63 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 15.
64 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. p. 33.
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Under the new "division of labour” the United States' allies
must be prepared to meet the gap in NATO defenses that 
could result from the possible diversion of U.S. forces 
to meet the security requirements for [South-West Asia]. 
The European allies must provide more airlift for rapid 
movement of reinforcements to Europe to replace U.S. 
airlift needed for operations outside the NATO area. 
They must also provide additional maritime forces and 
develop more reserve units to fill the gap created by 
U.S. reinforcements designated for NATO that could be 
deployed elsewhere. The U.S. reinforcements require 
increased host nation support and infrastructure to 
replace U.S. support needed in Southwest Asia in time of 
crisis.65
65 Ibid., p. 79. When the Carter administration left office in 
January 1981, the US and its NATO allies had only begun to 
analyze the implications for the Alliance of America's 
strategic policy for South-West Asia and to deliberate about 
how to reconcile the two "sides'” differences concerning that 
policy and about what the allies' contribution to a military 
"division of labour" ought to be. Limited space prevents more 
than a brief noting here of NATO Europe's initial resentment 
about America's hasty over-reaction to the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan without consulting it, its disagreement with 
the US about the nature of the Soviet threat to the Persian 
Gulf and (the need for) a military response to that threat and 
its view that America could not reasonably expect its support 
about an issue which, however momentous, lay outside NATO's 
area of responsibility. The "rapid deployment force" concept 
and a strategy for the RDF's potential use had not been 
thought through and it had little capability for credible, 
sustained operations. Its use might worsen, not enhance 
security in the Persian Gulf and US military involvement there 
against the USSR could pose serious danger to Europe: it could 
lower the nuclear threshold and weaken deterrence by diverting 
support forces and later arriving combat reinforcements 
putatively available for operations in Europe and it could 
jeopardize detente by "importing" from the Gulf tension, if 
not a greater possibility of confrontation.
On NATO Europe's relations and potential military 
cooperation with the US apropos of Persian Gulf security, see 
Gregory F. Treverton, "America And Europe After Afghanistan", 
NATO's Fifteen Nations 25 (April-May 1980), 27-31; United
States, Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, United 
States-Western European Relations In 1980. Hearings Before The 
Subcommittee On Europe And The Middle East. 96th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1980; United States, Library Of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, Nato After Afghanistan Report Prepared For 
The Subcommittee On Europe And The Middle East Of The 
Committee On Foreign Affairs, U.S. House Of Representatives By 
The Foreign Affairs And National Defense Division, Committee
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Other "important tasks" for the NATO allies consisted of 
making real annual increases in defence spending of at least 
three per cent for many years to come and following through on 
the Alliance's Long-Term Defence Programme for improving its 
armed forces. Japan had to increase its responsibility and 
capability for defence of its territory and the airspace and 
sea lanes in its vicinity. The involvement of America's 
allies with it in the military part of the security 
"framework", even if a French and British naval presence were 
the only direct contribution, was quite valuable not only to 
help deter the USSR and to reassure regional states but also 
to show the West's unity of purpose and cooperation. 
Otherwise the US Congress would soon refuse "to carry an 
unfair share of the total burden" for defence in South-West 
Asia and the American government would be forced to reduce its 
plans and programmes.66 In addition the US hoped to develop 
forms of parallel security cooperation with the People's 
Republic of China.
Print, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980; Karl Kaiser and others, 
Western Security; What has Changed? What should be done? 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1981);
Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, pp. 160-209; Shahram 
Chubin, "Western European Perceptions of Europe's Stake in 
Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean Security", in The Great Game, ed. 
Rubinstein, pp. 117-147; North Atlantic Assembly, Political 
Committee, Interim Report Of The Sub-committee On Out-Of-Area 
Security Challenges To The Alliance AB 207 PC/OA (84)2, 
International Secretariat, November 1984; Marc Bentinck, 
NATO's Out-of-Area Problem Adelphi Paper No. 211 (London: 
International Institute For Strategic Studies, Autumn 1986); 
Dov S. Zakheim, "Towards a Western Approach to the Indian
Ocean", Survival 22 (January-February 1980), 7-14;-- , "Of
Allies and Access", The Washington Quarterly 4 (Winter 1981), 
87-96; David M. Ransom, Lawrence J. McDonald, W. Nathaniel 
Howell, "Atlantic Cooperation For Persian Gulf Security", in 
Essays on Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1984), pp. 79-102; Christopher Coker and 
Heinz Schulte, "A European Option in the Indian Ocean", 
International Defense Review, no. 1 (1980), pp. 27-34.
66 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. p. 84.
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US Strategic Policy: Purposes. Concepts. Assumptions.
Contradictions and Debate
According to Brown the "inherent gravity” of a Soviet 
attack into South-West Asia and the "likelihood that it would 
lead to or be associated with a war . •. [elsewhere] make 
deterrence of such an action a high priority of U.S. policy in 
the region and the central goal of U.S. military policy 
there."67 How America tried to generate that deterrence will 
be examined farther below. But, as shown, the Carter 
administration judged a Soviet attack to be the least likely 
immediate threat to South-West Asia. Saunders, for example, 
pointed out in September 1980 that although the Soviet 
military "buildup" in Afghanistan had laid the "foundation" 
for potential further Soviet action, it was "at this point 
almost entirely related to events inside Afghanistan."68 Yet 
because the Administration was uncertain about the balance 
over the longer term between offensive and defensive motives 
for the Soviet intervention, it could not in prudence assume 
safely that the intervention was primarily defensive. And 
preparing for the "worst case", however improbable, was part 
of taking principal responsibility for deterring and 
countering politically the USSR.
More probable than large-scale Soviet aggression were 
"modest incursions" into neighbouring states by Soviet forces, 
their political use, indirect forms of Soviet military 
intervention and the USSR's employment of political and 
economic instruments of policy. In Brown's view an American
67 Brown, Thinking About Security, p. 147. Strategic policy 
was meant as well to underpin broader US policy: without a 
firm foundation in military potential, America's political 
policy would be "barren". See "Prepared Statement Of Hon. 
Robert Komer, Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy" in U.S. 
House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 66.
68 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 364. At this time, 
however, the Administration was quite concerned in private 
about signs of an impending Soviet attack upon Iran. See fn. 
124 below.
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military presence in South-West Asia, "if only a rotating 
presence - or even an occasional presence ... to show how 
quickly [the US] can get in there, would help deter some of 
the less extreme Soviet possible military actions."69 But he 
was not sure by how much. Countering the political uses of 
the Soviet armed forces and indirect intervention by the USSR 
required increasing the display of US power and resolve. But 
as in the case of "Soviet efforts to gain political domination 
of Southwest Asia by infiltration or other nonmilitary means", 
Brown understood that the "United States cannot prevent such 
attempts; it can only seek to reduce their effectiveness and 
to respond."70 America's conventional military strength was 
not the most important element in resisting Soviet 
"encroachment" but although its role was "limited", it was 
still necessary and "significant".
A U.S. military presence, an ability to introduce 
military forces into the region, arms transfers, and 
joint military planning and exercises with countries in 
the region can all be influential in dampening regional 
conflicts, helping the important states ... to achieve 
internal stability, and encouraging political resistance 
to Soviet influence. A U.S. military capability seen as 
usable ... will also affect Soviet perception of the 
costs and gains of political penetration.71
"As evidence of U.S. commitment and as a deterrent to the 
Soviets", Brown recognised, "even a small U.S. presence on the 
ground would be useful."72 Yet "especially if it is mistimed
69 Brown, "Case Study", p. "12". For discussions of the 
military aspect of the super-powers' political competition in 
the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East, see Shahram Chubin, 
"Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Political 
Dimension", pp. 124-133, and Jonathan Alford, "Soviet-American 
Rivalry in the Middle East: The Military Dimension", pp. 134- 
146, in The Soviet Union In The Middle East, eds. Dawisha and 
Dawisha.
70 Brown, Thinking About Security, p. 150.
71 Idem.
72 Ibid., p. 156.
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or if it is perceived to be directed at the countries of the 
region or at control of rather than access to their [oil]",73 
"[t]oo visible a U.S. presence”, and a permanent one much 
more, ”will increase the risk of internal unrest in many 
nations ...”74 and of friction between states. Thus
even if the resources were available for U.S. military 
actions clearly sufficient to prevent Soviet political 
domination or military conquest, they would probably have 
to be scaled down and stretched out to avoid 
counterproductive political effects that would outweigh 
the direct and indirect benefits.75
If for political reasons American ground forces supporting 
regional resistance against "creeping” Soviet "encroachment" 
could not be based in South-West Asia,
some small number ... would have to be able to be moved 
in very quickly on request of somebody in the region. 
For that purpose, [the US] ... would not be talking about 
three divisions or six divisions. [It] might be talking 
about a brigade or even a battalion. Being able to move 
that quickly on request becomes very, very important.76
Within the Persian Gulf the objectives of US strategic 
policy were, as the Administration had established in 1979, to 
show a more active interest in friendly states' security and 
a stronger commitment to contribute to it, to reassure those 
states and to re-establish America's credibility as a 
dependable security actor. At the regional level the US 
sought to enhance its friends' deterrence of potential foes by 
tacitly threatening to intervene and reinforce them, 
preferably indirectly, if they faced imminent attack and 
requested its help. At the internal level the Carter 
administration recognised that the armed forces were not
73 Ibid., p. 150.
74 Ibid., p. 156.
75 Ibid., p. 150.
76 Brown, "Case Study", p. "12".
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acceptable or very suitable for dealing with disturbances. 
But although difficult and dangerous, an intervention in order 
to "protect” access to oil implicitly was not ruled out. 
Political discretion - trying to avoid the adverse 
consequences of even seeming to threaten regional states - was 
ample reason why American policy did not mention outright a 
direct strategic role within the Persian Gulf. The Gulf 
states' anxiety, Brown noted, about "being intimidated by 
Western forces make an explicitly declared policy on defense 
against local threats unwise."77 And as for the sensitive 
issue of "whether the United States should plan to protect the 
oil fields against internal or regional threats", he 
considered that an "explicit commitment ... is more likely to 
upset and anger the oil suppliers than to reassure them."78
The "most immediate threat to stability in the Indian 
Ocean area", high ranking defence officials in the Carter 
administration acknowledged, was "internal instability, coups, 
subversion",79 sabotage and terrorist activity. The formal US 
policy towards the conservative Gulf states set forth by 
Saunders declared that the US "will not intervene in the 
internal affairs of any country."80 America's "ability to
77 Brown, Thinking About Security, p. 157. Potential uses of 
the US armed forces within the Persian Gulf are discussed by 
McNaugher, Arms and oil, pp. 160-198; Hackett, "Protecting Oil 
Supplies"; Peterson, Defending Arabia, pp. 172-177; Challenges 
for U.S. National Security Assessing the Balance: Defense 
Spending and Conventional Forces A Preliminary Report, Part 
2 Prepared by the Staff of the Carnegie Panel on U.S. 
Security and the Future of Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), pp. 177- 
181; Kemp, "Contingency Planning and Persian Gulf Options", 
pp. 69-72, 74; Collins and Mark, Use Of Force To Ensure 
Supplies: United States Congress, Congressional Budget Office, 
U.S. Ground Forces: Design And Cost Alternatives For NATO And 
Non-NATO Contingencies (n.p., 1980), pp. 55-62.
78 Brown, Thinking About Security, p. 157.
79 U.S. Senate, Defense Authorization Hearings On S. 2294. 
p. 445.
80 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 351.
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influence internal events in the gulf (sic) states remains 
limited",81 and working with Gulf governments in order to 
channel rapid economic and social change in "constructive 
directions", so that they would avoid following the path of 
imperial Iran, was the "only way" to deal with it. Although 
it intended principally to provide a "global umbrella" for 
regional stability against the USSR, America had expressed 
"concern for the [internal] security of the countries of the 
area, [but] not as [part of] a formal alliance or in any way 
that commits [the US] to respond to their call."82 "There 
can't be a policy", Saunders remarked further, "which one 
proclaims in advance."83 Were a monarchical government under 
serious threat of overthrow, the United States would respond 
"in the context of the situation - including the social forces 
present at that time."84 "As a practical matter" in an 
internal crisis, "the people inside the country properly deal 
with the situation. In some cases ..., they will turn to 
neighbors and try to deal with it in a regional context."85 
But if the crisis "goes beyond that, and there is a request 
for help from some quarter (sic) that is the issue which would 
have to be addressed at that time."86 Queried whether he 
"contemplated" the use of American military power in order "to 
prevent the take-over of a country through subversion by pro- 
Soviet forces", Brown replied that the US "would repel an 
external attempt to control from outside" but it was not "in 
the business" of trying "to determine what happens in the
81 Ibid., p. 335.
82 Ibid., p. 372.
83 Idem.
84 Idem.
85 Idem.
86 Idem.
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internal political evolution of various governments.”87 
Military force was "not a very effective or an acceptable way 
... of doing that."88 Military strength, he pointed out in 
January 1980 in the annual US defence report, would "not by 
itself often be productive in dealing with the basic causes of 
disorder in this tumultuous world ..." but in "some 
circumstances, it may be our only recourse."89 A year later, 
in his last defence report, he mentioned a "Western need to 
deter, or cope with, ... indigenous instability"90 as well as 
Soviet "adventurism". And were a coup attempt, not 
necessarily by "pro-Soviet forces", imminent in Saudi Arabia 
or the United Arab Emirates, a "quick Western intervention 
before ... a coup succeeded, in response to a request from 
what was seen as a legitimate authority resisting such a 
change, might be the only way to save the situation,"91 in 
Brown's view. On the other hand, a "Western intervention 
after a change in a Persian Gulf state could well polarize 
internal attitudes and forces against the intervening 
power."92 Recourse to arms, the Administration recognised as 
a general proposition, would signify a failure of policy.
According to Brzezinski Carter approved in 1980 his "idea 
for developing a very small rapid intervention force, capable 
of very quick reaction, for the purpose of helping a friendly 
government under a subversive attack."93 A small force, "even
87 Meeting The Soviet Challenge An interview with U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (Reprinted from "U.S. News 
and World Report", February 11, 1980, published at Washington, 
D.C.) , Official Text, International Communication Agency, U.S. 
Embassy, London, February 12th, 1980, p. 4.
88 Idem.
89 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1981. p. 62.
90 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. p. vii.
91 Brown, Thinking About Security, p. 157.
92 Idem.
93 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 450.
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if only of battalion size, could prove politically more 
valuable than a full-scale division deployed ten days or two 
weeks later."94 Further, contingency plans were reported to 
have been prepared for assisting "a friendly nation to
maintain or restore internal order at the request of that
nation's Government" and for "[s]eizing the oil fields if
saboteurs or terrorists threaten to strangle supplies to the 
Western industrial nations or Japan."95 But with regard to 
intervention in friendly Gulf states for the purpose of 
restoring access to oil cut off for political reasons, a
possibility not precluded by background briefings on US 
strategic policy, Brown thought that the economic need of the 
industrial countries could not justify that recourse.96 He 
"judged" such an "adventure" to be "unsustainable in practical 
terms, partly because of the existence of the Soviet Union",97 
which might launch a counter-intervention as the welcomed 
protector of the Gulf against "Western imperialism". And even 
if the USSR held back, "Western forces - [including] the 
larger ones needed to counter the Soviets - are unlikely to be 
able to keep the oil flowing in the ... circumstances of a 
legitimate regime's wishing to turn it off."98 Also, oil 
facilities were quite vulnerable to sabotage or destruction by 
the local population. "The determinant of a potential U.S. 
response" to an internal, or external, threat to a friendly 
state's oilfields
should be whether ... a legitimate regime asks for 
assistance and whether it and its people are themselves 
prepared to fight.... Such [threats] could arise, so it 
is appropriate for the United States to prepare plans and 
maintain the corresponding capabilities. The required 
capabilities are much less than, and somewhat different
94 Idem.
95 New York Times. September 26, 1980.
96 Brown, Thinking About Security, p. 144.
97 Brown, "Case Study", p. "6".
98 Brown, Thinking About Security, p. 157.
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from, the capabilities required to counter the threat of
a massive Soviet invasion.99
At the inter-state level of America's strategic policy 
for South-West Asia, history and US security policy ruled out 
a deterrent role and direct military involvement in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, in the intermittent fighting between Somalia 
and Ethiopia, in a renewal of war between Pakistan and India 
or in the war between Iraq and Iran beginning in September 
1980. And although in the Persian Gulf America's policy now 
was more direct and active deterrence, because Iran no longer 
was the intermediate deterrent between local states and the 
"ultimate” US deterrent/protector, America's deterrence still 
had to retain a tacit,100 cautious and indirect character, 
from political necessity. It had to be tacit and cautious, 
with military help available as discreetly as possible in the 
background, at a politically safe distance, because (as shown 
in Chapter Five) the conservative Gulf Arab countries viewed 
the US as a source of political embarassment, if not danger 
and as a potential military threat. American deterrence could 
remain indirect in the sense that actual military security in 
the Gulf had not deteriorated to the extent that friendly 
states could not (at least claim and appear to) take primary 
responsibility for their initial defence. Compared to its 
religious and political challenge, Iran did not pose a serious 
military threat to them. And Saudi Arabia's and Kuwait's 
relations with Iraq, long their chief political and military 
antagonist, had improved as a result of Iran's challenge to 
them all. Nonetheless the Saudis in particular were very 
anxious about the potential danger caused by their military 
weakness relative to their two large neighbours and they were
99 Idem.
100 The tacit character of US deterrence at the regional level 
was brought out in a major speech by Brown. While 
concentrating on deterrence against the USSR, he remarked, 
America "must be able, if need be, to defeat aggression at 
various levels." (Italics added.) Brown, "Protecting Persian 
Region", p. 65.
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exceedingly defensive in outlook and lacked confidence in 
their armed forces. Quiet US reassurance of them was very 
important. Thus American deterrence had to be more active 
than in the Shah's era in order to display greater 
preparedness to contribute to friendly states' security, 
especially in crises when they felt that their armed forces 
alone might not be able to cope adequately. If requested by 
a friend immediately threatened or under attack, America would 
launch a "supportive intervent ion preferably by indirect
means (arms supplies, advisers and logistic support, for 
example) but in a more direct way involving the actual use of 
US combat forces if needed, in order to reinforce the friend. 
A US intervention would take place, it was hoped by the Carter 
administration, as part of a joint military as well as 
political response by regional and perhaps other external 
powers.
Indirect intervention or deployment by moderate-sized 
naval or air forces or both, rather than the threat or use of 
a large number of American ground troops, were suggested by US 
policy-makers to suffice to help deter or deal with probable 
regional threats to friends. Thus Robert Komer, Under
Secretary of Defence for Policy in 1980, asserted that the 
"sizable naval presence in the Indian Ocean" of US aircraft
carriers and surface combatants augmented by periodic
deployments of fighter-interceptor aircraft from America and 
small Marine forces "will provide a deterrent to regional 
instibility (sic)."101 The United States' "near-term
planning" for South-West Asia, Brown pointed out in the annual 
US defence report in January 1981, "has considered a number of
"Supportive intervention" is "the contribution of ... 
additional capability to redress the military balance. A 
measure of cooperation by the country being supported is 
assumed, including the use of facilities on land." Michael 
MccGwire, "Projection of Force by External Powers", in The 
Indian Ocean, eds. Dowdy and Trood, p. 401.
101 U.S. Senate, Defense Authorization Hearings On S. 2294. 
p. 482.
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potential non-Soviet contingencies where a relatively small 
RDJTF would be adequate.1,102 "In small-scale conflicts, the 
United States may play a low-level role involving advisory 
teams, Special Forces, and logistics...."103 Noting that the 
conservative Gulf Arab countries could generate "a substantial 
measure of their own security against normal[?] intraregional 
threats",104 Saunders stated that America's "peacetime 
military presence" would be an "additional element in assuring 
the security of the area"105 against a "Soviet-backed military 
threat" to Saudi Arabia and its neighbours from Marxist South 
Yemen.
Saunders and members of the Department of Defence might 
have viewed America's ad hoc help to North Yemen against South 
Yemen's attack upon it in February-March 1979 as an indication 
of the approximate limit of its involvement in regional 
conflict indirectly supported by the USSR. The Americans had 
"collaborated closely with the Saudi government" to whose 
security the South Yemeni attack was perceived as an indirect 
threat. The US had "provided military supplies with the 
cooperation of the Saudi Government to North Yemen. [It had] 
sent training teams there to help in placing the equipment in 
the Yemeni forces"106 and it had also sent an aircraft carrier 
task group to the area as a demonstration of concern for the 
security of North Yemen and Saudi Arabia and of resolve to 
help uphold it. The US had "responded in a forceful way, and 
that response was adequate to the needs of that 
situation.1,107 America's strategic response sufficed also 
when shortly after the Iraq-Iran war began, Saudi Arabia
102 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. p. 191.
103 Idem.
104 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 362.
105 Ibid., p. 349.
106 Ibid. , p. 57.
107 Idem.
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requested its help to deter possible Iranian air attacks upon 
it and the US sent AWACS aircraft and stationed a cruiser with 
surface-to-air missiles off the Saudi Gulf coast. The cruiser 
was part of an American naval force in the Gulf of Oman and 
the Arabian Sea which with British, French and Australian 
naval contingents deterred Iran from threatening the passage 
of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Finally American 
strategic planners addressed the largest regional contingency 
with which the Rapid Deployment Force might have to contend: 
11 [R]epelling an incursion from a ... nation, such as Iraq, 
into the oil-producing nations around the Persian Gulf.”108 
Apropos of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, that contingency was, as 
noted, unlikely. It became even more unlikely after Iraq went 
to war with Iran (but in the middle 1980s the possibility 
arose that Iran might break through Iraqi defences and attack 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia).
Generating "adequate” deterrence against direct Soviet 
aggression, however improbable, meant redressing as far as 
possible the unfavourable balance of super-power forces 
available for regional operations by improving America's weak 
capability for defence. But as part of enhancing deterrence 
more immediately, the US sought to play on the Soviets' fear 
of a confrontation with America and its consequences; it 
indicated that it would pre-empt a Soviet attack's movement to 
critical positions with a "trip-wire” force and it invoked the 
possibility of escalating a conflict, whether to the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons or by spreading it to other regions.
It was true, Brzezinski observed in retrospect, that
when the commitment to the security of the Persian Gulf 
was made the United States was not in a position to meet 
the Soviet Union on the ground, ... matching man for man 
or tank for tank. Geography and logistical complexities
108 New York Times. September 26, 1980.
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made that impossible.109
But as a practical matter there was
no way for the United States to reach the conclusion 
secretly that the Persian Gulf is in [its] vital 
interest, then to build up [its] military forces in order 
to have the capability of responding locally, and only 
then to announce that the United States is committed to 
such a defense. In a democracy ..., only a public 
commitment is capable of generating the necessary 
budgetary support and the other decisions that are needed 
to implement a commitment. In the meantime, the very 
awareness in Moscow and elsewhere of America's engagement 
serves as the immediate deterrent.110 (Italics added.)
The purpose of the "Carter Doctrine"
was to make the Soviet Union aware of the fact that the 
intrusion of Soviet armed forces into an area of vital 
importance to the United States would precipitate an 
engagement with the United States, and that [it] would 
then be free to choose the manner in which [it] would 
respond. In fact, in [the Administration's] private 
contingency preparations, I made the point of instructing 
the Defense Department to develop options involving both 
"horizontal and vertical escalation" in the event of a 
Soviet military move toward the Persian Gulf, by which I 
meant that [the US] would be free to choose either the 
terrain or the tactic or the level of ... response.111
109 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 445.
110 Ibid., p. 446.
111 Ibid., p. 445. The use of American armed forces to deter 
and deal with Soviet military action in South-West Asia is 
considered by NcNaugher, Arms And Oil, pp. 47-86, who 
emphasizes the force planning and operational aspects of US 
strategy; Albert Wohlstetter, Meeting The Threat In The 
Persian Gulf European-American Institute for Security 
Research RS-11-1 (April 1981); Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Strategy 
for the Rapid Deployment Force", International Security 5 
(Spring 1981), 49-73; Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, 
pp. 109-118; Kemp, "Contingency Planning and Persian Gulf 
Options", pp. 67-69, 72-76; Geoffrey Kemp, "Military Force And 
Middle East Oil", in Energy And Security, eds. David A. Deese, 
Joseph S. Nye (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1981), pp. 365-387; (Carnegie Endowment Staff,) 
Challenges For U.S. National Security. pp. 172-177; 
Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Ground Forces, pp. 48-52.
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The American government, according to Brown's analysis, 
had to adjust its strategic policy for South-West Asia in 
light of nuclear parity between the US and the USSR. The end 
of America's “overwhelming nuclear predominance" made 
unfeasible the "pure" "trip-wire" approach of immediate, 
automatic nuclear retaliation which "was effective in 
deterring the Soviets in Europe (and perhaps also was working 
in Southwest Asia)...."112 The reformulation of America's 
regional strategic policy had to take into account the 
argument that the vital importance of Persian Gulf oil would 
in itself pose a substantial deterrent to a Soviet attack into 
South-West Asia because attacking a vital interest could lead 
to thermonuclear war. That was indeed "one element of 
deterrence of certain extreme Soviet military action. But how 
it would work would depend very much on circumstances.1,113 
There was the danger, albeit small, of a "fast" Soviet attack 
into South-West Asia which would enable the USSR to attain its 
objectives sufficiently speedily that the US would not have 
time to present a conventional defence. And because of 
nuclear parity the Americans might well decide not to escalate 
the conflict and use nuclear weapons.
If the U.S. forces could be pushed out very quickly, then 
[the conflict] might not escalate; and ... it would be 
the same calculation in Europe that might bring a Soviet 
attack there: an expectation or a hope to overrun Western 
Europe so quickly that the nuclear escalation would not 
take place during that overrun, and after the successful 
occupation it would not take place either.114
Such a military success would alter "what the Soviets call the 
correlation of forces suddenly and shockingly enough so that 
the coherence of U.S. alliances might dissolve very 
quickly.... What steps the U.S. would then be able to take is
112 Brown, "Case Study", p. "12".
113 Ibid., p. "4".
114 Ibid., p. "12".
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not an easy problem.”115
An effective conventional deterrent against a Soviet 
attack would involve, in addition to regional and perhaps some 
allied forces, Brown stated in March 1980,
both U.S. military presence in a troubled region and U.S. 
forces which can be quickly moved to it. What is 
important is the ability rapidly to move forces into the 
region with the numbers, mobility and firepower to 
preclude initial adversary forces from reaching vital 
points. It is not necessary for ... initial [US] units 
to be able to defeat the whole force an adversary might 
eventually have in place. It is also not necessary for 
[the US] to await the firing of the first shot or the 
prior arrival of hostile forces; many of [the American] 
forces can be moved upon strategic warning and some upon 
receipt of even very early and ambiguous indications.116
Pre-emption, mentioned by Brzezinski in December 1979, by 
Brown above in all but name and in June 1980 by General P.X. 
Kelly, the first commander of the Rapid Deployment Force, was 
a "critical idea" influencing US planning for military 
operations in the Persian Gulf region. According to Brown, 
whoever got there "first with a respectable force has an 
advantage as between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, because it 
is the other side that then has to escalate if it wants to 
attack the area that is occupied by the force that got there 
first."117 Putting the burden of initial engagement on the 
Soviet Union was important "because whoever first attacks the 
other's forces ... is creating a very, very grave risk."118 
Thus "[h]aving one U.S. division quickly in the area, within 
a matter of a week, ... or even a brigade in a matter of a few
115 Ibid., p. "4".
116 Brown, "Protecting Persian Region", p. 65.
117 United States, Congress, House, Committee On Appropriations, 
Department Of Defense Appropriations For 1981. Hearings Before 
The Subcommittee On The Department Of Defense, pt. 1, 96th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, p. 588.
118 Idem.
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days - may be much more valuable than having a plan that will 
get three divisions there in three months....”119 American 
forces could undertake one or both of two "possible strategies 
for the defense of the oil fields of the Gulf": "holding a 
line on the Zagros Mountains or holding an enclave around the 
oil fields themselves.1,120 Quick movement in order to pre-
119 Idem.
120 Brown, "Case Study", p. "8". US Army doctrine pertaining 
to how the United States would hold an enclave around the 
oilfields in Khuzistan is discussed in Desert Operations FM 
90-3 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department Of The Army, 
1977), p. 1-2:
The most likely situation that could involve US 
forces in desert operations is one in which a country had 
requested assistance against a mutual enemy operating in 
or against the country concerned. US Army forces could 
expect to be initially deployed in a lodgement area that 
should have an airfield suitable for landing heavy 
transport aircraft and, ideally, a deep water port. 
Operations would probably be conducted in four phases, 
supported as necessary by US naval and air forces:
Establishment of the Lodgement Area. It may be necessary 
to defend the lodgement area against insurgents, 
saboteurs, terrorists, or others sympathetic to the 
enemy. In any event, it will be necessary to secure it 
in order to establish a logistics base. For this reason, 
combat forces should be deployed early to allow the 
buildup to begin.
Buildup of the Logistic Base and Combat Forces. During 
this phase the logistics base is established to support 
the force. Follow on combat and combat support forces 
are brought into the theater, and the lodgement area is 
expanded as necessary.
Defensive Operations To Secure the Initial Area of 
Operations. It may be necessary to defend outnumbered 
until such time as sufficient combat power is available 
in the operational area to conduct offensive operations.
Offensive Operations To Destroy the Enemy. Offensive 
operations are conducted once sufficient combat, combat 
support, and combat service support forces have been 
deployed into the area to sustain such operations. 
Normally this time will come when US Army forces and 
their allies are able to establish at least local ground 
superiority.
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empt or exclude Soviet forces from occupying strategically 
critical positions would be accompanied by the 
interpositioning of US troops between them and their objective 
(in the case of oil fields) and interdiction of their lines of 
communication. And if
opposing forces could be interposed and interdiction 
accomplished early - both of those are very big ifs - the 
same sort of prospect which operates to help deter the 
Soviets from a military adventure in Europe could be 
introduced in Southwest Asia: the prospect of extended 
conflict on the ground with U.S. forces and of escalation 
of intensity and of geographic spread of the conflict. 
The longer such a conflict lasts, the more uncertain the 
Soviets or anybody else can be about what may happen, 
both at the scene of the conflict itself, and in the 
Soviet Union itself. Thus, the anticipation of a more 
protracted conflict operates as a better deterrent.121
In the short-term America's deterrence of Soviet military 
"adventurism" in South-West Asia had to depend "largely upon 
Soviet concerns that such an action on their part would lead 
to direct U.S.-Soviet conflict or confrontation, in turn 
leading to military conflict of unknowable intensity and 
location. "122
In the background of the United States' strategic policy 
were tactical nuclear weapons, the possibility of whose use 
against attacking Soviet forces was not ruled out in view of 
America's very weak capability for conventional combat in the 
Persian Gulf region. Possible recourse to nuclear weapons 
could not be excluded because by raising the USSR's 
uncertainty about the nature and extent of America's response 
to an attack, it increased deterrence. But the nuclear
It may be necessary to seize a lodgement area by force by 
air landing, air assault, or by over the beach 
operations. When this is the case, the operation is 
phased in essentially the same manner described above.
121 Brown, "Case Study", p. "8".
122 Ibid., p. "9".
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"option" posed enormous risk for the US too and because it 
would be most dangerous politically as well as militarily (see 
below), it could only be hinted at. Both the Americans and 
"the Soviets have nuclear weapons", Brown reminded Congress in 
early February 1980, "and whenever [the two sides] get engaged 
with each other in combat, which has never happened, then the 
risks of escalation are great."123 Asked at a Department of 
Defence press briefing on the "Persian Gulf crisis" whether 
the US "had thought about eventual escalation to tactical 
nuclear warfare, [a] defense official said, 'Yes, we are 
thinking about theater nuclear options in other areas than 
NATO,' meaning outside Western Europe."124 The possible use 
of nuclear weapons in battle with the USSR was "always 
implicit" because the US did not preclude in principle the 
first use of nuclear weapons. But when asked whether America 
would "contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in the face of 
a large-scale Soviet attack", Brown replied:
I don't want to talk about contingencies that go that 
far. The use of nuclear weapons would be, of course, a 
very, very grave step. If you ever got to that point, 
you would be dealing with matters even greater than a 
threat to the Persian Gulf region - important as that is. 
So I just don't want to anticipate what form an attack 
would take or what form defense or a deterrent would 
take.
What we're missing - or rather what we need to improve - 
is not our nuclear capability in this situation. What we 
need to improve is our conventional capability, to insure
123 U.S. House, Defense Appropriations 1981. p. 588.
124 Washington Post. February 2, 1980. When in late summer 
1980, the USSR seemed to be preparing its forces to attack 
Iran, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were reported to have told 
President Carter that America would have no other recourse 
than to use tactical nuclear weapons against a Soviet attempt 
to seize Iran's oil fields. See Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Was 
the US Ready to Resort to Nuclear Weapons for the Persian Gulf 
in 1980?", Armed Forces Journal International 124 (September 
1986), 92-93, 96, 98, 100-102, 104-105. The United States' 
potential use of nuclear weapons against the USSR in South- 
West Asia is discussed in Christopher Paine, "On The Beach: 
The Rapid Deployment Force and the Nuclear Arms Race", MERIP 
Reports No. Ill (January 1983), pp. 3-11, 30.
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there's no easy conventional attack that would overrun 
the region.125 (Italics added.)
Brown addressed in March 1980 the issue of resort to nuclear 
weapons, no doubt with the problem in mind of America's 
dubious strategic credibility: not only its unavoidable heavy 
near-term dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence but 
also having its hinted possible use of them perceived as a 
mere bluff and perhaps ‘'called” by the Soviet Union. There 
had been
press reports of alleged U.S. reliance on a "trip-wire" 
strategy, in which we would, by preference or necessity, 
quickly resort to theater nuclear weapons to defend 
against Soviet attack in the area. ... Any direct 
conflict between American and Soviet forces carries the 
risk of intensification and geographical spread of the 
conflict. We cannot concede to the Soviets full choice 
of the arena or the actions.
But that by no means implies that escalation to the 
use of nuclear weapons will be the consequence of a U.S.- 
Soviet clash in southwest (sic) Asia. In part to make 
such a result less likely, a major portion of our effort 
in the region is devoted to improving the conventional 
strength we can bring to bear there. In fact, given U.S. 
capabilities and those of others whose interests would be 
threatened by Soviet aggression, given the difficulties 
inherent in any Soviet military actions beyond its 
borders in rugged terrain and hostile surroundings, and 
given our wide range of options both to exploit other 
Soviet vulnerabilities and to defend against attack, 
conventional deterrence and defense are feasible 
goals.126
By starting to improve its conventional capability to 
deter Soviet military action, America sought to ensure that 
the USSR's large armed forces and operational advantages such 
as nearby bases would not exert a disproportionately large 
influence on Soviet policy for South-West Asia. The Soviets 
might miscalculate and think that even though there was a 
rough balance of interest in the region between themselves and
125 Brown, Meeting the Soviet Challenge, p. 3.
126 Brown, "Protecting Persian Region", p. 65.
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the Americans, they could still launch a successful attack 
against Iran or Pakistan at an acceptable cost. Enhancing the 
United States' capacity for regional combat and creating a 
more credible military balance was intended to minimize the 
Soviet government's sense of the utility of its armed forces 
as an instrument of policy. The US wanted to constrict the 
USSR's freedom of action in a potential "worst case" military 
adventure, to complicate its planning, operational and 
logistic problems and thus undermine its confidence of 
success. Above all the Carter administration meant to raise 
the risk and uncertainty incurred by a Soviet attack and 
convince the USSR that it would bear dangers and costs 
unacceptably greater than expected benefits. America sought 
to manipulate the Soviet Union's caution and limited 
propensity for taking risks by exploiting the fact that 
"unless the Soviets feel there is a very low risk of a U.S 
response, and therefore the costs seem low, they are most 
likely to use their forces directly only in those 
circumstances that they consider to be defensive or 
extreme."127 And in such circumstances, which the US 
estimated to be unlikely to occur soon, the USSR would try to 
achieve its objectives quickly, presenting America with a fait 
accompli which offered the "greatest chance of preempting an 
American response and minimizing the level (or at least the 
extent) of escalation."128
Operationally deterrence against a Soviet attack upon 
Iran was thought to require a capability for a very prompt 
response, perhaps for pre-emption, with the size of an initial 
US force of light ground combat units, tactical air force 
contingents and air defence units compromised in favour of its
127 Ross, "Considering Soviet Threats", p. 174.
128 Ibid., p. 175.
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speed of movement from America.129 A small force reaching 
crucial positions before Soviet forces did was better than a 
large force arriving later because the prospect of initiating 
actual fighting with US forces could well be the "ultimate” 
deterrent against Soviet aggression. This concept, the "trip­
wire”*, was the initial immediate basis of the deterrence 
process.130 The next facet of deterrence was the ability of 
the modest-sized US forces to use the very difficult terrain 
and the 500 miles distance from the USSR to southern Iran in 
order to prevent a relatively quick and cheap Soviet military 
success. Those forces had to slow down the advance of Soviet 
ground troops by destroying bridges and blocking mountain 
passes and to interdict the Soviets' lines of communication. 
Simultaneously the initial US forces had to protect against 
attack by Soviet airborne and long-range air forces the 
airfields and ports which sustained their operations and which 
would receive reinforcements for interpositioning between the 
advancing Soviet forces and the oilfields. Air power was 
essential for disrupting Soviet air and ground movements, 
intercepting Soviet air attacks and generating more time for
A "trip-wire” force is a relatively small force deployed to 
show commitment to defend interests. (It was "ultimate” in 
the sense that) an enemy's engagement with it would risk 
tactical nuclear retaliation.
129 Much of the substance of this paragraph draws from Joshua 
M. Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF 
Deterrent”, International Security 6 (Fall 1981), 126-158. (A 
later version of this article is in Epstein, Strategy And 
Force Planning, pp. 44-97.) For estimates by the Carter 
administration of how many troops could be brought to the 
Persian Gulf when - for example, about 24,000 men in 16 days, 
see Washington Post. February 2, 1980; New York Times. 
February 2 and 3, 1980; New York Times. September 26, 1980.
130 McNaugher, Arms And Oil, pp. 51-52, notes that
a contained conventional conflict has its own levels of 
escalation. The initial U.S. confrontation with Soviet 
forces would be an air interdiction campaign.... The 
[subsequent] confrontation of each superpower's 
conventional ground forces would probably be perceived as 
a new level of conflict and might in itself create the 
grounds for a cease-fire.
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US reinforcements to arrive, organize and deploy. Sufficient 
warning time131 and its resolute use were imperative if 
American air forces were to intercept and prevent immediately 
available Soviet airborne forces - two 7,000-man divisions - 
from making a lodgement in southern Iran before the first 
light US land contingents could arrive. Provided US air 
forces had already gained access to regional military 
facilities putting them within tactical range of southern Iran 
for rapid reaction, the Carter administration assumed, a 
Soviet airborne attack probably would be deterred. Soviet 
transport aircraft would be vulnerable to interception because 
their destination would lie beyond the range of most Soviet 
fighter escorts from the USSR and those escorts would be 
outside the range of Soviet ground control. Turkey, lying 
"athwart Soviet invasion routes", would be a valuable base of 
operations, if available. At any rate, in Brown's view, 
"Turkish bases and military strength, as a threat in being, 
must give the Soviets pause."132
The "trip-wire" was the only mode of localized deterrence 
possible in 1980. But looking ahead, the Carter
administration intended to move from the "trip-wire" to 
conventional defence: it sought to prepare a stronger
capability for actual defence, not just confrontation, against 
a Soviet attack and thereby to enhance the credibility of US 
deterrence133 and to reduce its dependence on the threat to 
use tactical nuclear weapons. A "key" requirement was to 
ensure the quicker deployment of more forces to a conflict in 
South-West Asia. A "reasonable near-term, mid-term goal",
131 Epstein, "RDF Deterrent in Iran", p. 140, maintains that the 
warning time for a Soviet attack into Iran would be "in the 
neighborhood of the usual three months. But ... [he] 
assume[s] only one month of warning."
132 Brown, "Case Study", p. "8".
133 For thoughts on a "middle ground" strategy between "pure" 
deterrence and "full" defence, see McNaugher, Arms And Oil, 
pp. 49-50.
364
Brown indicated, was
to be able to get two or three divisions there in ... a 
couple of weeks and sustain them indefinitely. A longer- 
term goal would be the ability to perhaps double that. 
Corresponding tactical Air Force capabilities would be 
... three or four wings within a few days as a mid-term 
goal - actually [the US could] do pretty close to that 
now within a week or 10 days - and, over a longer period 
of time, perhaps double or triple that amount.134
The US government assumed that provided more transportation 
ships and aircraft came into service, enabling the equivalent 
of about five nominally available divisions to arrive before 
Soviet forces reached southern Iran, those divisions would be 
sufficient to defend successfully against the approximately 
ten Soviet divisions actually present for combat in 
Khuzistan.135 A ratio of attacker to defender of only about 
2:1 (compared to the standard ratio at which defence could be 
successful of 3:1) would provide another element of 
deterrence. Further, there was the prospect that within a 
month, according to Brown, a Soviet engagement with American 
forces would escalate in intensity and widen to other 
regions.136 As it became more costly and protracted and 
harder to manage, the war would also become more unpredictable 
in course and consequence for the USSR and its termination 
would become more difficult.
Because of its weak conventional capacity to fight the 
USSR in South-West Asia, the United States' strategic policy 
relied heavily on deterrence. However, deterrence in its 
political and psychological aspect could not compensate for 
that inadequate capacity. By raising the costs and risks to 
the USSR of an attack and inducing more Soviet uncertainty 
about the likelihood of success except perhaps in occupying
134 Brown, "Case Study”, p. ”10”.
135 See Epstein, ”RDF Deterrent in Iran”, pp. 144-148.
136 Brown, "Case Study", p. "12".
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Iranian Azerbaijan, the US raised the danger of its own 
failure by at least an equal proportion. Also, closely linked 
with that danger, there were conflicts between America's 
strategic policy for South-West Asia and the principles and 
objectives of its general strategic policy. Just as much as 
the logistic and other shortcomings discussed further below, 
those contradictions, especially the weak political basis for 
cooperation with regional states, reduced the credibility of 
America's regional strategic policy premised on the timely, 
rapid movement of forces to readily available bases.
Warning time was critical for enabling the American 
government to mobilize and move a Rapid Deployment Joint Task 
Force to South-West Asia. But there was a risk that not 
enough time would be available if the Soviets achieved a 
degree of surprise or that too much time might be lost in the 
processes of decision-making, consultation and initial action 
to enable an opportune response. Some warning time would be 
lost because of the initial ambiguity, which the USSR would 
try to maximize, to the US intelligence services of its 
preparation for an attack. The Executive branch would have to 
determine how much uncertainty about the probability of an 
attack it was willing to accept and still begin to mobilize, 
a process which would be slowed in 1980 by obsolete planning 
and procedures as well as by the RDF's inadequate organization 
and readiness. Having established sufficiently clear 
knowledge of an intended attack and its probable objectives, 
the Executive would consume further warning time in making 
crucial decisions. It would have to decide whether, if the 
oilfields in southern Iran did not seem to be the immediate 
Soviet objective, US interests in northern Iran were 
sufficiently •'vital” to necessitate a perhaps long and 
certainly costly commitment to combat by US forces whose 
limited capability created a high risk of defeat. If it did 
resolve to fight, the Administration would have to define as 
precisely as possible the political and military goals which 
the armed forces had to and could fulfil.
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More warning time could well be used up as the Executive 
branch consulted with and sought the support of Congress, 
which might doubt that the oil of Iran alone was actually a 
"vital” interest worth fighting for. Congress might hesitate 
to give its support because there was no well-defined, formal 
US security treaty commitment to Iran; the "Carter Doctrine" 
was only a unilateral declaration and it had not been endorsed 
by Congressional resolution. Congress might be reluctant for 
fear that a confrontation with the Soviet Union might lead to 
the use of nuclear weapons. Nor would its support for the 
Administration be quickly forthcoming if "friendly" South-West 
Asian states and America's allies did not appear to be ready 
to cooperate. If it seriously opposed a military response to 
an (imminent) attack by the USSR, Congress could try to stop 
it by invoking the War Powers resolution of 1973 which limits 
to 60 days the President's use of the armed forces without 
Congress's declaration of war. Congress might influence the 
Executive branch to hold back mobilization in order not to 
prejudice diplomatic attempts to avert a Soviet attack.
America might not use warning time to full advantage 
because its strategic orientation was defensive, as manifest 
in the explicit objective to avoid war, above all with the 
Soviet Union. Its strong preference to wait for aggession and 
then respond tended to rule out pre-emption as politically 
unacceptable, quite possibly even if a Soviet attack were 
clearly impending. Thus the only recourse would be 
preclusion. But because of the USSR's contiguity to Iran, 
preclusion by initial US ground and air forces required them, 
as noted, already to have travelled the long distance from 
America to regional bases near the area of imminent Soviet 
attack. Otherwise a preclusive lodgement by Soviet airborne 
forces would severely complicate, if not deter American 
military action. Launching a counter-attack against a Soviet 
emplacement in southern Iran would put the burden of 
initiating an engagement on the US. American forces would be 
compelled to fight to establish a foothold, contradicting
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planning assumptions of an unopposed landing. All along, the 
US had to be acutely aware of the risk that it might intensify 
the super-power crisis and, whether by misperception or "over­
reaction”, prompt the Soviet military adventure it wished to 
deter. In order to minimize the USSR's use of the 
mobilization of an RDJTF for propaganda or threats or as a 
pretext for a "defensive" attack, it had to act astutely and 
with appropriate timing.
Contrary to the United States' strategic principles of 
"forward defence" and cooperation with regional states for 
defence on a coalition basis, there was no possibility in 
South-West Asia of a defensive alliance between America and 
regional states, with US land and air forces permanently 
present at host country bases, joint planning, doctrine and 
tactics, uniform operational concepts and an integrated 
command structure. Even the proposed informal "security 
framework" was compromised seriously by antagonistic US 
relations with Iran, unfriendly ones with Iraq and the great 
caution of the other Gulf Arab states, to whom explicit 
strategic association with America was politically 
unacceptable in view of Islam, Arab nationalism, "anti- 
imperialism", America's collaboration with Egypt and Israel 
and domestic and regional (Iran and Iraq) opposition to closer 
security ties with the US. Ad hoc cooperation with the US by 
"friendly" South-West Asian states as a confrontation with the 
USSR loomed would be uncertain: their perception of the Soviet 
threat and how to deal with it in a way best assuring their 
security probably would differ from the Americans' view. The 
US could not very well prepare for military operations in Iran 
against that country's wishes and without its request for help 
and its cooperation. And if a Soviet attack seemed imminent, 
the question would arise whether the Gulf Arab states would 
allow US forces access to their bases for the defence of Iran, 
which was an unfriendly, non-Arab state. Subject to Soviet 
reassurence about their safety if they did not assist the US, 
the regional states understandably would try to avoid
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dangerous entanglement in the impending super-power conflict, 
one in which nuclear weapons might be used on their territory. 
Because America was militarily the weaker side, accommodation 
to the Soviet Union would seem to be the immediate course of 
action least injurious to their security. In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, there was the danger that if it gave the 
Americans access to its bases, they might use their armed 
forces for the more manageable option of staging a 
"protective” occupation of its oilfields and installations and 
in effect divide the Persian Gulf into American and Soviet 
zones of influence. As a result of friendly states' fears for 
their security - not least from the domestic and local 
political repercussions of a large number of US forces on 
their territory - and differences with America about how to 
cope with a Soviet threat, the US faced the risk that South- 
West Asian states might not give it access to their bases or 
that they might hesitate to do so. While the United States 
consulted with regional states and tried to gain permission 
for access and also to ward off intense Soviet counter­
pressure, there would be delay, perhaps until the time 
sufficient for positioning US forces to preclude attacking 
Soviet forces from seizing critical points had been lost. And 
then access might be denied because an RDJTF would be thought 
to be unable to reverse a Soviet fait accompli. Probably the 
United States would encounter some disagreement and delay from 
its European allies as it tried to obtain permission for 
overflying and access to transit facilities and as the parties 
worked out what the allies' direct and other indirect 
contributions to defence in South-West Asia would be. Wishing 
to insulate detente in Europe from an extra-regional crisis, 
the allies would be most cautious in abetting a US military 
response, particularly were it perceived as too hasty and 
liable to increase rather than reduce the danger.
Once a conflict had begun, the United States proposed to 
deny the enemy his objectives, to contain the conflict, 
limiting its extent, length and intensity, while not
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compromising unacceptably its capacity to deter and defend in 
other regions. But contrary to those objectives of general 
strategic policy, US policy for South-West Asia threatened to 
widen the scope of the fighting and to increase its length, 
intensity or both.137 Lengthening a conflict was risky 
because America lacked the capability to sustain protracted 
combat. And if US "trip-wire” forces faced defeat before 
reinforcements arrived and America considered "vertical 
escalation” to the use of tactical nuclear weapons,138 
extremely difficult questions would be raised. Would the USSR 
be deterred from further action by an American threat to make 
first use of tactical nuclear weapons in view of the fact that 
if Soviet forces or territory were hit, it could retaliate 
with its own tactical nuclear weapons? Would not the threat 
or use of tactical nuclear weapons gravely damage America's 
relations with regional states and perhaps create a global 
political "fall-out" harmful to the US? The dangers of 
"vertical escalation", not excluding the potential for 
strategic nuclear exchanges between the US and the USSR, would 
be of such enormity - "even greater than a threat to the 
Persian Gulf region", according to Brown - as to make it 
virtually incredible and unacceptable.
"Horizontal escalation" - deliberately spreading a 
conflict to other regions instead of containing it - created 
much risk too. It would make a conflict less manageable, 
possibly diverting some US resources and attention from South- 
West Asia itself without necessarily drawing away Soviet 
forces and relieving the weak American position there.
137 Stephen T. Hosmer, Constraints On U.S. Military Strategies 
In Past Third World Conflicts Rand Note N-2180-AF, July 1984, 
"identifies and assesses the principal military-political 
constraints that have limited U.S. military involvements in 
the Third World since World War II" and that probably would 
limit US strategic policy in a potential conflict with the 
USSR in Iran.
138 For a critique of the "vertical escalation" strategy, see 
Epstein, Strategy And Force Planning, pp. 11-29.
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Depending on the nature of the "secondary” conflict, the US 
would confront the risk that demands might be made on its 
armed forces for simultaneous action in different theatres, 
demands which they could not meet. "Horizontal escalation" 
might create (further) tension and division between the 
Americans and their allies, who would scarcely welcome the 
"import" of a super-power conflict into Europe, particularly 
if the US were sending to the Persian Gulf some of its home- 
based forces designated to reinforce NATO.
Finally, ending a conflict in Iran on acceptable terms 
would be most difficult, if at all possible, whether or not 
the fighting had been spread to other regions. America's 
negotiating position would be weak because even if it had been 
able to protect the oilfields in southern Iran, it certainly 
could not defeat the Soviet forces, pushing them back to the 
USSR and restoring the status quo ante. Nor could the US 
prevent the Soviets from consolidating a position in northern 
Iran from where they would pose a constant threat to southern 
Iran and the northern Persian Gulf and exert more influence on 
the Gulf. Dependent on support from Gulf states and attentive 
to their views and to those of its allies and of US public and 
Congressional opinion anxious to minimize further casualties 
and fighting, the American government would be more 
susceptible than the USSR to domestic and international 
pressure to end the conflict. Close by and able to commit 
more, indeed a decisive amount of forces to combat in Iran if 
they chose to, the Soviets would possess much superior 
bargaining leverage for concluding a conflict largely on their 
terms and according to their timing. In deciding how best to 
minimize concessions to the USSR and to negotiate its forces 
out of Iran, the Americans would have to ask whether they were 
prepared to keep their forces in southern Iran indefinitely. 
Reaching an answer would require it, and regional states, 
allies and Congress to decide whether the long-term advantages 
of sustaining a presence in defence of "vital" interests would 
still be greater than its costs and risks.
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The United States' strategic policy for the Persian Gulf- 
Indian Ocean area was conceptually incomplete when the Carter 
administration left office in January 1981. In the evolution 
of policy beyond the pre-emptive or preclusive "trip-wire", 
conventional regional defence was the leading tendency and de 
facto policy because Brown and Komer advocated it. But it was 
challenged within the Department of Defence by the Navy, which 
espoused "horizontal escalation".139 The Navy sought to 
maximize its role in (its interpretation of the "correct") 
American global strategic policy and thereby justify much 
larger funds from Congress for acquiring new aircraft carriers 
and other ships. It assumed that Iran could not be defended 
against a large Soviet attack and that a super-power conflict 
there would be part of or lead to a wider war. Soviet 
aggression against Iran could be responded to better by 
attacking targets of value to the USSR equal to American 
interests in Iran. Those targets would lie in areas more 
accessible and vulnerable to US military power and where the 
Navy in particular gave America a more equal or superior 
fighting capability.
Brown and Komer thought that although conventional 
defence in Iran would be very demanding, it was nonetheless 
practicable. Provided the US used the time available to it 
because of the low probability of a Soviet attack soon and 
made adjustments and improvements in mobility, readiness, 
doctrine, training and weaponry, it could muster from extant 
force levels a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force adequate to 
impose unacceptably high punishment upon advancing Soviet 
forces and generate credible deterrence. "Horizontal 
escalation", on the other hand, might contribute to 
declaratory deterrence but it was objectionable in practice
139 For examples of the Navy's point of view, see Francis J. 
West, "NATO II: Common Boundaries for Common Interests", Naval 
War College Review 34 (January-February 1981), 59-67; John
Lehman, Jr. (appointed Secretary of the Navy in 1981), 
"Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy", Strategic Review 9 (Summer 
1981), 9-15.
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because it would expand to another region a conflict in the 
Persian Gulf which would not inevitably spread to a second 
theatre.140 And because probably it would not draw Soviet 
land forces away from Iran, it would not make an efficacious 
contribution to US defence there. Further, it might not be at 
all easy to find targets of a value to the USSR "equal" to 
America's interest in the oil, territorial integrity and 
independence of Iran. Besides preferring conventional defence 
over "horizontal escalation", Brown rejected the idea that the 
US Navy alone could act as a "trip-wire" against a Soviet 
attack upon Iran. Positioned in the Arabian Sea or the Gulf 
of Oman, it was too far away from western Iran to serve that 
purpose. Nor did he consider to be feasible a unilateral 
naval strategy for defence of the Persian Gulf oilfields: the 
Gulf was "too confined to make it prudent to bring aircraft 
carriers into it in the face of the threat from land-based air 
around its periphery."141 Protecting Iran's oilfields would 
also require ground and air forces.
There was debate too among proponents of conventional 
defence, about how best to respond to a Soviet attack. Ought 
the US to attempt a forward defence of Iran in the Zagros 
Mountains or ought it to give primary emphasis to creating a 
defensive enclave in Khuzistan and acquiesce in the USSR's 
occupation of north-western Iran? In terms of severity of 
logistic demands, establishing an enclave was more 
practicable.
The United States' strategic policy was also incomplete 
at the "lower", operational level. The US Army, for example,
140 Joshua M. Epstein, in "Horizontal Escalation Sour Notes of 
a Recurrent Theme", International Security 8 (Winter 1983-84), 
19-31, or in Strategy And Force Planning, pp. 30-43, 
criticizes and rejects "horizontal escalation" as America's
strategic policy for the Persian Gulf. McNaugher, Arms And 
Oil. pp. 50-51, doubts its efficacy too.
141 Brown, "Case Study", p. "8".
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had only made a start to evolving up-to-date doctrine, tactics 
and concepts of operations for fighting in mountain and desert 
and to experimenting with ways to enhance its light forces' 
firepower and maneuverability in both milieux. And the HQ RDF 
was only at the early stages of planning for contingencies in 
South-West Asia, many of which would require combined-arms 
operations.
The US military presence 
in South-West Asia
Besides "local forces for self-defence” and modest-sized 
British and French forces already in the region and possibly 
deployed to it in a crisis, deterrence and defence in South- 
West Asia against the USSR depended primarily, the Carter 
administration realised, on America's own military capability: 
its regional naval presence, the Rapid Deployment Force based 
in the US and logistic support for both, especially access to 
regional military facilities and, for the RDF, mobility forces
- ships and aircraft for carrying men, equipment and supplies
- and prepositioning of some kit and supplies in the Indian 
Ocean area. Many serious problems and deficiencies beset the 
RDF in particular and the US initiated measures to alleviate 
them, as discussed below.
Because US ground and air combat forces based in South- 
West Asia, in principle the best deterrent and signal to the 
USSR, were politically unacceptable to potential host states, 
the primary American regional military presence was naval 
deployments in the Arabian Sea. The now continuous presence 
since December 1979 of two aircraft carrier battle groups was 
the most feasible and tangible way for the US to display 
increased concern about its regional interests and its 
commitment and resolve to defend them and to reassure friends. 
The US naval force was superior in fighting ability to its 
Soviet counterpart and the tactical (nuclear weapons-capable) 
air power from the aircraft carriers was thought to add to 
deterrence of Soviet and regional military threats to friendly 
Gulf states. US naval forces would play an important part in
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the operations of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, for 
example by protecting shipping against Soviet submarines and 
Backfire bombers. But because the American navy would not 
except in extremis send its aircraft carriers into the Persian 
Gulf for lack of manoeuvre room and warning time against air 
attack, the range of carrier-based fighter-interceptor and 
ground attack aircraft was restricted to the lower Gulf. 
Naval air support for American military operations in a 
conflict in the northern Gulf would depend on aerial 
refuelling or access to local airfields. It could not 
substitute for deployments by the US Air Force.
An average US naval presence in 1980 consisted of the two 
aircraft carriers with as many as 150 aircraft between them, 
five cruisers, four destroyers or frigates, several attack 
submarines, five or six logistic support ships and a repair 
ship. There were also a Marine Amphibious Unit of 1,800 men 
on four amphibious ships which began regular deployments from 
March 1980; the Middle East Force, enlarged from three to five 
ships in 1979; and patrols by P-3C anti-submarine warfare and 
reconnaissance aircraft.142 The American presence was 
sustained by supplies coming from Subic Bay naval base which 
reached the ships on station in the northern Arabian Sea by 
way of Diego Garcia and Omani facilities to which the US had 
gained access. After the hostage crisis in Iran had ended, it 
was decided in 1980, only one aircraft carrier task group
would deploy continuously, so that the other one taken from
the Mediterranean or the western Pacific could spend more time 
there in contribution to America's formal security
commitments. The US Navy continued to consider the 
possibility of "homeporting" an aircraft carrier in the Indian 
Ocean area (at Cockburn Sound) and refitting a retired
aircraft carrier in order to reduce the strain on naval
142 For details see U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. 
pp. 411-414. Also note United States, Congress, Senate,
Committee On Foreign Relations, Perspectives On NATO's 
Southern Flank Committee Print, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, 
pp. 1-4.
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operations there and globally.
The United States also enlarged its air operations in the 
Indian Ocean area. The US Air Force sent AWACS intermittently 
to Egypt, from where they exercised with the American navy in 
the Arabian Sea, and from October 1980, after the start of the 
Iran-Iraq war, American AWACS operated continuously in Saudi 
Arabia. From January 1980 B-52 bomber aircraft from the US 
base at Guam in the Pacific flew regularly over the Indian 
Ocean on reconnaissance and surveillance missions which served 
to demonstrate the great striking range of America's 
conventional and potentially nuclear "Strategic Projection 
Force". Tactical fighter aircraft from the US began to visit 
Egypt periodically for training and for exercises with the 
Egyptian air force. Besides gaining experience of conditions 
in the Middle East, their purpose was to accustom the region 
to the presence of American air power and to "establish land- 
based US air forces there, including the Persian Gulf."143 
Brown and the Department of Defence wanted "carefully and 
gradually to build up a presence" of US air, sea and, if at 
all possible, land forces in the Indian Ocean area because, as 
noted above,
[t]he more presence there is consistent with political 
stability and the more indication there is that a very 
rapid additional large force could be introduced, the 
more the deterrent operates against the Soviet military 
actions and the more effect it has in terms of 
strengthening the political position.144
The closest immediate approximation to a larger American land- 
based presence was US military exercises in South-West Asia. 
Those such as "Bright Star", the first of a series of RDJTF 
exercises, conducted in Egypt in November 1980 by 1,400 
soldiers and airmen, provided the link between the continuous 
US naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Rapid Deployment
143 New York Times. June 13, 1980.
144 Brown, "Case Study", p. "12".
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Force in America. As the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff pointed out early in 1981,
The Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf exercise program is 
being developed in conjunction with Presidential 
direction to enhance US military access, presence, and 
contingency response capabilities for the region. The 
program provides a visible display of US commitment and 
ability to protect its interests, familiarizes US forces 
with operational and environmental characteristics of the 
region, exercises the surge development and planning 
base, and establishes an initial basis for access to 
facilities for later exercises or operations. Actual 
deployment exercises to the Persian Gulf will allow 
evaluation of H[ost] N[ation] S[upport] for US forces; 
improve combined US/host nation deployment, reception, 
and redeployment planning; develop better strategic 
deployment and logistics support requirements; establish 
and exercise overflight/staging rights with en route 
nations; and enhance interoperability with regional 
forces.145
The Rapid Deployment Force; purpose, organization, 
weaknesses and planned improvements
Although the peacetime presence of its maritime forces 
signalled America's interest in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean 
area, friends and enemies, according to the OJCS, would 
measure the depth of the United States' security commitment by 
its capacity to respond in a sustained way with resolve and 
efficacy against potential threats to its interests. That 
capacity lay in the Rapid Deployment Force.146 The RDF
145 U.S. OJCS, United States Military Posture FY 1982 
Supplement, p. 97.
146 Except where otherwise noted, this and the next two 
paragraphs are taken from U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. 
pp. 189-192. On the RDF consult James Wootten, Rapid 
Deployment Forces Issue Brief Number IB 80027, Congressional 
Research Service, The Library of Congress Date Originated: 
03/04/80, Date Updated: 03/23/81; Lt. General P.X. Kelly,
"Progress in the RDJTF", Marine Corps Gazette 65 (June 1981), 
38-44; Thomas A. Fabyanic, USAF, "Conceptual Planning and the 
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force”, Armed Forces and Society 
7 (Spring 1981), 343-365; United States, Congress,
Congressional Budget Office, The Marine Corps in the 1980's: 
Prestocking Proposals, the Rapid Deployment Force, and Other 
Issues Budget Issue Paper for Fiscal Year 1981 (May 1980); 
 , U.S. Ground Forces. pp. 45-52, 55-62, 71, 73, 81-87;
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consisted of a four-service reservoir of forces suitable for 
use in a broad range of non-NATO contingencies. But from 
August 1980 its exclusive area of concern was South-West Asia, 
where its primary mission was to deter further Soviet 
aggression either as a self-contained force or in concert with 
regional countries and perhaps allied states too. In order to 
meet the fundamental objective of confronting an aggressor 
with the risk of gaining little at a high cost for his 
venture, the RDF had to possess the capability and 
organization for moving to South-West Asia quickly and with 
minimal warning.
In a Soviet or regional contingency a Rapid Deployment 
Joint Task Force would be tailored for the mission at hand 
from forces in the RDF reservoir. In early 1981 the maximum 
potential size of the RDF was three Army divisions (the 82nd 
Airborne, the 101st Air Assault and the 24th Mechanized) and 
two brigades; at least five Air Force fighter wings, two 
squadrons of B-52s and support squadrons; one Marine 
Amphibious Force and one Marine Amphibious Brigade; and three 
aircraft carrier battle groups, one surface action group, five 
squadrons of P-3Cs, six amphibious ships and seven 
prepositioning ships at Diego Garcia.147 A relatively
United States, Congress, Congressional Record - Senate. 126, 
pt. 2 (June 27, 1980), S8702-S8705; Jeffrey Record, The Rapid 
Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian 
Gulf (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute For Foreign Policy
Analysis, February 1981);-- , "The RDF: Is the Pentagon
Kidding?”, The Washington Quarterly 4 (Summer 1981), 41-51; E. 
Asa Bates, "The Rapid Deployment Force - Fact or Fiction?”, 
Journal of the Roval United Services Institute for Defence 
Studies 126 (June 1981), 23-33; Victor H. Krulak, "The Rapid 
Deployment Force: Criteria and Imperatives”, Strategic Review 
8 (Spring 1980), 39-44; Johnson, The Military as an
Instrument. pp. 66-110. Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf and the 
Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1984), compares "U.S. and Soviet Power Projection 
Capabilities in the Gulf", pp. 803-872.
147 From statement by General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, Commander- 
in-Chief, U.S. European Command, in United States, Congress, 
House, Committee On Armed Services, Military Posture And H.R. 
2614 And H.R. 2970 (H.R. 3519). Hearings, pt. 1, 97th Cong.,
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small(er) RDJTF was thought to be adequate in a number of 
potential regional contingencies which near-term US planning 
had considered. America created no additional combat forces 
upon establishing the RDF; the forces already existed, as did 
some limited planning for their use in non-NATO contingencies. 
The forces in the RDF reservoir were assigned ordinarily to 
unified, specified or US-based commands. However, as a 
practical matter, the Department of Defence had assigned a 
core reservoir of forces the RDF role as one of its primary 
missions. Plans called for the RDF to "build” continuously 
for the next several years, adding both Army and Marine 
divisions with an appropriate complement of air and naval 
forces. The additional forces would come from those currently 
oriented towards NATO.
Major structural and organizational changes had been made 
in order to improve the quality of America's military planning 
and the effectiveness of its forces, particularly in joint- 
service operations. The Headquarters (HQ) RDF at MacDill Air 
Force Base in Tampa, Florida had become operational on March 
1, 1980. Its purposes were to consolidate in one organization 
the responsibility for developing operational planning for 
contingencies; to maintain sufficient capabilities and 
readiness for contingencies; to train and to exercise and 
improve capabilities; and to advocate change in procedures, 
capabilities and force structure as needed. During peacetime 
HQ RDF was subordinate to the Readiness Command and did not 
control operational forces. But upon deploying abroad, a 
command element from HQ RDJTF would control operational forces 
assigned to the RDJTF for the specific conflict. The 
commander of the RDJTF would take his orders from the European 
Command or the Pacific Command or report directly to the 
National Command Authority through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The choice of the command relationship would depend upon the 
nature and location of the contingency.
1st sess., 1981, p. 666; Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, 
p. 54.
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Besides the presence of aircraft carrier battle groups 
and intermittently a Marine Amphibious Unit in the Indian 
Ocean and the establishment of a Headquarters, a credible 
capability to fight in South-West Asia required an 
intelligence capability for early warning of an attack and a 
command, control, communications and intelligence capacity for 
all subsequent phases of RDJTF operations; ships and aircraft 
for movement to and within the South-West Asian theatre; and 
secure air and sea lines of communication along which to 
deploy and supply an RDJTF. Also necessary were overflight 
rights and access to and improvement of en route staging 
facilities and ports and airfields in South-West Asia; 
prepositioning of equipment and supplies at regional 
facilities and on ships at Diego Garcia; and combat support 
units and combat service support units for providing fuel and 
water, medical care and land transport.
Those requirements specified the main material weaknesses 
of the RDF. The credibility of US strategic policy for South- 
West Asia and its actual success whether against a Soviet 
attack or in other circumstances were predicated, as has been 
pointed out, upon the speedy movement of US forces, their 
ready access to facilities and sustained logistic support. 
But, the OJCS noted, ”[s]hortfalls and limitations in a number 
of areas constrain US ability to react swiftly and adequately 
to Southwest Asia contingencies.11148 The credibility of 
American strategic policy at the operational level was 
compromised heavily by the unreadiness in one way or another 
of many of the units composing the RDF, by too few ships and 
aircraft to carry more than a very small RDJTF to the Persian 
Gulf with celerity and, most acutely in early 1980, by the 
absence of regional facilities available for providing 
military and logistic support, save for Diego Garcia, which 
could only support the operations of an aircraft carrier task 
group for 30 days. The most formidable obstacle to an RDJTF
148 U.S. OJCS, United States Military Posture FY 1982 
Supplement, p. 56.
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was distance. From America, where most of the RDF was based, 
the Persian Gulf was over 7,000 miles by air, more than 8,000 
miles by sea by way of the Suez Canal and 12,000 miles by sea 
around Africa.
Because regional politics excluded basing US forces in 
South-West Asia, they would have to be carried to the region 
by aircraft and ships. Here the Carter administration faced 
the first major weakness: a very limited capability for moving 
large amounts of men, kit and supplies over long distances. 
"US airlift and sealift capabilities are insufficient for the 
rapid deployment of large forces to remote areas", 
acknowledged the OJCS; that was a "critical deficiency, for 
meeting and deterring threats require an ability to emplace 
forces before a crisis escalates into conflict."149 (Italics 
added.) Movement by air was the fastest way to reach the Gulf 
but the transport aircraft and supporting tanker aircraft for 
delivering quickly several brigades of light infantry would 
then be needed for bringing the support units and supplies for 
sustaining that initial force. Thus the immediate deployment 
by air of additional fighting forces, much less mechanized or 
armoured units, was not possible. The introduction of 
reinforcements would be delayed by "up to four to six weeks" 
because they would have to come by sea, and that was "too long 
a delay in several plausible scenarios",150 Brown thought. 
Besides insufficient aircraft to reinforce in a timely way its 
initial forces in the Gulf, the US did not have enough 
tactical transport aircraft available for use within South- 
West Asia. As for America's shipping resources, they were 
not well organized for quick availability; some ships were 
quite old and there were not enough vessels for "fast" 
movement to the Persian Gulf.
The next major operational weakness of the RDF was its
149 Ibid., pp. 43-46.
150 U.S. Senate, First Concurrent FY 1981. p. 86.
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relative unreadiness. The Marines and the 82nd Airborne 
division were rated for the most part ready for combat. In 
contrast "the 101st Airborne and the 24th Infantry (divisions 
were) rated not combat ready because of deficiencies in 
manpower, training and logistics.1,151 All the RDF-designated 
divisions lacked suitable doctrine, tactics, training, 
detailed planning, weapons, equipment and logistic support for 
combat in mountains or desert against a more heavily armed 
enemy or for "lower intensity" conflict. The readiness and 
sustainability of an RDJTF were impaired not only by 
deficiencies in kit - notably in command, control and 
communications, all the equipment for which would have to be 
brought into South-West Asia - and insufficient maintenance, 
shortages of spare parts and reserves of munitions but above 
all by shortages in critical categories of skilled and 
experienced personnel in all the armed services. America's 
reserve forces, whose role was to give combat support for the 
active divisions, were thought to be still too small, as well 
as unprepared, to support satisfactorily a mobilization, even 
though President Carter had authorized an increase in their 
number from 50,000 to 100,000 men. A further limit on the 
readiness of the RDF, one causing friction among the armed 
services and delay in a cirsis, was that it lacked a unified 
command. It was beset by rivalry between the Marines (HQ RDF) 
and the Army (Readiness Command) for its overall control; and 
in South-West Asia the operations of an RDJTF would be split 
between the European Command and the Pacific Command. 
Further, there were difficulties in collaboration among the US 
armed services because each had its own outlook, requirements 
and procedures.
The third serious operational problem faced by the RDF 
pertained to overflight rights, access to transit facilities 
and the availability within South-West Asia of facilities 
crucial for meeting its heavy logistic demands in combat and
151 New York Times. September 26, 1980.
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for sustaining the peacetime presence of the US Navy. America 
did not possess any formal rights of access in early 1980. 
Only Diego Garcia was readily available and even in its case, 
the US had to reach agreement with Britain permitting an 
expansion of facilities for the support in contingencies of an 
RDJTF and for more intensive peacetime uses. As noted 
earlier, cooperation from friendly states, especially those in 
the Persian Gulf, by way of granting America access to their 
facilities in a crisis was uncertain. And there was no 
possibility that with the exception of Oman, they would 
conclude an agreement with the US giving it access. Nor in 
early 1980 did America have prepositioned on ships in the 
Indian Ocean equipment and supplies which could quickly move 
to an area of conflict and "link up” with the first 
contingents of an RDJTF. The tactical movement of an RDJTF in 
South-West Asia would be hindered by inadequate roads, 
railways, airfields and ports and by extremes of climate and 
terrain and a dearth of water.
In 1980 the Carter administration undertook studies, 
sought Congressional funding and initiated measures for 
improving the capability of the RDF across its entire range of 
potential operations. Many steps were taken to increase 
readiness but the "principal goals” were "to improve strategic 
mobility and to provide adequate prepositioning; and to 
provide support and resupply to sustain forces in Southwest 
Asia.”152 Closely tied to those goals was a third one: to 
gain access to military facilities en route to and in South- 
West Asia. The United States' long-term mobility objective 
was to possess transportation ships and aircraft sufficient 
to support simultaneous full-scale deployments to Europe and 
the Persian Gulf in response to Soviet attacks in those 
places. As "rapid response is the key to successful 
employment of the RDF in most scenarios", Brown and the 
Department of Defence expected "a two- or even three-fold
152 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. p. 192.
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reduction in the time required for a ground force build-up, 
and a correspondingly substantial reduction in closure time 
for tactical (attack and fighter) aircraft units."153 By 1986 
the Americans wanted to be able to "deploy RDF ground forces 
to Southwest Asia at a steady rate (with essential support)" 
and also "several tactical fighter wings and B-52Hs (together 
with sustaining supplies and follow-on support) within one 
month, assuming no mobility assets were required for a 
simultaneous NATO contingency.1,154
The immediate initiatives the US undertook, in fact had 
begun in the late 1970s, in order to improve its current 
airlift resources155 consisted of modifying its long-range C-5 
and C—141 cargo aircraft so that in the case of the former, 
their service life would be extended from 7,000 hours to 
30,000 hours and that in the case of the latter, they could 
carry a 30 per cent larger load and be refuelled aerially. 
The American government sought to enlarge the stock of 
civilian aircraft available in reserve for carrying cargo over 
long distances. The only proposed measure for expanding the 
inventory and capability of America's inadequate airlift fleet 
was to build the C-X cargo aircraft. Its purpose would be to 
transport over intercontinental distances very large and bulky 
equipment such as tanks, which only the C-5 could carry.
Unlike the C-5 it would be able to use small and austere
airfields. At least 100 C-Xs had been planned for 
procurement but by the end of the Carter administration's time 
in office, the design of that new aircraft had not been 
decided upon or alternatives to it canvassed. The Department 
of Defence accelerated its purchase of the KC-10 tanker-cargo 
aircraft and deliberated about renovating its ageing KC-135 
tankers.
153 U.S. Senate, First Concurrent FY 1981. p. 88.
154 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. p. 198.
155 For details, see Ibid., pp. 200-203; U.S. OJCS, United
States Military Posture FY 1982 Supplement, pp. 92-93.
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Although airlift was critical for quick deployment of the 
initial light forces of an RDJTF, shipping would carry a large 
fraction of the troops and most of the kit and supplies needed 
for a relatively protracted conflict in the Persian Gulf 
region.156 Thus most of America's planned improvements in the 
availability and speed of response of its strategic mobility 
forces concentrated on the prepositioning ships and fast 
sealift ships. The main initiative for fast(er) sealift was 
the Navy's intended acquisition and conversion for roll- 
on\roll-off operations of eight high-speed (33 knots an hour) 
SL-7 container ships. Those ships would quicken the reaction 
to a conflict by America's heavier, mechanized forces so that 
the dangerous gap between the arrival of the initial forces 
and the arrival of their reinforcements would be much reduced. 
The SL-7 programme would provide "the capability to deliver a 
mechanized division plus some non-divisional support and 
initial supplies to the Persian Gulf in 20 to 26 days....”157 
The Carter administration resolved to enhance the readiness 
and availability of the civilian cargo ships to which it had 
access.
Prepositioning equipment and supplies on ships in the 
Indian Ocean, at Diego Garcia, was a most important measure: 
by putting logistic support within a week's sailing from 
South-West Asia and thereby cutting out the longer time for 
its movement by sea from the US, maritime prepositioning would 
enable air transport to concentrate mainly on carrying more 
troops for initial operations. Those ships would arrive at a 
port and the US forces arriving by air would take their 
equipment from them in the ”marrying-upM process. (But, as 
mentioned above, the American forces depended on ready access 
to friendly ports and airfields; they could not fight their 
way in.) The kit and supplies they carried would suffice for
156 See U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. pp. 203-206; U.S. 
OJCS, United States Military Posture FY 1982 Supplement.
pp. 93-94.
157 U.S. Defense, Annual Report FY 1982. p. 203.
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support until further materiel could come by sea. In July 
1980 seven Near-Term Prepositioning Ships were stationed at 
Diego Garcia. They provided equipment, supplies, fuel and 
water for a 12,000-man Marine Amphibious Brigade and some 
support for several Air Force squadrons and for Army units. 
As their name indicated, the Near-Term Prepositioning Ships 
were an interim step. Over a longer time, incrementally by 
1987, the Department of Defence planned to place at Diego 
Garcia aboard about 15 new Maritime Prepositioning Ships 
equipment and 30 days of supplies for three Marine brigades. 
In an emergency the Marines and some equipment not suitable 
for prepositioning would be airlifted to South-West Aisa by 
ten days or less, depending, as always, upon warning time.158
Logistic facilities: the "network concept” 
and negotiations for access
The United States needed logistic facilities as a 
foundation for its military operations in South-West Asia, 
especially for prompt action at the start of a conflict.159 
Gaining access to military facilities on the way to and in the 
Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area as expeditiously as possible 
was essential in order for the US to provide fuller and more 
efficient logistic support for the bigger demands imposed by 
its expanded and continuous naval presence, by its forces on 
exercises, training or intermittent deployments and by the 
deployment and operation in a contingency of an RDJTF. Wider
158 Ibid., p. 206.
159 The rationale for increasing America's access to military 
facilities in South-West Asia was expounded by Komer in U.S. 
House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. pp. 64-66; David Newsom, 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in 1980, in 
United States, Congress, Senate, Committee On Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Security Interests And Policies In Southwest 
Asia. Hearings Before The (Committee and Its) Subcommittee On 
Near Eastern And South Asian Affairs. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1980, pp. 76-78; Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary of State for 
Security Assistance, Science and Technology, "Somalia and the 
U.S. Security Framework", Statement before the Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on 
September 16, 1980, in DoSB 80 (December 1980), 22-26.
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access to facilities would benefit reconnaissance and 
surveillance missions and logistic supply flights and it would 
better enable ships to remain on station longer by providing 
for their refuelling, replenishment, maintenance and limited 
repair and for the rotation and "liberty” of their crews. 
Greater access would help the timely introduction of American 
forces into South-West Asia in an emergency by providing en 
route transit, overflight, rear area staging and resupply of 
forces; it would also contribute to sea control operations. 
By improving America's capacity to respond quickly to a 
contingency, a "network" of regional logistic support 
facilities would help to deter Soviet and regional military 
pressure upon friendly states. Along with economic and 
security assistance, enhancing regional facilities was part of 
the United States' general programme within the "cooperative 
security framework" for helping friendly countries to increase 
their ability for self-defence.
America did not seek permission to build its "own" large 
and permanent bases in the Indian Ocean area like Subic Bay in 
the Philippines because they would create political problems 
for the "host" state. As noted above, they would (be seen to) 
aggravate internal and regional tensions, infringe upon the 
"host's" sovereignty and independence and possibly implicate 
it in a super-power confrontation. (Indeed for these reasons, 
such bases were unacceptable in the first place.) Instead the 
US wanted to gain access to the extant facilities in South- 
West Asian states and improve the capacity of available ports 
and airfields to store fuel, supplies and ammunition and to 
sustain the movement of large numbers of men and amounts of 
equipment. Improvements would be made, for example, in 
warehousing, communications and navigational facilities and in 
the supply of water, electricity and billets for personnel. 
America sought to come to agreement with prospective "host" 
states for the freest use of their facilities possible on a 
routine or contingency basis. In normal conditions, only a 
small US "caretaker" staff would be stationed at a facility.
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"Using other countries' airfields and ports", the US goverment , 
considered, "would be faster and cheaper, require fewer 
Americans, be less risky politically and be more flexible in 
military deployment since they could be used occasionally or 
infrequently, according to need."160 But there were 
"drawbacks" to such use: the facilities would be "less under 
United States control, more subject to local political 
restrictions and less capable of serving the United States 
fleet, aircraft and ground forces since the logistic support 
provided would be much lighter than that of permanent American 
bases. "16i
The flexibility provided by the sought facilities was 
regarded to be more important than their drawbacks. America 
intended to establish a "network" of available facilities in 
the Indian Ocean area so that it could expand its political, 
military operational and logistic "flexibility and 
redundancy". More rather than fewer and bigger facilities 
would better assure an ability to support a wide range of 
operations by varying levels of US forces, spread the burden 
of support over several states and minimize it in any one of 
them. The political exposure of the "host" state and of the 
US itself would thereby be reduced. More practically still, 
a "network" of facilities would enable America to retain a 
degree of flexibility of action and carry on with its naval 
presence and other operations if one state denied it access to 
its ports and airfields or did so in a particular contingency 
- or if, during a conflict with the USSR, facilities used by 
the US in one country were attacked and destroyed. In "worst 
cases" the "bottleneck" created by the movement of a large 
volume of forces and materiel in a short time would be 
reduced. Negotiating access to facilities in South-West Asia 
was important, finally, because if a crisis did occur, there 
probably would not be sufficient time or opportunity to obtain
160 New York Times. January 20, 1980.
161 Idem. Note also New York Times. January 23, 1980.
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them; the US would have to rely on what it had already 
arranged for.
The "network” concept of (politically available) 
facilities embraced Oman, Somalia, Egypt, Kenya and Diego 
Garcia, the "single most important facility for logistics and 
communications support of the Naval Task Forces now deployed 
in the Arabian Sea."162 In January 1980 the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff
completed a study examining possible future uses of Diego 
Garcia. The study recommended that additional
capabilities be developed involving the use of the 
'entire island' area. In early 1980 the Pentagon stated 
that facilities on Diego Garcia would be expanded not 
only 'to support an increased U.S. presence in the Indian 
Ocean region in both peacetime and in a regional 
contingency situation', but also 'to increase logistic 
surge support for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 
in a contingency role'.1"
The logistic facilities planned by the Nixon administration in 
1974 for supporting operations for 30 days by one aircraft 
carrier task group were only just being completed. They were 
inadequate to sustain the continuous presence of two aircraft 
carrier task groups and intermittent deployments by a Marine 
Amphibious Unit as well as movements in an emergency by units 
of an RDJTF. Now the Department of Defence
wanted to develop Diego Garcia's 'ability to support 
large-scale air, ground and sea forces deploying through 
the Indian Ocean to the Middle East/Persian Gulf region'. 
In addition, Diego Garcia provided the anchorage for the 
Near-Term Pre-positional (sic) Ship Force, and plans to 
deploy the B-52 bombers of the Strategic Projection Force 
to the Gulf on conventional interdiction missions 
necessitated regional staging and support facilities at 
a relatively remote location so that the forward bases 
could be freed for tactical air operations. ... Also 
Diego Garcia was seen as a vital link for strategic
162 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 413.
163 Amitav Acharya, U.S. Military Strategy In The Gulf (London: 
Routledge, 1989), pp. 99-101.
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airlift operations into the Gulf from the Pacific side: 
as an air-refuelling, staging, or transfer point.164
Having consulted with Britain, which agreed in principle that 
it could expand the atoll's facilities, the US began or 
prepared for projects such as enlarging the anchorage, 
expanding and reinforcing the airstrip, adding a new pier, 
increasing the fuel storage capacity, improving 
communications, repair, ammunition storage and other 
facilities and constructing more housing.
Because of its small size and distance, 3,000 miles, from 
the northern Persian Gulf, Diego Garcia could complement but 
not substitute for other, closer facilities. Going ahead with 
negotiations initiated in December 1979, the United States 
signed an agreement with Oman on June 4, 1980 for use of
airfields at Seeb, Masirah island, Khasab and Thumrayt and 
ports at Mutrah and Salalah; with Kenya on June 26, 1980 for 
use of airfields at Nairobi and Nanyuki and the port of 
Mombasa; and with Somalia on August 22, 1980 for use of the 
port and airfield at Berbera and at Mogadishu. Although not 
made public each agreement stipulated that
United States to enjoy standard access and status of 
forces arrangements.
No U.S. security commitments to host country or formal 
obligation to sell weapons, although security assistance 
is implied.
United States to be granted discretionary use rights with 
respect to facilities in question, although United States 
must 'consult' with host government on major exercises 
and deployments.
Host government to retain sovereign rights over all 
facilities and ownership of all real property.
United States to pay for services rendered by host 
government, plus proportionate share of facility 
maintenance.
164 Ibid. , p. 99.
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United States to be allowed to upgrade facilities at its
own expense.
Agreements to remain in force for ten years.165
The most difficult agreement to negotiate, and for which 
to gain approval from the US Congress, was that with 
Somalia.166 America wanted to obtain access to Somali 
facilities, particularly Berbera, which was near the Bab al- 
Mandab and helped to offset Soviet facilities in South Yemen 
and Ethiopia, in order to support sea control and P3-C 
operations, resupply, refuelling, emergency repairs and 
transits by the US Air Force. But the US wanted equally to 
avoid entanglement in Somalia's attempts to achieve its 
primary foreign policy goal: to "recover” territory inhabited 
by ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, eastern 
Kenya and Djibouti. In the negotiations the Somalis initially 
sought $1,000 million in economic aid and a further $1,000 
million in military aid, US diplomatic support for their claim 
to Ogaden and an explicit US guarantee to come to their help 
in the event of a Soviet-supported Ethiopian attack against 
Somalia. The United States rejected Somalia's irridentist 
claims and opposed the presence of Somali troops in Ogaden. 
It agreed to give Somalia $40 million in military sales 
credits over two years and about $60 million in economic aid 
over two years. But it would do so only after the Somalis 
gave assurance that they would remove their troops from
165 Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, pp. 58-60.
166 Background is provided by Raymond W. Copson, Brenda M. 
Branaman, The Horn Of Africa And The United States Issue Brief 
Number IB 78019, Congressional Research Service, The Library 
Of Congress Date Originated: 03/10/78, Date Updated:
04/10/81; United States, Congress, House, Committee On Foreign 
Affairs, Reprogramming Of Military Aid To Somalia. Hearing 
Before The Subcommittee On Africa. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1980; Nimetz, "Somalia Framework"; United States, Congress, 
House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, U.S. Security Interests 
In The Persian Gulf. Report Of A Staff Study Mission To The 
Persian Gulf, Middle East, And The Horn Of Africa, October 21- 
November 13, 1980, Committee Print, 97th Cong., 1st sess.,
1981, pp. 49-53.
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Ethiopian territory and keep them out and that they would use 
"defensive” weapons obtained from the US only for protection 
of Somalia's internationally recognised frontiers. Otherwise 
further US aid would not be forthcoming. In the view of the 
Executive branch, the negotiations had secured access to 
Berbera and Mogadishu while minimizing the chance of further 
conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia or Kenya and of unwanted 
American entanglement in that conflict. Somalia accepted the 
terms of the negotiations because it wanted to establish as 
conspicuous an association with America as possible in order 
to balance Ethiopia and its Soviet patron and because, 
although the initial amount of promised American aid was 
small, probably it would be able to obtain more later.
The American-Somali agreement was opposed in Congress by 
the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. It had approved the US agreements with Kenya and 
Oman but it did not consider the contribution of the Somali 
facilities to be "essential to the achievement of United 
States military objectives.1,167 American aid to Somalia might 
encourage new aggression by it, exacerbate the conflict 
between Somalia and Ethiopia - indeed there was fighting in 
the Ogaden as the US-Somali agreement was signed - and it 
could increase the danger of a more direct American 
involvement. Important African states and the Organization of 
African Unity, which opposed the alteration of international 
boundaries by force, would be antagonized. The US would set 
back its relations with Ethiopia even further and its 
agreement with Somalia might cause the USSR to expand its 
military presence in Ethiopia, adding to the danger of an 
escalation of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict to the super-power 
level.168 Congress approved the agreement with Somalia only
167 This was the view of Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the House 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee On Africa, expressed in New York 
Times. July 6, 1980.
168 See International Herald Tribune. August 29, 1980; New York 
Times. August 29, 1980.
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after the Carter administration gave verified assurance in 
January 1981 that all Somali soldiers had left Ogaden.
Under its agreement with the US by which it would receive 
$50 million in economic aid and $27 million in military 
assistance over two years, Kenya confirmed access to its air 
and port facilities which US forces - aircraft carrier battle 
groups and P-3Cs - had long been using.169 Those facilities 
were valuable for providing refuelling and resupply, limited 
repair and maintenance and sea control in a conflict. Mombasa 
was a "liberty" port for American sailors and Nairobi airport 
was a staging point for logistic supply flights to Diego 
Garcia. The major improvement to facilities intended by 
America was the dredging of Mombasa harbour so that US 
aircraft carriers could enter it.
The Kenyan government signed the agreement with two 
reservations. First, the US was improving relations with the 
Somali enemy and intended to give it arms which it might use 
to attack Kenya. The political opposition in Kenya could 
exploit that possibility and weaken the government's 
authority. The Kenyan army might claim that it was too small 
now to defend the country and put dangerous pressure on the 
government if it did not obtain more arms and equipment. 
Second, although its relations with America were friendly, the 
Kenyan government led by Daniel Arap Moi wanted to preserve 
its non-aligned status, keep the great powers out of east 
Africa and maintain domestic stability and itself in power. 
Thus US military activities had to be kept limited; there 
could be no permanent, conspicuous or large American presence. 
Indicative of Nairobi's caution and intention to avoid too 
close and visible an association with the US was its refusal 
in summer 1980 to allow the Marine Amphibious Unit in the 
Indian Ocean to stage a landing exercise on the Kenyan coast.
169 For background and details, see U.S. House, U.S. Security 
Interests in Gulf, pp. 4, 43-46.
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Oman's friendly relations with the US, its international 
outlook and view of the USSR similar to America's, its 
proximity to the Persian Gulf and a small strip of its 
territory, Ras Musandum, forming the southern side of the 
Strait of Hormuz made it a valuable state from which to gain 
access to facilities. Omani facilities helped to resupply 
aircraft carrier task groups in the Arabian Sea and in a major 
conflict they would provide forward staging and prepositioned 
war materiel for RDJTF ground and air forces and tactical 
operational support for the US Air Force; they would enable 
the US to keep the Strait of Hormuz open against mining or 
attack. Oman could serve as a place for RDF exercises in 
peacetime. The US-Omani agreement of June 4, 1980 provided 
for
United States access to Omani military bases in 
circumstances where both countries would benefit from 
this use. The United States clearly could use Omani 
bases to respond to a Soviet attack on the region. It is 
not certain, however, whether the United States would be 
able to use Omani facilities to intervene in an intra- 
Arab conflict were American interests threatened.170
Oman's history, geography and political outlook enabled 
it to act with some independence from other Arab states and 
permit American access to its facilities as well as support 
the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. But because hostile opinion 
within and outside Oman towards the US role in the "peace 
process" was still an important consideration, the size of an 
American military presence had to be kept small and its 
visibility low. Oman perceived the advantage of the agreement 
with America to be that it was
tantamount to a U.S. commitment to its security. ... 
Oman is prepared to defend itself with U.S. military 
assistance should it be attacked by a state in the region 
such as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. 
However, in the event of a Soviet attack on Oman or clear 
Soviet involvement in a People's Democratic Republic of
170 Ibid., p. 16.
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Yemen attack, Oman would expect direct United States
military intervention and assistance.171
The provision to Oman of $50 million of military sales credits 
over two years and the prospect of more later on would help it 
to cope with the potential military threat from the PDRY and 
also to deal with a possible renewal of insurgency in Dhofar 
province. The creation of an American-Omani economic 
commission provided for by the agreement was meant to help 
"fund and promote economic development in Oman”. Generally 
Sultan Qaboos, the ruler of Oman, believed that the more 
America had an interest in his country, specifically in the 
form of available military facilities, the more likely it 
would be to give him the protection needed in a crisis. 
Discreetly providing the US with facilities and thereby 
strengthening its regional presence would help to deter South 
Yemen and check the expansion of Soviet influence in South- 
West Asia. As long as it was kept in the background, the 
United States would be a source of support and reassurance and 
the benefits of association with it would outweigh the 
liabilities of consorting with a super-power and the abettor 
of Israel.
Egypt offered America access to military facilities on an 
informal basis within the general context of the two sides' 
close collaboration in concluding the Egypt-Israel peace 
treaty, their similar views about the USSR's involvement in 
the Middle East, America's interest in Egypt as a source of 
regional moderation and stability and Egypt's interest in 
America as a source of sizable economic and military aid.172 
Egypt's stability was of strategic importance particularly for 
ensuring uninterrupted use of the Suez Canal, even more 
beneficial to the American navy from early 1981. Then the 
newly deepened waterway could accommodate transits by aircraft
171 Ibid., p. 17.
172 Ibid., pp. 63-70.
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carriers, allowing them to avoid the long journey around 
Africa to the Indian Ocean. The US viewed Egypt's cooperation 
as valuable for overflying rights, for providing a place for 
American forces to train and exercise in Middle Eastern 
conditions and for permitting access to facilities at Cairo 
West air base, Qena airfield in southern Egypt and at Ras 
Banas. The latter was a small and isolated facility on the 
southern part of Egypt's Red Sea coast. The Carter 
administration envisioned a much improved Ras Banas as a rear 
staging facility for B-52s on long-range missions and for an 
RDJTF, for which it would provide prepositioned war materiel. 
The Egyptians wanted to help the US to "project” better its 
military power in order that it could defend on request an 
Arab or Muslim country against Soviet or Iranian attack and 
also redress the imbalance of regional power favouring the 
USSR. But because of their colonial past and recent 
experience with the Soviet Union, they were willing to give 
America access to their facilities only on a temporary basis 
and in a way not seen to infringe upon their independence. 
Occasional exercises by US forces such as "Bright Star" were 
acceptable. In expectation of dangerous political
consequences at home and worsening further its relations with 
the Arab world, Egypt would not make facilities on the Sinai 
peninsula available to America on any basis. It required that 
a US presence be small and inconspicuous as well as temporary. 
All arrangements for US access to facilities had to be 
informal. This last stipulation clashed with the US 
Congress's requirement that Egypt had to sign a formal 
agreement giving America virtual guaranteed access to selected 
facilities before a substantial amount of money could be 
authorized for their development. This impasse was not 
resolved before the Carter administration left office.
As the United States' arrangements with Egypt showed, its 
access to friendly states' facilities was subject to serious 
political restriction. The "host" countries retained full 
sovereignty over their facilities and depending on internal
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and regional politics, all of them except Somalia would make 
their facilities available to America only on a discretionary, 
case-by-case basis. Because the US did not enjoy guaranteed 
access, it had to risk spending much of a thousand million 
dollars on improving facilities which might be denied it when 
needed. Operationally the utility of the South-West Asian 
facilities was limited by their distance from the Persian 
Gulf. Except for Oman they were too far away to give tactical 
support and even Oman was appropriate mainly for operations in 
the "lower” Gulf. Although serving important purposes in 
peacetime, the facilities in Oman, Egypt, Somalia and Kenya 
would be valuable to America in a contingency primarily in 
combination with facilities within the Persian Gulf.
Facilities within the Persian Gulf were, if and when 
available, the centre of the US logistic "network": they were 
essential to provide sustained support in front-line military 
operations against a Soviet or regional attack. But despite 
the US government's anxiety that it might not be able to 
arrange access to Gulf facilities as a crisis loomed, 
political considerations - America's support for Israel, its 
character as a large, external "imperial" power which might 
resort to unilateral intervention in order to "protect" access 
to oil, its rivalry with the USSR and also regional opposition 
to foreign bases in the Gulf and the danger of provoking more 
internal unrest - prevented friendly Gulf states from granting 
peacetime access to their facilities, except for the Middle 
East Force at Manama. Among the facilities in which the US 
was interested were King Khalid Military City, Dhahran air 
base and Jubayl naval port in Saudi Arabia and Jabal Ali port 
in Dubai. The Saudi bases were being built to a high standard 
(by US Army engineers) and with a much larger capacity than 
Saudi forces alone required. They were abundantly stocked 
with US weapons, equipment and related necessities such as 
spare parts. Large numbers of Americans were in Saudi Arabia 
in order to help support Saudi military activities and US 
AWACS were deployed there from October 1980. But although the
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Saudis and the Americans probably had started to discuss 
privately the potential emergency role of the bases, the 
Saudis' permission for US access would depend on the nature 
and circumstances of a crisis and, above all, their judgement 
about the balance of risk and advantage in cooperating with 
America. In the meantime Saudi Arabia and perhaps other
Gulf states which do not want a U.S. military presence or 
facility access agreement may be willing ... to consider 
participation in quiet forms of U.S. military cooperation 
such as strategic dialog (sic), pre-positioning of U.S. 
military equipment, familiarization of the United States 
with local assets and capabilities, and communications, 
navigational and air defense systems helpful ... in a 
time of conflict.173
The most important Persian Gulf bases to which the US 
would want access in a "worst case” contingency were in Iran. 
Their availability if the USSR attacked Iran depended on 
whether Iran decided to use the American "devil” to fight the 
Soviet one or to resist by itself. Turkish bases quite 
valuable for interdicting Soviet movements in Iran would be 
available to the US only in a response by NATO to an attack 
upon Turkey. Some American officials saw advantages in 
gaining access to facilities in Pakistan, for example at 
Karachi. But the possibility of American access there soon 
was precluded by many political factors such as Pakistan's 
difficult relations with its neighbours and the USSR, its 
Islamic identity, the likely internal opposition to a US 
military presence and the inconclusive nature of its 
discussions with America after the USSR's intervention in 
Afghanistan about US security and economic assitance to it 
(see Chapter Seven). Djibouti, near the Bab al-Mandab, was 
visited by ships of the Middle East Force and by P-3Cs but, 
because of that small state's position between Ethiopia and 
Somalia and because of French influence, it was off limits to 
additional American military activity in peacetime. Djibouti 
would be useful in a conflict for helping to prevent the USSR
173 Ibid., p. 4.
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from "choking” the flow of shipping through the Bab al-Mandab 
if the Djiboutans made it available and if the French employed 
their own force presence. In some circumstances France might 
allow the US to use its naval facilities at Reunion island. 
Simonstown naval base in South Africa was completing an 
expansion and modernization programme which would enable it to 
give a wide range of support to US ships deploying to the 
Indian Ocean or operating there but the US Navy had not 
visited it since 1967 because of South Africa's apartheid 
policy. America's resort to Simonstown in a conflict would 
incur strong disapproval throughout the Third World yet that 
might be considered an acceptable short-term "collateral" 
cost. In order to alleviate the strain put on naval task 
groups by protracted deployment in the Arabian Sea, the 
Americans thought about "homeporting" an aircraft carrier task 
group at Cockburn Sound naval facility south of Perth in 
Western Australia. During 1980 the US negotiated with 
Australia for landing rights for unarmed B-52s in order to 
ease their arduous reconnaissance flights over the Indian 
Ocean.
While it negotiated for access to military facilities in 
South-West Asia, the American government sought overflying and 
landing rights for US forces moving to it. The Carter 
administration approached for overflight rights Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and the Israelis, who offered use of their bases to the 
US,174 and it wanted to obtain those rights from Spain and 
Portugal. Lajes airfield in the Portuguese Azores was a vital 
refuelling stop for American aircraft en route to South-West 
Asia. The US intended to improve the facilities at Lajes in 
order that they could service a larger volume of American 
deployments in the event of a conflict. Obtaining extra 
support in contingencies for aerial movements by an RDJTF was
174 The United States did not seek access to Israeli bases as 
part of its "network" concept but it assumed that they would 
be available in emergencies. See Kupchan, The Persian Gulf 
and the West, pp. 134-137.
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why the Americans wanted access to air facilities in Liberia. 
Potential US use of the bases of Portugal, Spain, other 
Western European states and Morocco depended on those 
countries' assessment of the implications for them of the 
crisis to which America would be responding. The very 
restricted access afforded to US supply flights to Israel 
during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war was a reminder. Some 
American movements to South-West Asia would come from across 
the Pacific by way of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Guam, the 
Philippines, Thailand and perhaps Singapore. Permission for 
overflying, transit or both would be required because 
authorization was not covered by the terms of their respective 
security treaty or other ties with America. As in Europe, 
authorization depended on each state's interest and judgement.
Elaboration of Policy. 1980
In elaborating its strategic policy for the Persian Gulf- 
Indian Ocean area America recognised that the regional states 
themselves were the principal source of their security; they 
remained the first and most important line of political and 
military resistance against the USSR, however precarious and 
inadequate they would be in extreme circumstances. The US had 
to accept the political and physical distance imposed on its 
force presence in South-West Asia by friends whose security 
policies gave priority to regional politics over strengthening 
the military balance against the Soviet Union.
Deterring a Soviet attack against Iran was the foremost 
objective of US policy because "containing" the USSR had 
become the overriding policy imperative after its intervention 
in Afghanistan. Deterrence was more important than preparing 
to deal with dangers from within the Persian Gulf, even though 
a Soviet attack was an improbable "worst case". Maximizing 
deterrence in light of weak regional political support and 
available American forces' inability to defend against major 
Soviet aggression required the US to depend heavily on the 
declaratory and psychological aspect of deterrence. It sought
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to heighten the Soviets' sense of unacceptably high risk if 
they attacked Iran by playing on their small propensity to 
take risks for offensive purposes. The Americans emphasized 
the vital character of their interests in the Gulf and their 
resolve to defend them with the armed forces: if necessary 
they would resort to rapid pre-emptive movement to critical 
positions by a small ground force which might be a "trip-wire” 
to use of tactical nuclear weapons or to spreading a conflict 
to other regions.
At least until a stronger conventional capability was 
acquired, the United States' strategic policy seemed to impose 
more risk on itself than on the Soviets, even though that 
might be justified by its interests and defensive posture. 
The greatest risk was the dubious credibility of US policy. 
If Brown's observation was correct that America's vital 
interest in the Persian Gulf was not worth resort to tactical 
nuclear weapons, then US deterrence would be undermined. Pre­
emption would present much risk too, because the pressure to 
cover quickly the long distance from the US might force 
America into rash and possibly destabilizing unilateral action 
and discourage cooperation by regional friends and by allies 
critical for coalition defence. Spreading a conflict to other 
regions would add formidable complexity to its management and 
by no means assure its successful resolution. At bottom US 
deterrence in 1980 rested on a Soviet attack being more 
unikely than the American strategic policy was incredible. 
The United States' weak capacity for combat in South-West Asia 
tended to vitiate its regional military presence's political 
balancing of the Soviet armed forces.
America's strategic policy concluded that intervention 
within a friendly state when US interests were endangered 
would be politically unacceptable and counter-productive and 
militarily inefficacious. And if a threatened regime did need 
and ask for help, discreet indirect assistance from outside, 
not necessarily from the US, would be most appropriate. The
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Americans resolved to be better prepared in case their 
intervention might be requested. At the regional level the US 
sought to provide tacit, reassuring back-up deterrence from 
the background on behalf of friends. It hoped that its 
security assistance would enable their forces to be the 
"preferred effective alternative to direct commitment of US 
forces". But if in a crisis America's help were sought, it 
would respond with indirect means or, if required, with combat 
forces, preferably as part of a multilateral political and 
military response. The United States' forces available for 
reinforcing friends in a likelier, relatively moderate 
contingency could not in 1980 meet the extreme case of a large 
Iraqi attack. But the risk of failure was acceptably low 
because that attack was improbable.
Display, deterrence and intervention were the principal 
elements of the United States' policy which at its fullest 
potential extent could involve tactical nuclear warfare 
against the USSR in Iranian mountains, conventional defence 
against its attacking forces in Khuzistan or expanding a 
conflict to other regions; or armoured warfare against Iraq in 
the desert or intervention in friendly states. That policy 
was incomplete in many ways when the Carter administration 
left office in January 1981. It remained for the Reagan 
government to decide on specific strategic policy, to carry on 
with operational planning and devising concepts of operations 
and to prepare in all respects the Rapid Deployment Force.
This chapter has emphasized the important political 
aspect of America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean 
area. The efficacy of that policy depended at bottom on the 
response to it by the Soviet Union and the littoral states and 
it is that response which is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESPONSES TO POLICY
The efficacy of the contribution in 1979-1980 of 
America's strategic policy to its security policy for the 
Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area depended to a quite important 
extent upon the responses of the principal states subject to 
those policies.* This chapter seeks to assess those responses 
in the context of the littoral states' - Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Iraq and Pakistan - security outlook and their relations with 
the US and to explore the Soviet Union's perception of 
America's policies and its reactions to them. The Soviet 
response is analyzed first because the USSR was the chief 
subject of US strategic policy, being considered to be the 
most serious potential military threat to American regional 
interests. The response by India is discussed too, because it 
was an important state contiguous to South-West Asia which was 
very concerned about the possible consequences of US strategic 
policy for its security.
This chapter identifies ambivalence and opposition as the 
responses to the United States' strategic policy, and its 
analysis contributes importantly to the next chapter, which 
presents findings and conclusions about the utility of 
America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area from 1970 
to 1980.
The Soviet Union: Counter the Intensified Threat
of US Aggression
The Soviets considered America's revised strategic policy 
for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area to be dangerously 
aggressive.1 The US was using the USSR's defensive action in
US strategic policy involved in varying degrees states from 
Japan and Australia to NATO Europe but limited space prevents 
an examination of their response to that policy.
1 A thorough Soviet interpretation of America's strategic
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Afghanistan as an excuse to "protect”, in fact to control by 
armed intervention if necessary, the Gulf states, their oil 
and the sea routes and also to pose an increasing threat to 
Soviet security in the south. America's strategic policy, 
revised before the USSR sent its forces into Afghanistan, was 
part of its unilateral renewal of the Cold War in quest of 
global dominance by military superiority. The Soviets 
countered the enlarged US naval presence in the Arabian Sea 
with additional naval forces and tried to curb America's 
greater regional strategic role and presence by reaffirming 
their support for an Indian Ocean "Zone of Peace". In 
addition they put forward in December 1980 a proposal for 
security in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area which, if 
realized, would have minimized the United States' capability 
to conduct military operations there.
The USSR's response to America's modified policy 
consisted of, first, denying a threatening offensive purpose 
to its intervention in Afghanistan, in order to try to 
undermine the United States' use of it as a policy 
rationalization. The Soviet intervention was defensive only, 
intended to help the Marxist regime in Kabul to repel 
"aggression from outside" by the US, China and Pakistan.
Unceasing armed intervention and a we11-developed 
conspiracy by external reactionary forces created a real 
threat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and 
be transformed into a military staging ground for the 
imperialists on [the USSR's] southern border. In other 
words, the time came when we could no longer fail to 
respond to the request of the friendly government of 
Afghanistan. To act otherwise would have been to look on 
passively while a hotbed of serious danger to the 
security of the Soviet state was created....
policy is provided by Andrei Krutskikh, US Policies in the 
Indian Ocean (Moscow: Progress Publishers [English
translation], 1986).
2 From an interview with L.I. Brezhnev in Pravda, January 13, 
1980 in CDSP 32 (February 13, 1980), 2.
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Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan when 
external aggression against it had ceased. Second, the 
Soviets disavowed "expansionist plans” to attack Pakistan or 
Iran, seize the oil of the Persian Gulf and force their way to 
the Indian Ocean.3 Unlike the US the USSR
has never laid claim to other people's oil wealth, nor 
has it said that places where such wealth is located are 
spheres of its 'vitally important interests.' The Soviet 
Union saw to the development of its own energy sources 
ahead of time and, as far as oil is concerned, it 
supplies all its own requirements. No Soviet 
representative has stated, or could state, that the USSR 
intends to establish control over other people's oil or 
that it intends to dictate to other countries the terms 
on which they are to supply oil to the world market.4
Nor did the Soviet Union intend to threaten the sea lanes from 
the Persian Gulf. Noting that "the national interests or 
security of the United States of America or of other states 
are not in the least affected by the events in Afghanistan",5 
the Soviets claimed that the US was using their intervention 
as a pretext in order to subordinate the countries of the 
Middle East and Africa "to its hegemony, to pump out their 
natural resources without obstruction, and, ... to use their 
territory in its strategic plans against the world of 
socialism and the people's-liberation (sic) forces. This is 
the crux of the matter".6
From the Soviet vantage point the United States' 
militarist policies for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area 
could be understood correctly only if their real basis was 
identified, and that was the dangerous shift in America's
3 See article in Pravda. February 2, 1980 in CDSP 32 (March 5, 
1980), 1.
4 Idem.
5 Brezhnev interview in CDSP. February 13, 1980, p. 3.
6 From a speech by Brezhnev in Pravda. February 23, 1980 in 
CDSP 32 (March 26, 1980), 4.
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foreign policy from detente towards confrontation and a new 
Cold War before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.7 That 
change had occurred because at bottom, influential forces in 
America, above all the "right-wing quarters" and military- 
industrial complex which carried on the legacy of US global 
hegemonism and the Cold War, had refused to accept the 
realistic policies of the detente of the early 1970s. They 
emphasized falsely the "growing Soviet military threat" to 
Western security and played on the sense in America of its 
increasing dependence on oil and other natural resources from 
abroad and of US vulnerability to their possible disruption. 
America's rapprochement with China had made detente with the 
USSR seem less necessary, because together those two powers 
could "contain" and encircle it around Eurasia. The growing 
influence in the Carter administration of Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
long an advocate of Cold War, anger and hysteria in the US 
caused by the Iranian hostage crisis and the need to show 
"firmness" and reverse his unpopularity as the 1980 elections 
approached - those factors had pushed a vacillating Carter to 
abandon detente, at least for a time. By suspending various 
bilateral talks with the USSR, refusing to observe agreements 
with it and turning away from concern with arms limitations 
and disarmament after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 
the US was "over-reacting", out of proportion to the 
(significance of the) intervention and to its limited 
interests there, and tearing the fabric of detente. It was 
not behaving responsibly as a major power; it was exercising
7 A Soviet interpretation of America's return to a policy of
confrontation against the USSR is given by G. Arbatov in
Pravda. March 3, 1980 in CDSP 32 (April 2, 1980), 1-4, 11.
For Western analyses of the movement in super-power relations 
towards the second "Cold War", consult Adam B. Ulam, Dangerous 
Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Fred
Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso
Editions and NLB, 1983); and Garthoff, Detente and
Confrontation. pp. 591-1089.
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a destabilizing influence on international relations.8
A prominent and alarming theme of the US course of action 
hostile to detente was the '‘necessity” to gain military 
superiority over the USSR and thereby effectively confront, if 
not dominate it from a "position of strength". The 
militarization of US policy began when NATO decided in May 
1978 to approve automatic increases in its members' defence 
budgets for the rest of the century. In December 1979 America 
had imposed on its European allies a decision to deploy new 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles on their territory. Most 
importantly America had refused to ratify the second Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty, signed by the super-powers in June 
1979. The US was also launching huge new spending programmes 
for its armed forces and making plans for waging "limited" 
nuclear war, for which new weapons were being developed and US 
strategic nuclear doctrine was being modified. Furthermore it 
had become much more ready to
resort to military force in the third world to block or 
roll back progressive revolutionary movement. The Carter 
Doctrine was seen as ... the first step in an 
intensification of American reliance on military means to 
secure what it termed 'vital interests' but that seemed 
to extend to any area, even where U.S. interests had been 
minimal. It was a repudiation of the Nixon Doctrine, and 
reflected an end to the 'Vietnam syndrome' and self- 
imposed restraint in the use of military means in the 
geopolitical competition.9
The consequences of these trends would be an upward spiral of 
the arms race, more tension and insecurity and a greater 
chance of nuclear proliferation and war.
The USSR perceived the militarization of America's 
foreign policy to be readily apparent in the Persian Gulf-
8 Note the remarks by Brezhnev in CDSP. February 13, 1980, 
p. 4. Also see Ilya Kremer, "Policy of Missed Opportunities", 
New Times, no. 7 (February 1980), pp. 5-7.
9 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 1020.
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Indian Ocean area.10 That process had begun in 1979 "with 
American imperialism's crushing defeat in Iran, which 
genuinely frightened the US administration",11 and with the 
victory of US oil monopolies in keeping (the energy policy of) 
America dependent on imports of oil from the Persian Gulf, the 
main source of their profits. Finding no new regional 
"policeman" to secure its interests in the Gulf, the United 
States took on that role itself. It refused in July 1979 to 
resume with the USSR the Indian Ocean arms control talks and 
it planned and began to organize a Rapid Deployment Force for 
intervention in the Gulf. It decided to expand the Diego 
Garcia naval facility, used the hostage crisis in Iran as an 
excuse to deploy a large naval force in the Arabian Sea and 
sought access to regional military facilities. These measures 
were all taken before the Soviet Union's requested, defensive 
intervention in Afghanistan. Then, in putting forward the 
doctrine named after him, President Carter invoked the Soviet 
intervention and "threat" to the Gulf states and their oil in 
order impudently to proclaim the Persian Gulf as a zone of its 
"vital interests".12 That pretext was intended to justify the 
"end pursued by the United States today" which apparently was
to consolidate its military, political and economic 
penetration in this region and to establish a kind of 
guardianship - or, more precisely, military-economic 
domination - over the states in the region and their 
natural resources. It will be easier to do this, 
Washington assumes, if more people believe that the US is
10 See, for example, N. Mishkin, "Towards An Indian Ocean Zone 
Of Peace", International Affairs (Moscow), no. 6 (June 1979), 
pp. 87-91; Mikhail Goryanov, Two Wavs Of Looking At The Indian 
Ocean, trans. Valentin Kochetkov (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency 
Publishing House, 1981); I. Redko, N. Shaskolsky, The Indian 
Ocean: A Sphere Of Tensions Or A Zone Of Peace? (Moscow: Nauka 
Publishers, 1983), pp. 10-14, 23-35; Alexander I. Chicherov, 
"South Asia And The Indian Ocean In The 1980s", Asian Survey 
24 (November 1984), 1117-1130.
11 An observation by Ye. M. Primakov in Literaturnava gazeta 
(sic), March 12, 1980 in CDSP 32 (April 9, 1980), 5.
12 The "Carter Doctrine" is discussed in Boris Pyadyshev, "Ill- 
Starred Doctrines", New Times, no. 12 (March 1980), pp. 5-7.
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saving somebody from something there.13
In "protecting” its now more "vulnerable” "vital interests”, 
America asserted a proprietorial right to interfere and 
prevent objectionable social changes in the Middle East,14 
ones arbitrarily defined by it to jeopardize its access to 
oil. It was America's general purpose in the Indian Ocean 
area to oppose, intimidate and dictate its will to all 
progressive forces and states, to complicate their relations 
with the USSR and to split and weaken the supporters of peace 
and detente. That those were America's actual objectives was 
clear to the Soviets not just because there was no real threat 
to Persian Gulf oil, which was flowing without obstruction, 
but, according to one Soviet analysis, because the US did not 
possess a vital interest in the region's oil resources. Gulf 
oil was simply more convenient to extract and cheaper than 
America's own oil, which it wished to conserve.15
In order to subordinate the Persian Gulf states to its 
rule and to assure its control over their oil, the US was 
"knocking together” a new regional security bloc involving 
Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, Oman, Somalia and Kenya. On their 
territory and Diego Garcia was being established a network of 
military bases from which to stage "defensive” interventions. 
The Americans were trying to lessen the expense to themselves 
of military operations in the Gulf and Indian Ocean and to 
subordinate their European allies more closely to their plans 
by seeking to extend the defence function and boundary of NATO
13 CDSP. March 5, 1980, p. 1. Note too Soviet News (London), 
March 25, 1980.
14 Pravda, February 14, 1980 in CDSP 32 (March 19, 1980), 18.
15 These propositions are made in Ruben Andreasyan, "The 'Vital 
Interests' of Oil Imperialism”, New Times, no. 14 (April 
1980), pp. 21-22; Pravda. November 11, 1980 in CDSP 32 
(December 10, 1980), 24.
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to the Persian Gulf.16 They were intensifying security 
relations with China but their collusion with the PRC in 
support of the Afghan "rebels” was only serving to keep the 
USSR's "limited military contingent" in Afghanistan. The US 
sought also to create unrest among Muslims along the borders 
of the Soviet Union's Muslim republics.17 At the military 
level, besides acquiring access to regional facilities, 
expanding Diego Garcia, where kit and supplies were being 
stockpiled, putting its enlarged naval presence in the Arabian 
Sea on a continuous basis and organizing the RDF, the US was 
deploying Marine forces in the Indian Ocean and flying B-52 
long-range bombers over Soviet naval formations.
The Soviet Union declared its respect for the need of 
America and the West for secure access to oil supplies and the 
safety of the Gulf and Indian Ocean shipping routes. But the 
Soviets thought that America's growing tendency to use its 
armed forces in support of policy, as shown by its blatant 
military pressure on Iran and its irresponsible and 
adventurist raid there to free the US hostages, was leading it 
to threaten its own interests as well as the security and 
independence of regional states. As L.I. Brezhnev commented 
several times, it was absurd to think that the West's interest 
in assured oil supplies and secure sea lanes could be 
"protected" by turning the Indian Ocean area into a "powder 
keg".18 His view was supported by Soviet commentators, one of 
whom remarked, "Problems which exist in the Near East and in 
the Persian Gulf are not amenable to a military solution;"19 
there was no doubt that some things could
16 Pyadyshev, "Doctrines", pp. 6-7; L.I. Brezhnev, "Report Of 
The CPSU Central Committee And The Current Tasks Of The Party 
In Home And Foreign Policy" 26 th Congress of the CPSU, 
February 23, 1980 in New Times, no. 9 (February 1981), p. 25.
17 CDSP. April 9, 1980, p. 5.
18 CDSP. March 26, 1980, p. 4; "26th Congress Report", New
Times, no. 9 (February 1981), p. 25.
19 Soviet News (London), March 25, 1980.
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be done by military force - oil fields and pipelines can 
be bombed, set on fire and destroyed. But will this 
produce oil? No, the task of ensuring uninterrupted 
deliveries of oil from the Middle East and the Persian 
Gulf countries cannot be accomplished militarily.20
In making that appreciation the Soviet Union was keenly 
aware of the larger potential American threat to its own 
declared security interests in the Indian Ocean area: the 
prevention of a strategic threat to Soviet territory from the 
south, the safety of the all-season sea route from the 
European USSR to the East Asian USSR and friendly relations 
with the littoral states. The most serious danger from the 
south came from US nuclear weapons, whether aboard aircraft 
carriers, B-52s flying over the Indian Ocean or submarines. 
It was noted that
Memorandum No. 51, issued by President Carter, 
envisages a 1 limited use" of nuclear weapons in the 
Middle East and is another element of the strategic plans 
of the White House, (sic) concerning this region. ... 
Official spokesmen note that the use of nuclear weapons 
will be considered, if conventional means of containment 
bring no results.21
Concern for their southern security had led the Soviets to 
warn the United States in November 1978 not to intervene in 
Iran and to warn it in November 1979 not to attack Iran in 
response to the taking hostage of the US embassy staff in 
Tehran. The Soviets' concern about a possible American 
"invasion of Iran in the late summer or early fall of 1980 led 
to military preparations for a possible counterintervention to 
secure northern Iran and prevent a U.S. military presence on 
the Soviet southern border."22
20 CDSP. April 2, 1980, p. 11.
21 A. Alexiev, A. Fialkovsky, "For A Peaceful Indian Ocean", 
International Affairs (Moscow), no. 2 (February 1981), p. 89.
22 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, fn. 106, p. 1003.
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However unsuitable and futile America's policies for 
South-West Asia were, the Soviets could not "remain 
indifferent when the threat to our security is increasing", 
especially when those policies were part of the United States' 
"general policy aimed at creation for itself of a situation of 
military superiority on a global scale."23 The USSR could 
defend itself and, if forced to, it would take the appropriate 
steps.24 Its response to the American strategic "threat" 
essentially was to continue to pursue its perennial primary 
security objective for the Indian Ocean area: the removal or 
minimization of America's military presence and the facilities 
for supporting it and potentially forces deploying from the 
US. The Soviets reinforced their 18-20 ship naval squadron 
with 10-11 vessels whose purpose was to mark the US aircraft 
carrier battle groups in the Arabian Sea. (By 1981 there was 
an average of 25 Soviet naval vessels there.) Also they 
called for the resumption of the US-USSR arms control talks 
for the Indian Ocean area.
Politically the Soviet Union sought to discourage 
security and military cooperation with the US in South-West 
Asia by its NATO allies by appealing to their strong interest 
in maintaining detente in Europe. Besides reassuring them 
that it had no designs on Persian Gulf oil, the USSR proposed 
in February 1980 a European conference for the consideration 
of energy issues, which conference might serve indirectly to 
distance Europe from America. The Soviets approved a 
provision in the Afghan government's programme of May 1980 for 
a political settlement with Iran and Pakistan which stated 
that in reaching a settlement, "notice should be taken of 
military-political activity in the region of the Indian Ocean 
and the Persian Gulf on the part of the states from outside
23 United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee On The 
Indian Ocean A/AC.159/L.24, p. 8.
24 Idem. This point was made just as forcefully by Brezhnev in 
CDSP. March 26, 1980, pp. 3,4.
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that region.”25 The US naval presence in the Arabian Sea was 
one element of "outside interference” in the affairs of 
Afghanistan that would have to be removed before the USSR 
could withdraw.* The Soviet Union continued to support the 
creation of a "Zone of Peace” in the Indian Ocean because that 
would help in the struggle to maintain detente as well as lead 
to the virtual complete removal of the US military presence 
there.26 A "Zone of Peace”, the Soviet calculation went, 
would curb American nuclear strategic and conventional 
military operations much more to the advantage of Soviet 
security than Soviet armed forces would be curbed to US 
advantage. Finally, in December 1980 Brezhnev made a proposal 
for the security of the Persian Gulf region which called for 
observance of
the following mutual commitments:
- not to create foreign military bases in the Persian 
Gulf or on adjacent islands; not to deploy nuclear 
weapons of mass destruction there;
- not to use force or threaten the use of force against 
Persian Gulf countries, and not to interfere in their 
internal affairs;
- to respect the nonaligned status chosen by the Persian 
Gulf states; not to draw them into military groupings to 
which nuclear powers are party;
- to respect the sovereign right of the states of this 
region to their natural resources; and
- not to create any obstacles or threats to normal trade 
and the use of the sea lanes linking the states of this
By 1981 the Soviets no longer insisted on a linkage of 
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean security with a settlement of 
the "situation around Afghanistan”.
25 Pravda, May 15, 1980 in CDSP 32 (June 20, 1980), 6.
26 For typical Soviet views on the "Zone of Peace”, see Sergei 
Vladimirov, "The Struggle For A Peace Zone”, New Times, no. 8 
(February 1981), pp. 13-15; D. Nikolayev, "For Peace and 
Security In The Indian Ocean", International Affairs (Moscow), 
no. 9 (September 1982), pp. 57-64.
region with other countries of the world.27
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The main purposes of America's strategic policy for the 
Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area in 1980 vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union were to deter potential further military "adventures" by 
it and to counter political uses of the Soviet armed forces. 
But the USSR's reaction to the "Carter Doctrine" and 
initiatives such as the RDF and acquiring access to regional 
military facilities differed from what America intended. The 
Soviets respected the American and Western interest in Persian 
Gulf oil and did not plan to attack Iran or Pakistan. Their 
orientation was defensive, as manifest in their specific 
responses to US strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area, 
and they were not actively trying to use their armed forces 
politically in order to influence South-West Asian states. 
Because, they deduced, America's attempt to increase 
deterrence against them was unnecessary, that attempt 
reflected a dangerous major change in US policy: apparently 
the Americans had abandoned detente and were questing for 
global domination. Rather than being "disciplined" by 
American deterrence, the USSR feared greater international 
tension and instability because of US aggressiveness and 
militarism.
Saudi Arabia: Ambivalence about 
a Dangerous Friend
Saudi Arabia was ambivalent about the US strategic 
contribution to its security. It appreciated the "over the 
horizon" American naval presence for showing US interest and 
commitment to its security, protecting shipping and, along 
with the Rapid Deployment Force, giving more assurance that 
with their availability America could help it to cope better 
with regional military threats more likely than Soviet 
aggression. On the other hand the RDF seemed to be an 
unnecessary and inadequate deterrent against the USSR, unable 
confidently to defeat a major Iraqi attack and unsuitable to
27 Pravda, Dec. 11 1980 in CDSP 32 (January 15, 1981), 6.
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deal with internal dangers. The US was also a potential 
military threat because it might intervene with the RDF in 
"defence” of access to Saudi oil. Most of the time the 
American strategic connection was more politically dangerous 
than militarily useful and Saudi Arabia sought to keep it at 
a distance and to minimize its visible dependence upon it.28
The Saudis viewed America's strategic policy for the 
Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area from a perspective in which 
Israel, internal unrest, other Arab states such as Syria, 
South Yemen and Iraq and revolutionary Iran were more 
important threats to their security than the Soviet Union.29 
Even after the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan, the Saudis 
did not fear a Soviet attack upon Iran or the Gulf Arab states 
as much as the indirect, political threat from the USSR. Its 
"encirclement" of them by way of its political and military 
presence in South Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan did increase 
their sense of insecurity and they were aware of the Soviet 
Union's expected growing need for oil imports by the latter 
1980s. But in the meantime, rather than employ its armed 
forces directly in order to achieve its interests, the USSR 
would patiently take advantage of opportunities caused by 
America's support for Israel and increase its influence in the 
Middle East.
28 For discussions of Saudi security relations with the US, see 
David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia; Ambivalent 
Allies MERI Special Studies Number 3 (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1985); United States, Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, Saudi Arabia And The United 
States The New Context in an Evolving "Special Relationship". 
Report Prepared For the Subcommittee On Europe And The Middle 
East Of The Committee On Foreign Affairs, U.S. House Of 
Representatives, Committee Print, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1981; 
Abdul Kasim Mansur (pseud.), "The American Threat to Saudi 
Arabia", Survival 23 (January-February 1981), 36-41.
29 On Saudi security policy consult Adeed Dawisha, Saudi 
Arabia's Search for Security Adelphi Paper No. 158 (London: 
The International Institute For Strategic Studies, Winter 
1979-1980); William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s 
Foreign Policy. Security, and Oil (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1981); Safran, Saudi Quest.
Disagreeing with the US about the principal security 
threat to the Gulf, Saudi Arabia refused to join America's 
proposed "cooperative security framework” and to provide it 
with access to its bases. The best way for it to counter the 
USSR and to ensure Saudi Arabia's more immediate security was 
to influence Israel to accept a genuine, comprehensive 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But because America 
supported Israel and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and because 
it also confronted Iran, keeping a protective political 
distance from the US was a Saudi security objective of higher 
priority than conspicuous association with it for dealing with 
the lesser Soviet threat. Overt strategic cooperation with 
America, even if it did not support Israel, would still 
provoke criticism within Saudi Arabia, antagonize most of the 
Arab world and evoke fear of Western imperialism. Besides 
flouting Arab nationalism and the Gulf states' preference in 
principle for their region to be free from all super-power 
military presence, providing America with access to its bases 
would show that Saudi Arabia was too weak and incompetent to 
look after itself and that it had subordinated itself to US 
"protection”, in fact domination. Seen to give up their 
independence, the Saudis would lose face and legitimacy at 
home and abroad. Cooperation with the US would also prompt 
the Soviets to try to enlarge further their presence in and 
around the Gulf, thereby increasing the unwanted super-power 
competition.
The Saudis' fear of the dire political consequences of 
collaborating with the US was complemented by growing doubts 
about America's credibility as a security asset - about its 
will and capability to contribute to their security and the 
reliability and usefulness of its strategic contribution. 
After all it had failed to save the Shah, deal with the 
revolutionary regime in Tehran or rescue the diplomatic 
hostages; nor had the US countered the USSR's involvement in 
South Yemen or its intervention in the war in the Horn of 
Africa in 1977-78 on behalf of Ethiopia or its intervention in
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Afghanistan.
The Saudi government was quite sceptical too about the 
pertinence of US conventional forces for helping it to deal 
with internal disturbances. Unless deftly and discreetly 
used, they would only worsen a crisis and embarrass, if not 
endanger the government. To the extent that the US might be 
relevant for coping with forms of domestic unrest, it was 
hampered by inadequate intelligence and special operations 
capabilities.30 The publicity given the Rapid Deployment 
Force and their memory of America's veiled threats in 1973-75 
and 1979 of unilateral intervention suggested to some Saudis 
that the chief US security objective in Saudi Arabia was to 
preserve access to oil, not to contribute to the safety of the 
state. Thus the United States might use the RDF in order to
seize control of the Saudi oil fields. Even otherwise 
pro-American Saudi officers worried that the RDF, 
combined with the U.S. advisory teams in Saudi Arabia, 
would allow the U.S. to seize the oil facilities in the 
northeast provinces and that the U.S. planned to do this 
in the event of another oil embargo. While senior Saudi 
officials discounted this possibility - and knew that the 
U.S. was well aware that the long-range result of any 
such U.S. action would be to alienate the entire Arab and 
developing world - many middle-echelon officials took it 
more seriously. Even some senior Saudi officials were 
uneasy about the true purpose of the RDF....31
Because of the potential danger posed by America, its military 
involvement in domestic Saudi security was best confined to an 
indirect role such as training and providing specialized 
equipment for the Saudi Arabian National Guard, one of whose 
responsibilities was protecting the oilfields. If special 
forces or advice were needed, they would be available from 
Western European states, for example France at the time of the 
seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in late 1979.
30 Cordesman, Gulf Search, p. 258.
31 Ibid., p. 259.
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At the regional level of security the Saudis found the 
deployment by two US aircraft carrier task groups in the 
Arabian Sea to be "acceptable and reassuring".32 It was 
perceived to show America's interest in friendly states' 
security and its commitment and determination to help uphold 
it. The US naval presence was nearby yet inconspicuous, 
available but discreet - "on tap but not on top" - and it did 
not possess a ground intervention capability.* Together with 
the enlarged Middle East Force and the US Navy's cooperation 
with the Omani navy in monitoring the movement of shipping 
through the Strait of Hormuz, the aircraft carrier task groups 
helped to reduce Saudi fears about the safety of shipping. 
While asserting for political purposes that they could manage 
their security without dependence on external powers, the 
Saudis hoped that their own forces armed with advanced 
American weaponry, perhaps other friendly regional forces and 
all forms of US military presence in and near the Gulf - the 
"over the horizon" naval presence, training, technical and 
advisory personnel in the Kingdom itself and US contingency 
access to facilities in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and informally 
Egypt for a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force - would be 
adequate to deter most attacks by regional foes. The 
permanent presence of one or two US divisions based on Saudi 
territory was not wanted because, as noted, it was politically 
unacceptable and it could be used to seize the oil fields; nor 
was it needed: it would be much more than required for local 
contingencies.33 But if there were a direct and immediate 
"worst case" threat to Saudi Arabia from Iraq and more US 
forces were needed than were present, they could be asked in 
from America on a temporary, ad hoc basis. Their 
reinforcement of Saudi Arabia would be acceptable in a crisis
The intermittent presence in the Arabian Sea of a Marine 
Amphibious Unit did suggest a tacit US threat to intervene in 
"protection" of access to oil.
32 Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. p. 156.
33 Ibid., p. 56.
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when their military utility would be assumed to outweigh their 
political danger.
At the start of the Iraq-Iran war in late September 1980, 
Saudi Arabia sought help from the US in order to deter Iranian 
air attacks against (Iraqi aircraft and ships at) Saudi 
airfields and ports and against its oil facilities and also to 
prevent Iranian naval interference with the movement of 
shipping through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.34 The 
Americans sent four AWACS to Saudi Arabia and stationed a 
guided missile cruiser off the Saudi Gulf coast. But even 
though America's response did help to reassure the Saudis 
about the value and credibility of its strategic support for 
them, the Saudis still wanted America's help to be low in 
"visibility” in order to avoid provoking Iran. Thus Saudi 
Arabia declined to take part in a Saudi-American naval task 
group proposed by the US for preventing (Iranian) interference 
with shipping. Unlike their support for AWACS the Saudis' 
cooperation for defence of the sea lanes was "not essential[;] 
they preferred to leave the matter entirely in the hands of 
the United States so as to minimize the extent to which they 
openly 'compromised'...”35 their relations with other Arab 
states as well as Iran. Also the Saudis "could count on the 
United States to secure the transit of oil on its own, for its 
own ... ”36 and wider Western interests.
Saudi Arabia perceived America's regional deterrence 
policy towards the Soviet Union with ambivalence. The Saudis 
regarded the USSR as a lower order military threat because it 
was relatively distant and thus unlikely to launch an attack 
against them. Nonetheless, according to the US State
34 For details, see Safran, Saudi Quest, pp. 364-367, 410-411.
35 Ibid., p. 411.
36 Ibid., p. 367. British, French and Australian naval forces 
were present too in the northern Arabian Sea at the start of 
the Gulf War.
Department, high Saudi officials
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privately expressed great concern about possible Soviet 
threats to the region. There is general fear that the 
unstable situation in Iran would tempt Moscow to move 
into Iran, and that without some sort of American 
capability there would be nothing to prevent the Soviets 
from moving down to the gulf (sic) .37
Those officials "privately welcomed the demonstration of 
American determination to resist Soviet aggression in the 
region, including the development of a U.S. rapid deployment 
force and an over-the-horizon presence.1,38 But their welcome 
was qualified by uncertainty about the relevance and ability 
of the RDF to deter a Soviet attack. "Many Saudis" concluded 
that the US could not react effectively against a Soviet or 
other "major threat" to the Gulf; US "talk of major military 
intervention in the Gulf might be a bluff for much of the 
[1980s]."39 In the Saudis' view America's actual deterrent 
against the USSR remained its strategic nuclear forces. They 
seemed "to believe that the only effective deterrent to direct 
Soviet military intervention is the global balance of power. 
If the prospect of nuclear war does not deter the Soviet 
Union, a few American divisions in the gulf (sic) are unlikely 
to do so."40 And if American deterrence were a bluff and if 
Iran were not a "vital" interest worth fighting for by resort 
to nuclear weapons, was it inconceivable that in a 
confrontation with the USSR America might choose to avoid 
escalation to conflict? Might not the Americans either 
abandon Saudi Arabia, leaving it and the rest of the Gulf to 
their fate, or try to arrange with the Soviets to divide the 
region into spheres of oil access and influence? If so, the 
RDF would be an occupation force. Should the RDF be used
37 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 32.
38 Idem.
39 Cordesman, Gulf Search, pp. 257, 258, 259.
40 Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. p. 56.
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against a Soviet attack, however, the Saudis identified much 
danger in
a 'preemptive strategy' under which the U.S. would deploy 
its forces as soon as possible to ensure that they would 
be in place before the Soviets could act. Both the 
Saudis and many European leaders felt that such a 
strategy would lead the U.S. to overreact and to try to 
beat the Soviets to the punch, creating a hair-trigger 
willingness to commit U.S. forces long before the need 
for such a commitment was clear. From the Saudi 
perspective, it meant that the U.S. might suddenly try to 
massively increase its presence in the Gulf, and demand 
Saudi support of that action.... This course, the Saudis 
felt, could tie them to U.S. actions that would be so 
unpopular in the Arab world that they would isolate Saudi 
Arabia ... and greatly strengthen internal opposition to 
the royal family. The end result was that many Saudis 
became as worried over the possibility that the RDF would 
be used as over the possibility that it could not be 
used.41
The United States was the Saudis' ultimate source of 
military security and its strategic value to them lay in the 
politically safe(r) background and in some crises. From the 
background America did give some reassurance that it was 
committed to helping to uphold Saudi security and that it 
would balance politically and deter the Soviet armed forces. 
And in a crisis, at the start of the Iraq-Iran war when clear 
danger caused the Saudis temporarily to invert their security 
priorities and ask for relatively more conspicuous US military 
help, America gave an appropriate response. But the American 
strategic connection remained a political danger and of 
uncertain reliability. It had to be managed at least as much 
as relied upon.
Iran: Antipathy. Strategic Ambivalence 
Revolutionary Iran suspected intimidation and probably 
outright intervention against it as the purposes of US 
strategic policy for the Persian Gulf, but the American threat 
was "neutralized" by Iran's strong proclivity towards
41 Cordesman, Gulf Search, pp. 259-260.
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martyrdom. At the same time the Iranians still depended, 
however implicitly, on the US to balance politically and to 
deter the USSR.
Iran's view of America's strategic policy derived from a 
strong revulsion and antagonism towards the US "Great Satan" 
because of perceived past humiliation, political domination, 
economic exploitation and cultural pollution by it in close 
association with the reviled deposed Shah.42 The United 
States was the more immediate and dangerous threat to Iran 
than the Soviets, despite their intervention in Afghanistan,
primarily because of cultural contamination and only 
secondarily as a result of its military power. Iranians 
held the contradictory view of the US as at one and the 
same time impotent and omnipotent; the Islamic 
authorities feared US military power while also 
ridiculing it.43
America was thought not to possess legitimate military 
interests in the Persian Gulf44 and, according to Bani Sadr, 
elected President of Iran in January 1980, it wanted to defend 
only the region's oil, not its people.45 The US was using the 
hostage crisis and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as 
pretexts to reinforce and make permanent its regional military 
presence and to acquire logistic support facilities which 
might be used by the Rapid Deployment Force in attempts to
42 For valuable analyses of relations between Iran and America 
since World War II, see James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion 
The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988) and Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the 
United States A Cold War Study (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1988).
43 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), p. 205.
44 U.S. House, U.S. Gulf Interests 1980. p. 32.
45 British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary Of World 
Broadcasts. Second Series, The Middle East And North Africa, 
pt. 4, ME 6333, January 31, 1980, p. A/2. (Referred to below 
as BBC, SWB, ME.)
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undermine the Iranian revolution.46 That was also why, in 
Iran's understanding, the Americans "imposed” war on it by way 
of their Iraqi "agent”, Saddam Hussayn.
The focal point of the confrontation between Iran and the 
United States was the hostage crisis, in which the US 
attempted with its aircraft carrier task groups in the Arabian 
Sea, as well as by political and economic means, to exert 
pressure on the Iranians to release the hostages. America's 
coercive diplomacy failed47 because the Iranians expected an 
attack and rather than being afraid of one, fear being the 
basic source of US strategic leverage, they welcomed an 
opportunity for martyrdom. "In the final analysis" the 
American
naval presence served no useful role in the resolution of 
the hostage crisis. For the most part, the military 
options presented by the presence had military or 
political liabilities which reduced their political 
effectiveness. More importantly, even the most 
attractive option for indirect military action, a 
maritime quarantine imposed by mining, foundered on the 
basic point that due to the mindset of martyrdom, Iran 
would not have yielded to indirect military pressure. 
Therefore, the only military option which had a real 
chance of achieving the basic goal of the Carter foreign 
policy, i.e., the release of the hostages, was a direct 
rescue attempt. When that failed, there were no viable 
military options left... .48
While confronting US "imperialism”, Iran also opposed 
Soviet "atheist communism". The Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan had heightened Iran's fears that the USSR might 
eventually try to seize its provinces of Azerbaijan and
46 Reported by the State Department in U.S. House, U.S. Gulf 
Interests 1980. p. 33.
47 Lieutenant Commander William F. Hickman, US Navy, "Did It
Really Matter?", Naval War College Review 36 (March-April 
1983) , 17-30, explains why the US Navy was not able to help 
achieve America's policy objectives in the hostage crisis.
48 Ibid. , p. 27.
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Baluchistan, from which latter the Soviets would establish a 
position on the Arabian Sea, dominate the flow of shipping 
through the Strait of Hormuz and control the Middle East and 
South Asia.49 The Iranians "certainly plan[ned] to resist 
Russian expansionism”, according to Bani Sadr, ”but that does 
mean that we are going to give the ... Americans an excuse to 
set foot here once again.”50 Seeking to minimize their 
dependence on the US, the Iranians rejected an American offer 
to them in January 1980 to normalize relations and cooperate 
against the USSR. The US could best help Iran resist the 
Soviets by ceasing its intervention in Iranian affairs.
Iran's spurning of dealings with both super-powers was 
part of its "balanced” non-alignment. That derived from the 
sense that "all the ills of the world - inequality, an unjust 
international system, exploitation, oppression, the bullying 
of the weak by the strong - emanated from the 'arrogant' 
superpowers ..." who "were in collusion and were equally 
guilty."51 There was the danger too that the USSR and the US 
might come to blows on Iranian territory or decide to avoid 
confrontation by dividing Iran into spheres of influence, as 
Britain had done with Tsarist Russia in 1907 and with the 
Soviets in 1941. Iran "strongly opposed ... and condemn[ed] 
the military presence of non-regional powers - whether 
American or Soviet or any other power - in its southern 
waters."52 The "presence of American naval units and the 
corresponding reinforcement of Soviet naval units" was a 
"serious danger to peace and international security" and 
violated the United Nations' resolution calling for the
49 See comments by Bani-Sadr in Guardian. January 8, 1980 and 
by the then Iranian Foreign Minister, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, in 
Dawn. January 19, 1980.
50 BBC, SWB. ME, pt. 4, ME/6333, January 31, 1980, p. A/3.
51 Chubin and Tripp, Iran And Iraq At War, p. 205.
52 This quotation and those in the rest of this paragraph come 
from BBC, SWB. ME, pt. 4, ME/6343, February 12, 1980,
pp. A/7-A/8.
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creation of a MZone of Peace” in the Indian Ocean. In order 
”to ease the current situation, the US and the USSR must
leave the countries of the area alone and ... remove 
their forces ... as soon as possible. In this way the 
independence of the countries of the region and their 
non-alignment ... [from] East ... [and] West will be 
confirmed, and their existence will not be sacrificed to 
the plots and schemes of the superpowers which aim at 
dividing up the region.
Iran's "balanced” non-alignment still bestowed an 
implicit strategic role upon America, however. Recognising 
that the US and the USSR would not soon remove their forces 
from South-West Asia, its security policy called for each 
super-power to balance and deter the other in order to 
maximize Iranian security. Iran, its Minister of Defence made 
clear in March 1980,
'want[s] to have an equilibrium,' [because] 'The Iranian 
government well understands that, if there was no 
American pressure, the Russians would attack Iran, and 
vice versa.'
Asked what Iran would do if a Soviet armored column 
invaded, the minister [said], 'We would fight, and at the 
same time, the United States naturally would come and 
face the Soviet power.'53 (Italics added.)
At the strategic level at least, Iran's antipathy towards 
America yielded to ambivalence.
Iraq: Opposition to Interventionist Threat 
Iraq maintained that America's strategic policy for the 
Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area increased the threat to its 
independence and security, a view conditioned by more than 
twenty years of conflict between the two states' respective
53 International Herald Tribune. March 22, 1980.
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political and security outlook and interests.54 After the 
republican revolution in 1958, Iraq left the American- 
sponsored Baghdad Pact and adopted a non-aligned foreign 
policy55 and after the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, it 
broke diplomatic relations with the US: the Americans were 
imperialists hostile to the Arab nation and they were trying 
to dominate it, above all by supporting Israel, and to use the 
Arabs in their competition with the USSR. From the late 1960s
America had encouraged the Shah of Iran to assert hegemony
over the Gulf Arabs and until 1975 it, the Shah and Israel had 
tried to undermine Iraq by supporting the Kurdish rebellion. 
Iraq's alliance with the Soviet Union from 1972 was a 
defensive expedient which did not override its policy 
preference that both super-powers keep out of the Arab Gulf 
and that the Gulf states take sole responsibility for their 
security. The Iraqis objected strongly to the USSR's 
intervention in Afghanistan from late 1979 because further 
expansion of the Soviet presence and influence around the Gulf 
would compromise their ambition to exercise regional hegemony 
after the fall of the Shah.
The main purpose of US strategic policy for the Arab 
Gulf, according to Iraq, was (to be ready for) intervention, 
to seize the region's oil. Deterring the USSR was a secondary 
purpose, perhaps only a pretext for intervention. Saddam 
Hussayn, the President and ruler of Iraq, accused the 
Americans of trying ”to exploit the Iranian and Afghan 
situations to 'move its fleet and exert pressure on some 
regimes ... [and] to blatantly restore its influence and
prepare for its occupation of the rich oil fields in the
54 Barry Rubin, "United States-Iraq Relations: A Spring Thaw?", 
in Iraq: The Contemporary State, ed. Tim Niblock (London: 
Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 109-124, surveys relations between the 
two countries in a historical context.
55 On Iraq's non-alignment, consult Steven B. Kashkett, "Iraq 
And The Pursuit Of Nonalignment", Orbis 26 (Summer 1982), 
477-494.
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strategic region'.”56 The United States' attempt to rescue the 
hostages in Iran was an act of aggression showing its greater 
willingness to use the armed forces. Also its increased 
military presence in South-West Asia and its quest for access 
to bases in the Arab Gulf would provoke Soviet counter-action, 
thereby intensifying the rivalry between the US and the USSR 
and the potential for a super-power conflict. In response to 
the perceived increased American threat to its security after 
the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine, Iraq put forward in 
February 1980 the ”Arab National Charter”. Apropos of the US 
and the USSR, that document said that there must be no 
dependence on foreign powers* and that the Arab states ought 
to keep out of international conflict except when their 
territory was attacked. When there was foreign aggression 
against one of them, they should join together against it. 
The Charter rejected all forms of foreign military presence on 
Arab territory; a regime allowing such a presence would be 
"resisted”.
Judging America to be the principal strategic threat to 
the Arab Gulf, Iraq saw its alliance with the Soviets, whom it 
was confident it could manage, as a means by which to deter 
potential US aggression. Yet the Iraqis did not ignore the 
possibility of Soviet military action against the region. 
While proclaiming that they themselves would not allow the 
USSR to occupy Saudi territory, they nonetheless relied on the 
US to balance and to deter the Soviets. At a news conference 
in July 1980, Saddam Hussayn told the Gulf Arabs that if
the Soviet armies come to occupy your territories ... and 
the Arab armies are not able to repulse them, then you 
can, under the Arab National Charter we proposed to you, 
bring in the US army to face the Soviets. The US army is
In this spirit Iraq had rejected a proposal by Oman in 
September 1979 for Western powers to participate in patrolling 
the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
56 Reported by the State Department in U.S. House, U.S. Gulf 
Interests 1980. p. 32.
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not far away. It is present on all of the oceans and 
seas. All you have to do is wink at it and it will 
come.57
Pakistan: Keep Distance from Unreliable "Friend*1 
Pakistan declined to join America's proposed "cooperative 
security framework” in return for confirmation by the US of 
the two sides' security agreement of 1959 and an offer of 
economic and military aid. In its view the cost, particularly 
political, of a close security association with the Americans 
was much greater than the benefit from their inadequate offer 
of aid and their insufficient and unreliable security 
commitment to it.
Pakistan's perception of America since the 1960s as an 
unreliable source of security arose from the clash between its 
perception of India and America's view of the USSR (and China, 
up to 1969-1970) as the main threat to regional security. The 
United States' supply of arms to India after the Sino-Indian 
war in 1962, its embargo on arms transfers to India and 
Pakistan from the time of their war in 1965 and its 
indifferent support for Pakistan against India in the war in 
1971 generated strong feelings in Pakistan that its ties with 
America bilaterally and through CENTO and SEATO had little 
value in terms of actual, relevant US support. The drifting 
apart of Pakistan and America quickened in the 1970s as the US 
improved its relations with the Soviets and the Chinese and as 
Pakistan withdrew from SEATO (1972), emphasized its Islamic 
identity and cultivated relations with Muslim, notably Arab, 
states and in 1979 withdrew from CENTO and became a member of 
the non-aligned movement. Pakistan's relations with America 
under the Carter administration worsened sharply. In the 
Pakistanis' opinion America had applied its nuclear non­
proliferation policy and cut off in 1979 all forms of aid to 
them in an attempt to thwart their quest for a nuclear weapons 
capability, while not applying that policy to India. The
57 BBC, SWB, ME, pt. 4, ME/6479, July 24, 1980, p. A/13.
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United States' global policy from 1977 of trying to restrain 
the flow of arms to the Third World had prevented a 
significant renewal of arms aid to Pakistan. The Americans 
criticized it for its human rights record, and their 
encouragement of "regional influentials" favoured India. 
Pakistani-American relations reached a nadir when a mob burnt 
down the US embassy in Islamabad in November 1979.58
When in winter 1980 the terms of America's offer to it to 
join in the "cooperative security framework" became clear - 
confirmation by Congress of the security agreement of 1959 and 
$200 million in economic aid and $200 million in military aid, 
with more to come later - Pakistan rejected the proposal. The 
$400 million was derided by General Zia ul-Haq, then President 
of Pakistan, as "peanuts", inadequate even to begin to meet 
Pakistan's needs for a credible defence capability against 
potential Soviet threats. According to a "high Pakistani 
official", if his country accepted the $400 million it would 
not be buying "real security".59 Nor would the Pakistanis 
gain reassurance from America's reaffirmation of the agreement 
of 1959. For "real security" Pakistan wanted the US to raise 
that agreement to a full security treaty ratified by Congress 
which would oblige America to give it automatic military 
support against an attack by the USSR or India. Pakistan also 
wanted thousands of millions of dollars of military aid and
58 Thomas Perry Thornton discusses "Between The Stools: U.S. 
Policy Towards Pakistan During The Carter Administration" in 
Asian Survey 22 (October 1982), 959-977, from his vantage 
point as the member of the Carter National Security Council 
responsible for South Asia.
59 New York Times. July 16, 1980. The Pakistanis apparently 
assumed that although the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
was primarily defensive and presented no immediate danger, the 
USSR might engage in cross-border pursuits, probes and 
punitive attacks. If it did, the proposed US aid package 
would not provide the sufficient additional means for them to 
cope. The US might have stipulated other terms making its 
offer even more disadvantageous and unacceptable to Pakistan: 
no use of American weapons against India, no further 
development of its nuclear programme and, perhaps, access to 
Pakistani military facilities for the US armed forces.
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economic aid.
America's lack of interest in a full treaty and its past 
unreliability as a source of security sustained Pakistan's 
uncertainty that the US valued it enough to commit its armed 
forces to the defence of Pakistan in the event of a Soviet 
attack. Although America might risk war in order to protect 
its vital interests in the Persian Gulf against Soviet 
aggression, a less important Pakistan might be expendable.60 
Finally, if Pakistan accepted the US offer, it would put 
itself symbolically back into the American "camp", provoke 
domestic, Indian and Soviet hostility, compromise its non- 
aligned status and impair its relations with the Islamic 
states, notably Iran. The Zia regime "feared Khomeini's wrath 
almost as much as Brezhnev's”61 and well understood that too 
close an association with the US, whose pressure on Iran to 
release the American hostages was resented in Pakistan, would 
worsen its domestic political position.
Because in Pakistan's view, the United States' offer of 
a revived security relationship was not only inadequate but 
also might prejudice its broader security policy, Pakistan 
decided to keep its distance from the US, while quietly 
discussing its military needs with it, and await the election 
of an Administration more congenial, perhaps more reliable and 
certainly more bountiful in its offer of aid.
India; US Strategic Threat to its 
Security and Primacy in South Asia
India opposed America's revised security policy and 
strategic policy for South-West Asia because they complicated 
and endangered its security and its predominant political 
position in South Asia. Pakistan was the chief military 
threat to India and the United States' inclusion of Pakistan
60 Thornton, "Between The Stools”, p. 970; New York Times. July 
16, 1980.
61 Ibid., p. 972.
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in its "cooperative security framework" would, it was feared, 
involve supplying it with arms which could be used against 
India. India's views and influence about the security issue 
most important to it would be "marginalized". America's 
policies made India feel more vulnerable because they could 
lead to a regional conflict between the US and the USSR which 
might entangle it. The United States' enlargement of its 
naval forces in the Indian Ocean, its creation of the Rapid 
Deployment Force, its further development of Diego Garcia and 
its acquisition of access to regional military facilities 
threatened security and stability throughout the Indian Ocean 
area by encouraging a Soviet-American arms race and 
competitive super-power intervention as well as unilateral 
American intervention there.62
India perceived America's response to the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan from within a context of major 
differences between it and the US in foreign policy outlook, 
interests and priorities manifest in the Americans' closer 
relations with India's foes, Pakistan and China.63 India's 
foreign policy was non-aligned and, contrary to the US 
interpretation of non-alignment, that did not mean keeping 
equal distance between the super-powers so much as maintaining 
relations with each which best assured its interests and 
freedom of action. Non-alignment had been conceived as a way 
to minimize the intrusion of the Soviet-American rivalry into 
South Asia but beginning in the 1950s America had brought the
62 For these themes, see Republic of India, Government of 
India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1979-80
(Faridabad: Government of India Press, 1980), pp. i-iv; ---,
Report 1980-81 (New Delhi: n.p., 1981), pp. i-iv. Onkar
Marwah discusses the Indian perception of America's role in 
the Indian Ocean area as part of an analysis of "India's 
Strategic Perspectives on the Indian Ocean", in The Indian 
Ocean Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, eds. Dowdy and 
Trood, pp. 301-317.
63 These differences are discussed by Raju G.C. Thomas, 
"Security Relationships In Southern Asia: Differences In The 
Indian And American Perspectives", Asian Survey 21 (July 
1981), 698-709.
431
Cold War to the Indian sub-continent by its application of the 
balance of power concept. Mistakenly over-estimating the 
Soviet threat to states from Turkey to India, it had drawn 
India's neighbour, Pakistan, into its anti-Soviet security 
system. US military aid to Pakistan had led to war between 
India and Pakistan in 1965 and compromised India's main 
security interest - preventing a Pakistani attack upon it, a 
threat much more concrete than that posed by the Soviet Union. 
In 1971 the beginning of an entente between America and 
Pakistan's close friend, China, with whom India and the USSR 
were at odds, and the possibility of US collusion with 
Pakistan against India in the Bangladesh liberation war had 
required India to conclude a treaty of alliance with the 
Soviet Union. Historically, then, the United States had 
complicated India's security and pushed it closer to the USSR 
than preferred by the Indians, who also felt that America did 
not take them seriously as the leading power in South Asia.
In responding to America's modified policies for South- 
West Asia the government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who returned 
to power in January 1980, claimed that the US was over­
emphasizing its rivalry with the USSR and the need to 
"contain” the Soviet "expansionist threat" to the Persian 
Gulf. Because the Soviet move into Afghanistan was defensive, 
not offensive, as the US government seemed to think, India did 
not see the USSR as posing a military threat to the West's 
access to Persian Gulf oil and the sea lanes.64 The Soviets 
were becoming more involved in the Western economy and, 
recognising the importance of Gulf oil to it, they would not 
attempt a blatant and provocative coup de main against a vital 
Western interest. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had 
been a response partly to America's naval force increase in 
the Arabian Sea in 1979, its preparation of intervention 
forces for the Persian Gulf region important to Soviet
64 In June 1980, for example, Mrs. Gandhi said that she did not 
think the Soviets would "cross" from Afghanistan to the Indian 
Ocean. The Hindu. June 20, 1980.
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security, US and Chinese support for the resistance against 
the Marxist regime in Afghanistan, perhaps in the hope of 
obtaining bases there after its downfall, and the more general 
evolution of security ties between America and China which 
created in the USSR a stronger sense of "encirclement”. The 
Gandhi government's own response to the Soviets' intervention 
consisted of trying to encourage their withdrawal by way of 
"quiet diplomacy".
In India's view the Carter administration was responsible 
for initiating the new Cold War and shifting its active 
theatre from Europe to Asia.65 Based upon the wrong 
assumption about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and 
inappropriately militaristic in reaction to it, the United 
States' policies could seriously endanger Indian and also 
wider Indian Ocean security. The biggest danger to India was 
that by trying once again to use Pakistan to contain the USSR, 
the US would give the Pakistanis arms, of little use, much 
less need against the USSR, which might well encourage them to 
attack India, as in 1965. American arms for Pakistan would 
create an arms race that would be futile, because India would 
match Pakistan's acquisitions. The only real consequences 
would be a loss of funds for economic development and 
increased tension between New Delhi and Islamabad. India 
feared too the potential for US intervention on the side of 
Pakistan in the event of a new Indo-Pakistani war. A war was 
possible because Pakistan was politically unstable and the Zia 
ul-Haq regime might try to preserve a degree of unity in the 
fissiparous Pakistani state by launching a military adventure. 
Thus the Americans' (expected) supply of arms to Pakistan 
would generate instability in South Asia, which contradicted 
their own policy objectives. Further, India continued to 
worry about Pakistan's possible acquisition of a nuclear 
weapons capability with US connivance.
65 This was implied in India, Ministry of External Affairs, 
Report 1980-81. p. i.
A crucial element in America's strategic policy for the 
Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area was the quid pro quo presumed 
by the Indian government whereby the US would gain access to 
bases in Pakistan in return for giving it arms. Expected US 
access to bases in Pakistan and perhaps in Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh too, actual negotiated US access to military 
facilities in Oman, Somalia and Kenya and the further 
development of Diego Garcia were part of America's 
militarization of the Indian Ocean area on the pretext of 
responding to the events in Iran and Afghanistan.66 But a 
larger, now continuous naval presence supported by a network 
of facilities was not the best way to defend US interests, 
because it would only elicit and legitimize Soviet counter­
measures and hamper efforts to persuade the USSR to withdraw 
from Afghanistan. A super-power arms race would raise 
regional tension because it could lead to competitive American 
and Soviet intervention in the Indian Ocean area and entangle 
the littoral states more deeply in the rivalry between the US 
and the USSR. The Indians concluded that because the Soviet 
Union was in Afghanistan for defensive reasons, the United 
States probably was more concerned to "protect” the West's 
access to Persian Gulf oil. Therefore the Americans were most 
liable to employ the Rapid Deployment Force in order to 
intervene in conflicts between or within littoral states. An 
American intervention in the Persian Gulf, whether or not the 
Soviets were involved, would severely disrupt the flow of oil, 
on which India depended in part. Nor could India overlook 
that the large US naval presence, which could be used to 
intervene in another Indo-Pakistani war a la the Enterprise in 
1971, thwarted its aspiration to exercise naval predominance 
in the Indian Ocean. Finally, India considered the United 
States' strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area to possess 
a clear and dangerous nuclear dimension. America's hinted 
resort to nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet attack into 
the Persian Gulf and its spread of nuclear weapons into the
66 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1980-81. p. iv.
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area by way of its nuclear-armed aircraft carriers added to 
the littoral states' insecurity.
India objected to America's policies for South-West Asia 
and the Indian Ocean because a large increase in the US 
military presence for unnecessary deterrence against the USSR 
and for potential intervention in the Gulf made even more 
unattainable its objectives of reducing the super-powers' 
involvement in South Asia and minimizing the threat from 
Pakistan. India continued to urge the resumption of the 
Soviet-American negotiations on Indian Ocean naval arms 
control and to express strong support for a "Zone of Peace”, 
however unlikely, whereby the super-powers would remove their 
maritime forces and give up their use of regional facilities. 
The Indians also accelerated the expansion of their navy,67 
the better to monitor US naval operations and to raise the 
cost of potential American maritime intervention against them. 
But the above measures and others such as "quiet diplomacy” 
concerning Afghanistan could not lessen India's sense of 
greater risks imposed on it by US strategic policy in the 
1980s.
67 On India's naval policy, see fn. 4 in the Introduction to 
this thesis.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has proposed that America's strategic policy 
contributed efficaciously to achieving its security objectives 
for the Indian Ocean area from 1970 to 1980, that the display 
and threat of use of its armed forces helped successfully to 
uphold the security and stability of friendly, principally 
Persian Gulf states, to maintain continuous access to their 
oil, to ensure the safety of shipping and to limit Soviet 
influence. More generally, this thesis has examined a super­
power's policy for the essentially political use of the armed 
forces in a distant area and assessed the utility of that 
policy.
This thesis finds that until early 1979 US strategic 
policy was confined to intermittent naval display. In the 
Persian Gulf friendly states, above all Iran, took primary 
responsibility for inter-state security. Except for imperial 
Iran in 1978-79, they were able to maintain adequate internal 
stability. There was no military threat to shipping or to 
access to oil, which was preserved, except in 1973-74, by 
political, economic and legal means. A direct US military 
involvement was neither necessary nor wanted and it was ruled 
out by America's own security policy for the region, which 
emphasized instead an indirect role, by supplying arms, 
advisers and logistic help. The threat to the Gulf states 
from land-based forces in the Soviet Union was quite small and 
from 1970 to 1980, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean neither threatened littoral states or shipping nor 
exerted considerable political influence.
In the early 1970s occasional minor naval display was 
intended to counter politically the small Soviet squadron and 
to avoid giving a harmful impression of US indifference to 
littoral states' security in light of Britain's withdrawal
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from the Indian Ocean area and the Soviet navy's entry. But 
the littoral states' response to America's display then and in 
the later 1970s was ambivalent: the US presence did provide 
some reassurance because they wanted America to balance the 
USSR at sea; on the other hand, they worried, the US presence 
could be part of a super-power naval arms race which might 
jeopardize their independence and security and which they 
wanted to minimize, if they could not avoid. The deployment 
to the Bay of Bengal by the Enterprise aircraft carrier task 
group at the end of the Indo-Pakistani war in December 1971 
was interpreted by Pakistan and also Iran to show that the US 
was unreliable for helping them to achieve their security 
objectives and by India to indicate that the US was liable to 
threaten and potentially to intervene against it.
From late 1973 more regular naval display underlined 
America's greater, exaggerated concern to balance the Soviet 
naval presence and its strong interest in restoring and 
maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil interrupted by the Arab 
oil embargo from October 1973 to March 1974. Naval 
deployments reinforced the United States' indirect threats of 
armed retaliation against friendly Gulf Arab states if the 
embargo were not ended soon and, in 1974-75, of intervention 
should a new embargo be imposed. But America's threats 
failed; instead of making Gulf Arabs more compliant, it 
antagonized them: the US considered its "friends" as potential 
objects of military action. American diplomacy's part in 
arranging the Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements in 1974, 
not minatory naval posturing, influenced the Gulf Arab states 
to lift the oil embargo. Threats to intervene were low in 
political and military credibility because probably the cost 
of intervention would exceed the chance and benefit of its 
success. In late 1973 the American naval presence in the Gulf 
of Aden and southern Red Sea both helped US diplomacy to 
sustain the Egypt-Israel cease-fire negotiations and asserted 
the right of freedom of passage through the Bab al-Mandab, a 
strait used for international navigation. In early January
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1979 the US did not send an aircraft carrier task group to 
display off Iran lest it worsen the deteriorating political 
conditions there and the Shah's chance of survival and perhaps 
provoke more active Soviet interference. Earlier, in 1977-78, 
America's negotiations with the USSR about naval arms control 
for the Indian Ocean area had suggested that in stable 
conditions naval display was relatively unimportant as an 
instrument of policy.
In 1979-1980 America's modified strategic policy 
emphasized intensified display and the threat to use force, by 
more direct and active deterrence against the Soviet Union and 
Iraq and by preparing for intervention, if necessary, within 
friendly Gulf Arab states in the event of "turbulence”. The 
latter states' external security and internal stability were 
more precarious as a result of the Iranian revolution, Iraq's 
emergence as the paramount regional military power, the USSR's 
"encirclement" of the Arabian peninsula and intervention in 
Afghanistan and the Iraq-Iran war. But friendly states did 
not need a much enlarged US strategic contribution to their 
security because the threat to them from within the Persian 
Gulf and secondarily from the Soviets was more political than 
military in nature. They did not want a large, conspicuous 
and continuous American land-based force presence on their 
territory because it would demonstrate their close security 
association with the US, provoke political opposition 
internally and from Iraq, other Arab states, Iran and the 
Soviet Union and worsen, not enhance their security. They 
continued to prefer indirect forms of US strategic 
cooperation.
American intervention in the event of acute unrest within 
friendly Gulf states proved to be unnecessary because threats 
to their domestic stability remained limited and manageable by 
them. In most cases, certainly that of the Iranian 
revolution, the US understood, its intervention would be 
inappropriate or very risky, dubious in practicability and
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liable to reduce the chance of "saving” an endangered regime 
or of "protecting" access to oil. For most of the time a much 
more direct and active US deterrent role at the inter-state 
level was unnecessary too. Politics - improving relations 
with Iraq and parrying pressure from Iran - were friendly 
states' best source of security against potential aggression 
by them and also the best way to deal with the USSR's 
increasing involvement in South-West Asia. Politics could not 
prevent the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq and the cut­
off of their oil exports but the US was not committed to 
protecting either unfriendly state or access to their oil. 
Nor had it been committed to defending Afghanistan against the 
Soviet Union. There was no actual military threat to shipping 
in the Gulf, despite Saudi anxiety, or to access to friendly 
countries' oil until the start of the Iraq-Iran war.
The efficacy of US strategic policy lay in the extent to 
which it reassured friendly states that American armed forces 
could and would contribute reliably to their security, from 
the politically safer background and as they required in a 
crisis. The increased US naval presence did assuage the
Saudis' anxiety about the safety of shipping. America's "over 
the horizon" forces - from aircraft carrier task groups in the 
Arabian Sea to the Rapid Deployment Force in the US - added to 
Saudi Arabia's confidence that it could deal with the most 
likely regional attacks against it. They gave some 
encouragement that the US was now more prepared to resist 
Soviet aggression and to counter the political use of the 
Soviet armed forces. At the start of the Iraq-Iran war 
American air and naval forces helped to deter Iranian threats 
against Saudi oil installations and military facilities and 
against shipping in the Persian Gulf. The US force presence 
was requested by the Saudis, who judged the value of its 
contribution to their security to exceed temporarily, until 
the Iranian threat abated, its danger as a political 
liability.
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However, the United States' strategic reassurance of 
friendly states did not reduce markedly, indeed was weakened 
by their doubts about its reliability and their ambivalence 
towards it. Even in the background the US remained a 
politically dangerous and complicating factor in those states' 
precarious security. In the most important internal crisis, 
the revolution in Iran, the Americans had not saved the Shah 
and in potential domestic crises, the US might intervene only 
in order to secure access to oil, not to help an endangered 
regime. Nor had the US shown sufficient willingness to 
compete with the USSR and check its "encirclement” of the 
Gulf. And in part as a result of the decline of its strategic 
reputation in the 1970s, friendly states doubted whether the 
US would maintain its new resolve to counter the Soviets. 
Against a major attack by the Soviet Union or Iraq probably 
the US would not be a reliable protector because it did not 
possess the ready conventional capability to repulse it. At 
bottom the Persian Gulf might not be a "vital” US interest 
worth resort to nuclear weapons, America's credibility as the 
"ultimate" deterrent would prove to be hollow and from a 
position of weakness it would do a deal with the USSR at the 
expense of the region's security and independence. These 
considerations tended to weaken friendly states' confidence in 
the United States' peacetime role in upholding the military 
balance, regional and against the USSR, in the Persian Gulf.
US strategic policy could not, indeed was inappropriate 
to frustrate the Soviet Union's "encirclement" of Saudi Arabia 
because that was a political process. The USSR did not 
conclude an alliance each with Ethiopia, Afghanistan and South 
Yemen because America failed in early 1978 during the Horn war 
to engage in a naval show of force, which failure somehow 
"emboldened" the Soviets to be more "assertive" than otherwise 
they would have been. Rather, those three Marxist states
chose to enter into alliance with the Soviets for the 
advantages it would bring. More direct and active 
conventional deterrence against potential Soviet aggression
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against Iran was not necessary because the USSR did not intend 
to attack. The Soviet Union was already well aware of Iran's 
importance to the US and of the risk if it did launch an 
offensive. At most America's strategic policy underlined its 
warning to the Soviets to keep out of Iran and reinforced 
their extant caution. US policy suggested greater American 
aggressiveness and heightened the USSR's worry about the 
potential danger to a region contiguous to it. Unfriendly 
states - Iraq and Iran - and India opposed America's strategic 
policy for South-West Asia. The US, they perceived, 
exacerbated their own and regional security by preparing to 
seize Gulf oil, abetting their foe - Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan 
respectively, intensifying its rivalry with the USSR and 
potentially by clashing or colluding with it. But not even 
Iraq or Iran ruled out a tacit American strategic role as a 
counterweight against the Soviets.
This thesis concludes that the efficacy of American 
strategic policy's contribution to achieving US security 
objectives for the Indian Ocean area from 1970 to 1980 was 
minor until 1979 and moderate in 1979-1980. The efficacy of 
the US strategic contribution pertained only to the display of 
or threat to use the armed forces because their active use was 
never required. That efficacy was minor because with the 
egregious exception of imperial Iran, friendly states' own 
efforts and America's other, more important policy instruments 
sufficed to secure US objectives. Intermittent naval 
deployments were needed only for balancing the Soviet Indian 
Ocean squadron and their success was minor because the Soviet 
force and its political significance were minor. That success 
was qualified by littoral states' anxiety about the danger 
from a potential super-power naval arms race. America's naval 
deployment in response to the Indo-Pakistani war in late 1971 
failed, only causing India to perceive the US as a possible 
interventionist threat and confirming Pakistan's and Iran's 
sense of America's strategic unreliability. Naval display's 
modest success after the October 1973 Middle East war in
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reinforcing America's Arab-Israeli diplomacy and asserting 
freedom of navigation was overshadowed by its failure as part 
of the United States' indirect threat of retaliation against 
friendly Gulf Arab states if they did not end the oil embargo 
soon. In early January 1979 the US refrained from naval 
display off Iran which was undergoing revolution because it 
would only harm US interests there.
In 1979-1980 the success of American strategic policy was 
moderate, if greater than before, because increased display by 
mainly US naval forces from a politically safe distance did 
give friendly Gulf states some reassurance that America would 
contribute more reliably to their external security and that 
it was assuring better the safety of shipping and 
counterbalancing the USSR with more resolve. American forces 
gave appropriate requested help to Saudi Arabia in a crisis, 
at the start of the Iraq-Iran war, deterring Iranian attacks 
against it and shipping in the Gulf. But the efficacy of US 
strategic policy in reassuring friendly states remained 
narrow. For most of the time a larger US strategic role was 
not immediately necessary: friendly countries could still
manage their own security, principally by politics. American 
intervention was both unnecessary and recognised by the US to 
be inappropriate in most cases for helping friends to restore 
stability in an internal crisis or for maintaining access to 
their oil. At the same time, friendly Gulf states were aware 
of the US as a potential threat to intervene against them if 
it perceived its interests to be seriously in danger, and that 
recognition induced their ambivalence towards America's 
strategic policy. America's strategic reassurance of friends 
in the Persian Gulf was constricted by the consideration that 
their closer strategic association with the US would 
complicate, if not worsen, their relations with Iran and Iraq, 
who were more important to their immediate security than the 
US and who opposed it. US strategic policy could only 
mitigate, not dispel friends' doubts about the credibility of 
America's commitment and resolve to balance the USSR.
Further, America's weak capability for conventional operations 
in the Persian Gulf in the event of "worst case” aggression by 
the Soviet Union or Iraq led friendly countries to doubt its 
reliability as their ultimate military recourse. US strategic 
policy was neither appropriate by nature nor able, even as 
part of a general ensemble of US policy instruments, much less 
on its own, to check the USSR's improvement of its political 
and military position in South-West Asia in the late 1970s. 
Finally, the efficacy or more direct and active deterrence 
against a potential Soviet attack was marginal at most.
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